tihvavy  of  t:he  trheclo^ical  ^eminarjp 

PRINCETON  •  NEW  JERSEY 


From  the  Library  of 
Professor 
Benjamin  Breckinridge  VJarfield 
Bequeated  by  him 
to  the  LibraiSy 


UTayj-f^^'^- 


EIGHT 
LECTURES    ON    MIRACLES 


r 

EIGHT        V 
LECTURES  ON    MIRACLES 

f  d&i^.  /d.  i C[a_r'f--cC.<^ 

PREACHED   BEFORE    /i  ^    y     *  x  jfi.  C 

r//^    UNIVERSITY    OF    OXFORD 

IN  THE  YEAR  M.DCCC.LXV 


ON  THE  FOUNDATION  OF 

THE  LATE  REV.  JOHN  BAMPTON,  M.A. 

CANON   OF   SALISBURY 


By  J.   B.   MOZLEY,   D.D. 

REGIUS  PROFESSOR  OF  DIVINITY,  AND  CANON  OF  CHRIST  CHURCH,  OXFORD 


THIRD   EDITION 


NEW    YORK: 
SCRIBNER,    WELFORD    &    CO. 

1872 


Dei  Voluntas  rcrum  natura  est. — St.  Augustine. 

Miracles  well  attested  do  not  only  find  credit  themselves,  but  give  it 
also  to  other  truths,  which  need  such  confirmation. — Locke. 

The  miracle,  by  displaying  phenomena  out  of  the  ordinary  connexion  of 
cause  and  effect,  manifests  the  appearance  of  a  higher  power,  and  points 
out  a  higher  connexion ,  in  whicli  even  the  chain  of  phenomena  in  tlie 
visible  world  must  be  taken  up. — Ncander. 


EXTRACT 

FEOM  THE  LAST  WILL  AND  TESTAMENT 

OF  THE  LATE 

Eev.  JOHN  BAMPTON 

CANON  OF  SALISBURY 

"  I  give  and  bequeatli  my  Lands  and  Estates  to  the  Chancellor, 

"  Masters,  and  Scholars  of  the  University  of  Oxford  for  ever,  to  have 
"  and  to  hold  all  and  singular  the  said  Lands  or  Estates  upon  trust, 
"  and  to  the  intents  and  purposes  hereinafter  mentioned ;  that  is  to 
"  say,  I  will  and  appoint  that  the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University 
"  of  Oxford  for  the  time  being  shall  take  and  receive  all  the  rents, 
"issues,  and  profits  thereof,  and  (after  all  taxes,  reparations,  and 
"  necessary  deductions  made)  that  he  pay  all  the  remainder  to  the 
"  endowment  of  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons,  to  be  established  for 
"  ever  in  the  said  University,  and  to  be  performed  in  the  manner 
"  followdng : 

"  I  direct  and  appoint,  that,  upon  the  first  Tuesday  in  Easter. Term, 
"  a  Lecturer  be  yearly  chosen  by  the  Heads  of  Colleges  only,  and  by 
"  no  others,  in  the  room  adjoining  to  the  Printing-House,  between 
"  the  hours  of  ten  in  the  morning  and  two  in  the  afternoon,  to  preach 
"  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons,  the  year  following,  at  St.  Mary's 
"  in  Oxford,  bet^veen  the  commencement  of  the  last  month  in  Lent 
"  Term,  and  the  end  of  the  third  week  in  Act  Term. 

"  Also  I  direct  and  appoint,  that  the  eight  Divinity  Lecture  Ser- 
"  mons  shall  be  preached  upon  either  of  the  following  subjects — to  con- 
"  firm  and  establish  the  Christian  faith,  and  to  confute  all  heretics  and 
"  schismatics — upon  the  divine  authority  of  the  holy  Scriptures — 
"  upon  the  authority  of  the  writings  of  the  primitive  Fathers,  as  to 
"  the  faith  and  practice  of  the  primitive  Church— upon  the  Divinity 


vi         Extract  frovt  Canon  B  amp  tons  Will 

"  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour  Jesus  Christ — upon  the  Divinity  of  the 
"  Holy  Ghost — upon  the  Articles  of  the  Christian  Faith,  as  conipre- 
"  hended  in  the  Apostles'  and  Nicene  Creeds. 

"  Also  I  direct,  that  thirty  copies  of  the  eight  Divinity  Lecture 
"  Sermons  shall  be  always  printed,  within  two  months  after  they  are 
"  preached ;  and  one  copy  shall  be  <,'iven  to  the  C!liancellor  of  the 
"  University,  and  one  cojiy  to  the  Head  of  every  College,  and  one 
"  copy  to  the  ^layor  of  the  city  of  Oxford,  and  one  copy  to  be  put 
"  into  the  Bodleian  Library  ;  and  the  expense  of  printing  them  shall 
"  be  paid  out  of  the  revenue  of  the  Land  or  Estates  given  for  estab- 
"  lishing  the  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons;  and  the  Preacher  shall  not 
"  be  paid,  nor  be  entitled  to  the  revenue,  before  they  are  printed. 

"  Also  I  direct  and  appoint,  that  no  person  shall  be  qualified  to 
"  preach  the  Divinity  Lecture  Sennons,  unless  he  hath  taken  the 
"  degree  of  Master  of  Arts  at  least,  in  one  of  the  two  Universities  of 
"  Oxford  or  Cambridge  ;  and  that  the  same  person  shall  never  preach 
"  the  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons  twice." 


PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION 


THE  difficulty  which  attaches  to  Miracles,  in  the  period 
of  thought  through  which  we  are  now  passing,  is  one 
which  is  concerned  not  with  their  evidence,  but  with  their 
intrinsic  credibility.  There  has  risen  in  a  certain  class  of 
minds  an  apparent  perception  of  the  impossibility  of  sus- 
pensions of  physical  law.  This  is  one  peculiarity  of  the 
present  time:  another  is  a  disposition  to  maintain  the  dis- 
belief of  miracles  upon  a  religious  basis,  and  in  connexion 
with  a  declared  belief  in  the  Christian  revelation. 

The  following  Lectures,  therefore,  are  addressed  mainly 
to  the  fundamental  question  of  the  credibility  of  Miracles; 
their  use,  and  the  evidences  of  them,  being  only  touched 
on  subordinately  and  collaterally.  It  was  thought  that 
such  an  aim,  though  in  itself  a  narrow  and  confined  one, 
was  most  adapted  to  the  particular  need  of  the  day. 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION' 


THE  recent  movement  of  thought  in  the  direction  of  physical 
explanation  of  the  Gospel  miracles  or  the  reference  of  them  to 
unknown  laws  of  nature,  has  exhibited  more  of  philosophical  senti- 
ment than  philosophical  discrimination.  The  movement  has  origin- 
ated ill  a  msh  to  meet  scientific  objections  to  miracles  as  isolated  and 
anomalous  facts  ;  and  the  aim  has  been  to  reconcile  miracles,  or  to 
shew  that  we  have  a  right  to  expect  and  look  forward  to  their 
reconciliation,  with  the  claims  of  science.  With  this  aim  it  was 
necessary  that  when  writers  spoke  of  the  possibility  of  miracles  being 
reconciled  with  the  laws  of  nature,  they  should  distinctly  understand 
that  they  meant  a  reconciliation  with  the  laws  of  nature  in  the 
scientific  sense, — those  laws  which  scientific  men  mean  when  they  use 
this  phrase.  Unless  there  is  a  clear  understanding  on  this  point  the 
whole  labour  of  such  an  enquiry  is  thrown  away.  For  how  could  the 
objections  of  physical  science  be  met  by  even  proving  ever  so  clearly 
the  possilale  consistency  of  miracles  with  natural  law  in  a  different 
sense  from  that  in  which  physical  science  understands  it  ?  But 
though  it  was  so  necessary  that  those  who  aimed  at  some  reconcilia- 
tion of  miracles  with  the  laws  of  nature,  in  order  to  meet  the 
objections  of  science,  should  keep  the  scientific  sense  of  natural  law 
distinctly  in  their  minds,  tliis  has  not  been  done  ;  but  the  expression 
"law  of  nature"  has  been  constantly  used  without  any  accurate  or 
distinct  meaning,  and  the  result  has  been  a  considerable  waste  of 
speculating  power.  There  has  been  the  feeling  that  something  must 
be  done  on  this  head,  a  general  desire  to  satisfy  scientific  tests,  and  a 
disposition  to  give  a  guarantee  that  mii-acles  if  accepted  shall  only  be 
accepted  as  in  some  way  or  other  coming  under  natural  law,  and 
being  instances  of  it.  But  when  this  wish  came  to  reason  ;  when  it 
came  to  deal  with  the  question  how  this  reduction  of  miracles  to 
natural  law  was  to  be  made  out,  there  was  a  large  interval  between 
the  desire  felt,  and  the  argumentative  satisfaction  of  it ;  and  the 
speculative- aim  issued  in  much  confusion  and  obscurity. 

^  This  preface  includes  the  matter  of  some  Notes  of  the  First  Edition, 


Preface  to  Second  Editio7i 


Different  naturalizing  rationales  of  miracles  have  indeed  from  time 
to  time  been  put  forward  by  philosophers  who  have  endeavoured  to 
shew  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  regard  miracles  as  absolutely  in-egular 
events  ;  and  have  for  that  purpose  framed  suppositions  ujDon  which, 
assumed  to  be  tnie,  miracles  would  belong  to  a  system  and  would  be 
instances  of  law.  But  when  we  examine  these  naturalizing  hypotheses, 
and  the  asjiect  in  which  they  exhibit  miracles,  we  do  not  find  that 
miracles  are  under  them  naturalized  physically,  or  reduced,  any  more 
than  they  were  before,  to  natural  law  in  the  scientific  sense. 

1.  We  may  count  as  a  natiu-alizing  rationale  of  miracles  that 
defensive  aspect  taken  of  them  as  no  violations  of  the  laws  of  the 
Universe,  and  as  in  this  sense  no  violations  of  the  laws  of  Nature. 
Spinoza's  position  is  that  "  nothing  which  takes  place  in  nature  can 
be  contrary  to  the  universal  laws  of  nature."  This  defence  accepts 
Spinoza's  position,  and  applies  it  to  the  purpose  of  shewing  that 
miracles  are  in  a  certain  sense  natural.  The  power  which  suspends  a 
law  of  nature  is  just  as  natural  in  the  Universe,  as  the  law  which  is 
suspended.  There  is  therefore  no  such  a  thing  as  a  miracle  in  or 
with  relation  to  the  Universe  ;  one  event  is  as  natural  as  another. 

2.  Butler  has  proposed  a  naturalizing  rationale  of  miracles  which 
consists  in  the  imaginary  supposition  that  there  may  be  miraculous 
dispensations  going  on  in  other  parts  of  the  Universe  besides  our  own, 
and  that  therefore  to  an  intelligent  being  who  was  made  acquainted 
with  these  extraordinary  Divine  acts  in  other  worlds,  the  miraculous 
proceedings  in  this  world  would  present  themselves  as  belonging  to  a 
class  of  events,  or  to  an  order  of  nature.  "  The  only  distinct  meaning 
of  that  word  [natural]  is  stated,  fixed,  or  settled ;  since  what  is  natural 
as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so, 
i.e.  to  effect  it  continually  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or 
miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once.  And  from  hence  it  must 
follow  that  persons'  notion  of  what  is  natural  will  be  enlarged  in  pro- 
portion to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God  and  the  dis- 
pensations of  His  providence.  Nor  is  there  any  absurdity  in  suppos- 
ing that  there  may  be  beings  in  the  Universe  whose  capacities,  and 
knowledge,  and  views  may  be  so  extensive,  as  that  the  whole  Christian 
disjjensation  may  to  them  ajipear  natural,  i.e.  analogous  or  conform- 
able to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of  His  creation ;  as  natural  as 
the  visible  known  course  of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  seems 
scarce  any  other  possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that  only 
in  which  it  is  here  used ;  similar,  stated,  or  uniform."^ 


^  Analogy,  pt.  i.  ch.  IL 


Preface  to  Second  Edition  xi 

3.  Mr.  Babbage  has  suggested  that  a  miracle  may,  for  anything  we 
know,  be  the  result  of  the  same  original  law  of  creation  of  which 
nature  itself  is ;  the  same  mechanism  which  produces  the  order  of 
nature,  producing  also  the  exception  to  it.  And  he  has  illustrated 
this  conception  by  the  analogy  of  a  calculating  engine,  which  produces 
by  the  same  adjustment  a  regular  succession  of  numbers,  and  then  an 
exceptional  insulated  number,  after  which  it  takes  up  again  the  old 
succession.^ 

Here,  then,  are  three  naturalizing  rationales  of  miracles,  i.e.  which 
divest  miracles  in  a  certain  sense  of  their  anomalous  and  irregular 
character,  and  engraft  them  upon  system  and  order ; — rationales  which 
are  servicealjle  and  valuable  as  meeting  the  natural  and  reasonable 
desire,  inherent  in  the  human  mind,  for  order  and  law  in  some  sense, 
as  necessarily  attaching  to  all  the  works  of  God,  and  necessarily 
belonging  to  everything  in  the  Universe.  The  human  mind  rejects 
total  irregularity  and  eccentricity  as  an  impossibility  in  the  Universe 
as  a  whole ;  and  therefore  in  the  case  of  any  visibly  anomalous  event, 
such  as  a  miracle,  the  human  mind  is  committed  to  the  discovery  of 
some  point  of  view  in  which  the  event  in  question  ia  not  an  anomaly 
but  a  natural  event ;  and  it  is  committed  to  shew  that  the  pomt  of 
view  in  which  such  an  event  is  natural  is  paramount  to  and  takes 
precedence  of  that  point  of  view  in  which  it  is  anomalous.  The  first 
position,  then,  that  I  have  noticed  is  not  a  mere  conjectural  hypothesis, 
but  it  effects  this  object  with  resjiect  to  miracles  by  an  argument 
which,  upon  the  supj^osition  of  the  existence  of  a  personal  Deity,  is 
irresistible  and  incapable  of  refutation.  For  if  there  is  a  Being  in  the 
Universe  which  can  suspend  a  law  of  nature,  the  power  which  sus- 
pends the  law  is  evidently  just  as  natural,  and  is  just  as  much 
belonging  to  the  Universe  as  the  power  which  sustains  it.  Again, 
Butler's  imaginary  supposition,  though  it  is  no  more  than  imaginary, 
is  still  important  as  shewing  the  possibilities  of  the  case ;  that  there 
may  be,  for  anything  we  know,  certain  miraculous  dispensations 
going  on  in  other  worlds  which  would  make  the  miraculous  dispensa- 
tion in  this  world  one  of  a  class  or  order  of  events,  and  in  that  light 
natural.  Again,  Mr.  Babbage's  hypothesis,  by  referring  a  miracle 
back  to  the  original  law  of  creation  which  produced  the  order  of 
nature,  naturalizes  it  in  some  sense.  But  though  these  rationales  of 
mii-acles  have  for  their  object  the  naturalizing  of  miracles  in  sovie 
sense,  it  is  evident  when  we  examine  them,  that  none  of  them  are  or 
profess  to  be  physical  explanations  of  miracles,  i.e.  reductions  of  them 

1  Ninth  Bridgwater  Treatise,  eh.  viii. 


xii  Preface  to  Second  Edition 

to  laws  of  nature  in  the  scientific  sense  of  that  tenn.  In  no  case  is 
the  order  upon  which  they  engraft  miracles,  the  order  of  the  actual 
physical  world  of  which  we  have  experience. 

1.  The  first  position  asserts  the  supremacy  of  the  higher  law  of  the 
Divine  Power  over  the  subordinate  laws  of  visible  nature.  The 
order  in  which  a  miracle  is  inserted  then  by  this  position  is  obviously 
and  by  the  very  terms  of  the  statement  a  spiritual  and  invisible  order, 
not  a  physical  or  visible  one. 

The  same  rationale  of  the  naturalness  of  a  miracle  is  sometimes 
expressed  by  another  formula,  for  which  we  are  indebted  to  Brown, 
that  a  miracle  is  not  contrary  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  but  is 
only  an  effect  jiroduced  by  the  introduction  of  a  new  cause.  And 
this  formula  of  Brown's  has  been  put  in  an  amended  fonn  by  some 
writers,  w^ho  urge  that  in  a  miracle  there  is  no  violation  or  suspension 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  which  go  on  but  are  neutralized  or  counteracted 
by  a  higher  law.  But  it  is  evident  that  the  naturalness  which  is  gained 
for  a  miracle  by  either  of  these  explanations,  is  not  a  naturalness,  or 
a  confomiity  to  the  laws  of  nature,  in  the  scientific  sense  ;  because 
the  point  upon  which  the  naturalness  of  a  fact  turns  in  science,  is 
not  whether  that  fact  has  a  cause  simply,  but  whether  it  has  a  uniform 
or  constant  cause,  i.e.  whether  it  has  the  same  antecedent  by  which  it 
has  been  invariably  attended  in  other  cases.  It  is  nothing  to  the 
scientific  man  to  be  told  that  the  rolling  away  of  the  stone  from  the 
door  of  the  sepulchre  was  in  itself  a  natural  fact  which  could  have 
been  effected  by  human  macliinery,  and  that  the  cause  alone  was 
supernatural ;  because  the  character  of  the  cause  or  antecedent  is  the 
very  point  of  the  question  in  his  eye.  Had  the  stone  been  rolled 
away  by  machinery,  no  fact  could  have  been  more  natural  ;  but  if  it 
was  rolled  away  without  the  application  of  any  human  force,  the  fact 
was  then  unaccompanied  by  its  ordinary  and  constant  antecedent,  and 
was  therefore  not  a  natural  fact  in  the  scientific  sense.  Nor  does  the 
amended  form  of  the  formula  of  BrowTi  make  the  slightest  difierence 
on  this  head.  It  does  not  signify  in  the  eye  of  the  man  of  science 
how  we  describe  the  substitution  of  another  and  a  difierent  antecedent 
of  an  event,  for  its  ordinary  and  regular  one  ;  whether  we  say  that 
the  law  of  nature  was  in  that  case  suspended,  or  continued  but  Avas 
neutralized  by  a  higher  law  ;  he  looks  only  to  the  fact  itself  of  a 
strange  antecedent.  Was  sight  recovered  by  means  of  medical  treat- 
ment, or  by  the  restoring  force  of  time  ?  that  was  a  natural  fact,  be- 
cause these  are  ordinary  antecedents  of  recovery.  Was  it  recovered 
by  the  word  of  a  person  ?  it  was  then  not  a  natural  fact,  because  it 
occurred  not  with  its  ordinary,  but  wnth  a  new  and  strange  antecedent. 


Preface  to  Second  Edition  xiii 

It  is  quite  true  that  we  see  laws  of  nature  any  day  and  any  hour 
neutralized  and  counteracted  in  particular  cases,  and  yet  do  not  look 
upon  such  counteractions  as  other  than  the  most  natural  events  :  but 
it  must  be  remembered  that,  where  this  is  the  case,  the  counteracting 
agency  is  as  ordinary  and  constant  an  antecedent  in  nature  as  the 
agency  which  it  counteracts.     The  agency  of  the  muscles  and  the 
agency  of  the  magnet  are  as  ordinary  as  the  agency  of  gravitation 
which  they  both  neutralize.      Medicine  is  as  ordinary  an  agent  as 
the  disease  which  it  resists.     The  action  of  salt  is  as  constant  a  cause 
in  nature  as  the  putrefaction  which  it  retards.     All  these  facts  then 
are  natural.     But  where  the  counteracting  power  to  a  law  of  nature  is 
an  unknown  power,  a  power  not  in  nature,  then  the  counteraction  or 
neutralization  of  a  law  of  nature  is  not  a  natural  fact,  being  deprived 
of  its  ordinary  and  constant  antecedent,  and  coupled  Math  another  and 
a  new  antecedent.     The  elevation  of  a  body  in  the  air  by  the  force  of 
an  arm,  is  a  counteraction  indeed  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  but  it  is  a 
counteraction  of  it  by  another  law  as  natural  as  that  of  gravity.     The 
fact  therefore  is  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  nature.     But  if  the 
same  body  is  raised  in  the  air  without  any  application  of  a  known 
force,  it  is  not  a  fact  in  conformity  with  natural  law.     In  all  these 
cases  the  question  is  not  whether  a  law  of  nature  has  been  counter- 
acted, for  that  does  not  constitute  a  fact  contradictory  to  the  laws  of 
nature ;  but  whether  it  has  been  counteracted  by  another  natural  law. 
If  it  has  been,  the  conditions  of  science  are  fulfilled.     But  if  a  law  of 
nature  has  been  counteracted  by  a  law  out  of  nature,  it  is  of  no  pur- 
l^ose,  with  a  view  to  naturalize  scientifically  that  counteraction  of  a 
law  of  nature,  to  say  that  the  law  of  nature  has  been  going  on  all  the 
time,  and  only  been  neutralized  not  susjDended  or  violated.     These 
are  mere  refinements  of  language,  which  do  not  affect  the  fact  itself, 
that  a  new  conjunction  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  wholly  unlike 
the  conjunctions  in  nature,  has  taken  place.     The  laws  of  nature  have 
in  that  instance  not  worked,  and  an  effect  contrary  to  what  would 
have  issued  from  those  laws  has  been  produced.     This  is  ordinarily 
called  a  violation  or  suspension  of  the  laws  of  nature  ;  and  it  seems 
an  unnecessary  refinement  not  to  call  it  such.     But  whatever  name 
we  give  to  it,  the  fact  is  the  same  ;  and  the  fact  is  not  according  to  the 
laws  of  natiu'e  in  the  scientific  sense . 

2.  The  imaginary  hypothesis  of  Bishop  Butler  is  only  an  ima- 
ginary one,  and  therefore  it  is  not  one  of  which  physical  science  can 
take  any  cognizance.  The  claim  of  physical  science  is  that  miracles 
should  be  reconciled  with  the  actual  order  of  nature,  of  which  we  have 


xiv  Preface  to  Second  Edition 


experience,  not  with  an  imaginary  one  of  which  we  can  only  frame 
the  conception. 

3.  Mr.  Babbage's  rationale  of  miracles,  which  includes  the  cau&c 
of  the  miracle  in  the  original  law  of  creation,  leaves,  as  I  shew  in 
Lecture  VI.,  the  miraculous /«cf  as  really  miraculous  as  ever.  This 
hypothesis  does  not  profess  to  reduce  the  miracle  itself,  to  alter  the 
type  of  the  fact,  to  divest  it  of  its  apparent  eccentricity  and  re- 
solve it  to  similarity  with  any  known  classes  of  facts.  It  leaves  it  a 
real  exception  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  recognises  the  isolation  and 
the  anomaly  as  quite  real.  But  such  being  the  case,  this  hypothesis 
does  not  affect  the  position  of  a  miracle  in  the  eye  of  physical  science, 
or  accommodate  it  in  any  way  to  j^hysical  law  in  the  scientific  sense. 
Tliis  and  the  physical  explanation  of  a  miracle  proceed  indeed  on 
Avholly  contrarj-  grounds.  Mr.  Babbage  explains  the  miracle  as  an 
exception  to  the  order  of  nature  ;  the  other  or  physical  explanation 
explains  it  as  not  an  exception  ;  i.e.  not  so  in  reality,  but  only  in  ap- 
pearance. A  meteor  when  stripped  of  its  simply  ocular  irregularity 
as  a  phenomenon,  and  explained  by  science,  is  only  an  instance  of 
the  order  of  nature  :  a  miracle  is  the  same  after  it  has  gone  through  a 
physical  explanation  ;  but  a  miracle  remains  an  exception  to  that 
order,  and  is  explained  as  such  in  Mr.  Babbage's  hypothesis. 

Let  us  take,  e.jy.  the  miracles  of  Christ's  Eesurrection  and  Ascen- 
sion, as  they  stand  recorded  in  the  Gospels,  and  suppose  thein  under 
the  consideration  of  a  physical  philosopher  who  imposes  the  test  of 
consistency  with  the  laws  of  nature.  Would  the  objection  of  such  a 
person  to  these  stuijendous  and  eccentric  facts  be  met  l)y  a  theory 
wliich  simply  pushed  back  and  removed  further  off  their  causation, 
inserting  it  in  the  original  structure  of  the  machme  of  nature  ? 
Would  the  proposed  distance  of  the  root  and  original  of  these  mar- 
vellous events  make  any  difference  to  him  in  his  estimate  of  the  facts 
themselves,  and  of  their  astounding  and  exceptional  type  ?  It  could 
not.  His  test  is  a  totally  different  one,  which  is  not  affected  by  any 
such  theory.  His  criterion  is — can  these  marvellous  events  be  re- 
ferred ultimately  to  any  known  order  of  facts  ?  Can  they  be  brought 
under  the  head  of  any  actual  classes  of  phenomena  which  Ave  call  the 
laws  of  nature  %  If  they  cannot  be,  the  test  of  physical  science  is  not 
met;  the /acis  remain  anomalous,  and  that  is  the  very  thing  to  which 
the  physical  philosopher  objects. 

There  are  only  two  modes  of  reconciling  miracles  with  natural 
law,  in  the  scientific  sense. 

1.  One  is  the  discovery,  could  it  be  imaguied  possible,  of  inter- 


Preface  to  Second  Edition  xv 

mitting  laws  of  uature  under  whicli  they  came  ;  that  is  to  say,  could 
we  imagine  that  it  was  found  out  by  observation  that  miracles,  though 
exceptions,  were  recurring  exceptions,  and  exceptions  which  recurred 
with  the  same  invariable  antecedents.  Could  we  suppose,  amid  the 
apparent  iiTegularity  and  disorder  which  marked  the  occurrence  of 
miracles  in  the  world,  that  traces  of  such  a  law  as  this  could  be  made 
out ;  and  that  these  excejstions  to  the  order  of  nature,  were,  as  excep- 
tions, uniform  and  regular ;  in  that  case  miracles  would  have  been  as 
truly  brought  under  the  laws  of  nature  as  the  regular  course  of  nature 
is.  But  the  remark  is  obvious  that  no  such  intermitting  law  of 
miracles  is  seen  in  nature  ;  and  it  may  be  remarked  further,  that 
could  we  imagine  such  a  law  in  existence,  we  could  only  imagine  it 
by  imagining  also  at  the  same  time  an  alteration  of  the  present  order 
of  nature.  Such  a  conception  would  involve  this  result.  For  the  re- 
currence, with  whatever  intervals,  of  miracles  as,  e.g.  resurrections 
from  the  dead  with  regularity  and  uniformity,  or  with  the  same  in- 
variable antecedents,  would  constitute  a  new  order  of  nature.^ 

2.  The  other  mode  of  reconciling  miracles  with  the  laws  of  nature 
in  the  scientific  sense,  is  the  construction  of  some  hyjDothesis  which,  if 
true,  would  bring  them  out  of  their  apparent  isolation,  strip  them  of 
their  apparent  eccentricity,  and  reduce  them  to  the  head  of  known 
classes  of  facts.  This  has  been  done,  and  is  constantly  being  done, 
with  respect  to  eccentric  natural  phenomena.  Explanations  are  con- 
structed which  solve  the  apparent  anomaly  and  irregularity,  and  shew 
how  the  extraordinary  effect  maj'  have  been  in  reality  owing  to  well- 
known  laws  acting  under  unwonted  circumstances.  And  if  the  ex- 
planations are  admissible,  these  eccentric  phenomena  stand  hypothe- 
tically  under  the  head  of  natural  law.  Can  the  same  thing  be  done 
then  with  respect  to  miracles  ?  The  answer  is,  that  this  must  depend 
on  what  the  miracles  are.  We  have  the  miracles  of  Scripture  before 
us.  We  are  also  in  possession  of  science  with  its  large  powers  and  re- 
sources for  the  construction  of  hypotheses  and  explanations.  Can  any 
scientific  hypothesis  be  constructed  which  would  bring  the  miracles 
of  Scripture,  the  greater  and  more  stupendous  as  well  as  the  lesser 
ones,  under  natural  law.     It  must  be  admitted,  that  consideriug  what 

^  The  analogy  of  the  arithmetical  machine  fails  with  reference  to  a  phy- 
sical law  of  miracles,  there  being  no  intermitting  law  of  miracles  in  nature 
answering  to  the  intermitting  law  of  numbers  in  the  machine.  The 
machine  upon  the  same  adjustment,  always  produces  the  same  exceptional 
number  ;  which  therefore  belongs  to  the  law  of  the  machine.  But  there  is 
no  regularity  in  the  recurrence  of  miracles  corresponding  to  this  regularity 
in  the  recurrence  of  the  exceptional  number. 


xvi  Preface  to  Second  Edition 

some  of  the  Scripture  miracles  are,  sucli  an  expectation  is  chimerical ; 
that  the  nature  of  the  anomalies  is  such  that  no  scientific  hjqjothesis 
is  conceivable  which  can  subjugate  them,  strip  them  of  physical  sin- 
gularity, and  reduce  them  to  natural  facts.  Does  the  assemblage  of 
miracles  which  gathers  round  our  Lord,  commencing  -with  His  birth, 
carried  on  in  His  ministry,  and  terminating  in  His  Resui-rection  and 
Ascension,  admit  of  any  conceivable  physical  solution  ? 

It  must  be  seen  that  the  imjjediment  to  the  reconciliation  of 
miracles  with  the  laws  of  nature  in  the  scientific  sense,  arises  from  the 
special  character  of  that  sense,  from  the  peculiarity  of  the  scientific 
definition  of  the  laws  of  nature.  The  scientific  sense  of  "laws  of 
natiu'e"  is  a  particular  restricted  sense,  it  does  not  go  outside  of  or 
take  in  anything  but  absolute  physical  facts,  regai'ded  as  uniformly 
recim'ent,  or  reciUTing  with  the  same  antecedents.  Can  the  miracles 
of  Scripture  be  reduced  to  this  head  '\  Recent  reconciling  speculation 
has  by  an  ambiguous  use  of  the  term  "  laws  of  nature"  concealed  the 
point  of  the  question,  and  prevented  persons  from  seeing  what  the 
real  problem  which  they  had  proposed  to  themselves  was. 

It  must  be  observed,  too,  that  it  is  not  only  the  jdiysical  occurrence 
itself  which  in  the  case  of  these  miracles  has  to  be  reduced  to  the 
order  of  nature,  but  the  physical  occurrence  as  corresponding  to  and 
fitting  in  with  a  command,  an  announcement,  a  whole  set  of  preten- 
sions on  the  part  of  the  person  who  is  the  agent  or  the  centre  of  them. 
Should  the  question  e.r/.  ever  be  raised,  whether  the  miracle  of  our 
Lord's  Resurrection  was  a  fact  ultimately  referrible  to  natm-al  law ; 
the  fact  about  which  the  question  would  lie,  i.e..  about  which  we  should 
have  to  enquire  whether  it  might  be  idtimately  natural  or  not,  would 
be,  not  the  simple  resurrection  of  a  man  from  the  dead,  but  that  re- 
surrection as  coinciding  with  the  whole  nature,  mission  and  office  of 
Christ,  His  whole  character,  life  and  ministry,  as  well  as  Avith  the 
previous  announcements  of  the  event.  It  is  impossible  not  to  see, 
even  when  the  occurrence  itself  is  of  the  most  marvellous  kind,  how 
immensely  this  correspondence  to  a  notification  and  adaptation  to  a 
whole  set  of  circumstances  add  to  the  supematuralness  of  the  miracle, 
and  to  its  inexplicableness  ujjon  natural  grounds.  Because  all  this 
points,  upon  the  argument  of  design  or  coincidence,  to  a  special 
interposition  of  God,  as  distinguished  from  unknown  physical  causa- 
tion. Those  circumstances  of  a  miracle  which  distinguish  it  from  an 
isolated  marvel  are  also  great  evidences  of  its  supernatural  character. 
No  physical  explanation  of  it  as  an  isolated  marvel  is  an  explanation 
of  those  circumstances  which  distinguish  it  from  a  marvel. 

Indeed,  if  we  consider  what  a  miracle  in  the  religious  sense  is,  that 


Preface  to  Second  Edition  xvii 

it  is  in  its  very  nature  and  design  something  special,  sometliing  in 
apparent  contradiction  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  that  it  would  not 
answer  all  its  purposes  unless  it  was ;  what  reason  can  there  be  why- 
such  designed  ajoparent  exception  to  pliysical  order  should  be  in 
reality  all  the  time  an  instance  of  2>hysical  order?  If  there  is  indeed 
no  power  in  the  universe  equal  to  suspending  the  laws  of  nature,  such 
a  conclusion  is  wanted ;  but  if  there  is — and  a  miracle  in  the  religious 
sense  assumes  such  a  power — why  should  there  be  this  reversal  of  the 
appearance  by  the  reality?  Why  should  the  physical  exception 
follow  physical  regularity?  The  special  act  be  a  uniformly  recurrent 
act  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of  such  an  appended  condition  ?  And  why 
should  a  niiraculons  interposition  of  the  Deity  not  only  agree  with 
natural  law  in  the  universal  sense,  which  in  the  reason  of  the  case  it 
must  do,  but  also  satisfy  a  particular  restricted  and  technical  sense  of 
natural  law  assigned  to  the  term  in  physical  science? 

The  authority  of  Bp.  Butler  has  been  quoted  for  the  hypothesis  of 
the  referribleness  of  miracles  to  unknown  laws  of  nature ;  but  this  is 
a  misinterpretation  of  his  meaning,  as  a  reference  to  his  whole  argu- 
ment will  shew : — 

"  If  the  natural  and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  are  both 
from  God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other  and  together  make  up  one 
scheme  of  Providence;  our  being  incompetent  judges  of  one,  must 
render  it  credible  that  we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also  of  the 
other;  since  upon  experience  the  acknowledged  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  different  from  what,  before 
experience,  we  should  have  expected ;  and  such  as  men  fancy  there 
lie  great  objections  against:  this  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible 
that  they  may  find  the  revealed  dispensation  likewise,  if  they  judge 
of  it  as  they  do  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  very  different  from 
expectations  formed  beforehand,  and  liable  in  apjDearance  to  great 
objections;  objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the 
degrees  and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by  which  it  was 
attested  and  carried  on.     .     .     . 

"  If  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed  given  to  the  world  to  propa- 
gate Christianity  and  attest  the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have 
expected,  that  other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be 
invested  with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same  time,  have  been 
endued  with  prudence ;  or  that  they  should  have  been  continually 
restrained  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  it :  i.e.  that  God  should  have 
miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner  or  higher 

h 


xviii  Preface  to  Seco7id  Edition 

defj;ree.  But,  from  the  observations  made  above,  it  is  undeniably 
evident,  that  we  are  not  judges  in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were 
to  have  been  expected  He  shouhl  miraculously  interpose ;  upon  sup- 
position of  His  doing  it  in  some  degi-ee  and  manner."  {Analogii,  Part 
II.  ch.  iii.) 

"  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispensation  may  have  been, 
all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature, 
may  require  to  be  more  distinctly  made  out.  Consider  then,  upon 
what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common  course  of  nature  is 
carried  on  according  to  general  fore-ordained  laws.  We  know  indeed 
several  of  the  general  laws  of  matter  :  and  a  gi-eat  part  of  the  natural 
behaviour  of  living  agents  is  reducible  to  general  laws.  But  we  know 
in  a  manner  nothing,  by  what  laws,  storms  and  tempests,  earthquakes, 
famine,  pestilence,  become  the  instruments  of  destruction  to  mankhid. 
And  the  laws,  by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time 
and  place,  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers  ;  the  laws,  by 
which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  multitude  of  cases  :  and  by 
which  innimierable  things  happen,  of  the  gi-eatest  influence  upon  the 
aflairs  and  state  of  the  world  ;  these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to 
us,  that  we  call  the  events,  which  come  to  pass  by  them,  accidental  : 
though  all  reasonable  men  know  certainly,  that  there  cannot  in  reality 
be  any  such  thing  as  chance  ;  and  conclude,  that  the  things  which 
have  this  appearance  are  the  result  of  general  laws,  and  may  be  re- 
duced into  them.  It  is  then  but  an  exceeding  little  way,  and  in  but 
a  very  few  respects,  that  we  can  trace  up  the  natural  course  of  things 
before  us  to  general  laws.  And  it  is  only  from  analogy  that  we  con- 
clude the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  into  them ;  only 
from  our  seeing  that  part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding  that  the  course 
of  nature,  in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes  on  by  general  laws,  that 
we  conclude  this  of  the  rest.  And  if  that  be  a  just  ground  for  such 
a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just  ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  appre- 
hend, to  render  it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for  an- 
swering objections,  that  God's  miraculous  interj^ositions  may  have 
1)een,  all  along  in  like  manner,  by  general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus, 
tliat  miraculous  powers  should  be  exerted,  at  such  times,  upon  such 
occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to  such  per- 
sons, rather  than  others  ;  that  the  affairs  of  the  world,  being  permitted 
to  go  on  in  theii-  natural  course  so  far,  should,  just  at  such  a  point, 
have  a  new  direction  given  them  by  miraculous  interpositions  ;  that 
these  interpositions  should  be  exactly  in  such  degrees  and  respects 
only  ;  all  this  may  have  been  by  general  laws.  These  laws  are  un- 
known indeed  to  us ;  but  no  more  unknown  than  the  laws  from 


Preface  to  Second  Edition  xix 

whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  and  others  live 
to  extreme  old  age  ;  that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  another  in  under- 
standing ;  with  innumerable  more  things,  which,  as  Avas  before  ob- 
served, we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws  or  rules  at  all,  though  it  is 
taken  for  granted  they  are  as  much  reducible  to  general  ones  as 
gravitation.  Now,  if  the  revealed  dispensations  of  providence  and 
miraculous  interpositions  be  by  general  laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordi- 
nary government  in  the  course  of  nature,  made  known  by  reason  and 
experience,  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every  exigence  as  it 
arises  should  be  provided  for  by  these  general  laws  of  miraculous 
interpositions,  than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should  by  the 
general  laws  of  nature  ;  yet  there  might  be  wise  and  good  reasons 
that  miraculous  interpositions  should  be  by  general  laws,  and  that 
these  laws  should  not  be  broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other 
miracles."     (Ihid.  chap,  iv.) 

Butler,  then,  is  meeting  objections  to  the  scheme  and  evidence  of 
Christianity  ;  and,  among  the  rest,  "  objections  against  the  degrees 
and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by  which  it  was  attested 
or  carried  on."  And  one  answer  by  which  he  meets  these  objections 
is,  that  "  Christianity  is  a  scheme  or  constitution  imperfectly  com- 
prehended;" and  that  therefore,  in  oiir  ignorance  of  the  mode  in 
which  God's  miraculous  interpositions  have  been  conducted,  there  is 
nothing  against  the  supposition  that  they  have  been  all  along  con- 
ducted by  "  general  laws."  Upon  which  supposition,  he  observes, 
the  apparent  defects  in  the  exercise  of  these  miraculous  powers  and 
the  objects  answered  by  them  may  be  satisfactorily  accounted  for ; 
because  "  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every  exigence  as  it 
arises  should  be  provided  for  by  these  general  laws  of  miraculous 
interpositions,  than  that  every  exigence  in  nature  should  by  the 
general  laws  of  nature." 

We  now  come  to  that  point  of  the  argument  at  which  Butler  is 
misapprehended ;  i.e.  where  he  is  supposed  to  refer  miracles  to 
i;uknown  laws  of  nature,  whereas  his  mention  of  the  laws  of  nature 
is  for  a  very  different  purpose.  Having  made  the  supposition  of 
miraculous  interpositions  being  "  by  general  laws  of  wisdom," 
although  these  laws  are  unknown  to  ns,  he  confirms  that  supposition 
by  a  reference  to  the  unknown  laws  of  nature  by  which  we  are 
surrounded  on  all  sides.  Our  ignorance,  he  says,  of  the  general 
laws  of  miraculous  interpositions,  is  no  reason  that  there  may  not  be 
such  laws ;  for  we  are  ignorant  of  many  of  the  laws  of  natural 
phenomena,  "  storms,  tempests,  earthquakes,  famine,  pestilence  ; " 
and  yet  we  are  certain  that  those  events  do  take  place  in  obedience 


XX  Preface  to  Second  Edition 

to  certain  laws.  The  unknown  laws  of  nature  are  introduced,  not  as 
hang  the  laws  by  which  miracles  take  place,  but  as  furnishing  a 
parallel  to  those  laws,  upon  the  point  of  being  unknou-n,  which  is  a 
characteristic  common  to  both.  He  does  not  say  that  the  laws  by 
which  miracles  take  place  are  physical  laws  as  those  are  by  which 
eartli([uakes  and  pestilences  take  place  ;  but  that  our  ignorance  of 
the  physical  laws  by  which  earthquakes  and  pestilences  occur  is  a 
precedent  for  our  being  ignorant  of  the  general  laws  of  wisdom  by 
which  miracles  occur ;  which  laws  may  exist  notwithstanding,  and 
have  governed  those  interpositions  all  along.  The  common  ground 
is  not  the  identity  of  the  laws  under  which  extraordinary  natural 
phenomena  and  miraculous  interpositions  come,  but  the  similaiity  of 
the  ignorance  of  the  laws  in  both  cases. 

Such  is  the  meaning  of  Butler.  The  "  general  laws  of  miraculous 
interpositions  "  and  the  general  laws  of  nature  are  two  diflerent  sets 
of  laws  in  the  argument ;  but  the  one  supplies  a  ground  for  a  supposi- 
tion respecting  the  other  ;  the  existence  of  unknown  laws  of  nature 
shews  the  possibility  of  there  being  unknown  laws  of  miraculous 
interpositions.  Why,  the  objector  asks,  if  God  has  interposed  mira- 
culoiisly,  have  not  these  interpositions  been  more  general,  and  more 
effectual  ?  Why  have  not  miraculous  corrections  been  applied  more 
largely  to  the  faults  and  omissions  which  are  inherent  in  the  opera- 
tion of  the  laws  of  nature,  as  being  general  laws,  directed  to  the 
"eneral  as  distinguished  from  private  and  individual  advantage  ? 
The  answer  of  Butler  is,  that  these  miraculous  intei-jiositions  them- 
selves may,  for  anything  we  know,  have  been  all  along  conducted 
by  general  laws  ;  and  thus  that  the  benefit  from  them  may  have 
been  limited  by  the  same  cause  which  has  limited  the  benefit  of  the 
laws  of  nature. 

The  phrase,  then,  "  general  laws  of  wisdom,"  is  not  a  phrase  whicli, 
in  Butler's  meaning,  stands  for  the  laws  of  nature  or  points  to  any 
physical  solution  of  miracles.  The  phrase  expresses  and  stands  for 
certain  general  rules  laid  do\TO  by  Providence,  so  to  speak,  for  its 
own  guidance ;  according  to  which  rules  "  miraculous  powers  are 
exerted  at  such  times,  upon  such  occasions,  in  such  degrees  and 
manners,"  &c.;  which  general  rules  Providence  observes,  although  on 
particular  occasions  partial  advantages  might  follow  from  the  infrac- 
tion of  them  ;  the  partial  disadvantages  of  such  rules,  and  their 
failure  to  provide  for  "  every  exigence,"  being  the  very  condition  of 
their  general  benefit.  And  thus  understood,  the  supposition  that 
"  God's  miraculous  interpositions  may  have  been  all  along  by  general 
laws  of  wisdom,"  would  substantially  mean  that  there  was  an  in- 


Pi^eface  to  Second  Editio7i  xxi 

herent  limit  in  the  nature  of  things  to  the  utility  of  miracles,  bej'ond 
which  they  would  produce  injury  and  disadvantage  ;  the  general 
bad  result  of  the  excess  being  greater  than  the  particular  benefit  of 
it ;  which  intrinsic  limit  was  necessarily  observed  by  the  Autlior  of 
Nature,  who  conducted  these  interpositions  in  agreement  with,  these 
intrinsic  reasons,  and  by  rules  which  coincided  with  them. 

The  hypothesis  of  unknown  physical  law,  then,  cannot  meet  the 
miracles  of  Scripture  as  they  stand :  and  in  order  to  ajiply  such  an 
explanation  \Wth  any  success,  it  is  necessary  that  a  previous  step 
should  have  been  taken  with  resjaect  to  the  miraculous  facts  them- 
selves. This  whole  hypothesis  in  truth  supposes,  for  its  own  feasibility, 
the  previous  application  of  a  rationalistic  criticism  to  the  Gosjjel 
history  ;  it  supposes  a  prior  reduction  of  the  type  of  the  miraculous 
facts  recorded  in  it,  so  as  to  accommodate  them  to  the  proposed 
explanation,  and  make  them  proper  subjects  of  a  scientific  solution. 
In  order  to  be  open  to  such  treatment  in  the  first  instance,  the 
material  must  have  been  prepared  by  criticism;  in  which  case  it 
entii'ely  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  such  criticism  goes,  what  the 
material  is  which  is  finally  dealt  with,  and  what  facilities  it  affords 
for  such  treatment.  This  hypothesis  means,  in  short,  a  scientific 
explanation  of  some  extraordinary  events  which  may  be  supposed  to 
have  been  the  original  of  the  Gospel  history.  Such  an  original  is,  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  entertain  it,  of  vague  and  indefinite  composition ; 
but  so  long  as  the  imagination  secures  a  type  of  fact  which,  however 
vague,  is  subject-matter  of  scientific  explanation,  there  is  a  ground 
made  for  a  scientific  explanation  to  enter  upon  and  occupy.  The 
preparation,  however,  of  the  material  is  necessary  in  the  first  instance ; 
the  critical  idea  is  virtually  the  dominant  one  in  this  whole  hypo- 
thesis of  unkno-\vn  law  ;  the  mind  has,  consciously  or  imconsciously, 
adopted  it,  allowed  it  to  play  its  part,  and  given  it  authority  to  deal 
with  the  facts,  before  that  hypothesis  is  applied.  The  real  instrument 
of  reduction  to  law  which  is  emjiloyed  in  this  hypothesis  is  therefore 
criticism.  One  view  of  historical  evidence  opens  the  road  most 
effectually  to  a  scientific  explanation  of  Gospel  facts ;  another  view 
closes  it.  For  if  those  miracles  really  took  place  as  they  are  recorded, 
no  hypothesis  can  bridge  over  the  chasm  between  them  and  j^hysical 
law  in  the  scientific  sense.  In  the  theological  sense  of  natural  law, 
which  includes  the  invisible  laws  of  Divine  power,  all  the  miracles  of 
Scripture  are  instances  of  natural  law ;  but  the  idea  of  reconciling 
them  with  the  natural  law  of  science  is  cliimerical,  unless  with  the 
previous  aid  of  rationalistic  criticism. 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION 


IT  must  be  observed  that  the  controversy  respecting  miracles  tends 
to  a  stationary  point,  at  which  each  side  sees  what  its  real  pre- 
mises are,  and  sees  that  it  is  separated  from  the  other  by  a  difference  of 
first  principles.  This  has  perhaps  been  the  case  in  the  recent  discus- 
sion of  this  question. 

In  the  first  \Aace,  those  arguments  which  profess  to  settle  the 
question  of  miracles  by  a  kind  of  mathematical  method,  deciding 
against  their  possibility  by  general  formulas,  may  be  said  to  be 
abandoned  by  men  of  philosophy  and  science.  Thus  we  cannot  read 
Spinoza's  professed  demonstration  against  miracles  without  being 
struck  with  the  sort  of  antic^uated  and  obsolete  character  which  it 
carries  upon  the  very  surface  of  it.  Nor  has  a  recent  attempt,  which 
is  noticed  in  these  Lectures,  to  settle  the  question  by  a  quasi-mathe- 
matical proof  been  supported  by  men  of  science.  -  The  more  the 
human  mind  has  gone  into  this  question,  the  more  it  has  seen  reason 
to  put  aside  all  d  lyriori  ground  against  miracles  as  wholly  inadequate, 
and  to  consider  that  the  only  question  which  has  to  be  decided  on 
this  subject,  and  which  seriously  demands  our  attention,  is  the 
question  of  evidence — whether  certain  alleged  miracles  have  taken 
place  or  not. 

But  when,  having  put  the  sj)eculative  class  of  arguments  against 
miracles  aside,  we  go  to  the  practical  question  of  evidence,  we  find  our- 
selves here  again,  before  long,  coming  to  a  standstill  in  controversy, 
because  it  soon  appears  that  the  two  sides  have  no  conmion  criterion 
of  good  evidence  and  bad  :  that  what  is  strong  evidence  to  one  man 
is  weak  to  another  ;  what  is  sufficient  to  one  is  defective  to  another. 
And,  what  is  especially  to  the  purpose,  this  diff'erence  does  not  arise 
merely  from  a  diflerent  estimate  of  witnesses  and  external  data ;  which 
is  an  accidental  variation,  depending  on  a  fluctuating  individual  judg- 
ment :  but  it  arises  from  a  deeper  and  more  settled  cause,  in  the  funda- 
mental principles  and  assumjations  of  the  two  sides ;  their  respective 
preKminary  premises  and  inward  convictions.    We  may  note  it  as  a  law 


xxiv  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

of  evidence,  that  our  estimate  of  the  evidences  of  any  foct  necessarily 
varies  according  to  the  greater  or  less  antecedent  probability  which 
we  attach  to  the  fact.  We  see  this  very  clearly  when  the  antecedent 
probability  is  of  the  kind  which  arises  from  ordinary  experience : 
we  accept,  without  any  hesitation,  the  evidence  of  any  one  we  meet 
upon  a  common  every-day  fact ;  while  the  very  same  evidence,  if 
brought  in  support  of  an  extraordinary  fact,  would  not  satisfy  us, 
and  we  should  accept  it,  if  we  did,  with  diliiculty.  That  is  to  say : 
antecedent  probability  makes  sound,  and  the  want  of  it  makes  weak 
evidence.  The  truth  is,  no  one  is  ever  convinced  by  external 
evidence  only ;  there  must  be  a  certain  probability  in  the  fact  itself, 
or  a  certain  admissibility  in  it,  which  must  join  on  to  the  external 
evidence  for  it,  in  order  for  that  evidence  to  produce  conviction. 
Nor  is  it  any  fault  in  external  evidence  that  it  should  lie  so ;  but 
it  is  an  intrinsic  and  inherent  defect  in  it,  because  in  its  very  nature 
it  is  only  one  part  of  evidence  which  needs  to  be  supplemented  by 
another,  or  a  priori  premiss  existing  in  our  minds.  Antecedent 
probability  is  the  rational  complement  of  external  evidence ;  a  law 
of  evidence  unites  the  two  ;  and  they  cannot  practieallj'  be  separated. 
I  have  spoken  of  the  antecedent  probability  which  is  founded  upon 
ordinary  sensible  experience.  But  there  is  an  antecedent  probability 
also  which  is  formed  not  by  common  sensible  experience  but  by 
original  ideas,  instinctive  impressions,  and  fundamental  convictions  of 
the  mind.  Such  are  the  principles  of  natural  religion,  which  is  the 
name  we  give  to  certain  moral  and  religious  assumptions,  which  form 
the  groundwork  upon  which  some  proceed  in  all  considerations  of 
evidence;  but  which  are  not  embraced  and  adopted  by  all  minds. 
These  inward  premises  affect  the  whole  idea  of  God  in  the  human 
mind,  and  with  it  the  whole  view  of  miracles,  their  place  in  the 
scheme  of  Providence,  their  use,  and  their  probability.  /There  are 
two  ideas  of  the  Divine  Being  which  spring  respectively  from  two 
sets  of  first  principles — one  of  which  gathers  around  conscience,  the 
other  round  a  physical  centre.  There  is  the  idea  of  God  as  the 
Supreme  Mundane  Being,  the  Impersonation  of  the  causes  which  are 
at  work  in  the  development  and  completion  of  the  visible  world ; 
who  looks — not  from  heaven — with  calm  satisfaction  upon  the  suc- 
cessful expansion  of  the  original  seed  of  this  vast  material  organism 
—  the  Universal  Spectator  of  the  fabric  of  Nature,  the  growth  of  art, 
and  the  progress  of  civilization.  And  there  is  the  idea  of  Him  as 
Moral  Ciovernor  and  Judge  expressed  in  the  majestic  language  of 
Inspiration,  which  proclaims  the  "  High  and  lofty  One  that  inhabiteth 
eternity,  whose  name  is  Holy :  keeping  mercy  for  thousands,  for- 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  xxv 

giving  iniqiiity,  and  transgression,  and  sin,  and  that  will  by  no  means 
clear  the  guilty."  It  must  make  all  the  difference  in  our  notion  of 
miracles,  'and  in  the  antecedent  probability  with  which  the  evidence 
of  miracles  is  accompanied,  whether  we  entertain  one  of  these  ideas 
of  God  or  the  other.  If  we  entertain  the  former,  there  is  nothing  for 
miracles  to  do,  they  have  no  place  in  the  system  of  things  according 
to  our  conception  of  it,  they  are  wholly  foreign  and  alien  facts,  incon- 
gruous, discordant,  and  unmeaning.  If  we  entertain  the  latter,  there 
is  a  reason  for  them  :  they  have  a  natural  place  in  the  whole  scheme 
of  things,  as  we  conceive  it ;  especially  they  have  a  use,  as  a  guarantee 
to  a  revelation,  should  it  please  God  to  make  known  to  us  anything 
in  His  spiritual  relations  to  us,  which  we  do  not  know  by  oiu-  natural 
reason. 

'The  antecedent  probability  then  arising  from  this  inward  source 
has  the  same  effect  regarding  external  evidence,  in  giving  greater 
admissibility  to  it,  that  the  antecedent  probability  of  sensible  experi- 
ence has.  It  is  true  they  are  probabilities  arising  upon  wholly  dif- 
ferent ground,  and  they  may  be  called  probabilities  of  different  kinds; 
but  each  of  them  is  probability,  and  as  such  this  consequence  attaches 
to  each  of  them  alike,  viz.  that  of  affecting  the  strength  of  external 
evidence.  The  same  evidence  must  appear  very  different  to  us,  be 
measured  differently,  and  have  a  more  or  less  persuasive  power, 
according  as  its  subject-matter  has  this  inward  ground  of  probability 
attaching  to  it  or  not.  And  this  must  apply  to  the  evidences  of  the 
miracles  which  are  the  credentials  of  the  Gospel  dispensation.  Accord- 
ing to  our  conception  of  the  system  of  providence,  and  the  place 
which  miracles  have  in  that  system,  their  use  and  their  probability,  a 
difference  must  arise  in  the  value  of  the  historical  evidence  of  those 
miracles.  Nor  is  this  a  difference  of  imagination,  but  of  reason; 
because,  as  has  been  said,  it  is  a  very  law  of  evidence,  that  external 
evidence  must  be  supplemented  by  antecedent  probability.  External 
or  historical  evidence  has  an  intrinsic  defect  in  it,  for  the  purpose  of 
full  j)ersuasion  standing  alone,  without  this  internal  auxiliary,  because 
evidence  is,  by  its  very  nature,  a  double  thing,  in  which  an  outer 
part  has  its  complement  in  an  inner,  and  both  together  make 
the  whole  thing.  Antecedent  probability  is  a  constitutional  element 
of  evidence,  and  external  testimony  has  reasonably  a  different  weight, 
according  as  it  comes  to  us  with  or  without  it.  ' 

From  this  evidential  law  it  is  plain  that  those  who,  upon  the 
assumption  of  certain  principles,  reject  the  evidence  of  the  Gospel 
miracles,  may,  upon  that  assumption,  be  reasonable  in  that  rejection ; 
and  yet  that  those  who,  upon  the  assumption  of  other  principles, 


xxvi  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

accept  the  evidence  of  the  Gospel  miracles  may  upon  that  assump- 
tion be  quite  reasonable  in  that  acceptance.  What  is  inadequate  evi- 
dence to  those  who  hold  no  belief  in  any  power  equal  to  produce 
miracles,  or  in  any  jjurpose  to  which  they  would  apply,  may  be  ade- 
quate, and  reasonably  adequate,  to  those  who  proceed  upon  a  belief 
in  both  of  these  points.  These  two  schools  of  minds  live  indeed  in 
diti'erent  universes ;  and  what  has  or  has  not,  in  their  eyes,  a  natural 
place  in  the  universe,  must  depend  upon  what  conception  of  the 
imiverse  they  entertain.     As  has  been  observed  elsewhere — 

"  The  primary  ideas  and  sentiments  which  constitute  natural 
religion  are  a  legitimate  basis  for  the  mind  to  proceed  upon  in  its 
estimate  of  the  proof  of  revelation ;  they  correspond  to  the  principles 
in  special  departments  of  knowledge,  which  enable  those  who  are 
acquainted  with  those  dei^artments  to  judge  of  evidence  on  matters 
belonging  to  them  ;  only  with  this  difference,  that  the  principles  of 
science  ultimately  compel  universal  reception ;  the  moral  set  of 
principles  does  not.  But  this  distinction  does  not  interfere  with  the 
right  of  assertion,  as  regards  those  principles,  on  the  part  of  those 
who  have  them ;  they  have  a  right  to  assert  as  truth  what  is  irre- 
sistibly true  to  themselves  and  which  others  cannot  disjirove.  Those 
Avho  find  tliese  original  convictions  in  them,  have  a  right  to  appeal 
to  them  as  their  starting-points  and  their  reasoning  base.  They 
cannot  of  course  appeal  to  their  o^\^l  original  belief  as  binding  others, 
but  they  can  appeal  to  it  as  the  full  justification  of  themselves,  and 
of  that  favourable  attitude  towards  revelation  which  may  be  drawn 
from  it.  Such  a  primary  belief  is,  therefore,  a  strictly  philosophical 
premiss,  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  used.  Were  it  used  indeed 
for  the  purpose  of  2:)roving  revelation  to  those  in  whom  the  belief 
does  not  exist,  no  premiss  could  be  more  unphilosophical :  l)Ut  it 
is  not  used  for  this  purjiose  ;  it  is  only  used  for  tlie  purpose  of 
recommending  revelation  to  ourselves,  and  to  others  who  have  the 
same  primary  belief  with  ourselves,  and  for  this  purpose  it  is  a  philo- 
sophical premiss."     {Quarterly  Review,  July  1870.) 

Dr.  Newman  has  drawn  attention,  in  his  Grammar  of  Assent,  to 
this  property  of  the  antecedent  ground,  among  the  principles  of 
evidence ;  adding  to  his  forcible  explanation  of  it,  the  valuable  rule 
and  memento,  that  the  real  argumentative  weight  of  antecedent  pre- 
mises must  lie  in  those  premises  as  they  actually  exist  in  the 
individual's  mind,  and  not  as  they  are  presented  in  propositions. 
This  is  very  obvious  when  it  is  stated,  and  yet  it  requires  to  be 
stated,  or  the  truth  will  not  occur  to  us.  Men  of  philosophical  pre- 
tensions, who,  upon  their  own  premises,  reject  the  evidences  of  revela- 
tion, thmk  they  can  completely  understand  and  grasj)  the  antecedent 
premises  of  believers,  because  these  are  expressed  in  intelligible  pro- 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  xxvii 

positions ;  and  they  infer  tliat,  understanding  tliem,  they  can  decide 
conclusively  upon  the  inadequacy  of  them.  But  these  persons  are 
labouring  under  a  mistake  all  the  time  in  supposing  that  they  do  know 
Avhat  these  premises  really  are.  They  are  what  they  are  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  hold  them.  But  they  do  not  know  what  that  is ; 
nor  therefore  do  they  know  their  depth,  their  force,  their  stringency, 
the  weight  they  carry  with  them  in  the  balance  of  reason,  as  they 
exist  in  the  individual's  mind.  They  are  at  liberty  then  to  speak 
for  themselves,  and  to  say,  that  they  are  obliged,  upon  thdr  ante- 
cedent premises,  to  reject  the  evidences  of  revelation  ;  but  they 
cannot  say  that  it  is  unreasonable  in  others  to  accept  them  upon 
ilidrs ;  because,  in  truth,  they  do  not  know  theirs ;  they  know  them 
in  words  and  phrases,  but  they  do  not  know  them  as  they  really 
exist  in  life  and  fact.  Take,  e.g.,  to  quote  from  the  same  quarter 
again — the  sense  of  sin. 

"  This  is  a  knowledge  which  those  who  possess  it  start  with  as  an 
advantage  in  the  estimate  of  the  Christian  revelation  :  i.e.  they  have  a 
right  to  say  that  they  do.  It  is  not  knowledge  in  a  scientific  sense, 
but  it  is  knowledge  in  such  a  sense  as  that  those  who  have  it  are  in- 
stinctively assured  that  they  are  in  possession  of  some  truth,  and  are 
influenced  by  it  in  their  judgment  of  Revelation  and  its  proof.  It  is 
knowledge,  so  far  as  it  is  a  kind  of  insight,  partial  but  real  as  far  as  it 
goes,  into  the  nature  of  sometliing,  in  which  we  are  fundamentally 
concerned,  and  on  which  God's  deahngs  with  us  in  Revelation  pro- 
fess to  hinge.  It  corresponds,  in  its  place  and  results,  to  a  principle 
of  knowledge  in  some  special  department.  It  is  impossible  not  to 
see  what  a  strong  root  of  Christian  conviction  and  belief,  what  an  in- 
troduction to  the  Christian  dispensation,  this  sense  of  sin  in  the  mind 
of  St.  Paul  was.  St.  Paul  filled  two  remarkable  places ;  he  was  at 
once  the  first  philosophical  teacher  of  (/hristianity,  and  the  first  great 
convert  of  promulgated  Christianity,  What  is  the  most  conspicuous 
premiss,  then,  which  we  observe  working  in  his  mind,  to  beget  his 
belief  in  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  assure  him  of  its  being  a  real 
authentic  revelation  from  God  ?  We  see  it  in  the  ejjistles  which  suc- 
ceeded his  conversion.  It  is  the  sense  of  sin.  The  apprehension  of 
the  tremendous,  mysterious  fact  of  sin,  pervades  all  his  epistles,  as 
the  great  preliminary  to  the  acceptance  of  the  Gospel.  It  was  an 
assurance  in  his  mind,  which  was  of  the  nature  of  a  profound  know- 
ledge, answering  to  the  accurate  acquaintance  with  some  truth  in 
some  special  department.  Could  any  human  being  have  persuaded 
St.  Paul  that  he  knew  no  more  about  sin  than  Gallio  or  Herod,  and 
that  he  and  the  Sadducee  Ananias  stood  exactly  on  the  same  level 
upon  this  article  of  knowledge  1  He  felt  he  had  a  knowledge  of  this 
subject  which  other  people  had  not.  This  formed  the  basis  of  the 
Christianity  which  he  preached  and  propagated ;  and  if  he  persuaded 


xxvlii  Preface  to  Third  Ediiioii 

himself  by  the  same  arguments  by  which  he  persuaded  others,  it  was 
the  Ijasis  of  his  own  conversion  to  Christianity." — Quarterlij  lievieiv, 
July  1870. 

The  logical  position  therefore  of  the  Christian  and  infidel  toward 
each  other  is  this  :  one  of  the  parties  taking  certain  fundamental  per- 
ceptions— or  what  appear  to  him  to  be  such — Avhich  form  the  sub- 
stance of  natural  religion  as  his  starting-points,  and  judging  from 
them  as  a  reasoning  base,  accepts  from  that  base  of  judgment  the  evi- 
dences of  Christianity.  Can  the  other  refute  his  inference  ?  He  can- 
nut,  for  he  does  not  know  his  base.  He  knows  the  truths  of  natural 
religion  in  the  form  of  propositions  ;  he  cannot  possibly  know  them 
as  they  exist  in  the  individual's  mind.  He  cannot  know  then  how 
much  legitimate  force  they  exert  in  the  estimate  of  the  evidences  of 
revelation.  Can  he  then  disprove  the  principles  themselves  ?  He 
cannot,  for  they  are  not  in  opposition  to  any  known  truth  ;  while  the 
immense  concurrence  in  them,  and  the  general  homage  paid  to  them, 
protects  them  from  the  charge  of  fanaticism.  The  conclusion  ujjon 
the  premises  then,  and  the  premises  themselves,  are  alike  out  of 
reach  of  his  refutation  ;  the  acceptance  of  the  Christian  evidences 
upon  the  assumjJtion  of  natural  religion,  and  natural  religion  itself, 
are  alike  safe  from  the  disputant's  assault. 

It  is  thus  that  the  argument  as  to  evidences  tends  to  a  standstill — 
approaches  to  a  posture  of  the  two  parties  toward  each  other,  in 
which  neither  upon  his  own  premises  can  refute  the  other  upon  his ; 
or  force  his  own  conclusion  upon  the  other,  their  respective  ante- 
cedent grounds  remaining  the  same.  How  could  we  expect  those 
who  do  not  hold  the  principles  of  natural  religion  to  accept  the 
historical  evidences  of  Christianity  1  They  are  wanting  in  those  inward 
antecedent  convictions  which  are  a  necessary  complement  of  external 
evidence,  and  without  which  all  external  evidence  cannot  obtain  an 
entrance  into  a  mind.  But  at  the  same  time  the  corollary  from  this 
is  that  the  rejection  of  Christianity  by  such  minds  can  never  be 
urged  as  a  reflection  upon  Christianity,  because,  indeed,  such  minds 
have  not  the  full  argument  for  Christianity  before  them.  They 
are  not  in  possession  of  it,  because  they  have  cut  themselves  off  from 
the  foundation ;  and  therefore  there  is  nothing  upon  which  the  edifice 
of  Christian  belief  can  grow  up  in  them.  The  Comtist  treats  as 
xitter  delusions  and  mistakes  the  ideas  of  a  God,  of  prayer,  of  im- 
mortality ;  he  declares  that  the  assertion  that  these  are  instincts 
of  human  nature,  is  false ;  that  human  nature  has  not  got  these 
instincts,  and  has  no  such  longings,  and  feels  no  such  wants ;  that 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  xxix 

liunian  nature  cannot  only  do  without  them,  but  that,  where  they 
are  not  artificially  inserted  in  it  by  false  training  and  education, 
it  does  do  without  them.  But  how  can  the  rejection  of  Christianity 
by  those  who  are  without  a  necessary  part  of  the  evidences  for 
Christianity— viz.,  the  preliminarj^  convictions,  be  urged  as  any 
difficulty,  or  as  a  feet  which  tells  against  Christianity. 

In  this  stationary  attitude  then  of  the  two  parties  to  each  other  in 
the  argument  of  miracles,  there  has  sprung  up  on  the  side  of  the 
opponent  of  miracles  what  he  regards  as  the  argument  of  history. 
The  controversialist  who  uses  this  argument  abandons  reasoning; 
he  does  not  even  weigh  evidence ;  all  he  does  is  to  state  facts.  He 
asserts  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  pretension  to  exercise  supernatural 
power  has  gradually  declined,  and  been  given  up  in  civilized  society ; 
that  magic,  witchcraft,  and  other  forms  of  superhuman  agency  have 
become  obsolete,  have  ceased  to  retain  their  hold  on  the  actual  belief 
of  mankind  ;  and  that  the  continuance  of  these  claims  has  been  found 
in  fact  inconsistent  with  human  progress  and  advancement.  Could 
anything,  however  extraordinary,  it  is  asked,  happen  now,  of  which 
all  reasonable  persons  would  not  agree  to  wait  for  a  physical  explana- 
tion, instead  of  attributing  it  to  a  supernatural  cause  ?  This  is  a 
change,  then,  it  is  asserted,  and  a  transition  of  fact,  that  we  are  going 
through  ;  argument  does  not  affect  this  change  in  the  mind  of  society ; 
these  pretensions  were  given  up  in  the  actual  belief  of  mankind,  even 
at  the  very  time  that  they  retained  their  place  in  reasoning  and  philo- 
sophy ;  the  human  mind  is  yielding  to  laws  of  progress,  which  even 
its  own  intellectual  opposition  cannot  stop;  and  faith  in  these  claims 
has  retreated  before  the  influence  of  civilization. 

But  such  being  the  argument  against  the  supernatural  deduced 
from  actual  history,  and  the  known  change  in  human  belief ;  I  must 
observe  that  there  is  one  broad  line  of  distinction  which  separates 
all  this  purposeless,  trifling,  and  low  supernatural, — magic,  witchcraft, 
and  the  like,  from  the  miraculous  credentials  of  the  Christian  revela- 
tion ;  viz.,  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  while  the  belief  in  the  former 
has  become  obsolete,  the  belief  in  the  other  has  continued,  and  stood 
its  ground.  The  belief  in  the  Christian  miracles  has  now  possession 
of  the  mass  of  society,  educated  as  well  as  uneducated.  This,  then, 
is  an  answer  from  fact  to  an  argument  from  fact :  the  argument  is 
that  much  belief  in  supernatural  has  gone  with  civilization,  and  the 
answer  is  that  the  belief  in  the  Christian  miracles  continues  with  civi- 
lization. It  is  indeed  true  that  the  very  first  instinct  of  a  rational  mind 
at  this  day,  on  hearing  the  description  of  that  supernaturalism  which\ 
characterized  rude  ages,  is  to  say — this  cannot  be  true :  such  trivial, 


XXX  Preface  to  Third  Editio7i 

mean,  and  objectless  crowds  of  mii-acles,  as  those  of  old  magic  and 
■witchcraft,  must  be  false :  the  order  of  nature  is  a  solemn  fact,  and 
the  interference  with  it  must  be,  under  the  Divine  Providence,  a 
solemn  fact  too.  The  current  supernaturalism  then  of  rude  ages  is 
disbelieved.  But  the  miraculous  basis  of  Christianity  is  accepted. 
One  fact  then  is  met  by  another  fact :  the  fact  of  mankind's  disbelief 
is  met  by  the  fact  of  mankind's  belief.  It  may  be  replied,  indeed, 
that  the  distinction  wliich  is  now  maintained  between  the  Christian 
supernatural  and  the  vulgar  is  illogical,  and  will  not  be  found 
capable  of  being  upheld.  But  that  is  to  reason ;  and  the  new  form 
of  argument  excludes  reasoning,  and  ties  itself  to  fact.  It  is  the 
peculiar  boast  of  the  new  controversial  ground — that  it  does  not  argue 
but  only  state.  The  fact  is  stated  then  that  legendary  supernatural 
is  abandoned ;  and  that  is  met  by  the  counter  fact  that  the  Christian 
supernaturalism  is  retained.  We  have  reasoning  to  offer  if  the  law 
of  the  argument  allows  it ;  but  if  it  is  the  very  merit  of  this  new  argu- 
ment that  it  settles  the  question  by  the  statement  of  facts ;  that  is 
the  aggressive  fact,  and  this  is  the  defensive  fact ;  and  the  one  fact 
as  a  refutation  of  the  Christian  miracles,  is  directly  answered  by  the 
other  fact  in  support  of  them.  The  belief  in  legendary  super- 
naturalism has  been  practically  given  up  in  educated  society  for 
nearly  two  centiiries  ;  and  yet  with  the  full  consciousness  of  this 
abandonment  of  a  large  region  of  professed  supernatural  agency,  the 
Christian  miracles  have  continued  to  be  believed.  The  distinction 
has  been  maintained,  it  has  kept  its  ground,  and  it  has  sustained  a 
long  period  of  trial,  during  which  the  most  intelligent  and  acute 
minds,  fully  alive  to  the  progress  which  the  human  intellect  had  made 
in  throwing  off  superstitious  belief  in  sujierhuman  agency,  have 
nevertheless  firmly  maintained  the  belief  in  the  miracles  of  Chris- 
tianity. This  is  a  fact  of  history,  and  an  existing  fact  of  society  ; 
and  it  is  an  express  reply  to  the  other  fact  for  the  purpose  for  which 
that  fact  is  used.^ 

1  See  Note  5,  Lect.  VII. 


CONTENTS 

LECTUEE    I 

MIKACLES  NECESSARY  FOE  A  REVELATION 

St.  John  xv.  24 

If  I  had  not  done  among  them  the  works  that  none  other  man  did, 
they  had  not  had  sin, 

LECTUEE    II 

ORDER  OF  NATURE 

Gen.  viii.  22 

While  the  earth  remaineth,  seedtime  and  harvest,  and  cold  and  heat,  and 
summer  and  ivinter,  and  daij  and  night  shall  not  cease. 

LECTUEE    III 

INFLUENCE   OF   THE   IMAGINATION   ON   BELIEF 

Psalm  cxxxix.  14 

Marvellous  are  Thy  works,  and  that  my  soul  Jcnoiveth  right  well. 

LECTUEE    IV 

BELIEF  IN  A  GOD 

Hebrews  xi.  3 

Through  faith  we  understmid  that  the  worlds  ivcre  framed  by 
the  word  of  God. 


xxxii  Contents 

LECTURE    V 

TESTIMONY 
Acts  i.  8 

Yc  slwll  he  witnesses  unto  Me  both  in  Jerusalem,  and,  in  all  Jadcea,  and 
in  Samaria,  and  unto  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  earth. 

LECTUEE    VI 

UNKNOWN  LAW 

St.  John  v.  17 

My  Father  worketh  hitherto,  and  I  v:ork. 

LECTURE    VII 

MIRACLES  REGARDED  IN  THEIR  PRACTICAL  RESULT 
Romans  vi.  17 

But  God  he  thanlrd,  that  ye  were  the  servants  of  sin,  hut  ye  have  oheyed 
from  the  heart  that  form  of  doctrine  ivhich  was  delivered  you. 

LECTUEE    VIII 

FALSE  MIRACLES 
Matt.  vii.  22 

Many  will  say  to  Me  in  that  day.  Lord,  Lord,  have  we  not  prophesied  in 
Thy  name  ?  and  in  Thy  name  have  cast  otit  devils  ?  ami  in  Thy  name 
done  many  wonderful  works  ? 


LECTURE  I 

MIEACLES  NECESSAEY  FOR  A  EEVELATION" 

St.  John  xv.  24 

If  I  had  not  donc'among  them  the  works  that  none  other  man  did, 
they  had  not  had  sin. 

HOW  is  it  that  sometimes  when  the  same  facts  and 
truths  have  been  before  men  all  their  lives,  and  pro- 
duced but  one  impression,  a  moment  comes  when  they 
look  different  from  what  they  did  ?  Some  minds  may 
abandon,  while  others  retain,  their  fundamental  position 
with  respect  to  those  facts  and  truths,  but  to  both  they 
look  stranger ;  they  excite  a  certain  surprise  which  they 
did  not  once  do.  The  reasons  of  this  change  then  it  is  not 
always  easy  for  the  persons  themselves  to  trace,  but  of  the 
result  they  are  conscious ;  and  in  some  this  result  is  a 
change  of  belief. 

An  inward  process  of  this  kind  has  been  going  on  re- 
cently in  many  minds  on  the  subject  of  miracles;  and  in 
some  with  the  latter  result.  When  it  came  to  the  question 
— which  every  one  must  sooner  or  later  put  to  himself  on 
tliis  subject — did  these  things  really  take  place  ?  are  they 
matters  of  fact  ?  they  have  appeared  to  themselves  to  be 
brought  to  a  standstill,  and  to  be  obliged  to  own  an  inner 
refusal  of  their  whole  reason  to  admit  them  among  the 
actual  events  of  the  past.  This  strong  repugnance  seemed 
to  be  the  witness  of  its  own  truth,  to  be  accompanied  by  a 

A 


2  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

clear  and  vivid  light,  to  be  a  law  to  the  imderstauding,  and 
to  rule  without  appeal  the  question  of  fact. 

This  intellectual  movement  against  miracles  is  partly 
owing,  doubtless,  to  the  advance  of  science  withdrawing 
minds  from  moral  grounds  and  fixing  tliem  too  exclusively 
upon  physical.  I  am  not  sure,  however,  that  too  much 
has  not  been  made  of  science  as  the  cause  in  this  case ; 
because,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  see  persons  who  are  but 
little  acquainted  with  physical  science  just  as  much  op- 
posed to  miracles  as  those  who  know  most  about  it ;  and 
for  a  very  good  reason.  For  it  is  evident  that  the  objection 
which  is  felt  against  miracles  does  not  arise  from  any 
minute  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature,  or  any  elaborate 
analysis  which  has  shewn  the  connexion  of  those  laws, 
traced  them  farther  back,  and  resolved  them  into  higher 
and  simpler  laws ;  but  simply  because  they  are  opposed  to 
that  plain  and  obvious  order  of  nature  which  everybody 
sees.  That  a  man  sliould  rise  from  the  dead,  eg.  is  plainly 
y  contradictory  to  our  experience  ;  therein  lies  the  difficulty 
of  believing  it ;  and  that  experience  belongs  to  everybody 
as  much  as  to  the  deepest  philosopher. 

A  cause,  which  has  had  just  as  much  to  do  with  it  as 
science,  is  what  I  may  call  the  historical  imagination.  By 
the  historical  imagination  I  mean  the  habit  of  realizing 
past  time,  of  putting  history  before  ourselves  in  such  a 
light  that  the  persons  and  events  figuring  in  it  are  seen  as 
once-living  persons  and  once-present  events.  This  is  in 
itself  a  high  and  valuable  power,  and  it  is  evident  that 
there  is  too  little  of  it  in  the  mass  of  men,  to  whom  the 
past  is  a  figured  surface  rather  than  an  actual  extension 
backward  of  time,  in  which  the  actors  had  all  the  feelings 
of  the  hour  and  saw  it  passing  by  them  as  we  do, — the 
men  who  were  then  alive  in  the  world,  the  men  of  the  day. 
The  past  is  an  inanimate  image  in  their  minds,  which  does 
not  beat  with  the  pulse  of  life.     And  this  want  of  reality 


I]  for  a  Revelation 


attaching  to  the  timc^  certain  occurrences  in  it  do  not  raise 
the  questionings,  which  those  very  occurrences  realized 
would  raise.  But  a  more  powerful  imagination  enables  a 
man  in  some  way  to  realize  the  past,  and  to  see  in  it  the 
once-living  present;  so  that  when  he  comes  across  any 
scene  of  history,  he  can  bring  it  home  to  himself  that  this 
scene  was  once  present,  that  this  was  the  then  living  world. 
But  when  the  reality  of  the  past  is  once  apprehended  and 
embraced,  then  the  miraculous  occurrences  in  it  are  rea- 
lized too  :  being  realized  they  excite  surprise ;  and  surprise, 
when  it  once  comes  in,  takes  two  directions;  it  either 
makes  belief  more  real,  or  it  destroys  belief.  There  is  an 
element  of  doubt  in  surprise ;  for  this  emotion  arises  'because 
an  event  is  strange,  and  an  event  is  strange  because  it  goes 
counter  to  and  jars  with  presumption.  Shall  surprise  then 
ffive  life  to  belief  or  stimulus  to  doubt  ?  The  road  of  belief 
and  unbelief  in  the  history  of  some  minds  thus  partly  lies 
over  common  ground ;  the  two  go  part  of  their  journey  to- 
gether ;  they  have  a  common  perception  in  the  insight  into 
the  real  astonishing  nature  of  the  facts  with  which  tliey 
deal.  Tlie  majority  of  mankind  perhaps  owe  their  belief 
rather  to  the  outward  influence  of  custom  and  education 
than  to  any  strong  principle  of  faith  within  ;  and  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  many  if  they  came  to  perceive  how  wonderful 
what  they  believed  was,  would  not  find  their  belief  so  easy 
and  so  matter-of-course  a  thing  as  they  appear  to  find  it. 
Custom  throws  a  film  over  the  great  facts  of  religion,  and 
interposes  a  veil  between  the  mind  and  truth,  which,  by 
preventing  wonder,  intercepts  doubt  too,  and  at  the  same 
time  excludes  from  deep  belief  and  protects  from  disbelief. 
But  deeper  faith  and  disbelief  throw  off  in  common  the 
dependence  on  mere  custom,  draw  aside  the  interposing 
veil,  place  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  contents  of  the 
past,  and  expose  themselves  alike  to  the  ordeal  of  wonder. 
I  would,  however,  give  a  passing  caution  against  one 


4  Miracles  7iecessary  [Lect. 

mistake  wliich  a  mind  gifted  with  an  historical  imagination 
is  apt  to  commit.  Such  a  mind  raises  a  clear  and  vivid 
picture  of  a  particular  period,  imagines  the  persons  acting 
and  speaking,  calls  up  a  perfect  scene,  and  fills  it  with  the 
detail  of  actual  life.  Tlie  world  which  it  tlnis  pictures,  it 
then  assimilates,  with  allowance  for  externals,  to  the  world 
of  the  present  day,  translating  character  and  motives, 
actions  and  events  into  a  modern  type,  in  order  to  make 
them  look  real  and  living.  If  the  period,  then,  into  whicli 
this  mind  has  transported  itself  be  that  of  the  first  promul- 
gation of  the  Gospel,  the  miraculous  events  of  that  epoch 
are  imagined  and  pictured  as  the  kind  of  supernatural 
events  which,  if  they  made  their  appearance  at  the  present 
day,  would  receive  a  natural  explanation.  Tlie  person  I 
am  supposing  has  hitherto,  then,  made  no  mistake  of  fact, 
because  he  has  only  raised  a  picture,  and  only  professed  to 
do  so.  But  just  at  this  juncture  he  is  apt  to  make,  una- 
wares, a  mistake  of  fact ;  i.e.  to  suppose,  because  he  has 
transported  himself  in  imagination  to  the  world  of  a  distant 
age,  that  therefore  he  has  seen  that  world  and  its  contents, 
and  to  mistake  a  picture  for  reality.  It  seems  to  him  as  if 
he  could  bring  back  a  report  from  thence,  and  assure  us 
that  nothing  really  took  place  in  that  world  of  the  nature 
that  we  suppose.  But  in  truth  he  no  more  knows  by  this 
process  of  the  imagination  what  took  place  in  that  world, 
than  another  person  knows :  for  we  cannot  in  this  way 
ascertain  facts.  The  imagination  assumes  knowledge,  and 
does  not  make  it :  it  vivifies  the  stock  we  have,  but  does 
not  add  one  item  to  it.  The  supposition — '  Had  we  lived 
in  the  world  at  that  time  we  should  have  seen  that  there 
was  nothing  more  miraculous  in  it  then  than  there  is  now ' 
• — carries  a  certain  persuasiveness  with  it  to  some  ;  but  it 
is  a  mere  supposition.  They  may  by  an  effort  of  mind 
have  raised  a  vivid  image  of  the  past,  but  they  have  not 
gained  the  least  knowledge  of  its  events  by  this  act.     That 


I]  for  a  Revelation  5 

world  has  now  passed  away  and  cannot  be  recalled.  But 
certain  things  are  said  to  have  taken  place  in  it.  Whether 
those  events  did  take  place  or  not  must  depend  on  the  tes- 
timony which  has  come  down  to  us. 

With  this  jtrefatory  notice  of  a  prevalent  intellectual 
feature  of  the  day, — for  this  effort  to  realize  the  past,  to 
make  it  look  like  yesterday,  does  not  only  characterize  in- 
dividual writers,  but  is  part  of  the  thought  of  the  age, — I 
enter  upon  the  consideration  of  the  position  which  I  liave 
chosen  as  the  subject  of  these  Lectures ;  viz.,  that  Miracles, 
or  visible  suspensions  of  the  order  of  nature  for  a  provi- 
dential purpose,  are  not  in  contradiction  to  reason.  And, 
first  of  all,  I  shall  enquire  into  the  use  and  purpose  of 
miracles, — especially  with  a  view  to  ascertain  whether  in 
the  execution  of  the  Divine  intentions  toward  mankind, 
they  do  not  answer  a  necessary  purpose,  and  supply  a  want 
which  could  not  be  supplied  in  any  other  way. 

There  is  one  great  necessary  purpose,  then,  which  divines 
assign  to  miracles,  viz.,  the  proof  of  a  revelation.  And 
certainly,  if  it  was  the  will  of  God  to  give  a  revelation, 
there  are  plain  and  obvious  reasons  for  asserting  that 
miracles  are  necessary  as  the  guarantee  and  voucher  for 
that  revelation.  A  revelation  is,  properly  speaking,  such 
only  by  virtue  of  telling  us  something  which  we  could  not^ 
know  without  it.  But  how  do  we  know  that  that  commu- 
nication of  what  is  undiscoverable  by  human  reason  is  true  ? 
Our  reason  cannot  prove  the  truth  of  it,  for  it  is  by  the 
very  supposition  beyond  our  reason.  There  must  be,  then, 
some  note  or  sign  to  certify  to  it  and  distinguish  it  as  a 
true  communication  from  God,  which  note  can  be  nothing 
else  than  a  miracle. 

The  evidential  function  of  a  miracle  is  based  upon  the 
common  argument  of  design,  as  proved  by  coincidence. 
The  greatest  marvel  or  interruption  of  the  order  of  nature 
occurring  by  itself,  as  the  very  consequence  of  being  con- 


y 


6  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

nected  with  nothing,  proves  nothing ;  but  if  it  takes  place 
in  connexion  with  the  word  or  act  of  a  person,  that  coinci- 
dence proves  design  in  the  marvel,  and  makes  it  a  miracle; 
and  if  that  person  professes  to  report  a  message  or  revela- 
tion from  heaven,  the  coincidence  again  of  the  miracle  with 
the  professed  message  from  God  proves  design  on  the  part 
of  God  to  warrant  and  authorize  the  message.  The  mode 
in  which  a  miracle  acts  as  evidence  is  thus  exactly  the 
same  in  which  any  extraordinary  coincidence  acts :  it  rests 
upon  the  general  argument  of  design,  though  the  particular 
design  is  special  and  appropriate  to  the  miracle.  And 
hence  we  may  see  that  the  evidence  of  a  Divine  communi- 
cation cannot  in  the  nature  of  the  case  be  an  ordinary 
event.  For  no  event  in  the  common  order  of  nature  is  in 
the  first  place  in  any  coincidence,  with  the  Divine  commu- 
nication :  it  is  explained  by  its  own  place  in  nature,  and  is 
connected  Mdth  its  own  antecedents  and  consequents  only, 
having  no  allusion  or  bearing  out  of  them.  It  does  not 
either  in  itself,  or  to  human  eye,  contain  any  relation  to 
the  special  communication  from  God  at  the  time.  But  if 
there  is  no  coincidence,  there  is  no  appearance  of  design, 
and  therefore  no  attestation.  It  is  true  that  prophecy  is 
such  an  attestation,  but  though  the  event  which  fulfils  pro- 
phecy need  not  be  itself  out  of  the  order  of  nature,  it  is  an 
indication  of  a  fact  which  is ;  viz.,  an  act  of  superhuman 
knowledge.  And  this  remark  would  apply  to  a  miracle 
which  was  only  miraculous  upon  the  prophetical  principle, 
or  from  the  extraordinary  coincidence  which  was  contained 
in  it.  And  hence  it  follows  that  could  a  complete  pliysical 
solution  be  given  of  a  whole  miracle,  both  the  marvel  and 
the  coincidence  too,  it  would  cease  from  that  moment  to 
perform  its  function  of  evidence.  Apparent  evidence  to 
those  who  had  made  the  mistake,  it  could  be  none  to  us 
who  had  corrected  it. 

It  will  be  urged,  perhaps,  that  extraordinary  coincidences 


I]  for  a  Revelation 


take  place  in  the  natural  course  of  providence,  which  are 
called  special  providences  ;  and  that  these  are  regarded  as 
signs  and  tokens  of  the  Divine  will,  though  they  are  not 
visible  interferences  witli  the  order  of  nature.  But  special 
providences,  though  they  convey  mine,  do  not  convey  full 
evidence  of,  design.  Coincidence  is  a  matter  of  degree,  and 
varies  from  the  lowest  degree  possible  to  the  fullest  and 
highest.  In  whatever  degree,  therefore,  a  coincidence  may 
api^ear  in  the  events  of  the  world,  or  in  the  events  of  private 
life,  in  that  degree  it  is  a  direction,  to  whomsoever  it  is 
evident,  to  see  the  finger  of  God  either  in  public  affairs  or 
in  his  own ;  and  to  draw  a  lesson,  or  it  may  be  to  adopt  a 
particular  course  of  conduct,  in  consequence.  But  it  is  of 
the  nature  of  a  miracle  to  give  proof,  as  distinguished  from 
mere  surmise,  of  a  Divine  design ;  and  therefore  the  most 
complete  and  decisive  kind  of  coincidence  alone  is  miracu- 
lous. 

It  must  be  observed,  however,  that  a  special  providence 
is  an  indication  of  a  special  Divine  design,  to  whatever  ex- 
tent it  is  so,  only  as  being  an  indication  of  extraordinary 
Divine  agency  somewhere  ;  for  from  the  ordinary  nothing 
special  would  have  been  inferred.  But  extraordinary  Divine 
agency  partakes  substantially  of  a  miraculous  character; 
though  that  character  is  not  placed  directly  before  our 
eyes,  but  is  only  gathered  from  such  marks  of  comcidence 
as  the  events  in  the  case  exhibit.  The  point  at  which  the 
Divine  power  comes  into  contact  with  the  chain  of  natural 
causation  is  remote,  and  comparatively  hidden;  but  still 
however  high  up  in  the  succession  of  nature,  such  extraor- 
dinary agency  is,  at  the  point  at  which  it  does  occur,  pre- 
ternatural ;  because  by  nature  w^e  mean  God's  general  law, 
or  usual  acts.  A  special  providence  thus  differs  from  a 
miracle  in  its  evidence,  not  in  its  nature ;  it  is  an  invisible 
miracle,  which  is  indirectly  traceable  by  means  of  some 
remarkable  concurrences  in  the  events  before  us.     If  a 


8  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

marvel  is  commanded  or  announced,  or  even  what  is  not  a 
marvel  but  only  a  striking  event  (such  as  sudden  cure  of  a 
bad  disease),  and  it  takes  jjlace  immediately,  the  coinci- 
dence is  too  remarkable  to  be  accounted  for  in  any  other 
way  than  design.  The  destruction  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah, 
the  dividing  of  the  lied  Sea,  and  other  miracles  which  were 
wrouglit  by  the  medium  of  natural  agency,  were  miracles 
for  this  reason.  But  in  the  case  of  a  special  providence, 
the  coincidence  suggests  but  does  not  compel  this  interpre- 
tation. The  death  of  Arius,  e.g.  was  not  miraculous,  be- 
cause the  coincidence  of  the  death  of  an  heresiarch  taking 
place  when  it  was  peculiarly  advantageous  to  the  orthodox 
faith,  to  which  it  M'ould  have  been  advantageous  at  any 
time,  was  not  such  as  to  compel  the  inference  of  extraordi- 
nary Divine  agency ;  but  it  was  a  special  providence,  be- 
cause it  carried  a  reasonable  appearance  of  it.  The  miracle 
of  the  Thundering  Legion  was  a  special  providence,  but  not 
a  miracle  for  tlie  same  reason,  because  the  coincidence  of 
an  instantaneous  fall  of  rain  with  public  prayer  for  it  car- 
ried some  appearance,  but  not  proof,  of  preternatural 
agency,  especially  in  the  climate  where  the  occurrence 
happened.  Where  there  is  no  violation  of  physical  law, 
the  more  surprising  and  inexplicable  must  be  tlie  coinci- 
dence in  events  in  order  to  constitute  the  proof  of  extra- 
ordinary Divine  agency;  and  therefore  in  that  class  of 
miracles  which  consists  of  answers  to  prayer,  the  most  un- 
accountable kind  of  coincidence  alone  can  answer  the  pur- 
pose. And  the  same  principle  ap^jlies  to  other  miracles. 
The  appearance  of  the  cross  to  Constantine  Mas  a  miracle 
or  a  special  providence,  according  to  which  account  of  it 
we  adopt.  As  only  a  meteoric  appearance  in  the  shape  of 
a  cross,  without  the  adjuncts,  it  gave  some  token  of  preter- 
natural agency,  but  not  full  evidence. 

It  may  be  conceded,  indeed,  that  the  truths  which  are 
communicated  in  a  revelation  might  be  conveyed  to  the 


I]  for  a  Revelation 


Immau  mind  without  a  visible  miracle:  and  upon  this 
ground  it  has  appeared  to  some  that  a  revelation  does  not 
absolutely  require  miracles,  but  might  be  imj)arted  to  the 
mind  of  the  person  chosen  to  be  the  recipient  of  it  by  an 
inward  and  invisible  process  alone.  But  to  suppose  upon 
this  ground  that  miracles  are  not  necessary  for  a  revelation 
is  to  confound  two  things  which  are  perfectly  distinct ; 
viz.,  the  ideas  themselves  wliich  are  communicated  in  a 
revelation,  and  the  proof  that  those  ideas  are  true.  For 
simply  imparting  ideas  to  the  human  mind,  or  causing 
ideas  to  arise  in  the  human  mind,  an  ordinary  act  of  Divine 
power  is  sufficient,  for  God  can  put  thoughts  into  men's 
minds  by  a  process  altogether  secret,  and  without  the  ac- 
companiment of  any  external  sign,  and  it  is  a  part  of  His 
ordinary  providence  to  do  so.  And  in  the  same  way  in 
which  He  causes  an  idea  of  an  ordinary  kind  to  arise  in  a 
person's  mind,  He  could  also  cause  to  arise  an  extraordi- 
nary idea ;  for  though  the  cliaracter  of  the  ideas  themselves 
would  differ,  the  process  of  imparting  them  would  be  the 
same.  But,  then,  when  the  extraordinary  idea  was  there, 
what  evidence  would  there  be  that  it  was  true  ?  None : 
for  the  process  of  imparting  it  being  wholly  secret,  all  that 
the  recipient  of  it  could  possibly  then  know,  would  be  that 
lie  had  the  idea,  that  it  was  in  his  mind  ;  but  that  the  idea 
was  in  his  mind  would  not  prove  in  the  least  that  it  was 
true.  Let  us  suppose,  e.g.,  that  the  idea  was  imparted  to 
the  mind  of  a  particular  person  that  an  atonement  had  hecn 
made  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  ivorld,  and  that  the  Divine 
powder  stopped  wdth  the  act  of  imparting  that  idea  and  went 
no  further.  The  idea,  then,  of  a  certain  mysterious  event 
having  taken  place  has  been  imparted  to  him  and  he  has 
it,  but  so  far  from  that  person  being  able  to  give  proof  of 
that  event  to  others,  he  would  not  even  have  received  evi- 
dence of  it  himself.  In  an  enthusiastic  mind,  indeed,  the 
rise,  without  anything  to  account  for  it,  of  the  idea  that 


lo  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

such  an  event  had  taken  place,  might  of  itself  produce  the 
hdicf  that  it  had,  and  be  taken  as  witness  to  its  own  truth ; 
but  it  could  not  reasonably  constitute  such  a  guarantee, 
even  to  himself,  and  still  less  to  others. 

The  distinction  may  be  illustrated  by  a  case  of  prophecy. 
It  was  divinely  communicated  to  the  ancient  prophet  that 
Tyre  or  Babylon  should  be  destroyed,  or  that  Israel  should 
be  carried  into  captivity ;  and  in  this  communication  itself 
there  was  nothing  miraculous,  because  the  idea  of  the 
future  destruction  of  a  city,  and  of  the  future  captivity  of 
a  people,  could  be  raised  in  the  mind  of  a  prophet  by  the 
same  process  by  which  God  causes  a  natural  thought  to 
arise  in  a  person's  mind.  But  then  the  mere  occurrence  of 
this  idea  to  the  prophet  would  be  no  proof  that  it  was  true. 
In  the  case  of  prophecy,  then,  the  simple  event  which  ful- 
fils it  is  the  proof  of  the  truth  of  that  idea ;  but  this  kind 
of  proof  does  not  apply  to  the  case  of  a  revelation  of  a 
doctrine,  which  must  therefore  have  another  sort  of  guar- 
antee. 

If,  then,  a  person  of  evident  integrity  and  loftiness  of 
character  rose  into  notice  in  a  particular  country  and  com- 
munity eighteen  centuries  ago,  who  made  these  communi- 
cations about  himself — that  he  had  existed  before  his 
natural  birth,  from  all  eternity,  and  before  the  world  was, 
in  a  state  of  glory  with  God  ;  that  he  was  the  only-begotten 
Son  of  God ;  that  the  world  itself  had  been  made  by  him  ; 
that  he  had,  however,  come  down  from  heaven  and  assumed 
the  form  and  nature  of  man  for  a  particular  purpose,  viz., 
to  be  the  Lamb  of  God  that  taketh  away  the  sins  of  the 
world;  that  he  thus  stood  in  a  mysterious  and  superna- 
tural relation  to  the  whole  of  mankind ;  that  through  him 
alone  mankind  had  access  to  God ;  that  he  was  the  head 
of  an  invisible  kingdom,  into  which  he  should  gather  all 
the  generations  of  righteous  men  who  had  lived  in  the 
world ;  that  on  his  departure  from  hence  he  should  return 


I]  for  a  Revelation  1 1 

to  heaven  to  prepare  mansions  there  for  them ;  and  lastly, 
that  he  should  descend  again  at  the  end  of  the  world  to 
judge  the  whole  human  race,  on  which  occasion  all  that 
were  in  their  graves  should  hear  his  voice  and  come  forth, 
they  that  had  done  good  unto  the  resurrection  of  life,  and 
they  that  had  done  evil  unto  the  resurrection  of  damna- 
tion,— if  this  person  made  these  assertions  about  himself, 
and  all  that  was  done  was  to  make  the  assertions,  what 
would  be  the  inevitable  conclusion  of  sober  reason  respect- 
ing tliat  person  ?  The  necessary  conclusion  of  sober  reason 
respecting  that  person  would  be  that  he  was  disordered  in 
his  understanding.  What  other  decision  could  we  come  to 
when  a  man,  looking  like  one  of  ourselves  and  only  exem- 
plifying in  his  life  and  circumstances  the  ordinary  course 
of  nature,  said  this  about  himself,  but  that  when  reason 
had  lost  its  balance,  a  dream  of  extraordinary  and  un- 
earthly grandeur  might  be  the  result  ?  By  no  rational 
being  could  a  just  and  benevolent  life  be  accepted  as  proof 
of  such  astonishing  announcements.  Miracles  are  the 
necessary  complement  then  of  the  truth  of  such  announce- 
ments, which  without  them  are  purposeless  and  abortive, 
the  unfinished  fragments  of  a  design  which  is  nothing  un- 
less it  is  the  whole.  They  are  necessary  to  the  justification 
of  such  announcements,  which  indeed,  unless  they  are 
supernatural  truths,  are  the  wildest  delusions.  The  matter 
and  its  guarantee  are  the  two  parts  of  a  revelation,  the  ab- 
sence of  either  of  which  neutralizes  and  undoes  it.  (i.) 

But  would  not  a  perfectly  sinless  character  be  proof  of  a 
revelation  ?  Undoubtedly  that  would  be  as  great  a  miracle 
as  any  that  coidd  be  conceived  ;  but  where  is  the  proof  of 
perfect  sinlessness  ?  No  outward  life  and  conduct,  how- 
ever just,  benevolent,  and  irreproachable,  could  prove  tliis, 
because  goodness  depends  upon  the  inward  motive,  and  the 
perfection  of  the  inward  motive  is  not  proved  by  the  out- 
ward act.     Exactly  the  same  act  may  be  perfect  or  imper- 


12  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

feet  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  doer.  The  same  language 
of  indignation  against  the  wicked  which  issues  from  our 
Lord's  mouth  might  be  uttered  by  an  imperfect  good  man, 
who  mixed  human  frailty  with  the  emotion.  We  accept 
our  Lord's  perfect  goodness  then  upon  the  same  evidence 
upon  which  we  admit  the  rest  of  His  supernatural  charac- 
ter; but  not  as  proved  by  the  ovitv/ard  goodness  of  His 
life,  by  His  character,  sublime  as  that  was,  as  it  presented 
itself  to  the  eye. 

On  the  subject,  however,  of  the  necessity  of  miracles  to 
a  revelation,  the  ground  has  been  taken  by  some  that  this 
necessity  is  displaced  by  the  strength  of  the  interned  evi- 
dence of  Christianity.  And  first,  it  is  urged  that  the  in- 
trinsic nature  of  the  doctrines,  and  their  adaptation  to  the 
human  heart,  supplies  of  itself  the  proof  of  their  truth. 

But  the  proof  of  a  revelation  which  is  contained  in  the 
substance  of  a  revelation  has  this  inherent  check  or  limit 
in  it,  viz.,  that  it  cannot  reach  to  what  is  undiscoverable  by 
reason.  Internal  evidence  is  itself  an  appeal  to  reason,  be- 
cause at  every  step  the  test  is  our  own  appreciation  of  such 
and  such  an  idea  or  doctrine,  our  own  perception  of  its  fit- 
ness ;  but  human  reason  cannot  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
prove  that  wliicli,  by  the  very  hypothesis,  lies  beyond 
human  reason. 

Let  us  take,  e.g.,  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation.  The 
idea  of  a  union  of  the  Divine  nature  with  the  human  has 
approved  itself  to  the  mind  of  mankind  as  a  grand  and 
sublime  idea ;  in  debased  shapes  it  has  prevailed  in  almost 
every  religion  of  the  heathen  world,  and  it  occupies  a 
marked  space  in  the  history  of  human  thought.  The 
Christian  doctrine  appeals  to  every  lofty  aspiration  of  the 
human  heart ;  it  exalts  our  nature,  places  us  in  intimate 
relation  to  God,  and  inspires  us  with  a  sense  of  His  love. 
The  human  heart  therefore  responds  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation,  and  feels  that  doctrine  to  be  adapted  to  it. 


I]  for  a  Revelation 


But  because  the  idea  is  thus  adapted  to  it,  is  that  a  proof 
that  it  has  been  chosen  in  the  Divine  counsels  to  be  put 
into  execution  ?  No  :  it  would  be  wild  reasoning  to  infer 
from  the  sublimity  of  a  supposition,  as  a  mere  conception 
of  the  mind,  that  that  conception  had  been  embodied  in  a 
Divine  dispensation,  and  to  conclude  from  a  thought  of 
man  an  act  of  God.  To  do  this  is  to  attribute  to  ourselves 
perceptions  of  the  Divine  will  beyond  our  conscience ;  i.e., 
to  attribute  to  ourselves  supernatural  perceptions.  So, 
again,  that  the  human  heart  responds  to  an  Atonement 
supposed  to  be  revealed,  is  no  proof  that  that  Divine  act 
has  taken  place ;  because  the  human  heart  has  no  power 
by  its  mere  longings  of  penetrating  into  the  supernatural 
world,  and  seeing  what  takes  place  there. 

But  the  internal  evidences  of  Christianity  include,  beside 
the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  doctrines,  the  fruits  of  Christianity 
— its  historical  development.  However  necessary,  it  is  said, 
the  evidence  of  miracles  was  upon  the  first  promulgation 
of  the  Gospel,  when  the  new  faith  was  but  just  sown,  and 
its  marvellous  growth,  its  great  results,  its  mighty  conquests 
over  the  human  heart  were  not  yet  before  the  eye,  it  is  no 
longer  necessary  now,  when  we  have  these  effects  before  us. 
This  is  a  kind  of  proof  then  of  a  revelation  which  is  peculiarly 
adapted  to  produce  inward  conviction — a  persuasion  of  the 
truth  of  that  religion  which  produces  such  results.  No 
member  of  the  Christian  evidence  taken  singly  has  perhaps 
so  much  strength  as  this ;  nor  can  we  well  rest  too  much 
upon  it,  so  long  as  we  do  not  charge  it  with  more  of  the 
burden  of  proof  than  it  is  in  its  own  nature  equal  to — viz. 
the  whole.  But  that  it  cannot  bear.  If  the  sincere  belief 
of  persons  in  something  does  not  prove  that  thing,  can  the 
natural  consequences  of  that  belief  of  themselves  prove  it  ? 
If  I  am  asked  for  the  proof  of  a  doctrine,  and  I  say  simply, 
"  I  believe  it,"  that  is  obviously  no  proof;  but  if  I  go  on  to 
say,  "  This  belief  has  had  in  my  own  case  a  connexion  with 


14  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

devout  practice,"  that  alone  is  not  adequate  proof  either, 
even  though  this  connexion  has  taken  place  in  others  as 
well  on  a  large  scale.  We  can  indeed  in  imagination  con- 
ceive such  a  universal  spread  of  individual  holiness  and 
goodness  as  would  amount  to  a  supernatural  manifestation: 
as,  e.g.  if  we  supposed  that  the  description  of  the  Christian 
Church  given  in  parts  of  prophecy  was  literally  fulfilled, 
and  "the  people  were  all  righteous."^  But  the  actual 
result  of  Christianity  is  very  different  from  this.  There 
are  two  sides  of  the  historical  development  of  Christianity ; 
one  of  success  and  one  of  failure.  What  proportion  of 
nominal  Christians  in  every  age  have  been  real  Christians  ? 
Has  Christianity  stopped  war,  persecution, tyranny,  injustice, 
and  the  dominion  of  selfish  passion  in  the  world  which  it 
has  professedly  converted  ?  No ;  nor  is  that  the  fault  of 
Christianity,  but  of  man.  But  if  the  appeal  is  made  to  the 
result  of  Christianity  as  the  proof  of  the  supernatural  truths 
of  Christianity,  we  must  take  that  result  as  it  stands. 
What  is  that  result  ?  It  is  that  amidst  the  general  deflec- 
tion of  Christians  from  the  Gospel  standard,  a  certain 
number — so  large  indeed  in  comparison  with  the  corres- 
ponding class  among  the  heathen  as  to  surprise  us,  but 
small  as  compared  with  the  whole  body — are  seen  in  every 
age  directing  their  lives  upon  religious  principles  and 
motives.  But  we  cannot  safely  pronounce  this  to  be  a 
standing  supernatural  phenomenon,  equivalent  to,  and 
superseding  the  need  of  miraculous  evidence.  Taken 
indeed  in  connexion  with  prophecy,  the  results  of  Chris- 
tianity stand  upon  a  stronger  ground  as  Christian  evidence ; 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  this  connexion  introduces 
another  element  into  the  argument,  different  from  and 
additional  to  the  simple  fact -of  the  results,  viz.  the  fulfil- 
ment of  prophecy  contained  in  them, — an  element  of  proof 
which  is  in  essence  niirandous  proof.     (2.) 

^  Isaiali  Ix.  2i. 


I]  for  a  Revelation  15 

It  must  be  remembered  that  when  this  part  of  Christian 
evidence  comes  so  forcibly  home  to  iis,  and  creates  that 
inward  assurance  which  it  does,  it  does  this  in  connexion 
with  the  proof  of  miracles  in  the  background;  which 
though  it  may  not  for  the  time  be  brought  into  actual 
view,  is  still  known  to  be  there,  and  to  be  ready  for  use 
upon  being  wanted.  The  mdirect  proof  from  results  has 
the  greater  force,  and  carries  with  it  the  deeper  persuasion, 
because  it  is  additional  and  auxiliary  to  the  direct  proof 
behind  it  upon  which  it  leans  all  the  time,  though  we  may 
not  distinctly  notice  and  estimate  this  advantage.  Were 
the  evidence  of  moral  result  to  be  taken  rigidly  alone,  as 
the  one  single  guarantee  for  a  Divine  revelation,  it  would 
then  be  seen  that  we  had  calculated  its  single  strength  too 
highly.  If  there  is  a  species  of  evidence  which  is  directly 
appropriate  to  the  thing  believed,  we  cannot  suppose,  on 
the  strength  of  the  indirect  evidence  we  possess,  that  we 
can  do  without  the  direct.  But  miracles  are  the  direct 
credentials  of  a  revelation ;  the  visible  supernatural  is  the 
appropriate  witness  to  the  invisible  supernatural — that 
proof  which  goes  straight  to  the  point,  and,  a  token  being- 
wanted  of  a  Divine  communication,  is  that  token.  We 
cannot,  therefore,  dispense  with  this  evidence.  The  position 
that  the  revelation  proves  the  miracles,  and  not  the 
miracles  the  revelation,  admits  of  a  good  qualified  meaning; 
but  taken  literally,  it  is  a  double  offence  against  the  rule, 
that  things  are  properly  proved  by  the  proper  proof  of 
them ;  for  a  supernatural  fact  is  the  proper  proof  of  a 
supernatural  doctrine ;  while  a  supernatural  doctrine,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  certainly  not  the  proper  proof  of  a  super- 
natural fact. 

But  suppose  a  person  to  say,  and  to  say  with  trr.th,  that 
his  own  indi\ddual  faith  does  not  rest  upon  miracles; 
is  he  therefore  released  from  the  defence  of  miracles  ?  Is  the 
question  of  their  truth  or  falsehood  an  irrelevant  one  to  him? 


1 6  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

Is  his  faith  secure  if  they  are  disproved  ?  By  no  means :  if 
miracles  were,  although  only  at  the  commencement,  necessary 
to  Christianity;  and  if  they  were  actually  wrought  and  there- 
fore form  part  of  the  Gospel  record  and  are  bound  up  with 
the  Gospel  scheme  and  doctrines ;  this  part  of  the  structure 
cannot  be  abandoned  without  the  sacrifice  of  the  other  too. 
To  shake  the  authority  of  one-half  of  this  body  of  statement 
is  to  shake  the  authority  of  the  whole.  Whether  or  not  the 
individual  makes  use.  of  them  for  tlie  support  of  his  own 
faith,  the  miracles  are  there;  and  if  they  are  there  they 
must  be  there  either  as  true  miracles  or  as  false  ones.  If 
he  does  not  avail  himself  of  their  evidence,  his  belief  is 
still  affected  by  their  refutation.  Accepting  as  he  does  the 
supernatural  truths  of  Christianity  and  its  miracles  upon 
the  same  report,  from  the  same  witnesses,  npon  the  authority 
of  the  same  documents,  he  cannot  help  having  at  any  rate 
this  negative  interest  in  them.  For  if  those  witnesses  and 
documents  deceive  us  with  regard  to  the  miracles,  how  can 
we  trust  them  with  regard  to  the  doctrines  ?  If  they  are 
wrong  upon  the  evidences  of  a  revelation,  how  can  we 
depend  upon  their  being  right  as  to  the  nature  of  that 
revelation  ?  If  their  account  of  visible  facts  is  to  be 
received  with  an  explanation,  is  not  their  account  of 
doctrines  liable  to  a  like  explanation  ?  Eevelation  then , 
even  if  it  does  not  need  the  truth  of  miracles  for  the  benefit 
of  their  proof,  still  requires  it  in  order  not  to  be  crushed 
under  the  weight  of  their  falsehood. 

Or  do  persons  prefer  resting  doctrine  upon  the  ground 
more  particularly  of  tradition  ?  The  result  is  still  the  same. 
For  the  Christian  miracles  are  bound  up  insei'iarably  witli 
the  whole  corjms  of  Cliristian  tradition.  But  if  tradition 
has  been  mistaken  with  respect  to  facts,  how  can  we  trust 
it  witli  respect  to  doctrines  ?  Indeed,  not  only  are  miracles 
conjoined  with  doctrine  in  Christianity,  but  miracles  are 
inserted  m  the  doctrine  and  are  part  of  its  contents.     A 


I]  for  a  Revelation  1 7 

man  cannot  state  his  belief  as  a  Christian  in  the  terms  of 
the  Apostles'  Creed  without  asserting  them.  Can  the 
doctrine  of  our  Lord's  Incarnation  be  disjoined  from  one 
physical  miracle  ?  Can  the  doctrine  of  His  justification  of 
us,  and  intercession  for  us,  be  disjoined  from  another  ? 

This  insertion  of  the  great  miracles  of  our  Lord's  life  in 
the  Christian  Creed  itself  serves  to  explain  some  language 
in  the  Fathers  which  otherwise  might  be  thought  to  indicate 
an  inferior  and  ambiguous  estimate  of  the  effect  of  miracles 
as  evidence.  They  sometimes  speak  of  the  miracles  per- 
formed by  our  Lord  during  His  ministry  as  if  they  were 
evidence  of  His  mission  rather  as  the  fulfilment  of  prophecy, 
than  upon  their  own  account.  Upon  this  head,  then,  it 
must  be  remembered,  first,  that  to  subordinate  miracles  as 
evidence  to  prophecy  is  not  to  supersede  miraculous 
evidence ;  for  propliecy  is  one  department  of  the  miraculous. 
But,  in  the  next  place,  the  miraculous  Birth  of  our  Lord, 
His  Besurrection  and  Ascension,  were  inserted  in  the  Chris- 
tian Creed ;  which  cardinal  miracles  being  accepted,  the 
lesser  miracles  of  our  Lord's  ministry  had  naturally  a  sub- 
ordinate place  as  evidence.  If  a  miracle  is  incorporated  as 
an  article  in  a  creed,  that  article  of  the  creed,  the  miracle, 
and  the  proof  of  it  by  a  miracle,  are  all  one  thing.  The 
great  miracles  therefore,  upon  the  evidence  of  which  the 
Christian  scheme  rested,  being  thus  inserted  in  the  Christian 
Creed,  the  belief  in  the  Creed  was  of  itself  the  belief  in  the 
miraculous  evidence  of  it.  The  doctrinal  truth  of  the 
Atonement,  its  acceptance,  and  the  enthronement  of  the 
Son  of  God  in  heaven  at  His  Father's  right  hand,  is  indeed 
in  the  abstract  separable  from  the  visible  miracles  of  the 
Eesurrection  and  Ascension  which  were  tlie  evidence  of  it; 
but  actually  in  the  Christian  Church  this  evidence  of  the 
doctrine  is  the  very  form  of  the  doctrine  too ;  and  the 
Fathers  in  holding  the  doctrine  held  the  evidence  of  miracles 
to  it.     (3.) 

B 


1 8  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

Thus  miracles  and  the  supernatural  contents  of  Chris- 
tianity must  stand  or  fall  together.  These  two  questions — 
the  nature  of  the  revelation,  and  the  evidence  of  the  revela- 
tion— cannot  be  disjoined.  Christianity  as  a  dispensation 
undiscoverable  by  human  reason,  and  Christianity  as  a  dis- 
pensation authenticated  by  miracles — these  two  are  in 
necessary  combination.  If  any  do  not  include  the  super- 
natural character  of  Christianity  in  their  definition  of  it,  re- 
garding the  former  only  as  one  interpretation  of  it  or  one 
particular  traditional  form  of  it,  which  is  separable  from 
the  essence, — for  Christianity  as  thus  defined,  the  support 
of  miracles  is  not  wanted,  because  the  moral  truths  are  their 
own  evidence.  But  Christianity  cannot  be  maintained  as  a 
revelation  undiscoverable  by  human  reason,  a  revelation  of 
a  supernatural  scheme  for  man's  salvation,  without  the 
evidence  of  miracles. 

And  hence  it  follows  that  upon  the  supposition  of  the 
Divine  design  of  a  revelation,  a  miracle  is  not  an  anomaly 
or  irregularity,  but  part  of  the  system  of  the  universe  ;  be- 
cause, though  an  irregularity  and  an  anomaly  in  relation  to 
either  part,  it  has  a  complete  adaptation  to  the  whole. 
There  being  two  worlds,  a  visible  and  invisible,  and  a 
communication  between  the  two  being  wanted,  a  miracle  is 
the  instrument  of  that  communication.  An  exception  to 
each  order  of  things  separately,  it  is  in  perfect  keeping  with 
both  taken  together,  as  being  the  link  or  medium  between 
them.  This  is,  indeed,  the  form  and  mode  of  order  which 
belongs  to  instruments  as  a  class.  A  key  is  out  of  relation, 
either  to  the  inside  or  outside  taken  separately  of  the 
inclosure  which  it  opens ;  but  it  is  in  relation  to  both  taken 
together  as  being  the  instrument  of  admission  from  the  one 
to  the  other.  Take  any  tool  or  implement  of  art,  handicraft, 
or  husbandry,  and  look  at  it  by  itself;  what  an  eccentric 
and  unmeaning  thing  it  is,  wholly  out  of  order  and  place ; 
but  it  is  in  exact  order  and  place  as  the  medium  between 


I]  for  a  Revelatio7i  19 

the  workman  and  the  material.  And  a  miracle  is  in 
perfect  order  and  place  as  the  medium  between  two  worlds, 
though  it  is  an  anomaly  with  respect  to  one  of  them 
alone. 

Spinoza,  indeed,  upon  this  ground  of  order,  That  nothing 
can  be  out  of  the  order  of  the  universe  that  takes  place  in 
the  universe,  denies  the  possibility  of  a  miracle ;  but  the 
truth  of  this  inference  depends  entirely  on  the  definition  we 
give  of  a  miracle.  If  a  miracle  is  defined  to  be  something 
which  contradicts  the  order  of  the  whole,  then,  we  admit 
that  nothing  which  is  out  of  the  order  of  the  whole  can  exist 
or  take  place,  and  therefore  we  allow  that  there  can  he  no 
such  thing  as  a  miracle.  But  if  a  miracle  is  only  a  con- 
tradiction to  one  part,  i.e.  the  visible  portion  of  the  whole, 
this  conclusion  does  not  follow.  And  thus,  according  as  we 
define  a  miracle,  this  ground  of  universal  order  becomes 
either  a  ground  for  refuting  the  miraculous  or  a  ground  for 
defending  it.  The  defect  of  Spinoza's  view  is  that  he  will 
not  look  upon  a  miracle  as  an  instrument,  a  means  to  an 
end,  but  will  only  look  upon  it  as  a  marvel  beginning  and 
ending  with  itself  "  A  miracle,"  he  says,  "  as  an  interrup- 
tion to  the  order  of  nature,  cannot  give  us  any  knowledge 
of  God,  nor  can  we  understand  anything  from  it."  (4.) 
It  is  true  we  cannot  understand  anything  from  an  interrup- 
tion of  the  order  of  nature,  simply  as  such ;  but  if  this 
interruption  has  an  evidential  function  attaching  to  it,  then 
something  may  be  understood  from  it,  and  something  of 
vast  importance. 

We  must  admit,  indeed,  an  inherent  modification  in  the 
function  of  a  miracle  as  an  instrument  of  proof  To  a 
simple  religious  mind  not  acquainted  with  ulterior  con 
siderations  a  miracle  appears  to  be  immediate,  conclusive, 
unconditional  proof  of  the  doctrine  for  which  it  is  wrought; 
but,  on  reflection,  we  see  that  it  is  checked  by  conditions ; 
that  it  cannot  oblige  us  to  accept  any  doctrine  which  is 


20  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

contrary  to  our  moral  nature,  or  to  a  fundamental  principle 
of  religion.  But  this  is  only  a  limitation  of  the  function  of 
a  miracle  as  evidence,  and  no  disproof  of  it ;  for  conditions, 
thougli  they  interfere  with  the  force  of  a  principle  where 
they  are  not  complied  with,  do  not  detract  from  it  where 
they  arc.  We  liave  constantly  to  limit  the  force  of  particular 
principles,  whetlier  of  evidence,  or  morals,  or  law,  which  at 
first  strike  us  as  absolute,  but  which  upon  examination  are 
seen  to  be  checked;  but  these  principles  still  remain  in 
substantial  strength.  Has  not  the  autliority  of  conscience 
itself  checks  and  qualifications  ?  And  were  a  person  so 
disposed,  could  he  not  make  out  an  apparent  case  against 
the  use  of  conscience  at  all — that  there  were  so  many  con- 
ditions from  this  quarter  and  the  other  quarter  limiting  it, 
that  it  was  really  left  almost  without  value  as  a  guide  ? 
The  same  remark  applies  to  some  extent  to  the  evidence  of 
memory.  The  evidence  of  miracles,  then,  is  not  negatived 
because  it  has  conditions.  The  question  may  at  first  sight 
create  a  dilemma — If  a  miracle  is  nugatory  on  the  side  of 
one  doctrine,  what  cogency  has  it  on  the  side  of  another  ? 
Is  it  legitimate  to  accept  its  evidence  when  we  please,  and 
reject  it  when  we  please  ?  But  in  truth,  a  miracle  is  never 
without  an  argumentative  force,  although  that  force  may  be 
counterbalanced.  Any  physical  force  may  be  counteracted 
by  an  impediment,  but  it  exists  all  the  while,  and  resumes 
its  action  upon  that  impediment  being  removed.  A  miracle 
has  a  natural  argumentative  force  on  the  side  of  that  doctrine 
for  which  it  is  wrought ;  if  the  doctrine  is  such  that  we 
cannot  accept  it,  we  resist  the  force  of  a  miracle  in  that  in- 
stance; still  that  force  remains  and  produces  its  natural 
effect  when  there  is  no  such  obstruction.  If  I  am  obliged 
by  the  incredible  nature  of  an  assertion  to  explain  the 
miracle  for  it  upon  another  principle  than  the  evidential,  I 
do  so  ;  but  in  the  absence  of  this  necessity,  I  give  it  its 
natural  explanation.     A  rule  gives  way  when  tliere  is  an 


IJ  for  a  Revelation  2  r 

exception  to  it  made  out ;  but  otherwise  it  stands.  AVhen 
we  know  upon  antecedent  grounds  that  the  doctrine  is 
false,  the  miracle  admits  of  a  secondary  explanation,  viz.  as 
a  trial  of  faith ;  but  the  first  and  most  natural  explanation 
of  it  is  still  as  evidence  of  the  doctrine,  and  that  remains 
in  force  when  there  is  no  intrinsic  objection  to  the  doctrine. 

When,  then,  a  revelation  is  made  to  man  by  the  only  in- 
strument by  which  it  can  be  made,  that  that  instrument 
should  be  an  anomaly,  an  irregularity  relatively  to  this 
visible  order  of  things,  is  necessary ;  and  all  we  are  con- 
cerned with  is  its  competency.  Is  it  a  good  instrument  ? 
is  it  effective  ?  does  it  answer  its  purpose  ?  does  it  do  w^hat 
it  is  wanted  to  do  ? 

This  instrument,  then,  has  certainly  one  important  note 
or  token  of  a  Divine  instrument ; — it  bears  upon  it  the 
stamp  oi power.  Does  a  miracle,  regarded  as  mere  prodigy 
or  portent,  appear  to  be  a  mean,  rude,  petty,  and  childish 
thing  ?  Turn  away  from  that  untrue  because  inadequate 
aspect  of  it,  to  that  which  is  indeed  the  true  aspect  of  a 
miracle.  Look  at  it  as  an  instrument,  as  a  powerful  instru- 
ment, as  an  instrument  which  has  shewn  and  proved  its 
power  in  the  actual  result  of  Christendom.  Christianity  is 
the  religion  of  the  civilized  v/orld,  and  it  is  believed  upon 
its  miraculous  evidence.  Now  for  a  set  of  miracles  to  be 
accepted  in  a  rude  age,  and  to  retain  their  authority 
throughout  a  succession  of  such  ages,  and  over  the  ignorant 
and  superstitious  part  of  mankind,  may  be  no  such  great 
result  for  the  miracle  to  accomplish,  because  it  is  easy  to 
satisfy  those  who  do  not  inquire.  But  this  is  not  the  state 
of  the  case  which  we  have  to  meet  on  the  subject  of  the 
Christian  miracles.  The  Christian  being  the  most  intelli- 
gent, the  civilized  portion  of  the  world,  these  miracles  are 
accepted  by  the  Christian  body  as  a  whole,  by  the  thinking 
and  educated  as  well  as  the  uneducated  part  of  it,  and  the 
Gospel  is  believed  upon  that  evidence.     Allowance  made 


2  2  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

for  certain  schools  of  thought  in  it,  this  age  in  which  we 
live  accepts  the  Christian  miracles  as  the  foundation  of  its 
faith.  But  this  is  a  great  result — the  establishment  and 
the  continuance  of  a  religion  in  the  world, — as  the  religion 
too  of  the  intelligent  as  well  as  of  the  simpler  portion  of 
society.  Indeed,  in  connexion  with  this  point,  may  we  not 
observe  that  the  evidence  of  miracles  has  been  taken  up  by 
the  most  inquiring  and  considerate  portion  of  the  Christian 
body;  by  that  portion  especially  which  was  anxious  that  its 
belief  should  be  rational,  and  should  rest  upon  evidence  ? 
Of  that  great  school  of  writers  which  has  dealt  with  miracles, 
the  conspicuous  characteristics  have  been  certainly  no 
childish  or  superstitious  love  of  the  marvellous,  but  the 
judicial  faculty,  strong  reasoning  powers,  strong  critical 
powers,  the  power  of  estimating  and  weighing  evidence. 
May  we  not  then,  when  the  miracle  is  represented  as  a  mere 
childish  desideratum,  take  these  important  circumstances 
into  consideration, — the  object  which  the  Christian  miracles 
have  actually  effected ;  their  actual  result  in  the  world ; 
the  use  which  has  been  made  of  them  by  reasonable  and 
reflecting  minds;  the  source  which  they  have  been  of 
reasonable  and  reflecting  belief;  their  whole  history,  in 
short,  as  the  basis,  along  with  other  considerations,  of  the 
Christian  belief  of  the  civilized  world,  educated  and  un- 
educated ?  May  we  not  call  attention  to  the  Gospel  miracle 
in  its  actual  working, — that  it  has  been  connected  not  with 
fanciful,  childish,  credulous,  and  superstitious,  but  with 
rational  religion ;  that  it  has  been  accepted  by  those  whose 
determination  it  has  been  only  to  believe  upon  rational 
grounds ;  that  indeed,  if  there  is  a  difference,  it  has  been 
the  instrument  of  conviction  rather  to  the  reasoning  class 
of  minds  than  the  unreasoning.  A  miracle  is  in  its  own 
nature  an  appeal  to  the  reason ;  and  its  evidence  contrasts 
in  this  respect  with  the  mere  influence  of  sentiment  and 
tradition.     These  are  stronff  witnesses  to  the  nature  of  a 


I]  for  a  Revelation  23 

miracle  as  an  instrument,  and  shew  that  a  miracle  is  a  great 
instrument,  and  worthy  of  the  Divine  employment. 

For — and  this  largely  constitutes  the  greatness  and 
efficacy  of  the  instrument — the  evidence  of  a  miracle  is  not 
only  contemporary  with  the  miracle,  but  extends  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  through  all  subsequent  ages  into  which 
the  original  testimony  to  such  miracle  is  transmitted.  The 
chain  of  testimony  is  indeed  more  and  more  lengthened  out, 
and  every  fresh  liuk  which  is  added  is  a  step  further  from 
the  starting-point ;  but  so  long  as  the  original  testimony 
reaches  us,  through  however  may  links,  the  miracle  which 
it  attests  is  the  same  evidence  that  it  ever  was.  Scientific 
men  have  sometimes,  indeed,  speculated  upon  the  effect  of 
time  upon  the  value  of  historical  evidence;  practically 
speaking,  however,  between  an  event's  first  standing  in  re- 
gular history,  and  its  very  latest  which  is  at  this  very 
moment,  we  see  no  difference.  The  testimony  to  the  battle 
of  Pharsalia  is  as  strong  now,  as  at  its  first  insertion  in  the 
page  of  history ;  nor  can  we  entertain  the  notion  of  a  time, 
however  remote,  when  it  will  not  be  as  strong  as  it  is  now. 
Whatever  value,  then,  the  testimony  to  the  Christian 
miracles  had  when  tliat  testimony  first  took  its  place  in 
public  records,  that  it  has  now,  and  that  it  will  continue  to 
have  so  long  as  the  world  lasts.  But  such  a  prospect  raises 
our  estimate  of  the  importance  and  the  greatness  of  a 
miracle  as  an  instrument  indefinitely,  for  indeed  we  do  not 
know  its  full  effects,  we  are  in  the  middle,  or  perhaps  only 
as  yet  in  the  very  beginning  of  its  history  as  a  providential 
engine  for  the  preservation  of  a  religion  in  the  world.  A 
miracle  is  remarkably  adapted  for  the  original  propagation 
of  a  religion,  but  this  is  only  its  first  work.  The  question 
must  still  always  arise,  and  must  be  always  rising  afresh 
in  every  generation  afterwards, — Why  must  I  believe  in 
this  revelation  ?  So  far,  then,  from  the  use  of  miracles 
being  limited  to  a  first  start,  even  supposing  a  religion 


24  Miracles  necessary  [Lect. 

could  spread  at  first  Ly  excitement  and  sympathy  without 
them,  a  time  must  come  Avhen  rational  and  inquiring  minds 
would  demand  a  guarantee ;  and  when  that  demand  Avas 
made  a  miracle  alone  could  answer  it.  The  miracle  then 
enters  at  its  hirth  upon  a  long  career,  to  supply  ground  for 
rational  belief  throughout  all  time. 

INfahometanism,  indeed,  established  itself  in  the  world 
without  even  any  pretence  on  the  part  of  its  founder  to 
miraculous  powers.  But  the  triumph  of  !Mahometanism 
over  human  belief,  striking  as  it  has  been,  cannot  blind  us 
to  the  fact  that  the  belief  of  the  Mahometan  is  in  its  very 
principle  irrational,  because  he  accepts  IMahomet's  super- 
natural account  of  himself,  as  the  conductor  of  a  new  dis- 
pensation, upon  Mahomet's  own  assertion  simply,  joined  to 
his  success.  (5.)  But  this  belief  is  in  its  very  form  irra- 
tional ;  and  whatever  may  be  the  apparent  present  strength 
and  prospects  of  Mahometanism,  this  defect  must  cling  to 
its  very  foundation,  with  this  corollary  attaching  to  it,  viz. 
that  t/the  law  of  reason  is  allowed  to  work  itself  out  in  the 
history  of  human  religions,  the  ultimate  dissolution  of  the 
Mahometan  fabric  of  belief  is  certain,  because  its  very 
existence  is  an  offence  against  tliat  law.  But  the  belief  of 
the  Christian  is,  at  all  events  in  form,  a  rational  belief, 
which  tlie  Mahometan's  is  not ;  because  the  Christian 
believes  in  a  sujDernatural  dispensation,  upon  the  proper 
evidence  of  such  a  dispensation,  viz.  the  miraculous.  Ante- 
cedently, indeed,  to  all  examination  into  the  particiilars  of 
the  Christian  evidence,  Christianity  is  the  only  religion  in 
the  world  which  professes  to  possess  a  body  of  direct  exter- 
nal evidence  to  its  having  come  from  God.  Mahometanism 
avows  the  want  of  this  ;  and  the  pretensions  of  other  reli- 
gions to  it  are  mockery.  One  religion  alone  produces  a 
body  of  testimony — testimony  doubtless  open  to  criticism 
— but  still  solid,  authentic,  contemporaneous  testimony,  to 
miracles — a  body  of  evidence  which  makes  a  stand,  and 


I]  for  a  Revelation  25 

upholds   with    a   natural    and    genuine   strength   certain 
facts. 

And  in  this  distinction  alone  between  Mahometanism 
and  Christianity,  we  see  a  different  estimate  of  the  claims 
of  reason,  lying  at  the  foundation  of  these  two  religions 
and  entertained  by  their  respective  founders.  Doubtless 
the  founder  of  Mahometanism  could  have  contrived  false 
miracles  had  he  chosen,  but  the  fact  that  he  did  not  con- 
sider miraculous  evidence  at  all  wanted  to  attest  a  super- 
natural dispensation,  but  that  his  word  was  enough,  shews 
an  utterly  barbarous  idea  of  evidence  and  a  total  miscal- 
culation of  the  claims  of  reason  which  uufits  his  religion 
for  the  acceptance  of  an  enlightened  age  and  people ; 
Avhereas  the  Gospel  is  adapted  to  perpetuity  for  this  cause 
especially,  with  others,  that  it  was  founded  upon  a  true 
calculation,  and  a  foresight  of  the  permanent  need  of  evi- 
dence ;  our  Lord  admitting  the  inadequacy  of  His  own  mere 
word,  and  the  necessity  of  a  rational  guarantee  to  His  re- 
velation of  His  own  nature  and  commission.  "  If  I  had 
not  done  among  them  the  works  that  none  other  man  did, 
they  had  not  had  sin;"^  "The  works  that  I  do  bear  wit- 
ness of  Me,  that  the  Father  hath  sent  Me."  ^ 

1  St.  John  XV.  24.  2  iti^  y,  36. 


LECTURE  II 

OEDER   or   NATUEE 

Gen.  viii.  22. 

While  the  earth  remaineth,  seedtime  aiid  harvest,  and  cold  and  heat,  and 
sii/mraer  and  winter,  and  day  and  night  shall  not  cease. 

WHATEVEE  difficulty  there  is  in  believing  in  miracles 
in  general  arises  from  the  circumstance  that  they 
are  in  contradiction  to  or  unlike  the  order  of  nature.  To 
estimate  the  force  of  this  difficulty,  then,  we  must  first 
understand  what  kind  of  belief  it  is  which  we  have  in  the 
order  of  nature  ;  for  the  weight  of  the  objection  to  the  mir- 
aculous must  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  belief  to  which 
the  miraculous  is  opposed. 

And  first,  what  is  meant  by  the  order  of  nature  ?  It 
will  be  answered,  That  succession  and  recurrence  of  physical 
events  of  which  we  have  had  experience.  But  this,  though 
true  as  far  as  it  goes,  would  be  a  very  inadequate  definition 
of  what  we  mean  by  that  important  phrase — ^just  omitting 
indeed  the  main  point.  Eor  that  order  of  nature  which  we 
assume  in  all  our  purposes  and  plans  in  life  is  not  a  past 
but  a  future.  That  which  is  actually  known  and  has  been 
observed  is  over  and  gone,  and  we  have  nothing  more  to 
do  with  it :  it  is  that  which  has  not  come  under  our  obser- 
vation, and  which  is  as  yet  no  part  of  our  knowledge,  which 
concerns  us ;  not  yesterday's  but  to-morrow's  state  of  the 
case.  We  entertain  a  certain  belief  respecting  what  will 
be  the  state  of  the  case  to-morrow  with  reference  to  the 


Order  of  Nature 


rising  of  the  sun  and  other  things :  and  that  is  the  order  of 
nature  witli  which  we  are  practically  concerned,  not  that 
part  of  it  which  we  know,  but  that  part  of  it  of  which  we 
are  ignorant. 

"What  we  mean,  then,  by  the  phrase  '  order  of  nature '  is 
the  connection  of  that  part  of  the  order  of  nature  of  which 
we  are  ignorant  with  that  part  of  it  which  we  knoAV — the 
former  being  expected  to  be  such  and  such  'because  the 
latter  is.  But  this  being  the  case,  how  do  we  justify  this 
expectation,  i.e.  how  do  we  account  for  the  belief  in  the 
order  of  nature  ? 

This  belief,  then,  is  defined  as  consisting  in  an  expecta- 
tion of  likeness — that  the  unknown  is  lihe  tlie  known,  that 
the  utterly  invisible  future  will  be  lihe  the  past.  "  This," 
says  Bishop  Butler,  "is  that  presumption  or  probability 
from  analogy  expressed  in  the  very  word  continuance  which 
seems  our  only  natural  reason  for  believing  the  course  of 
the  world  will  continue  to-morrow  as  it  has  done,  so  far  as 
our  experience  and  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us 
back."     (I.) 

But  though  the  fact  is  very  obvious  that  we  do  exjDect 
the  unknown  to  be  like  the  known,  the  future  like  the 
past,  why  is  it  that  we  do  ?  on  what  ground  does  this  ex- 
pectation arise  ?  whence  is  it  "  that  likeness  should  beget 
this  presumption  ? "  The  answer  to  this  question  will  decide 
the  mental  character  of  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of 
nature,  and  so  enable  us  to  estimate  the  weight  of  the 
objection  to  the  miraculous  thence  arising. 

On  asking  ourselves  the  question,  then,  why  we  believe 
that  the  future  order  of  nature  will  be  like  the  past,  why 
such  and  such  a  physical  fact  will  go  on  repeating  itself  as 
it  has  done,  say  the  rising  of  the  sun,  or  the  ebb  and  flow 
of  the  tide,  our  first  imjDulse  is  to  say  that  it  is  self-evident 
it  will  do  so.  But  such  a  ground  gives  way  upon  a  moment's 
reflection.     We  mean  by  self-evident  that  of  which  the 


28  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

opposite  is  self-contradictory ;  but  though  the  fact  that  the 
sun  rose  to-day  would  be  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  it 
did  not  rise  to-day,  it  is  in  no  way  contradicted  by  the  fact 
that  it  will  not  rise  to-morrow.  These  two  facts  are  quite 
consistent  with  each  other,  as  much  so  as  any  other  two 
facts  that  could  be  mentioned. 

But  thougli  the  connexion  in  our  minds  between  the  past 
recurrence  of  a  physical  fact  up  to  this  very  day,  and  its 
future  recurrence  to-morrow,  is  not  a  self-evident  one,  is 
there  any  reason  of  any  kind  tliat  can  be  assigned  for  it  ? 
I  apprehend  that  when  we  examine  the  different  reasons 
Avliich  may  be  assigned  for  this  connexion,  i.e.  for  this 
belief  that  the  future  will  be  like  the  past,  they  all  come 
at  last  to  be  mere  statements  of  the  belief  itself,  and  not 
reasons  to  account  for  it. 

It  may  be  said,  e..g.  that  when  a  fact  of  nature  has  gone 
on  repeating  itself  a  certain  time,  such  repetition  shews 
that  there  is  a  permanent  cause  at  work ;  and  that  a  per- 
manent cause  produces  permanently  recurring  effects.  But 
what  is  there  to  vshew  the  existence  of  a  pejjiianent  cause  ? 
Nothing.  The  effects  which  have  taken  place  shew  a  cause 
at  work  to  the  extent  of  those  effects,  and  those  particular 
instances  of  repetition,  but  not  at  all  further.  That  this 
cause  is  of  a  nature  more  permanent,  than  its  existing  or 
known  effects,  extending  further,  and  about  to  produce 
other  and  more  instances  besides  those  it  has  produced 
already,  we  have  no  evidence.  Why  then  do  we  expect 
with  such  certainty  the  further  continuance  of  tliem  ?  "We 
can  only  say,  because  we  believe  the  future  will  be  like  the 
past.  We  have  professed,  then,  to  give  a  reason  why  we 
believe  this,  and  we  have  only  at  last  stated  the  fact  that 
we  do. 

Let  us  imagine  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  physical 
phenomenon  for  the  first  time.  Upon  that  singular  occur- 
rence we  should  have  but  the  very  faintest  expectation  of 


II]  Order  of  Nature  1 9 

another.  If  it  did  occur  again  once  or  twice,  so  far  from 
counting  on  another  recurrence,  a  cessation  would  come  as 
the  more  natural  event  to  us.  But  let  it  occur  a  hundred 
times  and  we  should  feel  no  hesitation  in  inviting  persons 
from  a  distance  to  see  it ;  and  if  it  occurred  every  day  for 
years,  its  recurrence  would  then  be  a  certainty  to  us,  its 
cessation  a  marvel.  But  what  has  taken  place  in  the  in- 
terim to  produce  this  total  change  in  our  belief  ?  From  the 
mere  repetition  do  we  know  anything  more  about  its  cause? 
No.  Then  what  have  we  got  besides  the  past  repetition 
itself  ?  Nothing.  Why  then  are  we  so  certain  of  its  future 
repetition  ?  All  we  can  say  is  that  the  known  casts  its 
shadow  before ;  we  project  into  unborn  time  the  existing 
types,  and  the  secret  skill  of  nature  intercepts  the  darkness 
of  the  future  by  ever  suspending  before  our  eyes,  as  it  were 
in  a  mirror,  a  reflexion  of  the  past.  We  really  look  at  a 
blank  before  us,  but  the  mind,  full  of  the  scene  behind, 
sees  it  again  in  front. 

Or  is  it  to  give  a  reason  why  we  believe  that  the  order 
of  nature  will  be  like  what  it  has  been,  to  say  that  we  do 
not  know  of  this  constancy  of  nature  at  first,  but  that  we 
get  to  know  it  by  experience  ?  What  do  we  mean  by  know- 
ing from  experience  ?  We  cannot  mean  that  the  future 
facts  of  nature  have  fallen  within  our  experience,  or  under 
our  cognizance ;  for  that  would  be  to  say  that  a  future  fact 
is  a  past  fact.  We  can  only  mean,  then,  that  from  our 
past  experience  of  the  facts  of  nature,  we  form  our  expecta- 
tion of  the  future ;  which  is  the  same  as  saying  that  we 
believe  the  future  will  be  like  the  past :  but  to  say  this  is 
not  to  give  a  reason  for  this  belief,  but  only  to  state  it. 

Or  do  we  think  it  giving  a  reason  for  our  confidence  in 
the  future  to  say  that  though  "  no  man  has  had  experience 
of  what  is  future,  every  man  has  had  experience  of  what 
was  future  ? "  This  is  a  true  assertion,  but  it  does  not  help 
us  at  all  out  of  the  present  difficulty,  because  the  confidence 


30  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

of  wliich  we  speak  relates  not  to  what  was  future,  but  to 
what  is  future.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  what  is  future 
becomes  at  every  step  of  our  advance  what  loas  future,  but 
that  which  is  now  still  future,  is  not  the  least  altered  by 
that  circumstance ;  it  is  as  invisible,  as  unknown,  and  as 
unexplored  as  if  not  one  single  moment  of  the  past  had 
preceded  it,  and  as  if  it  were  the  very  beginning  and  the 
very  starting-point  of  nature.  Let  any  one  place  himself 
in  imagination  at  the  first  commencement  of  this  course  of 
nature,  at  the  very  first  opening  of  the  great  roll  of  time, 
before  any  of  its  contents  had  been  disclosed, — what  would 
he  know  of  the  then  future  course  of  nature  ?  Xothing. 
At  this  moment  he  knows  no  more  of  its  future  course  dat- 
ing from  this  moment.  However  at  each  jiresent  instant 
the  future  emerges  into  light,  this  only  moves  forward  the 
starting-point  of  darkness;  at  every  fresh  step  into  the 
future  the  future  begins  afresh,  and  is  as  unknown  a  future 
as  ever,  behind  the  same  impenetrable  veil  which  has 
always  hid  it.  Whatever  time  converts  into  the  known 
we  are  always  on  the  confines  of  the  unknown ;  and  what- 
ever tracts  of  this  country  w^e  discover,  the  rest  is  as  much 
undiscovered  ground  as  ever.  That  "  every  man  then  has 
had  experience  of  what  was  future,"  is  no  reason  for  his 
confidence  in  what  is  future,  except  upon  one  assumption, 
viz.  that  the  future  will  be  like  the  past.  But,  such  being 
so,  this  professed  reason  for  the  belief  in  question  does  not 
account  for  it,  but  assumes  it. 

What  ground  of  reason,  then,  can  we  assign  for  our 
expectation  that  any  part  of  the  course  of  nature  will  the 
next  moment  be  like  what  it  has  been  up  to  this  moment, 
i.e.  for  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  ?  None. 
No  demonstrative  reason  can  be  given,  for  the  contrary  to 
the  recurrence  of  a  fact  of  nature  is  no  contradiction.  No 
probable  reason  can  be  given,  for  all  probable  reasoning 
respecting  the  course  of  nature  is  founded  upon  this  pre- 


II]  07'der  of  Nature  31 

sumption  of  likeness,  and  therefore  cannot  be  the  founda- 
tion of  it.  No  reason  can  be  given  for  this  belief.  It  is 
without  a  reason.  It  rests  upon  no  rational  ground  and 
can  be  traced  to  no  rational  principle.  Everything  con- 
nected with  human  life  depends  upon  this  belief,  every 
practical  plan  or  purpose  that  we  form  implies  it ;  every 
provision  we  make  for  the  future,  every  safeguard  and  cau- 
tion we  employ  against  it,  all  calculation,  all  adjustment  of 
means  to  ends,  supposes  this  belief;  it  is  this  principle 
alone  which  renders  our  experience  of  the  slightest  use  to 
us,  and  without  it  there  would  be,  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned, no  order  of  nature  and  no  laws  of  nature  ;  and  yet 
this  belief  has  no  more  producible  reason  for  it,  than  a 
speculation  of  fancy.  A  natural  fact  has  been  repeated ;  it 
will  be  repeated  : — I  am  conscious  of  utter  darkness  when 
I  try  to  see  why  one  of  these  follows  from  the  other  :  I  not 
only  see  no  reason,  but  I  perceive  that  I  see  none,  though 
I  can  no  more  help  the  expectation  than  I  can  stop  the 
circulation  of  my  blood.  There  is  a  premiss  and  there  is 
a  conclusion,  but  there  is  a  total  want  of  connexion  between 
the  two.  The  inference,  then,  from  the  one  of  these  to  the 
other  rests  upon  no  ground  of  the  understanding ;  by  no 
search  or  analysis,  however  subtle  or  minute,  can  we 
extract  from  any  corner  of  the  human  mind  and  intelli- 
gence, however  remote,  the  very  faintest  reason  for  it. 

Such  was  the  conclusion  of  a  great  philosopher  of  the 
last  century,  after  an  examination  of  the  foundation  upon 
which  the  belief  in  the  order  of  nature  rested.  "  When  it 
is  asked,"  says  Hume,  "  what  is  the  foundation  of  all  our 
reasonings  and  conclusions  concerning  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect,  it  may  be  replied  in  one  word — Experience. 
But  if  we  ask.  What  is  the  foundation  of  all  conclusions 
from  experience  ?  this  implies  a  new  question,  which  may 
be  of  more  difficult  solution.  .  .  .  Experience  can  be 
allowed  to  give  direct  and  certain  information  of  those  pre- 


32  Order  of  Nature  [Lect, 

cise  objects  only,  and  that  precise  period  of  time  which  fell 
under  its  cognizance  ;  but  wliy  should  this  experience  be 
extended  to  future  times  and  to  other  objects  ?  It  must 
be  acknowledged  that  there  is  here  a  consequence  drawn 
by  the  mind,  that  there  is  a  certain  step  taken,  a  process 
of  thouglit  and  an  inference  which  wants  to  be  explained. 
These  two  propositions  are  far  from  the  same.  I  have 
found  that  such  and  such  an  object  has  always  been 
attended  with  such  an  effect,  and  I  foresee  that  other 
objects  which  are  in  appearance  similar  will  be  attended 
with  similar  effects.  I  shall  allow,  if  you  please,  that  the 
one  proposition  may  justly  be  inferred  from  the  other ;  I 
know  in  fact  that  it  always  is  inferred :  but  if  you  insist 
that  the  inference  is  made  by  a  chain  of  reasoning,  I  desire 
you  to  produce  that  reasoning.  The  connexion  between 
these  propositions  is  not  intuitive.  Tliere  is  required  a 
medium  which  may  enable  the  mind  to  draw  such  an  in- 
ference, if,  indeed,  it  can  be  draM^n  by  reasoning  and  argu- 
ment. What  that  medium  is  I  must  confess  passes  my 
comprehension.  I  cannot  find,  I  cannot  imagine  any  such 
reasoning.  You  say  that  the  one  proposition  is  an  infer- 
ence from  the  other ;  but  you  must  confess  that  the  infer- 
ence is  not  intuitive,  neither  is  it  demonstrative.  Of  what 
nature  is  it  then  ?  To  say  it  is  experimental  is  begging 
the  question.  For  all  inferences  from  experience  suppose 
as  their  foundation  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  past : 
it  is  impossible  therefore  that  any  arguments  from  experi- 
ence can  prove  this  resemblance.  Let  the  course  of  things 
be  allowed  hitherto  ever  so  regular,  that  alone,  without 
some  new  argument  or  inference,  proves  not  that  for  the 
future  it  will  continue  so.  As  an  agent  I  am  quite  satis- 
fied on  the  point,  but  as  a  philosopher  I  want  to  learn  the 
foundation  of  this  inference.  No  reading  nor  inquiry  has 
yet  been  able  to  remove  my  difficulty.  Can  I  do  more 
than  propose  it  to  the  public,  even  though  perhaps  I  have 


II]  Order  of  N attire  33 

small  hopes  of  obtaining  a  solution  ?  AVe  sliall  at  all 
events  by  this  means  be  sensible  of  our  ignorance,  if  we  do 
not  augment  our  knowledoe."  1 

Such  is  the  nature  of  this  remarkable  and  momentous 
inference  and  belief — necessary,  all  important  for  the 
purposes  of  life,  but  solely  practical  and  possessing  no 
intellectual  character.  Will  it  be  said  that  this  unintel- 
lectual  and  unreasoning  character  belonsjs  to  it  in  common 
with  all  the  original  perceptions  of  our  nature,  which 
cannot,  as  being  original,  rest  upon  any  argumentative 
foundation  ?  This  would  not  be  a  true  or  correct  account 
of  the  character  of  this  j)articular  inference,  and  the  absence 
of  the  rational  quality  in  it.  For  there  is  this  important 
difference  between  the  rational  or  intellectual  perceptions 
which  cannot  be  traced  further  back  than  themselves,  and 
this  inference  we  are  speaking  of,  viz.  that  those  perceptions 
cannot  be  contradicted  without  an  absolute  absurdity, 
whereas  an  event  in  contradiction  to  this  inference  is  no 
absurdity  at  all.  The  truth  of  a  mathematical  axiom  can- 
not be  traced  further  back  than  itself;  but  then  an  axiom 
is  self-evidently  true,  and  a  contradiction  to  it  is  as  self- 
evidently  false.  And,  to  go  out  of  the  sphere  of  strict 
demonstration,  the  inference  from  the  coincidence  of  one 
part  with  another  in  organized  matter,  to  design  or  law  as 
distinguished  from  chance,  is  an  inference  which  cannot  be 
traced  further  back  than  itself;  but  then  this  inference 
cannot  be  contradicted  without  a  shock  to  reason.  The 
sujDposition  that  this  whole  world  came  together  by  chance 
is  an  absurdity.  But  the  inference  from  the  past  to  the 
future  wants  this  intrinsic  note  and  test  of  an  inference  of 
reason,  that  the  contradictory  to  it  is  in  no  collision  with 
reason.  There  is  no  violence  to  reason  in  the  supposition 
that  the  world  will  come  to  an  end,  and  the  sun  will  one 
day  not  rise,  notwithstanding  the  increasing  presumption 
1  Enquiry  concerning  the  Human  Understanding,  sect.  iv. 
C 


34  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

from  repetition  up  to  that  very  day  that  it  will  rise.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  wholly  unmeaning  to  observe  that  the  great  meta- 
physician himself,  who  analyzed  the  argument  from  experi- 
ence, has  unconsciously  tested  that  argument  by  this  very 
case.  Two  famous  atheistical  pTiilosophers  have  predicted 
the  end  of  the  world  and  the  dissolution  of  all  things.  The 
grand  and  striking  prophecy  of  Lucretius  is  given  with  an 
almost  oracular  solemnity ;  hut  the  vaticination  of  our  own 
philosopher,  based  upon  hints  and  analogies  in  nature,  is 
also  delivered  with  a  grave  and  serious  voice,  which  arrests 
attention.  "  Suppose,"  says  Hume,  "  all  authors  in  all 
languages  agree  that  from  the  1st  of  January,  1600,  there 
was  a  total  darkness  over  the  whole  earth  for  eight  days : 
suppose  that  the  tradition  of  this  extraordinary  event  is  still 
strong  and  lively  among  the  people:  that  all  travellers  who 
return  from  foreign  countries  bring  us  accounts  of  the  same 
tradition,  without  the  least  variation  or  contradiction :  it  is 
evident  that  our  present  philosophers,  instead  of  doubting 
the  fact,  ought  to  receive  it  as  certain,  and  ought  to  search 
for  the  causes  whence  it  might  be  derived.  The  decay, 
corruption,  and  dissolution  of  nature  is  an  event  rendered 
probable  by  so  many  analogies,  that  any  phenomenon  which 
seems  to  have  a  tendency  towards  that  catastrophe  comes 
within  the  reach  of  human  testimony." ^  The  end  of  the 
world,  then,  so  far  from  being  impossible,  is  here  contem- 
plated as  likely ;  and  yet  up  to  the  very  moment  of  the  end 
— for  if  it  comes  at  all,  it  may  come  in  a  moment — the 
argument  from  experience  that  it  will  continue  will  be  in 
full  force, — nay,  in  the  very  greatest  force  that  it  has  ever 
been  in  since  the  beginning  of  things.  The  argument  from 
mere  experience,  then,  intrinsically  differs  in  the  quality  of 
reasoning,  not  only  from  mathematical  reasoning,  but  even, 
as  has  been  noticed,  from  the  other  great  department  of 
prohdble  reasoning. 

^  Essny  on  Miracles. 


II]  Order  of  Nature  35 

Indeed,  that  this  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  not 
a  part  of  reason  is  shewn  by  the  circumstance  that  even  the 
brute  animals  are  possessed  with  it,  apparently  quite  as 
much  as  man  is.  This  is  indeed  the  very  first  and  most 
obvious  trait  of  their  instinct ;  for  it  must  strike  the  most 
ordinary  observers  that  all  animals  show  by  their  actions  that 
from  the  past  they  infer  the  future,  and  that  they  calculate, 
just  in  the  same  way  in  which  we  do,  upon  the  constancy 
of  that  part  of  the  course  of  nature  with  which  they  are 
concerned.  Xor  can  we  by  the  very  minutest  analysis 
discover  the  slightest  difference  in  tlie  nature  of  this  par- 
ticular instinct  in  the  two  cases,  however  different  may  be  the 
range  and  rank  of  the  facts  to  which  it  is  applied.  How- 
ever limited  the  experience  of  animals  as  compared  with 
man's,  the  inference  from  experience  is  the  same  in  them 
as  in  man.  "  We  admire,"  says  Hume,  "  the  instincts  of 
animals  as  something  very  extraordinary  and  inexplicable 
by  all  the  disquisitions  of  the  human  understanding.  But 
our  wonder  will  perhaps  cease  or  diminish,  when  we  con- 
sider that  experimental  reasoning  itself,  which  we  possess 
in  common  with  beasts,  is  nothing  but  a  species  of  instinct 
or  mechanical  power,  that  acts  in  us  unknown  to  ourselves."^ 
I  would  add, to  this  statement  one  remark.  Some  faint 
elements  of  reason  being  discernible  in  the  brute,  it  is  not 
enough  to  prove  that  a  process  is  not  a  process  of  reason, 
that  something  approaching  to  it  is  seen  in  the  brute.  But 
allowing  tliis,  still  a  mental  act  which  an  animal  performs 
in  a  mode  which  we  cannot  see  to  differ  from  the  human 
mode  of  it,  however  valuable  an  act,  is  not  what  we 
popularly  call  and  mean  by  an  act  of  reason. 

Under  what  head,  then,  shall  we  bring  this  mysterious 
and  incomprehensible  inference  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown,  from  the  objects  and  time  of  which  we  have  had 
experience  to  other  objects  and  other  times  of  which  we 

^  Enquiry,  &c.,  sect.  ix. 


2,6  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

have  none ; — that  which  we  call  belief  in  the  order  of 
nature  ?  To  what  general  principle  si  mil  we  refer  this 
common  primordial  property  of  rational  and  irrational 
natures  which  lies  at  the  basement  of  the  whole  pyramid 
of  life  ?  It  is  not  of  importance  to  bring  it  under  any 
regular  head,  so  long  as  we  understand  its  general  character. 
We  may  observe  that  our  nature,  though  endowed  with 
reason,  contains  constitutionally  large  irrational  depart- 
ments, and  includes  within  it,  as  a  true  and  genuine  part 
of  itself,  nay,  and  a  most  valuable  part,  many  processes 
which  are  entirely  spontaneous,  irresistible,  and,  so  to  call 
it,  of  the  automaton  kind.  Such,  e.g.  is  the  impression 
which  time  makes  upon  us,  by  which  it  relieves  our  sorrows 
and  moderates  our  joys.  The  loss  of  a  relative  or  friend  is 
in  point  of  reason  the  same  loss  years  hence  that  it  is  now, 
but  we  can  no  more  prevent  the  effect  of  time  upon  our 
mind,  than  we  can  the  spontaneous  action  of  an  internal 
bodily  organ.  So,  again,  tlie  force  of  association  is  an 
irresistible  principle.  The  ties  of  place  and  of  country  are 
in  one  respect  irresistible ;  men  may  act  against  them,  but 
can  never  cancel  or  annihilate  tliem  in  their  own  minds. 
And — to  take  a  signal  instance — custom  or  ,  habit  is  an 
irresistible  principle.  No  reason  can  be  given  why  acts 
should  become  easier  by  repetition,  i.e.  for  the  force  of 
habit.  The  acts,  however,  being  done,  the  formation  of  a 
habit  is  as  sjjontaneous  and  irresistible  a  process  as  the 
growth  of  a  vegetable.  Under  which  head  the  belief  now 
spoken  of  would  appear  to  come.  "  Whenever,"  says  the 
philosopher  I  have  quoted,  "the  repetition  of  any  particular 
act  or  operation  produces  a  propensity  to  renew  the  same 
act  or  operation,  without  being  impelled  by  any  reasoning 
or  process  of  the  understanding,  we  always  say  that  this 
propensity  is  the  efi'ect  of  custom.  By  employing  that 
word  we  do  not  pretend  to  have  given  the  ultimate  reason 
of  such  a  propensity.     AVe  only  point  out  a  principle  which 


II]  Order  of  Nature  3  7 

is  universally  acknowledged,  and  which  is  well  known  by 
its  effects.  Perhaps  we  can  push  our  inquiries  no  further 
or  pretend  to  give  the  cause  of  this  cause ;  but  must  rest 
contented  with  it  as  the  ultimate  principle  which  we  can 
assign  to  all  our  conclusions  from  experience.  This 
hypothesis  seems  even  the  only  one  which  explains  the 
difficulty  why  we  draw  from  a  thousand  instances  an 
inference  which  M^e  are  not  able  to  draw  from  one 
instance."^ 

^  Enquiry  concerning  the  Human  Understanding,  sect.  v.  It  will  be 
observed  that  this  argument  from  experience  of  which  we  are  speaking,  is 
different  from,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with,  what  we  call  the  argu- 
ment of  analogy.  The  term  analogy  itself  may  indeed  be  applied  to  any 
case  of  likeness  :  on  which  account  the  inference  from  like  past  to  like 
future,  or  the  argument  of  experience,  may  be  and  is  sometimes  called  an 
argument  of  analogy.  But  it  must  be  seen  that  it  makes  all  the  difference 
in  the  nature  of  the  argument  whether  it  is  applied  to  like  fliysical  facts  or 
like  acts  of  a  moral  being.  What  we  call  by  distinction  the  argument  of 
analogy  is  concerned  with  the  latter  :  it  is  an  argument  from  an  act  of  the 
Divine  Being  in  one  case  to  the  probability  of  a  like  act  in  another 
W'hich  appears  to  us  a  similar  case.  The  validity  of  this  argument,  then, 
depends  entirely  upon  the  similarity  of  these  two  cases  ;  the  resemblance  in 
the  two  sets  of  circumstances  and  nature  of  the  two  objects  to  which  the 
two  acts  belong — the  two  acts  from  the  one  of  which  we  argue  to  the  other. 
Nothing  could  be  more  absurd  than  to  argue  from  one  act  to  another  like 
it,  if  there  were  no  resemblance  in  the  cases  in  and  objects  for  which  the 
two  acts  were  j^erformed.  And  the  same  with  respect  to  the  negative  side 
of  analogy.  Nothing  could  be  more  absurd  than  to  suppose  that,  to  prove 
the  tenableness  of  one  course  of  action,  attributed  to  the  Deity,  in  one  case, 
it  was  enough  to  point  to  even  the  most  admitted  similar  course  of  Divine 
action  in  a  totally  different  case.  The  whole  validity,  then,  of  the  argument 
of  analogy  depends  upon  the  establishment  of  a  parallel  case,  i.e.  though  not 
absolutely  identical,  substantially  similar  :  and  for  the  correctness  of  this 
resemblance  in  the  two  cases  we  make  ourselves  responsible  when  we  use 
the  argument.  But  the  selection  of  a  real  parallel  or  like  case,  such  as 
this  argument  stands  in  need  of,  is  an  act  of  reason  and  judgment,  requiring 
thought  and  comparison ;  it  is  indeed  an  act  wliich  exercises  the  utmost 
discrimination  ;  and  is  therefore  an  act  of  another  kind  wholly  to  the 
mechanical  expectation  of  like  events  or  recurrences  in  nature.  Whence  it 
appears  that  the  argument  of  analogy,  as  it  is  called,  is  a  fundamentally 
different  argument  from  the  argument  of  experience. 


38  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

Aud  now,  the  belief  in  the  order  of  nature  being  thus, 
however  powerful  and  useful,  an  unintelligent  impulse  of 
which  we  can  give  no  rational  account,  in  what  way  does 
this  discovery  affect  the  question  of  miracles  ?  In  this 
way:  that  this  belief  not  having  itself  its  foundation  in 
reason,  the  ground  is  gone  upon  which  it  could  be  main- 
tained that  miracles  as  opposed  to  the  order  of  nature  were 
opposed  to  reason.  There  being  no  prodiTcible  reason  why 
a  new  event  should  be  like  the  hitherto  course  of  nature, 
no  decision  of  reason  is  contradicted  by  its  unlikeness.  A 
miracle  in  being  opposed  to  our  experience  is  not  only  not 
opposed  to  necessary  reasoning,  but  to  any  reasoning.  Do 
I  see  by  a  certain  perception  the  connexion  between  these 
two — It  lias  happened  so  :  it  loill  happen  so ;  then  may  I 
reject  a  new  reported  fact  which  has  not  happened  so,  as  an 
impossibility.  But  if  I  do  not  see  the  connexion  between 
these  two  by  a  certain  perception,  or  by  any  perception,  I 
cannot.  For  a  miracle  to  be  rejected  as  such  there  must  at 
any  rate  be  some  proposition  in  the  mind  of  man  which  is 
opposed  to  it :  and  tliat  proposition  can  only  spring  from 
the  quarter  to  which  we  have  been  referring,  viz.  that  of 
elementary  experimental  reasoning.  But  if  this  experi- 
mental reasoning  is  of  that  nature  which  philosophy 
describes  it  as  being  of,  i.e.  if  it  is  not  itself  a  process  of 
reason,  how  can  there  from  an  irrational  process  of  the 
mind  arise  a  proposition  at  all, — to  make  which  is  the 
function  of  the  rational  faculty  alone  ?  There  cannot ; 
and  it  is  evident  that  the  miraculous  does  not  stand  in  any 
opposition  whatever  to  reason. 

I  have  spoken  throughout  this  argument  of  the  belief  in 
the  order  of  nature  as  the  expectation  of  continuance.,  of  a 
like  f^iture ;  but  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  unlike 
event  is  a  future  or  a  reported  past  one  :  in  either  case  it 
comes  into  collision  with  the  expectation  of  likeness, 
which  takes  within  its  scope  alike  the  future  and  the  past. 


II]  Order  of  Nature  39 

The  report  of  a  past  unlike  event  encounters  the  same 
resistance  in  the  mind  as  the  idea  of  a  future  one. 

Thus  step  by  step  has  philosophy  loosened  the  connexion 
of  the  order  of  nature  with  the  ground  of  reason,  befriend- 
ing, in  exact  proportion  as  it  has  done  this,  the  principle  of 
miracles.  In  the  argument  against  miracles  the  first 
objection  is  that  they  are  against  law ;  and  this  is  answered 
by  saying  that  we  know  nothing  in  nature  of  law  in  the 
sense  in  which  it  prevents  miracles.  Law  can  only  pre- 
vent miracles  by  compeMing  and  making  necessary  the 
succession  of  nature,  i.e.  in  the  sense  of  causation ;  but 
science  has  itself  proclaimed  the  trath  that  we  see  no  causes 
in  nature;^  that  the  whole  chain  of  physical  succession  is 
to  the  eye  of  reason  a  rope  of  sand,  consisting  of  ante- 
cedents and  consequents,  but  without  a  rational  link  or 
trace  of  necessary  connexion  between  them.  We  only 
know  of  law  in  nature  in  the  sense  of  recurrences  in  nature, 
classes  of  facts,  like  facts  in  nature — a  chain  of  which,  the 
junction  not  being  reducible  to  reason,  the  interruption  is 
not  against  reason.  The  claim  of  law  settled,  the  next  ob- 
jection in  the  argument  against  miracles  is  that  they  are 
against  experience ;  because  we  expect  facts  like  to  those  of 
our  experience,  and  miracles  are  unlike  ones.  The  weight, 
then,  of  the  objection  of  unlikeness  to  experience  depends 
on  the  reason  which  can  be  produced  for  the  expectation  of 
likeness :  and  to  this  call  philosophy  has  replied  by  the 
summary  confession  that  we  have  no  reason.  Philosophy, 
then,  could  not  have  overthrown  more  thoroughly  than  it 
has  done  the  order  of  nature  as  a  necessary  course  of  things, 
or  cleared  the  ground  more  effectually  for  the  principle  of 
miracles. 

'  Taking  **  cause"  not  in  an  absolute  sense  as  necessarily  containing  its 
effect,  but  in  the  popular  sense  of  secondary  cause,  which  may  be  suspended 
by  a  higher  cause,  the  idea  of  real  causation  in  nature  is  not  opposed  to  the 
miraculous  ;  and  general  belief  has  united  the  two. 


40  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

Hitherto,  however,  we  have  beeu  dealing  with  the  infer- 
ence from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  or  the  belief  in  the 
uniformity  of  nature,  in  connexion  only  M'ith  the  facts  of 
vulgar  sensible  experience.  Let  us  now  regard  the  same 
inference  and  principle  in  connexion  with  science;  in 
which  connexion  it  .receives  a  more  imposing  name,  and  is 
called  the  inductive  principle.  The  inductive  inference  or 
principle  is  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which,  when  the 
philosopher  has  ascertained  by  discovery  a  particular  fact 
in  nature,  and  its  recurrence  in  the  same  connexion  within 
his  own  observation,  he  forthwith  infers  that  this  fact  will 
universally  take  place,  or  converts  it  into  a  law.  Does  this 
inference  from  past  experience,  then,  in  connexion  with 
science  pass  into  a  new  phase  and  become  luminous  and 
intellectual,  or  does  it  remain  the  same  blind  and  un- 
reasoning instinct  as  before  ? 

Wlien  we  examine,  then,  what  it  is  which  composes 
that  process  which  is  called  inductive  reasoning,  we  find 
that  it  consists  of  two  parts,  and  that  the  first  of  these  two 
parts  is  the  simple  discovery  of  a  fact.  There  is  wanted 
the  physical  cause  of  some  known  fact,  and  this  cause  is 
another  fact  not  known  as  yet  in  this  relation,  for  Avhich 
accordingly  the  philosopher  institutes  a  search.  It  must 
be  a  fact  which  fulfils  certain  conditions,  must  always  pre- 
cede the  known  fact  when  tlie  latter  takes  place,  and 
always  omit  this  precedence  when  it  does  not  take  place. 
The  test  of  invariable  antecedence  puts  aside  as  causes  on 
the  one  hand  all  the  facts  which  the  event  ^«/i'cs  place  ?nV7i- 
oxit,  and  on  the  other  hand  all  which  the  event  does  not 
take  place  vntli,  till  it  gets  at  the  residuum  which  is  the 
pliysical  cause.  The  sagacity  of  the  man  of  science,  then, 
is  shewn  in  hitting  upon  and  singling  out  the  fact  whicii 
fulfils  these  conditions  from  the  midst  of  the  whole  pro- 
miscuous crowd  of  facts  which  surround  the  phenomenon 
before  him — a  process  which  severely  tries  his  powers  of 


II]  Order  of  Nature  4 1 

observation,  force  and  steadiness  of  attention,  quickness  of 
apprehension,  watchfulness,  accuracy ;  his  powers  of  com- 
parison, of  seeing  things  in  relation,  and  detecting  hidden 
relationships  and  connexions  in  things.  He  has  to  extract 
the  real  key  to  the  enigma  out  of  a  quantity  of  deceptive 
and  misleading  promises  of  solution,  which  take  him  in  dif- 
ferent directions  only  to  retrace  his  steps  ;  he  has  to  repeat 
again  and  again  the  selection  of  facts  which  he  brings  to 
the  test,  to  see  if  they  answer  to  it ;  he  has  to  carry  in  his 
mind  a  large  body  of  old  observations,  in  order  to  provide 
connexion  and  productiveness  to  the  new. 

This  is  the  first  part,  then,  of  the  inductive  process  ;  but 
as  yet  we  have  only  ascertained  a  fact — a  fact  indeed 
which  fulfils  peculiar  conditions,  and  therefore  has  not 
been  observed  by  the  ordinary  use  of  the  eyes,  but  by  a 
process  of  selection  ;  but  still  no  more  than  a  fact,  that  is 
to  say,  a  particular  past  occurrence  which  has  been  often 
repeated ;  that  the  pursuit  of  it  has  been  regular  and 
systematic  does  not  alter  the  particularity  of  the  fact,  or 
make  it  at  all  the  more  a  universal  or  a  law.  To  take  the 
familiar  instance  of  the  discovery  of  vaccination.  In  this 
instance  it  was  discovered  that  in  all  the  observed  cases 
of  freedom  from  a  particular  complaint,  a  certain  fact 
preceded  that  fact ;  but  that  was  only  a  particular  observa- 
tion :  how  was  it  converted  into  a  universal,  or  into  the 
law  that,  where  that  fact  or  something  equivalent  to  it  pre- 
ceded, that  freedom  would  always  follow  ? 

The  inference,  then,  which  converts  scientific  observation 
into  law,  which  we  call  the  inductive  principle,  and  is  the 
second  part  of  the  inductive  process,  is  exactly  the  same 
instinct  which  converts  ordinary  and  common  experience 
into  law ;  viz.,  that  habit  by  which  we  always  extend  any 
existing  recurrent  fact  of  nature  into  the  future.  The  in- 
ductive principle  is  only  this  unreasoning  impulse  applied , 
to  a  scientifically  ascertained  fact,  instead  of  to  a  vulgarly 


42  Order  of  NaUire  [Lect. 

ascertained  fact.  Science  is  only  a  method  of  ascertaining 
the  fact,  which  when  once  ascertained  is  the  same  as  any 
common  fact,  and  dealt  with  by  our  nature  in  the  same 
way.  Science  has  led  up  to  the  fact,  but  there  it  stops, 
and  for  converting  the  fact  into  a  law,  a  totally  unscientific 
principle  comes  in,  the  same  as  that  which  generalizes  the 
commonest  observation  in  nature.  The  one  is  a  selected 
fact  indeed,  the  other  an  obvious  palpable  fact,  but  that 
which  gives  constancy  and  future  recurrence  to  each — the 
prediction  attaching  to  them,  is  a  simple  impression  of 
which  we  can  give  no  rational  account,  which  likens  the 
future  to  the  past.  The  naturalist  obtains  his  fact  by  his 
own  sagacity,  but  the  generalization  of  it  is  done  for  him, 
and  this  spontaneous  addition  is  the  same  in  the  discovery 
of  a  philosopher  and  the  observation  of  a  savage.  There  is 
all  the  difference  in  the  philosophical  rank  of  the  two  ob- 
servations, their  transition  from  fact  into  law  is  one  common 
mechanical  appendage.  That  which  stereotypes  them  both 
is  the  same,  and  for  his  future  or  universal  the  scientific 
man  falls  back  upon  the  same  instinct  as  that  which  sup- 
plies the  physical  prospect  of  the  peasant.  (2.) 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked  by  the  way,  that  what  is 
called  inductive  reasoning  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  reason- 
ing. It  is  called  so  because  an  inference  is  made  in  it,  a 
general  conclusion  is  drawn  from  particulars.  But  the 
first  part  of  the  inductive  process  is  not  reasoning  but  ob- 
servation ;  the  second  part  is  not  reasoning  but  instinct : 
the  scientific  part  is  not  inductive,  the  inductive  part  is 
not  scientific.  (3.)  Hence  we  cannot  attribute  to  scientific 
men,  by  however  penetrating  and  lofty  faculties  they  may 
have  discovered  facts,  any  peculiar  perception  of  recurrence 
or  law.  Language  has  been  used  as  if  science  generated  a 
perception  of  mathematical  or  necessary  sequence  in  the 
order  of  nature.  (4.)  But  science  has  herself  proclaimed 
the  truth  that  there  is  no  necessary  connexion  in  nature ; 


II]  Order  of  Nature  43 

nor  has  science  to  do  with  generalization  at  all,  but  only 
with  discovery.  And  I  may  add,  that  though  science  avails 
herself  of  the  inductive  principle  and  depends  for  all 
her  utility  upon  it,  still  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  this 
principle  is  not  the  province  of  physical  but  of  mental 
science. 

It  must  be  observed,  again,  that  the  inductive  principle 
thus  spoken  of  as  unscientific,  upon  which  the  order  of 
nature  is  founded,  is  totally  different  from  the  perception 
of  harmony  and  relation  in  nature.  We  use  the  phrase 
'order  of  nature'  in  two  senses;  that  of  arrangement,  and 
that  of  recurrence.  I  see  relation  amongst  different  things, 
and  I  call  that  the  order  of  nature ;  and  I  see  the  repetition 
of  the  same  thing,  and  I  call  that  the  order  of  nature  too. 
I  examine  the  component  parts,  and  see  their  wonderful 
and  subtle  adjustment ;  and  I  take  everything  in  a  lump, 
and  expect  its  uniform  continuance ;  and  both  of  these  I 
call  the  order  of  nature.  But  in  one  of  these  senses  order 
is  a  scientific  perception,  in  the  other  it  is  not :  and  though 
philosophers  have  a  far  deeper  insight  into  the  order  of 
nature  in  the  one  sense  than  common  people  have,  they 
have  not  in  the  other.  Their  knowledge  of  nature  enables 
them  to  unravel  the  multiplicity  of  relations  in  her,  and  so 
to  see  a  more  wonderful  and  nicer  agreement  or  system  in 
her ;  but  gives  them  no  greater  light  whereby  to  prophesy 
her  continuance  or  repetition.  While  we  also  remark  that 
it  is  not  in  the  sense  of  harmony  and  system  that  the  order 
of  nature  is  opposed  to  the  miraculous  at  all.  The  action 
of  some  intricate  engine  is  interrupted  designedly  for  some 
purpose ;  is  the  admirable  perfection  of  the  machinery  at 
all  interfered  with  by  that  fact  ?  Do  I  see  its  order  and 
arrangement  the  less  ?  Does  even  an  injurious  interrup- 
tion of  the  relations  of  the  internal  organs  of  the  body,  as 
disease  is,  make  our  bodily  structure  at  all  less  wonderful 
a  contrivance  ?     The  order  of  nature,  then,  in  the  sense  of 


44  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

its  harmony,  is  not  disturbed  by  a  miracle ;  the  interruption 
of  a  train  of  relations  in  one  instance  leaves  them  standing 
in  every  other,  i.e.  leaves  the  system  as  such  untouched. 
Xature  is  the  same  surprising  exhibition  of  mutual  relation 
and  adjustment,  whether  in  one  instance  or  so  the  action 
of  the  machine  is  or  is  not  interrupted.  What  is  disturbed 
by  a  miracle  is  the  m.echanical  expectation  of  recurrence, 
from  which,  and  not  from  the  system  and  arrangement  in 
nature,  the  notion  of  immutability  proceeds. 

"What  is  the  conclusion,  then,  to  be  drawn  from  this 
statement  of  the  process  of  induction  ?  It  is  this.  The 
scientific  part  of  induction  being  only  the  pursuit  of  a 
particular  .fact,  miracles  cannot  in  the  nature  of  tlie  case 
receive  any  blow  from  the  scientific  part  of  induction ;  be- 
cause the  existence  of  one  fact  does  not  interfere  with  the 
existence  of  another  dissimilar  fact.  That  which  docs  resist 
the  miraculous  is  the  ?t?iscientific  part  of  induction,  or  the 
instinctive  generalization  upon  this  fact.  The  inductive 
principle  being  that  which  assimilates  the  unknown  to  the 
known,  or  establishes  the  order  of  nature,  is  opposed  to  any 
dissimilar  fact  or  interruption  of  that  order,  whether  we 
think  of  it  as  going  to  be,  or  wdiether  we  think  of  it  as 
having  by  report  taken  place.  A  reported  miracle  is  a  re- 
ported case  in  which  the  oixler  of  nature  did  not  for  that 
instance  continue,  but  was  interrupted.  The  inductive 
principle  therefore  resists  that  miracle.  But  what  is  the 
inductive  principle  ?  What  is  its  nature  ?  what  is  its 
force  ?  what  is  its  weiglit  upon  such  a  question  ?  Tlie  in- 
ductive principle  is  simply  the  mechanical  expectation  of 
the  likeness  of  the  unknown  to  the  known,  not  become  any 
more  luminous  than  it  was  before  because  its  subject-mat- 
ter is  higher;  but  being  in  the  most  vulgar  and  the  most 
scientific  material  alike  unreasoning,  i.e.  no  part  of  the  dis- 
tinctive reason  of  man.  When,  then,  there  is  nothing  on 
the  side  of  reason  opposed  to  it,  as  is  the  case  commonly 


II]  Order  of  Nature  45 

we  follow  it  absolutely.  But  supposing  there  should  arise 
a  call  of  reason  to  us  to  believe  what  is  opposite  to  it ;  sup- 
posing there  is  the  evidence  of  testimony,  w^hich  is  an  aj)- 
peal  to  our  proper  reason,  that  an  event  has  taken  place 
which  is  opposed  to  this  impression — it  is  evident  then 
that  our  reason  must  prevail  in  the  encounter,  i.e.,  that  if 
there  is  on  one  side  positive  evidence,  the  antecedent 
counter-expectation  of  instinct  must  give  way.  And  thus 
we  come  round  to  Butler's  statement  of  the  ground  of  ex- 
perience, that  "  there  is  a  probability  that  all  things  will 
continue  as  we  experience  they  are,  except  in  those  re- 
spects in  wdiich  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be 
altered."  This  definition  of  the  force  of  experience  is  an 
appeal  to  our  consciousness,  and  our  consciousness  responds 
to  it,  recognising  no  other  belief  in  the  order  of  nature  but 
the  one  thus  described.  But  as  thus  described  this  belief 
is  self-limited,  and  intrinsically  admits  of  events  contrary 
to  it ;  within  its  very  body  and  substance  is  contained  the 
confession  of  its  own  possible  error,  the  anticipation  of  rea- 
sonable contradiction  to  it. 

The  proper  function  of  the  inductive  principle,  the  argu- 
ment from  experience,  or  the  belief  in  the  order  of  nature 
— by  whatever  phrase  we  designate  the  same  instinct — is 
to  operate  as  a  practical  basis  for  the  affairs  of  life  and  the 
carrying  on  of  human  society.  Without  it  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  the  world  to  go  on,  because  without  it  we 
should  have  no  future  before  us  to  calculate  upon;  we 
should  not  feel  any  assurance  of  the  continuance  of  the 
world  itself  from  moment  to  moment.  This  principle  it  is, 
then,  which  makes  human  life  practicable ;  which  utilizes 
all  our  knowledge ;  which  makes  the  past  anything  more 
than  an  irrelevant  picture  to  us  ;  for  of  what  use  is  the  ex- 
perience of  the  past  to  us  unless  we  believe  the  future  will 
be  like  it  ?  But  it  is  also  evident  what  is  not  the  proper 
function  of  this  principle.     It  does  not  belong  to  this  prin- 


46  Order  of  Nature  [Lect. 

ciple  to  lay  down  speculative  positions,  and  to  say  what 
can  or  cannot  take  place  in  the  world.  It  does  not  belong 
to  it  to  control  religious  belief,  or  to  determine  that  certain 
acts  of  God  for  the  revelation  of  His  will  to  man,  reported 
to  have  taken  place,  have  not  taken  place.  Such  decisions 
are  totally  out  of  its  sphere ;  it  can  assert  the  universal  as 
a  law ;  but  the  universal  as  a  law  and  the  universal  as  a 
proposition  are  wholly  distinct.  The  proposition  is  the 
universal  as  a  fact,  the  law  is  the  universal  as  a  presump- 
tion ;  the  one  is  an  absolute  certainty,  the  other  is  a  prac- 
tical certainty,  Mdien  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  the  con- 
trary. The  one  contains  and  includes  the  particular,  the 
other  does  not :  from  the  one  we  argue  mathematically  to 
the  falsehood  of  any  opposite  particular ;  from  the  otlier  we 
do  not.  Yet  there  has  existed  virtually  in  the  speculations 
of  some  philosophers  an  identification  of  a  universal  as  a 
law,  with  a  universal  proposition  ;  by  which  summary  ex- 
pedient they  enclosed  the  world  in  iron,  and  bound  the 
Deity  in  adamantine  fetters ;  for  such  a  law  forestalls  all 
exception  to  it.  An  apparently  counter-process  has  indeed 
accompanied  this  elevation  of  induction  to  mathematics, 
viz.,  the  lowering  of  mathematics  to  induction.  But  either 
form  of  identification  has  the  same  result,  for  if  demon- 
strable and  experimental  reasoning  stand  on  the  same 
ground,  an  alchemical  process  is  obtained  for  transmuting 
the  blind  inference  from  experience  into  demonstration, 
and  thus  endowing  the  order  of  nature  which  rests  upon 
that  experience  with  the  character  of  immutable  and  neces- 
sary law.  (5.) 

For  example,  one  signal  miracle,  pre-eminent  for  its 
grandeur,  crowned  the  evidence  of  the  supernatural  char- 
acter and  office  of  our  Lord — our  Lord's  ascension — His 
going  up  with  His  body  of  flesh  and  bones  into  the  sky,  in 
the  presence  of  His  disciples.  "  He  lifted  up  His  hands, 
and  blessed  them.     And  while  He  blessed  them,  He  was 


II]  Order  of  Nature  47 

parted  from  them,  and  carried  up  into  heaven.  And  they 
looked  steadfastly  toward  heaven  as  He  went  up,  and  a 
cloud  received  Him  out  of  their  sight."  ^ 

Here  is  an  amazing  scene,  which  strikes  even  the  devout 
believer,  coming  across  it  in  the  sacred  page  suddenly  or 
by  chance,  amid  the  routine  of  life,  with  a  fresh  surprise. 
Did,  then,  this  event  really  take  place  ?  Or  is  the  evidence 
of  it  forestalled  by  the  inductive  principle  compelling  us  to 
remove  the  scene  as  such  out  of  the  category  of  matters  of 
fact  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  inductive  principle  is  in  its 
own  nature  only  an  expectation ;  and  that  the  expectation, 
that  what  is  unlike  our  experience  will  not  happen,  is  quite 
consistent  with  its  occurrence  in  fact.  This  principle  does 
not  pretend  to  decide  the  question  of  fact ;  which  is  wholly 
out  of  its  province  and  beyond  its  function.  It  can  only 
decide  the  fact  by  the  medium  of  a  universal ;  the  universal 
proposition  that  no  man  has  ascended  to  heaven.  But  this 
is  a  statement  which  exceeds  its  power ;  it  is  as  radically 
incompetent  to  pronounce  it  as  the  taste  or  smell  is  to 
decide  on  matters  of  sight;  its  function  is  practical,  not 
logical.  No  antecedent  statement,  then,  which  touches  my 
belief  in  this  scene,  is  allowed  by  the  laws  of  thought. 
Converted  indeed  into  a  universal  proposition,  the  induc- 
tive principle  is  omnipotent,  and  totally  annihilates  every 
particular  which  does  not  come  within  its  range.  The  uni- 
versal statement  that  no  man  has  ascended  into  heaven, 
absolutely  falsifies  the  fact  that  One  Man  has.  But  thus 
transmuted,  the  inductive  principle  issues  out  of  this  meta- 
morphose, a  fiction  not  a  truth ;  a  weapon  of  air,  which 
even  in  the  hand  of  a  giant  can  inflict  no  blow  because  it 
is  itself  a  shadow.  The  object  of  assault  receives  the  un- 
substantial thrust  without  a  shock,  only  exposing  the  want 
of  solidity  in  the  implement  of  war.     The  battle  against 

^  Luke  xxiv.  50,  51  ;  Acts  i.  9,  10. 


48  Order  of  Nature 

the  supernatural  has  been  going  on  long,  and  strong  men 
have  conducted  it  and  are  conducting  it — hut  what  they 
want  is  a  weapon.  Tlie  logic  of  unbelief  wants  a  universal. 
But  no  real  universal  is  forthcoming,  and  it  only  wastes  its 
streuuth  in  wielding  a  fictitious  one. 


LECTURE  III 

INFLUENCE  OF  THE  IMAGINATION  ON  BELIEF 

Psalm  cxxxix.  14 
Marvellous  are  Thy  tvorks,  and  that  my  soul  hnoweth  right  well. 

IT  is  evident  that  the  effect  which  the  visible  order  of 
nature  has  upon  some  minds  is,  that  as  soon  as  they 
realize  what  a  miracle  is,  they  are  stopped  by  what  appears 
to  them  a  simple  sense  of  its  impossibility.  So  long  as 
they  only  believe  by  habit  and  education,  they  accept  a 
miracle  without  difiiculty,  because  they  do  not  realize  it  as 
an  event  which  actually  took  place  in  the  world ;  the  alter- 
ation of  the  face  of  the  world,  and  the  whole  growth  of  in- 
tervening history,  throw  the  miracles  of  the  Gospel  into  a 
remote  perspective  in  which  they  are  rather  seen  as  a  pic- 
ture than  as  real  occurrences.  But  as  soon  as  they  see 
that,  if  these  miracles  are  true,  they  once  really  happened, 
what  they  feel  then  is  the  apparent  sense  of  their  impossi- 
bility. It  is  not  a  question  of  evidence  with  them :  when 
they  realize,  e.g.,  that  our  Lord's  resurrection,  if  true,  was  a 
visible  fact  or  occurrence,  they  have  the  seeming  certain 
perception  that  it  is  an  impossible  occurrence.  "  I  cannot," 
a  person  says  to  himself  in  effect,  "  tear  myself  from  the 
type  of  experience,  and  join  myself  to  another.  I  cannot 
quit  order  and  law  for  what  is  eccentric.  There  is  a  repul- 
sion between  such  facts  and  my  belief  as  strong  as  that 
between  physical  substances.     In  the  mere  effort  to  con- 

D 


50  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

ceive  these  amazing  scenes  as  real  ones,  I  fall  back  upon 
myself  and  upon  that  type  of  reality  which  the  order  of 
nature  has  impressed  upon  me." 

Now  when  such  a  person  proceeds  to  probe  the  ground 
of  his  deep  objection  to  a  miracle,  the  first  thing,  I  think, 
that  cannot  but  strike  him  is  how  very  poor  any  reason  he 
can  allege  and  specify  is,  compared  with  the  amount  of  his 
own  inward  feeling  of  certainty.  If  he  is  a  reflecting  per- 
son, he  cannot  but  be  struck  of  his  own  accord  with  this 
singular  disproportion  between  the  two — on  the  one  hand  an 
overpowering  prepossession,  on  the  other  hardly  anything  to 
sustain  it.  The  form  in  which  he  will  first  put  his  reason 
to  himself  will  perhaps  be  that  miracles  are  inconceivable 
to  him.  But  what  is  meant  by  this  assertion  ?  That  the 
causes  are  inconceivable  ?  But  the  causes  of  the  commonest 
physical  facts  are  the  same.  That  the  facts  are  inconceiv- 
able ?  But  the  facts  are  not  inconceivable,  but  conceiv- 
able. I  can  conceive  the  change  of  water  into  wine  just 
as  easily  as  I  can  conceive  any  chemical  conversion ;  i.e.  I 
can  first  conceive  water,  and  then  I  can  conceive  wine  in 
the  place  of  water ;  and  that  is  all  I  can  do  in  the  case 
of  any  change  of  one  substance  into  another  in  chemistry. 
The  absence  of  the  medium  of  an  artificial  process  only 
makes  the  cause  inconceivable,  not  the  fact.  So  I  can  form 
the  idea  of  a  dead  man  alive  again,  just  as  easily  as  I  can 
of  the  process  of  decay ;  one  fact  is  as  conceivable  as 
another,  while  the  causes  are  alike  inconceivable  of  both. 

We  cannot  rest,  then,  at  the  reason  of  inconceivableness, 
but  must  go  on  to  some  further  one.  Is  it  that  miracles 
are  physical  results  produced  without  means,  without  a 
physical  m.edium  intervening  between  the  Divine  will  and 
the  result  ?  But  we  cannot  pronounce  upon  the  fact  of  the 
total  absence  of  means,  but  only  on  their  invisibility,  Avhich 
belongs  to  many  steps  and  media  in  nature.  Nor  can  we 
pronounce  upon  the  necessity  of  physical  means ;  for  even 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  51 

in  the  natural  action  of  will  or  spirit  upon  matter,  there 
must  be  a  point  at  which  the  one  acts  on  the  other  without 
a  medium,  however  inconceivable  that  may  be  ;  otherwise 
if  the  media  never  end,  the  one  never  gets  at  the  other 
at  all. 

The  reason  then  against  miracles  that  we  come  to  at  last, 
and  in  which  all  these  vaguer  reasons  end,  is  simply  their 
urdikcncss  to  the  order  of  nature.  A  suspension  of  tlie  order 
of  nature  is  the  ordinary  phrase  in  which  we  express  this 
unlikeness  to  the  order  of  nature  (i) ;  but  whether  or  not 
we  call  unlikeness  by  this  term,  the  fact  itself  is  the  ulti- 
mate objection  to  a  miracle.  It  was  shewn,  however,  in 
my  last  lecture,  what  the  expectation  of  likeness  was,  and 
that  no  reason  against  an  unlike  event  as  such  was  pro- 
ducible or  even  imaginable. 

The  rejecter  of  miracles  has  indeed,  in  the  overpowering 
force  of  an  impression  upon  his  liiind,  something  to  which 
argument  is  hardly  adapted.  Every  time  he  recalls  a 
miracle  to  his  imagination,  he  recalls  a  felt  something  at 
the  bottom  which  in  his  own  idea  closes  the  door  against 
it ;  something  at  the  root  of  the  matter  which  is  untouched, 
a  true  cause  of  conviction  which  is  unanswered  ;  he  cannot 
conceive  that  so  strong  a  rejecting  influence  as  he  feels  can 
be  without  rational  necessity ;  that  the  force  of  the  resis- 
tance in  his  mind  is  not  its  own  vindication. 

And  yet  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  anything — 
possibility — i.e.  as  far  as  we  know — is  a  judicial  question 
which  must  be  decided  in  the  same  way  as  a  question  of 
fact.  There  is  a  court  which  decides  this  question — the 
inner  court  of  our  own  mind,  in  which  witnesses  are  cited 
and  evidence  is  heard.  The  witnesses  cited  into  this  court 
are  all  the  faculties  and  perceptions  of  our  minds ;  and 
when  they  have  answered  to  the  summons,  one  question  is 
put  to  them, — Does  any  reason  exist  why  a  miracle  is  im- 
possible ?     If  they  know  of  none,  the  case  is  over.     The 


52  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

court  of  possibility  decides  in  the  same  way  in  which  a 
court  of  fact  does.  It  is  an  open  court  into  which  all  mankind 
are  admitted,  for  indeed  the  witness  in  that  court  is  the 
collective  reason  of  mankind,  which  appears  there  to  give  an 
account  of  itself,  to  declare  to  its  own  known  contents,  and 
whether  amongst  them  all  there  is  found  a  reason  for  the  im- 
possibility of  a  miracle.  Science  has  its  summary  evidence 
of  fact  by  which  it  challenges  foregone  conclusions;  and 
reason  has  the  same. 

What  has  been,  then,  in  the  present  instance  the  cause  at 
work — that  which  has  made  a  reason,  when  there  was  none, 
against  the  miraculous  as  such  ?  I  cannot  but  think  that 
under  an  intellectual  disguise  it  is  the  imagination.  The 
design,  as  I  have  stated,  of  the  inductive  principle  or  belief 
in  the  order  of  nature  is  a  practical  one — to  enable  provision 
to  be  made  for  human  life  and  welfare ;  which  could  not  be 
done  unless  we  could  reckon  upon  the  likeness  of  the  past 
to  the  future.  For  without  this  expectation,  wliat  would 
be  our  prospect  ?  Every  moment  of  nature  might  be  its 
last,  and  we  shou.ld  live  upon  the  constant  brink  of  utter 
change  and  dissolution,  which  would  paralyze  all  action  in 
us.  But  the  impression  as  it  exists  in  us  by  nature  being 
entirely  a  practical  one,  and  this  being  its  legitimate  and 
constitutional  scope,  imagination  seizes  hold  of  it  and 
diverts  it  from  its  scope  ;  by  brooding  upon  it  exaggerates 
it ;  converts  a  practical  expectation  into  a  scientific  truth, 
and  extracts  from  an  unreasoning  instinct  what  it  cannot 
by  its  very  nature  contain — a  universal  intellectual  proposi- 
tion, that  the  order  of  nature  is  immutable. 

We  apply  the  term  imagination  to  denote  that  faculty 
by  which  the  mind  adds  anything  out  of  itself  to  a  fact  or 
truth,  whether  that  fact  or  truth  be  a  visible  object,  or  an 
idea  or  motive  within  us.  Being  such,  however,  the  ima- 
gination has  a  very  different  moral  aspect  according  as  it 
acts  in  one  or  other  of  two  ways  ;  that  is  to  say,  actively. 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  53 

by  energy  and  self-exertion  from  within,  or  passively,  by 
yielding  to  an  impulse  or  impression  from  without.  In 
either  case  it  adds  to  a  fact  something  which  that  fact  does 
not  supply  of  itself ;  for  to  yield  too  much  to  an  impression 
is  to  exaggerate  it :  but  the  two  cases  of  addition  widely 
differ.  When  the  imagination  acts  by  energy  from  within, 
when  it  enables  us  to  see  the  force  and  extent  of  some 
truth,  to  grasp  a  condition  of  things  external  to  ourselves, 
to  understand  the  feelings  and  the  wants  of  others,  to  ad- 
mire nature,  to  sympathize  with  man ;  or  when  it  aids  in 
the  work  of  combination,  construction,  invention  ;  in  thus 
actively  imparting  meaning  and  life  to  facts,  imagination  is 
a  noble  and  effective  instrument,  if  indeed  we  may  not  call 
it  a  part,  of  reason.  But  when  the  imagination  exaggerates 
an  impression  by  passively  submitting  and  surrendering 
itself  to  it,  when  it  gives  way  to  the  mere  force  of  attrac- 
tion, and  instead  of  grasping  something  else,  is  itself  grasped 
and  mastered  by  some  dominant  idea — it  is  then  not  a 
power,  but  a  failing  and  a  weakness  of  nature.  We  may 
call  these  respectively  active  and  passive  imagination. 
When  imagination  is  spoken  of  in  books  of  morals  as  a 
common  source  of  delusion  and  unhappiness  in  men,  who 
are  carried  away  by  their  joys  and  griefs,  their  hopes  and 
fears,  and  allow  impressions  to  fasten  upon  them  till  they 
cannot  shake  them  off,  it  is  not  the  active  imagination 
which  is  meant,  but  the  passive. 

The  passive  imagination,  then,  in  the  present  case  exag- 
gerates a  practical  expectation  of  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
implanted  in  us  for  practical  ends,  into  a  scientific  or  uni- 
versal proposition ;  and  it  does  this  by  surrendering  itself 
to  the  impression  produced  by  the  constant  spectacle  of  the 
regularity  of  visible  nature.  By  such  a  course  a  person 
allows  the  weight  and  pressure  of  this  idea  to  grow  upon 
him  till  it  reaches  the  point  of  actually  restricting  his 
sense  of  possibility  to  the  mould  of  physical  order.     It  is  a 


54  Infiiience  of  the  [Lect. 

common  remark  that  repetition  as  such  tends  to  make  itself 
believed  ;  and  that  if  an  assertion  is  simply  reiterated  often 
enough  it  makes  its  way  to  acceptance ;  which  is  to  say 
that  the  force  of  impression  produces  belief  independently 
of  reason.  The  order  of  nature  thus  stamps  upon  some 
minds  the  idea  of  its  immutability  simply  by  its  repetition. 
The  imagination  we  usually  indeed  associate  with  tlie  ac- 
ceptance of  the  supernatural  rather  than  with  the  denial  of 
it ;  but  the  passive  imagination  is  in  truth  neutral ;  it  only 
increases  the  force  and  tightens  the  hold  of  any  impression 
upon  us,  to  whatever  class  the  impression  may  belong ; 
and  surrenders  itself  to  a  superstitious  or  a  physical  idea, 
as  it  may  be.  Materialism  itself  is  the  result  of  imagina- 
tion, which  is  so  impressed  by  matter  that  it  cannot  realize 
the  existence  of  spirit. 

The  passive  imagination  thus  accounts  for  the  rise  of  the 
apparent  perception  of  the  impossibility  of  a  miracle.  For 
what  is  this  perception  in  those  who  have  it,  and  what  is 
the  actual  form  which  it  takes  ?  The  form  which  it  takes 
is  this,  that,  upon  the  image  of  a  miracle  occurring  to  the 
mind,  there  is  at  once  an  entire  starting  back  and  repulsion 
from  it,  as  from  sometliing  radically  antagonistic  to  the  very 
type  of  reality  and  matter  of  fact.  Xow,  that  a  contradiction 
to  the  order  of  nature  should  excite  a  provisionary  resis- 
tance in  our  minds  is  inevitable ;  because  we  possess  the 
instinctive  expectation  of  uniformity,  unlikeness  disagrees 
with  that  expectation,  this  disagreement  creates  surprise, 
and  surprise  is  provisionary  resistance.  But  what  is  it  that 
makes  this  provisionary  resistance  final  ?  Is  it  reason  ? 
No.  Eeason  imposes  no  veto  upon  unlikeness.  Then  it  is 
the  imagination.  Eeason  may  reject  that  unlike  event  for 
want  of  evidence,  imagination  alone  can  reject  it  as  such. 

Is  it  not  true,  indeed,  that  the  intellect,  like  the  feelings 
and  affections,  is  capable  of  contracting  bad  habits,  which 
need  not  at  all  interfere  with  the  soundness  and  acuteness  of 


Ill]  Imagination  07t  Belief  55 

it  in  general,  but  may  only  corrupt  and  disable  the  judg- 
ment upon  particular  subjects  ?  If  then,  when  there  is  no 
producible  reason  why  a  miracle  should  be  impossible,  a 
person  appears  to  himself  to  perceive  that  it  is  ;  if  the  in- 
tellect is  so  bound  to  the  order  of  nature  that  it  rejects  by 
an  instantaneous  impulse  a  fact  of  a  contrary  type  as 
such,  it  can  only  be  because  the  intellect  has  contracted  an 
imsound  habit  upon  that  subject-matter. 

It  will  be  replied,  however,  "  We  do  not  reject  strange 
and  anomalous  facts  as  such,  we  receive  many  such ;  and 
therefore  our  disbelief  in  miracles  is  not  the  effect  of  ima- 
gination starting  back  from  an  eccentric  type."  But  I 
answer,  that  the  acceptance  of  eccentric  facts  solely  upon 
the  hypothesis  that  they  are  ultimately  reducible  to  the 
order  of  nature,  is  not  an  acceptance  of  really  eccentric 
facts.  They  are  admitted  and  receive  assent  only  upon  the 
idea  that  their  eccentricity  is  a  temporary  mask,  underneath 
which  really  lie  facts  which  come  under  the  head  of  existing 
classes  and  known  laws.  They  are  accepted  as  hypothetically 
like,  facts  to  known  ones,  not  as  unlike  ones.  Notwithstand- 
ing all  the  admission  which  is  extended  to  such  pheno- 
mena, facts  ultimately  eccentric  excite  as  such  a  final 
resistance  in  the  minds  to  which  we  are  alluding,  although 
no  reason  for  their  impossibility  is  forthcoming. 

And  yet  we  may  see  how  the  imagination  is  compelled 
to  confront  and  consent  to  the  most  inconceivable  things, 
because  it  is  dragged  by  the  reason  to  do  it.  Two  great 
counteracting  influences  appeal  to  it  to  preserve  its  balance 
against  the  impression  from  the  uniformity  of  nature,  and  to 
rouse  it  from  its  lethargic  submission  to  custom  and  recur- 
rence. One  is  the  wonders  of  the  visible  world,  the  other 
is — for  in  this  discussion  I  assume  the  doctrines  of  natural 
religion — the  wonders  of  the  invisible  world. 

First  the  wonders  of  nature  appeal  to  the  imagination, 
in   counteraction   to   the   yoke   of  physical  law.     If  we 


56  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

examine  into  the  nature  of  the  sense  of  wonder,  we  see 
that  it  implies  a  kind  of  resistance  in  the  mind, —  often, 
indeed  more  generally,  a  pleased  resistance, — but  still  a 
resistance  to  the  facts  which  excite  it.  There  is  an  ele- 
ment of  doubt  in  wonder,  a  hesitation,  a  difficulty  in 
taking  in  the  new  material  and  incoi'porating  it  in  the 
existing  body  of  belief  There  is  a  sense  of  strangeness  in 
wonder,  of  something  to  overcome  in  the  character  of  the 
fact  presented  to  it.  All  wonder  therefore,  where  the  facts 
are,  as  they  are  in  the  case  of  natural  marvels,  admitted,  is 
a  precedent  for  facts  resisted  and  yet  believed,  resisted  on 
one  side  of  our  nature,  believed  on  another;  all  wonder 
therefore  tends  to  dispose  us  to  the  supernatural.  We  see 
that  in  nature  God  acts  in  modes  which  astonish  us,  which 
startle  us.  On  every  side  are  seeming  incredibilities.  Why 
should  this  be  so  ?  Why  is  nature  such  a  dispensation  of 
surprises  ?  Why  is  it  that  no  processes,  no  methods,  no 
means  to  ends  go  on  in  her  which  do  not  contain  this 
element  ?  Is  it  the  unavoidable  condition  of  existence  at 
all  that  it  should  be  wonderful,  and  that  all  its  mechanism 
should  be  wonderfid.  ?  Whether  it  is  or  no,  the  wonders  of 
nature  are  precedents  of  the  kind  which  I  mention. 

But  we  have  no  sooner  said  thus  much  than  we  are  im- 
mediately met  by  the  fact  that  many  men  who  have  had 
the  deepest  sense  of  the  wonderful  in  nature  have  been 
disbelievers  in  the  supernatural :  and  the  names  of  some 
great  poets,  and  men  of  powerful  imagination  in  the  realm 
of  science,  will  occur  as  familiar  instances  of  this.  What, 
then,  is  the  difference  in  the  sense  of  wonder  in  these  two 
spheres  such  as  would  account  for  this  fact ;  and  what  is 
the  relation  in  which  the  wonderful  in  nature  stands  to  the 
supernatural  ? 

The  old  saying  then,  that  nature  is  as  wonderful  really 
as  any  miracle,  were  we  not  so  accustomed  to  her,  omits 
the  task  of  comparison,  and  does  not  bring  out  an  im- 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  57 

portant  distinction  which  exists  between  these  two  kinds 
of  the  wonderful.  A  wonder  of  natural  science  is  wonder- 
ful on  its  own  account,  and  by  reason  of  what  is  actually 
seen  in  it.  In  some  vast  disposition  of  nature  for  supply- 
ing the  eye  with  light,  or  the  vegetable  with  proper  nutri- 
ment, or  the  limbs  with  active  power,  or  for  providing  the 
breath  of  life  itself,  or  for  communicating  heat,  or  distribut- 
ing colour,  or  for  sustaining  the  motions  of  the  heavens, 
or  for  any  of  those  innumerable  purposes  for  which  the 
physical  universe  is  adapted  and  contrived — it  is  the 
incredible  power  which  comes  out  and  exhibits  and  ex- 
presses itself  in  the  arrangement  which  constitutes  the 
subject  of  wonder.  The  effect  is  like  that  of  looking  on 
some  gigantic  machine  in  motion :  it  is  the  regulated  force 
in  action  before  our  eyes  that  arrests  us,  which  we  admire 
for  its  own  sake.  The  greatness  lies  in  what  is  present 
and  addresses  itself  to  our  perceptions,  as  power  in  execu- 
tion. This  is  the  case  especially  in  the  impression  made 
upon  ns  by  those  extraordinary  revelations  of  science 
w^hich  divulge  as  it  were  the  miracles  of  nature, — the  dis- 
closures, e.g.  of  the  velocity  of  some  of  the  motions  of 
nature,  or  the  magic  of  her  metamorphoses  and  conver- 
sions. Even  in  the  region  of  rude  nature  the  source  of 
wonder  is  in  this  respect  the  same,  that  that  emotion 
arises  in  consequence  of  some  signal  force  of  nature  which 
comes  out  and  is  manifested  and  expressed;  which  thus 
strikes  us  with  astonishment  on  its  own  account.  Such  is 
the  impression  produced  by  the  speed  of  lightning,  the 
rage  of  winds,  the  weight  of  waters,  even  the  great  sounds 
of  nature.  And  the  same  remark  applies  to  the  ]Derception 
of  the  obvious  and  palpable  features  of  order,  beauty,  and 
grandeur  in  nature  ;  viz.  that  the  effect  which  they  pro- 
duce upon  our  minds  is  an  effect  arising  from  something 
which  is  expressed  and  which  comes  out  before  ovir  eyes. 
But  while  the  marvel  of  nature  surprises  on  account  of 


58  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

what  is  visible  and  expressed  in  it,  a  miracle,  on  the  other 
hand,  excites  our  ■svonder  less  as  a  visible  fact  than  as  the 
sign  of  an  invisible  one :  the  wonderful  really  lies  behind 
it ;  for  that  which  lies  behind  a  miracle,  the  true  reality  of 
which  the  eccentric  sign  is  but  the  veil  and  front,  is  the 
world  supernatural.  A  miracle  shows  design  and  inten- 
tion, i.e.  is  the  act  of  a  Personal  Being.  Some  one,  there- 
fore, there  is  who  is  moving  behind  it,  with  whom  it 
brings  us  in  relation,  a  spiritual  agent  of  whose  presence  it 
speaks.  A  miracle  is  thus,  if  true,  an  indication  of  another 
world,  and  an  unseen  state  of  being,  containing  personality 
and  will;  of  another  world  of  moral  being  besides  this 
visible  one ;  and  this  is  the  overawing  and  impressing  con- 
sideration in  it;  in  the  wonder  excited  by  it,  the  mind 
rests  only  momentarily  on  the  external  fact,  and  passes  on 
immediately  to  that  mysterious  personal  power  out  of 
nature  of  which  it  is  the  token. 

Hence  we  obtain  the  true  scope  and  character  of  that 
affection  or  propensity  of  the  human  mind  which  we  call 
the  love  of  the  supernatural.  It  is  impossible  to  question 
the  existence  and  universality  of  this  aflection,  and  that  it 
is  an  affection  which  is  productive  of  a  characteristic  sensa- 
tion of  pleasure.  And  when  we  examine  and  analyze  this 
sensation,  and  investigate  the  source  of  this  gratification — 
one  instance  of  which  indeed  we  may  say  we  have  even  in 
the  interest  which  attaches  to  those  reported  cases  of 
supernatural  communications  and  visits  from  the  unseen 
world,  upon  whatever  evidence  resting,  which  we  have  all 
heard  in  conversation — when  we  trace,  I  say,  this  emotion 
to  its  source,  we  find  it  deeply  and  intimately  connected 
with  the  sense  of  eternity  in  our  minds,  the  desire  for  our 
own  future  existence.  Any  communication  from  the  un- 
seen world — supposing  it  for  an  instant  to  be  true — is  a 
token  of  personal  existence  going  on  in  that  world,  and  so 
a  pledge,  as  it  were,  of  the  continuation  of  our  own  per- 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  59 

sonal   life   when   we   depart   hence.     We   are   interested 
parties  therefore.     How  indeed  do  we  see  people  super- 
stitiously,  fancifully,  and  therefore  wrongly,  catching  at 
such  signs  of  another  world  as  if  for  safety ;  at  anything 
which  promises  a  rescue  from  the  absorption  of  the  grave. 
But  the  very  morbid  excess  of  such  longings  shows  that 
the  love  of  the  supernatural  is  no  fictitious  feeling.     A 
miracle   then,   besides   all  the   other  purposes   which   it 
serves,  is  an  answer  to  this  affection ;  it  speaks  to  us  of  a 
power  out  of  this  order  of  things,  of  will,  of  Moral  Being, 
of  Personal  Being  in  another  world — of  His  existence,  whose 
existence,  according  to  our  Lord's  argument,  is  a  security  for 
the  continuance  of  our  own.    Thus  a  miracle  has  an  awe  and 
a  wonder  attaching  to  it  which  is  peculiarly  its  own,  and 
is  in  marked  contrast  with  physical  wonder ;  because  it  is 
a  sign  of  an  invisible  world.     It  speaks  to  us  in  a  manner 
and   to   a  purpose,  which  all  the  astonishing   forces   of 
nature  collected  together  cannot  reach   to :   because  it  is 
addressed  immediately  to  the  soul,  to  the  sense  of  immor- 
tality.    The  marvels  of  nature  do  not  address  themselves 
immediately  to  this  part  of  us.     Physical  wonder  is  simply 
an  entering  into  present  reality,  into  loliat  things  are ;  the 
sense  is  part  of  our  very  understanding ;  for  though  great 
intellects  have  it  most,  a  man  must  be  without  intellect  at 
all  who  has  no  wonder.     And  therefore  all  the  marvels  and 
all  the  stupendous  facts  in  nature  do  not  speak  to  us  in 
that  way  in  which  one  miracle  speaks  to  us ;  because  thei/ 
do  not  speak  to  us  directly  of  eternity ;  t?oe'i/  do  not  tell  us 
that  we  are  not  like  themselves — passing  waves  of  the  vast 
tide  of  physical  life. 

And  here  I  will  just  remark  upon  the  perverse  deter- 
mination of  Spinoza  to  look  at  miracles  in  that  aspect 
which  does  not  belong  to  them,  and  not  to  look  at  them  in 
that  aspect  which  does.  He  compares  miracles  with 
nature,  and  then  says  how  wise  is  the  order  of  nature,  how 


6o  Injiucnce  of  the  [Lect. 

meaningless  the  violation  of  it;  how  expressive  of  the 
Almighty  ]\Iind  the  one,  what  a  concealment  of  it  the 
other !  But  no  one  pretends  to  say  that  a  miracle  com- 
petes with  nature,  in  physical  purpose  and  effectiveness. 
That  is  not  its  object.  But  a  miracle,  though  it  does  not 
profess  to  compete  with  nature  upon  its  rival's  own 
ground,  has  a  ghostly  force  and  import  which  nature  has 
not.  If  real,  it  is  a  token,  more  pointed  and  direct  than 
physical  order  can  be,  of  another  world,  and  of  ]\foral 
Being  and  Will  in  that  world.  And  I  may  add,  that  for 
this  effect  of  a  miracle  the  benevolent  and  philanthropical 
type  is  not  necessary,  however  befitting  such  miracles  as 
are  intended  to  be  emblems  of  Divine  love :  it  is  enough 
for  this  function  of  a  miracle  that  'power  is  shown :  nor  do 
we  on  that  accoimt  bow  down  to  the  tmre  power  in  a 
miracle,  but  only  to  that  power  as  the  sign  and  evidence  of 
a  truth  beyond  it. 

Wonder  in  the  natural  world,  then,  differs  from  that 
wonder  which  has  for  its  object  the  supernatural;  and  this 
accounts  for  the  fact,  referred  to  above,  of  some  men  of 
great  genius  not  having  been  believers  in  the  supernatural, 
though  they  had  the  deepest  sense  of  the  wonderful. 

But,  although  the  two  wonders  are  not  the  same,  it  is 
not  the  less  time  that  one  of  them  points  to  the  other, 
that  physical  wonder  is  an  introduction  to  the  belief  in 
the  supernatural.  It  is  an  introduction  to  it  in  this  way, 
that  it  tends  to  raise  in  the  mind  a  larger  idea  of  possi- 
bility— that  idea  which  is  expressed  in  the  old  quota- 
tion, that  "  there  are  more  things  in  heaven  and  earth 
than  are  dreamed  of  in  our  philosophy;"  the  notion  of 
the  potential  as  distinguished  from  what  is  actual ;  the 
sense  of  the  unknown.  The  same  faculty  of  imagination 
which  causes  wonder  also  naturally  produces  this  larger 
•sense  of  possibility ;  for  indeed  this  latter  is  a  'kind  of 
negative    imagination;    which    without    framing    positive 


Ill]  Iniagmation  on  Belief  6i 

images  or  figures  of  things,  or  putting  contingencies  into 
shajDe,  distinctly  contemplates  the  idea  of  what  is  out  of 
sight,  and  raises  up  a  vivid  sense  of  the  unknown  region  of 
what  may  be.  This  negative  imagination  is  in  the  affairs 
of  this  world  the  groundwork  of  a  worldly  sagacity ;  for 
those  who  are  conscious  of  surrounding  darkness,  though 
they  do  not  shape  to  themselves  the  contents  of  it,  catch 
the  more  readily  at  such  facts  as  emerge  to  light,  and  are 
more  cautious  under  their  concealment ;  and  in  spiritual 
things  partakes  of  the  nature  of  faith ;  for  a  sense  of  the 
possible  unknown  enters  largely  into  our  notion  of  faith. 

Nor  is  this  connection  of  the  sense  of  wonder  with  this 
sense  of  possibility  shown  by  a  common  source  only  in  the 
imagination;  it  is  also  proved  by  a  common  foe,  which  acts 
as  the  stupifier  and  suppressor  of  them  both — viz.  custom. 
Custom  proverbially  diminishes  wonder.  It  is  commonly 
noticed  as  a  deteriorating  effect  of  custom,  that  it  benumbs 
the  faculty  of  admiration.  The  case  has  been  often  put, 
that  could  we  imagine  ourselves  with  our  mature  faculties 
seeing  nature  for  the  first  time,  the  sight  of  her  glory  would 
act  irresistibly  upon  us  like  a  splendid  vision,  and  raise  the 
most  powerful  emotions ;  but  that  we  are  accustomed  to 
her  and  therefore  our  perception  of  her  sublimity  is  dead- 
ened.^ We  would  fain  release  ourselves  from  the  thraldom 
of  this  stupor,  unwind  to  its  very  last  link  the  chain  of 

^  "  Nil  aJeo  magnum  nee  tarn  mirabile  quicquam 
Principio,  quod  non  minuant  mirarier  omnes 
Paulatim  ;  ut  coeli  clarum  purumque  colorem 
Quemque  in  se  cohibent  paluutia  sidera  passim 
Luuseque  et  sulis  pra?clara  luce  nitorem  : 
Omnia  quse  si  nunc  primum  mortalibus  adsint 
Ex  iniproviso  ceu  sint  objecta  repente ; 
Quid  magis  his  rebus  poterat  mirabile  dici, 
Aut  minus  ante  cpiod  auderent  fore  credere  gentes  ? 
Nil  ut  opinor,  ita  htec  species  miranda  fuisset ; 
Quom  tibi  jam  nemo  fessus  satiate  videndi 
Suspicere  iu  cceli  dignatur  lucida  templa." — Lucretius,  ii.  1027. 


62  Injiueiice  of  the  [Lect. 

custom  by  which  we  are  bound,  and  win  back  the  original 
perception;  but  we  are  held  in  the  iron  grasp  of  necessity. 
The  efl'ect  of  constant  repetition  is  that  the  impression  wears 
off,  and  our  admiration  becomes  not  so  much  admiring  as  the 
consciousness  that  we  ought  to  admire.  And  yet  if  God, 
in  planting  us  here,  has  set  us  down  before  a  spectacle  which 
is  designed  to  elicit  our  admiration,  it  is  plain  that  this  de- 
fect of  it  is  a  confession  that  we  are  so  far  inadequate  to  the 
situation  in  which  we  are  placed.  I  do  not  say  that  it  may 
not  be  partially  remedied  by  effort  and  culture.  So  the 
awe  which  moral  and  religious  truths  inspire  wears  off  by 
repetition,  till  they  become  mere  words ;  unless  a  counter- 
acting force  is  found  in  our  own  minds.  And  thus  the  same 
person  may  exemplify  the  simultaneous  growth  of  the 
strengthening  and  M'eakening  effect  of  custom ;  deriving 
from  this  power  an  extraordinary  facility  and  readiness  in 
the  use  of  particular  faculties,  while  the  same  power  has 
deadened  in  him  the  impression  of  every  high  truth. 

But  if  custom  proverbially  diminishes  wonder,  its  effect 
in  limiting  the  idea  of  possibility  is  equally  proverbial :  for 
it  is  the  most  familiar  observation,  that  when  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  certain  modes  of  doing  things  we  get  to  think  no 
other  mode  possible.  No  incongruity  so  glaring  but  that  it 
is  harmony  itself  to  the  eye  of  custom  ;  no  combination  so 
true  but  that  it  looks  to  it  an  impossibility  :  because  the 
mind  has  surrendered  itself  captive  to  one  form  and  mould, 
and  cannot  conceive  anything  different  from  what  it  is. 
And  here  I  observe  the  questionable  company  in  which  the 
imjjression  of  immutability  in  the  order  of  nature,  i.e.  of 
the  possibility  of  nothing  out  of  it,  comes ;  for  the  same 
principle  that  limits  the  sense  of  possibility  also  deadens 
the  sense  of  wonder,  and  blunts  the  perception  of  beauty 
and  truth.  There  is  an  evident  analogy  in  these  two  effects 
of  custom ;  its  effect  upon  sensibility,  and  its  effect  upon 
belief.     For  I  have  shown  that  the  innnutability  of  the  order 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  63 

of  nature  is  the  decision  of  custom,  only  custom  operating 
on  the  area  of  all  nature  instead  of  a  small  and  local  scale.^ 
A  common  source  and  a  common  foe  then  alike  shew  the 
connection  of  the  sense  of  ^^  onder  with  the  larger  sense  of 
possibility;  while  the  connection  of  this  latter  with  the 
belief  in  the  supernatural  is  obvious.  The  sense  of  |)hysical 
wonder  therefore  is  through  this  medium  intrinsically  allied 
to  and  introductory  to  the  belief  in  the  supernatural.  It  is 
an  attitude  of  mind  which  favours  the  latter  belief.  We 
may  observe  that  some  old  religions,  e.g.  the  Scandinavian, 
and  the  still  earlier  Aryan,  seem  to  have  been  almost 
founded  upon  the  sense  of  physical  wonder.  At  the  same 
time  the  sense  of  wonder  in  nature  may  stop  at  a  first  stage 
and  not  reach  this  further  one  which  naturally  succeeds  to 
it.  Having  followed  its  object  up  to  the  gates  of  dark- 
ness, there  the  imagination  of  the  poet  rested ;  and  it  was 
the  more  likely  to  do  so  if  his  mind  was  under  the  in- 
fluence of  sensual  passion  or — what  is  a  better  though  still 
a  bad  reason — a  deep  prejudice  against  the  supernatural 
arising  from  passionate  indignation  at  the  abuses  of  religion, 
and  hypocrisy  in  the  profession  of  it. 

But  the  miraculous  having  a  natural  ally  in  the  marvels 
of  nature,  has  in  the  next  place  a  still  stronger  support  and 
a  more  direct  parallel  in  the  wonderful  truths  of  the  invisible 
world,  which  in  this  inquiry  we  assume. 

Upon  this  head,  then,  a  ground  has  been  recentl}^  taken 
which  deserves  notice.  "  We  are  ready,"  it  has  been  said, 
"  to  admit  the  existence  of  an  invisible  world  totally  differ- 
ent from  this  visible  one-  we  do  not  object  to  aiiy thing 
inconceivable  in  that  world ;  to  the  most  mysterious  and 

1  "  Quelle  raison  ont-ils  de  dire  qu'on  ne  peut  ressusciter  ?  Quel  est 
plus  difficile  de  luaitre  ou  de  ressusciter,  que  ce  qui  n'a  jamais  ete  soit,  ou 
que  ce  qui  a  ete  soit  encore  ?  Est  il  plus  difficile  de  venir  en  etre  que  d'y 
revenir  ?  La  coutume  nous  rend  I'un  facile  ;  la  manque  de  coutume  rend 
I'autre  impossible.  Populaire  facon  de  juger." — Pascal,  cd.  Faugcrc,\ol. 
ii.  p.  323- 


64  Injiue7ice  of  the  [Lect. 

incomprehensible  doctrines  relating  to  it ;  "we  leave  un- 
touched the  whole  domain  of  the  spiritual  and  invisible. 
But  the  existence  of  another  world  or  order  of  things  is 
another  thing  altogether  from  the  interruption  of  this. 
What  staggers  our  reason  is  not  the  invisible  supernatural, 
but  the  violation  of  physical  law."     (2.) 

This  position,  then,  breaks  down  with  respect  to  the 
doctrines  of  revelation,  for  the  simple  reason  that  those 
doctrines  require  miracles  for  their  proof,  and  therefore 
cannot  consist  with  the  rejection  of  the  miraculous.  But 
how  does  it  stand  as  a  simple  comparison  of  the  belief  in 
the  miraculous  with  the  belief  in  an  invisible  world  ? 

It  is  quite  true,  then,  that  if  there  is  any  intrinsic  absur- 
dity in  the  interruption  of  order  as  such,  the  absurdity  of 
the  interruption  of  order  in  one  world  is  not  cancelled  by 
the  existence  of  another  and  a  second  world:  and  it  is 
irrelevant  to  bring  forward  the  latter  fact  as  any  extenua- 
tion of  the  former.  But  if  the  objection  to  the  interruption 
of  order  is  only  a  certain  resistance  of  the  mind,  in  that 
case,  in  admitting  so  astonishing  a  conception  as  the  exis- 
tence of  an  invisible  world,  we  have  already  got  over  the 
resistance  of  our  minds  in  one  most  singular  and  remarkable 
instance ;  which  is  a  precedent  for  our  getting  over  it  in 
another  instance.  The  natural  effect  of  the  mind  taking 
in  one  strange  and  surprising  truth,  is  that  it  entertains 
less  opposition  to  another  truth,  on  account  of  its  being 
strange  and  surprising.  The  parallel  holds  in  this  impor- 
tant respect,  even  if  the  two  instances  are  distinguished 
from  each  other  in  some  points. 

For  what  image  can  be  presented  to  the  mind  which 
more  confounds  the  imagination  than  personal  existence 
after  the  body's  dissolution  ?  What  can  go  more  counter 
to  the  impress  of  experience  ?  What,  if  we  did  not  believe 
it  to  be  the  most  serious  of  all  facts,  would  be  a  more  wild 
and  eccentric  conception,  more  like  a  dream  of  imagination 


4 


Ill]  Imaginatiojt  on  Belief  65 

and  a  visionary  creation  of  the  poet,  than  the  existence  of 
another  invisible  world  of  created  beings  ?  If  a  reflecting 
person  is  asked  what  it  is  absolutely  easy  to  believe  in,  his 
answer  is  short, — Matter,  and  life  connected  with  matter. 
If  he  is  asked  what  it  is  not  absolutely  easy  to  believe  in, 
his  answer  is  equally  short, — Everything  else.  The  real 
belief  in  invisible  things  is,  and  is  intended  to  be,  and  is 
represented  in  Scripture  as  being,  not  entirely  easy,  but 
requiring  an  effort  and  ascent  of  the  mind.  To  a  carnal 
imagination  an  invisible  world  is  a  contradiction  in  terms 
— another  world  besides  the  wlioU  world.  ISTor  is  there 
much  difference  upon  this  head  between  the  unseen  world 
of  natural  religion  and  the  unseen  world  of  the  Nicene 
Creed.  The  notion  of  a  fixed  and  final  state  which  absorbs 
all  transitory  life ;  of  an  eternal  world  and  consummation 
of  all  things  which  gathers  into  itself  the  whole  spiritual 
population  of  the  universe,  and  distributes  into  its  infinite 
realms  of  endless  life  the  countless  millions  of  personal 
beings  who  pass  into  it  out  of  this  state  of  mortality — this 
or  the  Christian  doctrine  of  another  world  is  a  far  sublimer 
conception  than  any  pagan  one ;  but  another  world  at  all 
is  a  marvellous,  astonishing,  and  supernatural  conception. 
And  if  we  go  into  particulars,  we  know  that  there  must  be 
forms  of  life  in  that  world,  conditions  of  intelligence,  sights 
and  objects  in  it  which  follow  inconceivable  types.  And 
we  allow  all  this  to  be  a  reality,  and  innumerable  hosts  to 
be  living  now  in  that  unseen  sphere  which  is  only  divided 
from  us  by  the  veil  of  the  flesh.  Now  a  person  may  say 
that  a  marvellous  condition  of  things  in  another  world  is 
not  the  same  with  the  miraculous  in  this,  but  can  he 
embrace  the  former  conception  as  an  actual  truth,  without 
a  general  effect  on  his  standard  of  credibility  ?  Could  he 
avoid,  while  this  idea  was  vividly  upon  him,  feeling  less 
resistance  in  the  mind  to  the  miraculous  ?  Could  a  mir- 
acle look  otherwise  than   Uss  strange  to  him  with  the 

E 


66  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

strong  impression  of  an  existing  different  world  at  the 
moment  upon  Lis  mind  ?  Has  not  the  obstacle  of  unlike- 
ness  to  the  known  had  to  give  way,  and  has  there  not  been 
already  introduced  into  his  mind  something  wholly  alien 
to  the  experimental  contents  of  it  ?  That  which  is  repul- 
sive in  a  miracle  is  the  eccentricity  of  type  in  the  fact ; 
this  provokes  the  rejecting  instinct,  the  antagonism  of 
custom  or  experience;  but  in  the  admission  of  another 
world  he  has  already  passed  through  the  shock  of  this  col- 
lision. If  an  eternal  invisible  world  indeed  is  admitted  at 
all,  it  is  so  vast  a  conception,  that  this  visible  world  floats 
like  a  mere  fragment  upon  the  unfathomable  depths  of  that 
great  mystery ;  and  its  laws  assume  a  subordinate  rank. 

When,  then,  the  distinction  is  drawn  between  the  exist- 
ence of  another  world  and  the  violation  of  order  in  this 
world;  between  the  invisible  and  inconceivable,  and  the 
miraculous;  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  both  cases 
alike  there  is  a  difficulty  of  belief,  arising  from  the  common 
source  of  that  mental  habit  which  visible  order  engenders. 
If,  then,  I  yield  to  this  habit  in  the  one  instance,  why  may 
I  not  yield  to  it  in  the  other,  and  an  invisible  world  be- 
come an  unreal  conception  to  me  ?  An  historical  imagina- 
tion throws  itself  back  into  the  Gospel  era,  pictures  the 
people,  the  city,  the  passing  day  of  the  time  and  country ; 
then  when  it  has  made  that  time  as  real  as  possible,  as 
truly  present  time  once  as  to-day  is  now,  the  doubt  arises 
— How  can  I  believe  that  this  stupendous  miracle  was  a 
real  occurrence  ?  But  exactly  the  same  ord(;al  will  disturb 
the  belief  in  the  invisible  world.  Let  a  person  try  to  think 
it  real ;  let  him  say  to  hmiself — '  Is  the  whole  multitude 
that  has  passed  away  from  this  earthly  scene  since  the  race 
of  man  existed,  in  existence  now,  every  one  of  them  a 
living  person  in  the  realms  of  spirit ;  is  this  person,  is  tliat 
person  at  this  moment  living,  this  great  monarch,  that 
sagacious  statesman,  that  sublime  philosopher  or  poet,  that 


Ill]  hnaginatioii  on  Belief  67 

heroic  soldier  of  antiquity  ?  Are  the  men  of  all  ages,  from 
tlie  earliest  pastoral  tribe  to  the  generation  that  has  only 
just  departed  from  us,  enjoying  a  simultaneous  existence  in 
that  world?  Are  such  things  conceivable?'  As  such 
thoughts  crowd  upon  his  mind  will  he  not  find  it  as  difti- 
cult  to  think  all  this  a  reality,  as  he  does  the  miraculous  to 
be  such  ?  And  yet  if  he  does  not  think  it  a  reality,  what 
has  he  to  look  forward  to  himself  when  this  passing  scene 
is  over  ?  This  resistance,  then,  of  the  imagination  to  the 
miraculous  is  either  no  test  of  its  truth,  or  a  test  which 
endangers  the  existence  of  the  invisible  world  as  well. 

When  we  reduce  the  broad  distinction  drawn  between 
the  invisible  world  and  the  miraculous  as  objects  of  belief 
to  its  first  principle,  that  principle  would  seem  to  be  the 
principle  of  unity,  or,  if  we,  may  so  express  it,  one  xcorhl  at 
a  time, — that  the  two  worlds  admitted  to  exist,  must  exist 
in  absolute  disconnexion.  The  objection  felt  against  a 
miracle  is  that  it  offends  against  this  principle,  that  it  puts 
the  two  worlds  into  communication  and  junction  with  each 
other,  whereas  they  are  intrinsically  separate ;  that  it  is  an 
interpolation  from  one  order  of  things  into  another,  an  in- 
jection of  the  supernatural  into  the  sphere  of  the  natural, 
thus  confounding  two  systems  which  are  perfectly  distinct. 
Can  the  Supreme  Mind  or  Will  in  the  invisible  world 
declare  itself  by  the  insertion  of  an  anomalous  fact  in 
nature  ?     It  is  boldly  answered,  No. 

With  respect,  then,  to  this  objection  to  a  miracle,  that  it 
is  a  transgTession  against  the  anity  of  nature,  I  observe 
that  nature,  so  far  from  being  constructed  upon  any  prin- 
ciple of  unity  or  simplicity  in  its  contents,  is  itself  the  first 
great  transgressor  of  that  principle,  being  as  mixed  and 
heterogeneous  a  composition  as  can  be  imagined;  and 
that  therefore  the  introduction  of  a  miracle  into  this  sceiie 
is  not  a  sudden  incongruity,  but  that  we  are  prepared  for 
it    by  the    miscellaneous    and    dissimilar    physical    and 


68  Iiifiiience  of  the  [Lect. 

spiritual  material  of  this  world  itself.  It  would  indeed  be 
a  contradiction  in  terms  to  say  that  nature  had  anything 
in  it  supernatural ;  because  the  fact  of  the  constant 
appearance  of  anything  in  nature  makes  it  natural,  and 
that  only  is  supernatural  which  is  out  of  the  order  of 
nature.^  But  though  the  contents  of  nature  are  all  in 
common  natural,  as  being  its  contents,  they  are  of  such 
totally  different  types,  and  some  so  mucli  higher  than 
others,  that  some  as  compared  to  and  in  relation  to  others 
are  supernatural.  A  miracle  is  therefore  no  discordant 
isolation  in  a  system  of  mere  matter,  but  blends  with  and 
carries  out  the  diversity  of  nature,  which  takes  off  the  edge 
of  the  resistance  to  it. 

It  would  be  cognate  to  this  observation  to  notice  that 
which  has  been  so  much  dwelt  upon  by  many,  that 
nature  hordcrs  everywhere  upon  the  supernatural ;  that  the 
supernatural  is  not  removed  to  an  impassable  distance 
from  her,  but  stands  at  her  very  portals  and  touches  her 
veiy  outskirts.  God  is  not  in  nature ;  nevertheless  the 
evidence  of  a  God  is.  But  what  does  evidence  imply  ?  It 
implies  a  light  breaking  through  nature,  revealing  that 
which  is  the  subject  of  this  light ;  that  nature  is  tracked 
to  the  edge  of  an  incomprehensible  truth.  Wherever 
evidences  of  design,  then,  appear  in  the  world,  there  nature 
borders  upon  mystery — the  mystery  of  the  Universal  ]\Iiud 
and  Will.  And  what,  again,  is  the  very  infinity  of  the 
material  world  ?  Do  we  not  think  of  it  as  a  kind  of 
impossibility,  so  extravagant  and  eccentric  a  fact  it  is,  and 
replete  witli  extravagant  results  ?  (3.)    Space  itself,  divested 

^  We  mean  by  the  supernatural  tliat  wliicli  is  out  of  the  order  of  nature. 
God,  angels,  departed  spirits,  heaven  and  hell,  are  out  of  the  order  of 
nature  because  they  are  not  in  nature  at  all ;  a  miracle  is  in  nature  in  the 
sense  of  visibility,  but  is  not  in  the  order  of  nature  ;  tlie  invisible  world 
therefore,  and  miracles,  are  supernatural.  But  life,  the  human  soul, 
conscience,  reason,  will,  are  natural,  because  they  are  in  the  order  of  nature 
or  part  of  our  constant  experience. 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  69 

of  the  limit  of  sense,  seems  incredible.  Yet  this  space  is 
not  a  mere  idea  but  ^fad  of  this  ■world ;  for  not  anywhere 
out  of  nature,  but  in  whatever  direction  I  point  my 
finger,  lies  that  enigma  of  infinite  space  which  is  as 
insoluble  and  mysterious  as  an  apparition.  But  I  revert 
to  the  topic  of  the  mixed  physical  and  spiritual  contents 
of  nature ;  which  comes  to  a  head  in  the  situation  of  man 
in  nature. 

The  record  which  this  earth  gives  of  itself  shows  that 
after  a  succession  of  stages  and  periods  of  vegetable  and 
animal  change,  a  new  being  made  his  appearance  in  nature. 
Those  who  profess  to  trace  the  bodily  frame  of  man  to  a 
common  animal  source,  still  admit  that  the  rational  and 
moral  icing  man  is  separated  from  all  other  animal  natures 
by  a  chasm  in  the  chain  of  causation  which  cannot  be 
filled  up ;  and  that  even  if  such  a  transition  is  only  con- 
ceived as  a  leap  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  level  in  the  same 
species,  such  a  leap  is  only  another  word  for  an  inexplic- 
able mystery.  But  such  a  change  cuts  asunder  the 
identity  of  the  being  which  precedes  it  and  the  being 
which  succeeds  it.    (4.) 

The  first  appearance,  then,  of  man  in  nature  was  the 
appearance  of  a  new  being  in  nature ;  and  this  fact  was 
relatively  to  the  then  order  of  things  miraculous ;  no  more 
physical  account  can  be  given  of  it  than  could  be  given  of 
a  resurrection  to  life  now.  What  more  entirely  new  and 
eccentric  fact  indeed  can  be  imagined  than  a  human  soul 
first  rising  up  amidst  an  animal  and  vegetable  world  ? 
Mere  consciousness — was  not  that  of  itself  a  new  world 
within  the  old  one  ?  Mere  knowledge — that  nature  her- 
self became  known  to  a  being  within  herself,  was  not  that 
the  same  ?  Certainly  man  was  not  all  at  once  the  skilled 
interpreter  of  nature,  and  yet  there  is  some  interpretation 
of  nature  to  which  man  as  such  is  equal  in  some  degree. 
He  derives  an  impression  from  the  sight  of  nature  which 


70  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

an  animal  does  not  derive ;  for  though  the  material  spec- 
tacle is  imprinted  on  its  retina,  as  it  is  on  man's,  the  brute 
does  not  see  what  man  sees.  The  sun  rose  then,  and  the 
sun  descended,  the  stars  looked  down  upon  the  earth,  the 
mountains  climbed  to  heaven,  the  cliffs  stood  upon  the 
shore,  the  same  as  now,  countless  ages  before  a  single 
being  existed  who  saio  it.  The  counterpart  of  this  whole 
scene  was  wanting — the  understanding  mind ;  that  mirror 
in  which  the  whole  was  to  be  reflected;  and  when  this 
arose,  it  was  a  new  birth  for  creation  itself,  that  it  became 
Tcnown, — an  image  in  the  mind  of  a  conscious  being.  But 
even  consciousness  and  knowledge  were  a  less  strange  and 
miraculous  introduction  into  the  world  than  conscience. 

Thus  wholly  mysterious  in  his  entrance  into  this  scene, 
man  is  now  an  insulation  in  it :  he  came  in  by  no  physical 
law,  and  his  freewill  is  in  utter  contrast  to  that  law.  "What 
can  be  more  incomprehensible,  more  heterogeneous,  a  more 
ghostly  resident  in  nature,  than  the  sense  of  right  and 
wrong?  What  is  it  ?  Whence  is  it?  The  obligation  of 
man  to  sacrifice  himself  for  right  is  a  truth  which  springs 
out  of  an  abyss,  the  mere  attempt  to  look  down  into  which 
confuses  the  reason.  (5.)  Such  is  the  juxtaposition  of 
mysterious  and  physical  contents  in  the  same  system.  Man 
is  alone,  then,  in  nature ;  he  alone  of  all  the  creatures  com- 
munes with  a  Being  out  of  nature ;  and  he  divides  himself 
from  all  other  physical  life  by  prophesying,  in  the  face  of  uni- 
versal visible  decay,  his  own  immortality. 

But  man's  situation  in  nature  being  such,  his  original 
entrance  a  miracle,  his  sojourn  an  interpolation  in  the  phy- 
sical system,  a  world  within  a  world — a  life  of  conscious- 
ness, freewill,  conscience,  reason,  communion  with  God, 
sense  of  immortality  insulated  as  an  anomaly  in  the  midst 
of  matter  and  material  law ;  is  it  otherwise  than  in  accor- 
dance with  this  fact  that  the  Divine  method  of  training  and 
educating  this  creature  should  be  marked  by  distinctive  and 


Ill]  Imagination  on  Belief  71 

anomalous  features  ?  If  man  himseK  is  an  exception  to 
nature,  why  should  not  his  providential  treatment  be  the 
same  ?  Why  should  not  that  economy  be  divided  occa- 
sionally from  the  order  of  nature  by  the  same  mystery  and 
chasm  which  divides  its  subject  from  it  ?  The  being  is  an 
isolated  being — isolated  in  his  commencement  and  in  his 
destiny — for  whom  miracles  are  designed.  These  Divine 
acts  are  concerned  with  the  education  of  man,  his  instruc- 
tion, the  revelation  of  important  truths  to  him,  and  his 
whole  preparation  and  training  for  another  world ;  but  this 
being  the  case,  what  does  such  a  dispensation  of  miracles 
amount  to  but  this,  that  man  has  been  educated  in  connec- 
tion with  his  own  mysterious  origin  and  fountain-head,  and 
that  the  same  extraordinary  agency  which  produced  his 
first  entrance  into  the  world  directed  his  course  in  it.  An 
anomalous  situation  bears  corresponding  fruits.  "  The 
soul  of  man,"  says  Lord  Bacon,  "was  not  produced  by 
heaven  or  earth,  but  was  breathed  immediately  from  God  : 
so  that  the  ways  and  proceedings  of  God  with  spirits  are 
not  included  in  nature  ;  that  is  in  the  laws  of  heaven  and 
earth ;  but  are  reserved  to  the  law  of  His  secret  will  and 


grace. 


1 


It  is  indeed  avowed  by  those  who  reduce  man  in  common 
with  matter  to  law,  and  abolish  his  insulation  in  nature, 
that  upon  the  admission  of  freewill,  the  objection  to  the 
miraculous  is  over ;  and  that  it  is  absurd  to  allow  exception 
to  law  in  man,  and  reject  it  in  nature.     (6.) 

What  has  been  said  may  be  collected  and  abridged  in  one 
pregnant  position — that  man  while  in  this  world  is  placed 
in  relations  to  another ;  which  is  a  supernatural  relation- 
ship within  nature.  Could  we  imagine  a  person,  who  had 
not  conceived  the  idea  of  religion,  seeing  for  the  first  time 
the  act  of  prayer — his  surprise  and  perplexity  at  the  sight 
would  truly  indicate  what  a  remarkable  insertion  in  nature 
^  A  Confession  of  Faith,  vol.  ii.  p.  482. 


72  Influence  of  the  [Lect. 

this  relationship  to  the  unseen  world  was.  So  far  from  the 
two  worlds  standing  totally  apart,  human  reason  itself 
places  them  in  connexion  ;  and  this  connexion  naturalizes 
a  miracle.  The  same  Divine  policy  which  has  imparted 
this  double  scope  to  reason,  and  instituted  in  this  world 
our  relations  to  another,  only  goes  a  step  further  when  it 
gives  us  a  message  or  communication  from  that  world.  The 
school  which  calls  itself  Secularist  sees  this  result  involved 
in  this  premiss,  and  therefore  cuts  off  revelation  at  the  root 
by  denying  that  we  have  any  relations  to  another  world 
at  all ;  by  the  maxim,  "  Act  for  the  world  in  which  you 
live  ;  while  you  are  in  this  world  you  have  nothing  to  do 
with  another."     (7.) 

To  conclude,  then,  let  us  suppose  an  intelligent  Christian 
of  the  present  day  asked,  not  what  evidence  he  has  of 
miracles,  but  how  he  can  antecedently  to  all  evidence  think 
such  amazing  occurrences  possible  ;  he  would  reply,  '  You 
refer  me  to  a  certain  sense  of  impossibility  which  you  sup- 
pose me  to  possess,  applying  not  to  mathematics  but  to 
facts.  Now  on  this  head  I  am  conscious  of  a  certain  natu- 
ral resistance  in  my  mind  to  events  unlike  the  order  of 
nature.  But  I  resist  many  things  which  I  know  to  be  cer- 
tain ;  infinity  of  space,  infinity  of  time,  eternity  past, 
eternity  future,  the  very  idea  of  a  God  and  another  world. 
If  I  take  mere  resistance  therefore  for  denial,  I  am  confined 
in  every  quarter  of  my  mind,  I  cannot  carry  out  the 
very  laws  of  reason,  I  am  placed  under  conditions  which 
are  obviously  false.  I  conclude,  therefore,  that  I  may  resist 
and  believe  at  the  same  time.  If  Providence  has  implanted 
in  me  a  certain  expectation  of  uniformity  or  likeness  in 
nature,  there  is  implied  in  that  very  expectation  resistance 
to  an  unYikQ,  event ;  which  resistance  does  not  cease  even 
when  upon  evidence  I  believe  the  event,  but  goes  on  as  a 
mechanical  impression,  though  the  reason  counterbalances 
it.     Kesistance  therefore  is  not  disbelief,  unless  by  an  act 


Ill]  Imagmation  on  Belief  73 

of  my  own  reason  I  gim  it  an  absolute  veto,  which  I  do  not 
do.  My  reason  is  clear  upon  the  point,  that  there  is  no 
disagreement  between  itself  and  a  miracle  as  such.' 

Such  a  reply  would  be  both  true  itself,  and  also  a  caution 
against  a  mistake  which  both  younger  and  older  minds  are 
apt  to  fall  into,  that  of  confounding  the  resistance  of  im- 
pression to  a  miracle  with  the  veto  of  reason.  Upon  the 
facts  of  the  Gospel  history  being  first  realized,  they  neces- 
sarily excite  this  resistance  to  a  greater  extent  than  they 
did  when  they  were  mainly  accepted  by  habit ;  but  this 
resistance  is  in  itself  no  disbelief,  though  some  by  the  very 
mistake  of  confounding  it  with  disbelief  at  last  make  it  such, 
when  in  consequence  of  this  misconception  they  begin  to 
doubt  about  their  own  faith. 

Nor  is  it  dealing  artificially  with  ourselves  to  exert  a  force 
upon  our  minds  against  the  false  certainty  of  the  resisting 
imagination — such  a  force  as  is  necessary  to  enable  reason 
to  stand  its  ground,  and  bend  back  again  that  spring  of  im- 
pression against  the  miraculous  which  has  illegally  tight- 
ened itself  into  a  law  to  the  understanding,  Reason  does 
not  always  prevail  spontaneously  and  without  effort  even 
in  questions  of  belief;  so  far  from  it,  that  the  question 
of  faith  against  reason  may  often  be  more  properly  termed 
the  question  of  reason  against  imagination.  It  does  not 
seldom  require  faith  to  believe  reason,  isolated  as  she  may 
be  amid  vast  irrational  influences,  the  weight  of  custom,  the 
power  of  association,  the  strength  of  passion,  the  vis  inertim 
of  sense,  the  mere  force  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  as  a 
spectacle — those  influences  which  make  up  that  power  of 
the  world  which  Scripture  always  speaks  of  as  the  anta- 
gonist of  faith. 


LECTURE  IV 

BELIEF   IN   A   GOD 

Hebrews  xi.  3 

Through  failh  inc  undcrsiaml  that  the  worlds  were  framed  by  the  word 
of  God. 

THE  peculiarity  of  the  argument  of  miracles  is  that  it 
begins  and  ends  with  an  assumption;  I  mean  an 
assumption  relatively  to  that  argument.  We  assume  the 
existence  of  a  Personal  Deity  prior  to  the  proof  of  miracles 
in  the  religious  sense;  but  with  this  assumption  the 
question  of  miracles  is  at  an  end ;  because  such  a  Being 
has  necessarily  the  power  to  suspend  those  laws  of  nature 
which  He  has  Himself  enacted. 

For,  the  Divine  f)owcr  assumed,  vain  would  it  be  to  throw 
the  impossibility  of  such  an  interruption  on  the  Divine 
will — as  if  the  act  were  contrary  to  the  Divine  perfections ; 
and  as  if  it  argued  inconsistency  and  unsteadiness  in  the 
Deity  thai,  having  established  the  order  of  nature,  He 
should  disturb  it  by  exceptional  acts.  For  it  can  argue  no 
inconsistency  in  the  Divine  will  to  institute  an  order  of 
nature  for  one  purpose  and  suspend  it  for  another.  The 
essential  uniformity  and  regularity  of  Divine  action  is  a 
purely  arbitrary  conception,  and  certainly  one  not  borrowed 
from  any  criterion  of  excellence  in  human  conduct.  God 
cannot  depart  indeed  from  His  absolute  purpose,  but  it  does 
not  follow  from  that,  that  an  unvaried  course  of  action  is 
His  purpose.     The  order  of  nature  is  not  founded  upon  a 


Belief  in  a  God  75 


tlieatrical  principle,  as  if  it  were  a  grand  procession,  any 
interruption  of  which  was  in  itself  desecration :  its  merit 
lies  in  its  utility ;  it  is  necessary  for  human  life,  and  animal 
life  too,  which  otherv/ise  could  not  be  sustained,  because 
there  would  be  no  knowing  what  to  expect  or  what  to 
provide  against  from  hour  to  hovir.  But  for  this  practical 
use,  nothing  would  signify  less  than  whether  the  whole 
material  universe  were  in  order  or  disorder.  But  if  the 
merit  of  the  order  of  nature  lies  in  its  use,  there  is  no 
reason  why  it  should  not  be  suspended,  if  there  is  use  in 
suspending  it. 

The  question  of  miracles  is  thus  shut  up  within  the 
inclosure  of  one  assumption,  viz.  that  of  the  existence  of  a 
God.  When  we  state  this,  however,  it  is  replied  that  this 
very  conception  of  God,  as  a  personal  omnipotent  Being,  is 
a  peculiar  conception  for  which  there  is  no  evidence  in 
material  nature.  '  Everybody,'  it  is  said,  'must  collect  from 
the  order  and  harmony  of  the  physical  universe  the  exist- 
ence of  a  God,  but  in  acknoMdedging  a  God,  we  do  not  there- 
by acknowledge  this  peculiar  or  doctrinal  conception  of  a 
God.  We  see  in  the  structure  of  nature  a  Mind,  a  universal 
]\Iind,  but  still  a  Mind  which  only  operates  and  expresses 
itself  by  law.  Nature  only  does  and  only  can  inform  us  of 
mind  in  nature,  the  partner  and  correlative  of  organized 
matter.  Nature,  therefore,  can  speak  to  the  existence  of  a 
God  in  this  sense,  and  can  speak  to  the  omnipotence  of 
God  in  a  sense  coinciding  with  the  actual  facts  of  nature ; 
but  in  no  other  sense  does  nature  witness  to  the  existence 
of  an  Omnipotent  Supreme  Being.  Of  a  universal  Mind 
out  of  nature  nature  says  nothing,  and  of  an  Omnipotence 
which  does  not  possess  an  inherent  limit  in  nature,  she 
says  nothing  either.  And  therefore  that  conception  of  a 
Supreme  Being  which  represents  Him  as  a  Spirit  inde- 
pendent of  the  physical  universe,  and  able  from  a 
standing-place  external  to  nature  to  interrupt  its  order,  is 


76  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

a  conception  of  God  for  which  we  must  go  elsewhere. 
That  conception  is  obtained  from  revelation,  wliich  is 
asserted  to  be  proved  by  miracles.  But  tliat  being  the 
case,  this  doctrine  of  Theism  rests  itself  upon  miracles,  and 
therefore  miracles  cannot  rest  upon  this  doctrine  of 
Theism.'    (i.) 

If  the  premiss  then  of  this  argument  is  correct,  and  this 
doctrine  of  Theism  is  from  its  standing-ground  in  nature 
thrown  back  upon  the  ground  of  revelation,  this  conse- 
quence follows  ;  and  more,  for  miracles  being  thrown  back 
upon  the  same  ground  on  which  Theism  is,  the  whole 
evidence  of  revelation  becomes  a  vicious  circle;  and  the 
fabric  is  left  suspended  in  space,  revelation  resting  on 
miracles  and  miracles  resting  on  revelation.  But  is  this 
premiss  correct  ? 

It  is  then  to  be  admitted  that  historically,  and  looking 
to  the  general  actual  reception  of  it,  this  conception  of  God 
was  obtained  from  revelation.  Not  from  the  first  dawn  of 
history  to  the  spread  of  Christianity  in  the  world,  do  we 
see  in  mankind  at  large  any  belief  in  such  a  Being.  The 
vulgar  believed  in  many  gods,  the  philosopher  believed  in 
a  Universal  Cause ;  but  neither  believed  in  God.  The 
philosopher  only  regarded  the  Universal  Cause  as  the 
spring  of  the  Universal  machine,  which  was  necessary  to 
the  working  of  all  the  parts,  but  was  not  thereby  raised  to 
a  separate  order  of  being  from  them.  Theism  was  dis- 
cussed as  a  philosophical  not  as  a  religious  question,  as  one 
rationale  among  others  of  the  origin  of  the  material  uni- 
verse, but  as  no  more  affecting  practice  than  any  great 
scientific  hypothesis  does  now.  Theism  was  not  a  test 
which  separated  the  orthodox  philosopher  from  the  hetero- 
dox, which  distinguished  belief  from  disbelief;  it  estab- 
lished no  breach  between  the  two  opposing  theorists;  it 
was  discussed  amicably  as  an  open  question ;  and  well 
it    might    be,    for    of   all   questions    there   was   not   one 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  77 

which  could  make  less  practical  difference  to  the  philoso- 
pher, or,  upon  his  view,  to  anybody,  than  whether  there 
was  or  was  not  a  God.  Nothing  would  have  astonished 
him  more  than,  when  he  had  proved  in  the  lecture  hall  the 
existence  of  a  God,  to  have  been  told  to  worship  Him. 
'Worship  whom?'  he  would  have  exclaimed:  'worship 
what  ?  worship  how  ?'  Would  you  picture  him  indignant 
at  the  polytheistic  superstition  of  the  crowd  and  manifest- 
ing some  spark  of  the  fire  of  St.  Paul,  "  when  he  saw  the 
city  wholly  given  to  idolatry,"  you  could  not  be  more  mis- 
taken. He  would  have  said  that  you  did  not  see  a  plain 
distinction;  that  the  crowd  was  right  on  the  religious 
question,  and  the  philosopher  right  on  the  philosophical ; 
that  however  men  might  uphold  in  argument  an  infinite 
abstraction,  they  could  not  worship  it ;  and  that  the  hero 
was  much  better  fitted  for  worship  than  the  Universal 
Cause ;  fitted  for  it  not  in  spite  of  but  in  consequence  of 
his  want  of  true  divinity.  The  same  question  was  decided 
in  the  same  w^ay  in  the  speculations  of  the  Brahmans. 
There  the  Supreme  Being  figures  as  a  characterless  imper- 
sonal essence,  the  mere  residuum  of  intellectual  analysis, 
pure  unity,  pure  simplicity.  No  temple  is  raised  to  him, 
no  knee  is  bended  to  him.  Without  action,  without  will, 
without  affection,  without  thought,  he  is  the  substratum  of 
everything,  himself  a  nothing.  The  Universal  Soul  is  the 
unconscious  Omnipresent  Loolicr-on ;  the  complement,  as 
co-extensive  spectator,  of  the  universal  drama  of  nature ; 
the  motionless  mirror  upon  which  her  boundless  play  and 
sport,  her  versatile  postures,  her  multitudinous  evolutious 
are  reflected,  as  the  image  of  the  rich  and  changing  sky  is 
received  into  the  passive  bosom  of  the  lake.  Thus  the 
idea  of  God,  so  far  from  calling  forth  in  the  ancient  world 
the  idea  of  worship,  ever  stood  in  antagonism  wdth  it :  the 
idol  was  worshipped  because  he  was  not  God,  God  was  not 
worshipped  because  He  was.     One  small  nation  alone  out 


78  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

of  all  antiquity  worshipped  God,  believed  the  universal 
Being  to  be  a  personal  Being.  That  nation  was  looked 
upon  as  a  most  eccentric  and  unintelligible  specimen  of 
humanity  for  doing  so ;  but  this  whimsical  fancy,  as  it 
appeared  in  the  eyes  of  the  rest,  was  cherished  by  it  as  the 
most  sacred  deposit ;  it  was  the  foundation  of  its  laws  and 
polity;  and  from  this  narrow  stock  this  conception  was 
engrafted  upon  the  human  race. 

But  although  this  conception  of  the  Deity  has  been  re- 
ceived through  the  channel  of  the  Bible,  what  communi- 
cates a  truth  is  one  thing,  what  proves  it  is  another  :  the 
truth  once  possessed  is  seen  to  rest  upon  grounds  of  natural 
reason.  The  theory  of  a  blind  plastic  nature  might  account 
for  some  imaginable  world,  but^  does  not  account  for  this 
world.  For  we  naturally  attribute  to  the  design  of  a  per- 
sonal Being,  a  contrivance  which  is  directed  to  the  exist- 
ence of  a  personal  Being ;  if  an  elaborate  bodily  organiza- 
tion issues  in  the  life  of  myself — a  person,  I  cannot  avoid 
concluding  that  there  is  at  the  bottom  of  it  the  intention 
of  a  personal  being  that  I  should  live.  From  personality 
at  one  end,  I  infer  personality  at  the  other ;  and  cannot 
svippose  that  the  existence  which  is  contrived  should  be 
intelligent  and  moral,  and  the  contriver  of  it  a  blind 
irrational  force.  The  proof  of  a  personal  Deity  does  not 
rest  upon  physical  organization  ^alone,  but  on  physical 
organization  adapted  to  the  wants  of  moral  beings.  The 
Bible  therefore  assumes  this  truth  rather  than  formally  com- 
municates it ;  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis  proceeds  upon  it 
as  proved  ;  and  the  prophet  though  he  speaks  as  a  prophet, 
still  also  speaks  as  a  man  on  this  subject.  He  proclaims 
this  idea  of  God  as  a  plain  truth  of  iiuman  reason,  whicli 
the  world  did  not  see  only  because  it  was  blinded  by  folly ; 
he  ridicules  polytheism  with  indignation  and  sarcasm  ;  he 
foretells  the  ultimate  universal  worship  of  the  One  God. 
He  sees  with  the  eye  of  prophecy,  and  of  reason  too,  that 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  '    79 

the  true  idea  of  God  cannot  remain  for  ever  in  a  corner, 
but  must  some  day  find  access  to  the  whole  mind  of  the 
human  race,  which  is  made  for  its  reception  ;  to  the  expul- 
sion of  the  false  religions  of  the  world. 

Not,  however,  that  the  existence  of  a  God  is  so  clearly 
seen  by  reason  as  to  dispense  with  faith  (2)  ;  not  from  any 
want  of  cogency  in  the  reasons,  but  from  the  amazing 
nature  of  the  conclusion — that  it  is  so  unparalleled,  tran- 
scendent, and  inconceivable  a  truth  to  believe.  It  requires 
trust  to  commit  one's  self  to  the  conclusion  of  any  reason- 
ing, however  strong,  when  such  as  this  is  the  conclusion  ; 
to  put  enough  dependence  and  reliance  upon  any  premisses 
to  accept  upon  the  strength  of  them  so  immense  a  result. 
The  issue  of  the  argument  is  so  astonishing,  that  if  we  do 
not  tremble  for  its  safety,  it  must  be  on  account  of  a  prac- 
tical principle  in  our  minds  which  enables  us  to  confide  and 
trust  in  reasons,  when  they  are  really  strong  and  good  ones. 
Which  principle  of  trust  is  faith — the  same  principle  by 
which  we  repose  in  a  witness  of  good  character  who  in- 
forms us  of  a  marvellous  occurrence — so  marvellous  that 
the  trust  in  his  testimony  has  to  be  sustained  by  a  certain 
effort  of  the  reasonable  will. 

The  belief,  therefore,  in  the  existence  of  a  God  is  not 
because  it  is  an  act  of  reason,  any  the  less  an  act  of  faitli. 
Because  faith  is  reason,  only  reason  acting  under  particular 
circumstances.  When  reason  draws  conclusions  which  are 
in  accordance  with  experience,  which  have  their  parallels 
in  the  facts  which  we  are  conversant  with  in  the  order  of 
nature  and  in  common  life,  then  reason  is  called  reason : 
when  reason  draws  conclusions  which  are  not  backed  by 
experience,  and  which  are  not  paralleled  by  similar  facts 
within  our  ordinary  cognizance,  then  reason  is  called  faith. 
Faith,  when  for  convenience'  sake  we  do  distinguish  it  from 
reason,  is  not  distinguished  from  reason  by  the  want  of 
premisses,  but  by  the  nature  of  the  conclusions.     Are  our 


8o  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

conclusions  of  the  customary  type  ?  Then  custom  imparts 
the  full  sense  of  security.  Are  they  not  of  the  customary 
but  of  a  strange  and  unknown  type  ?  Then  the  mechani- 
cal sense  of  security  is  wanting,  and  a  certain  trust  is  re- 
quired for  reposing  in  them,  which  we  call  faith.  But  that 
which  draws  these  conclusions  is  in  either  case  reason.  We 
infer,  we  go  upon  reasons,  we  use  premisses  in  either  case. 
The  premisses  of  faith  are  not  so  palpable  as  those  of 
ordinary  reason,  but  they  are  as  real  and  solid  premisses 
all  the  same.  Our  faith  in  the  existence  of  a  God  and  a 
future  state  is  founded  upon  reasons,  as  much  so  as  the 
belief  in  the  commonest  kind  of  facts.  The  reasons  are  in 
themselves  as  strong,  but  because  the  conclusions  are  mar- 
vellous and  are  not  seconded  and  backed  by  known  parallels 
or  by  experience,  we  do  not  so  passively  acquiesce  in  them: 
there  is  an  exertion  of  confidence  in  depending  upon  them 
and  assuring  ourselves  of  their  force.  The  inward  energy 
of  the  reason  has  to  be  evoked,  when  she  can  no  longer 
lean  upon  the  outward  prop  of  custom,  but  is  thrown  back 
upon  herself,  and  the  intrinsic  force  of  her  premisses.  Which 
reason  not  leaning  upon  custom  is  faith :  she  obtains  the 
latter  name  wlien  she  depends  entirely  upon  her  own  in- 
sight into  certain  grounds,  premisses,  and  evidences,  and 
follows  it,  though  it  leads  to  transcendent,  unparalleled,  and 
supernatural  conclusions. 

We  may  remark  that  when  reason  even  in  ordinary  life 
or  in  physical  inquiry  is  placed  under  circumstances  at  all 
analogous  to  those  of  religion,  reason  becomes,  as  a  conse- 
quence of  tliat  situation,  a  kind  of  faith.  We  have  a  very 
different  way  of  yielding  to  reasons  in  common  life,  accord- 
ing as  the  conclusions  to  which  they  lead  accord  with  or 
diverge  from  the  type  of  custom.  We  accept  them  as  a 
matter  of  course  in  the  former  case,  it  requires  an  effort  to 
accept  them  and  place  dependence  upon  them  in  the 
latter ;   which  dependence  upon  them  in  the  latter  case 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God 


therefore  is  a  kind  of  faith.  Indeed,  the  remark  may  be 
made  that  a  kind  of  faith  appears  to  be  essential  for  prac- 
tical confidence  in  any  reasoning  whatever  and  any  pre- 
misses, when  we  are  thrown  back  upon  ourselves  and  do 
not  act  mechanically  in  concert  with  others.  And  we  fre- 
quently see  persons  who,  when  they  are  in  possession  of 
the  best  arguments,  and,  what  is  more,  understand  those 
arguments,  are  still  shaken  by  almost  any  opposition,  be- 
cause they  want  the  faculty  to  trust  an  argument,  when 
they  have  got  one ;  which  is  not  the  case  with  others  who 
can  both  understand  and  trust  too ;  wherein  we  see  the 
link  which  connects  faith  with  self-confidence  and  strength 
of  will.  In  religion,  then,  where  conclusions  are  so  totally 
removed  from  the  type  of  custom,  and  are  so  vast  and 
stupendous,  this  applies  the  more  strongly ;  but  in  truth, 
all  untried  conclusions  need  faith,  whatever  strong  argu- 
ments there  may  be  for  them.  When  a  scientific  man  sees 
various  premisses  conspiring  to  direct  him  to  some  new 
truth  or  law  in  nature,  the  aptness  with  which  these  coin- 
cide and  fall  in  with  each  other  may  amount  to  such  strong 
evidence,  that  he  may  feel  virtually  certain  of  his  dis- 
covery, and  yet  he  does  not  feel  it  quite  secure  till  it  has 
stood  the  test  of  some  crowning  experiment.  His  reason, 
then,  in  the  interim,  is  faith,  he  trusts  his  premisses,  he  feels 
practically  sure  that  they  cannot  mislead  him,  he  sees  in 
their  whole  mode  of  combining  and  concurring  a  warrant 
for  the  issue,  although  the  final  criterion  is  still  in  pros- 
pect. Such  a  condition  of  mind  is  analogous  to  that  of 
the  religious  believer,  who  perceives  in  nature,  moral  and 
physical  (for  we  are  speaking  only  of  natural  religion  at 
present),  the  strongest  arguments  for  certain  religious  con- 
clusions— such  as  the  existence  of  a  God,  and  a  future  life; 
and  yet  waits  for  that  final  certification  of  these  great 
truths,  which  wiU  be  given  in  another  world.  "  For  we  are 
saved  by  hope,  but  hope  that  is  seen  is  not  hope :  for  what 

F 


82  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

a  man  seetli,  why  doth  he  yet  hope  for  ?  But  if  Me  hope 
for  that  we  see  not,  then  do  we  with  patience  wait  for  it." 
Faith,  then,  is  unverified  reason ;  reason  which  has  not  yet 
received  the  verification  of  the  final  test,  but  is  still  ex- 
pectant. 

Indeed,  does  not  our  heart  bear  witness  to  the  fact  that 
to  believe  in  a  God  is  an  exercise  of  faith  ?  That  the  uni- 
verse was  produced  by  the  will  of  a  personal  Being,  that 
its  infinite  forces  are  all  the  power  of  that  one  Being,  its 
infinite  relations  the  perception  of  one  Mind — would  not 
this,  if  any  truth  could,  demand  the  application  of  the 
maxim — Credo  quia  imijossihilc  ?  Look  at  it  only  as  a  con- 
ception, and  does  the  wildest  fiction  of  the  imagination 
equal  it  ?  No  premisses,  no  arguments  therefore,  can  so 
accommodate  this  truth  to  us,  as  not  to  leave  the  belief  in 
it  an  act  of  mental  ascent  and  trust ;  of  faith  as  distin- 
guished from  sight.  Divest  reason  of  its  trust,  and  the 
universe  stops  at  the  impersonal  stage — there  is  no  God. 
And  yet  if  the  first  step  in  religion  is  the  gi^eatest,  how  is 
it  that  the  freest  and  boldest  speculator  rarely  declines  it? 
How  is  it  that  the  most  mysterious  of  all  truths  is  a  uni- 
versally accepted  one  ?  "What  is  it  which  guards  this 
truth  ?  What  is  it  which  makes  men  shrink  from  deny- 
ing it  ?  Why  is  atheism  a  crime  ?  Is  it  that  authority 
still  reigns  upon  one  question,  and  that  the  voice  of  all 
ages  is  too  potent  to  be  withstood  ? 

But  this  belief,  however  obtained,  being  assumed  in  the 
argument  of  miracles,  in  discussing  this  argument,  we  have 
to  do  not  with  the  proof  of  a  personal  Deity,  but  only  with 
the  natural  consequences  of  this  belief,  supposed  to  be 
true.  To  extract  consequences  indeed  out  of  admissions 
before  the  sense  of  such  admissions  is  defined  or  under- 
stood, is  an  illegitimate  proceeding  ;  and  from  the  mere  ad- 
mission of  a  God  in  some  sense,  we  could  not  thus  argue. 
But  if  not  only  the  existence  of  a  Deity  in  some  sense  is 


IV]  Belief  m  a  God  83 

admitted,  but  if  that  sense  is  defined,  and  the  religious  con- 
ception of  the  Deity  as  a  moral  and  personal  Being  is 
admitted  to  be  true  ;  this  is  a  ground  uj)on  which  we  may 
fairly  argue,  and  from  which  we  may  deduce  consequences  ; 
that  is  to  say,  we  may  examine  what  the  belief  means,  and 
what  is  necessarily  and  naturally  implied  in  this  belief 
supposed  to  be  true. 

But  this  conception  of  a  God  necessarily  implies  omni- 
potence ;  because  the  Universal  Cause  must  have  power, 
and  universal  power,  if  He  has  will ;  which,  according  to 
this  religious  and  moral  conception  of  Him,  He  has.  No 
will,  no  power,  indeed,  for  oar  very  idea  of  power  im- 
plies will;  but  together  with  will  the  Universal  Being 
possesses  power,  and  power  commensurate  with  Himself ; 
including  the  particular  power  involved  in  a  miracle.  For 
any  cause  has  as  such  the  power  to  suspend  its  own  effects, 
depending  as  these  do  altogether  upon  it,  provided  only  it 
has  the  will ;  if  voluntary  power  set  them  going  the  same 
power  can  stop  them.  The  Universal  Cause  therefore  has 
the  same  power ;  and  either  God  has  will  and  He  can  inter- 
rupt the  order  of  nature  ;  or  He  has  not  a  will  and  He  is 
not  in  the  religious  sense  God. 

A  personal  Deity,  therefore,  can  suspend  the  order  of 
nature ;  but  all  admit  a  personal  Deity  who  admit  the 
principle  of  religious  worship.  We  use  the  word  '  per- 
sonal '  only  to  denote  that  in  the  Deity  which  constitutes 
Him  more  than  a  force,  to  express  that  He  is  a  moral  Being, 
a  Being  with  will.  AU  worship  implies  such  a  personal 
Being  to  whom  it  is  addressed.  For  I  do  not,  of  course, 
include  under  worship  that  passionate  contemplation  of 
nature  which  is  sometimes  called  worship.  The  ecstacy  of 
atheistic  poets  at  the  sight  of  nature  was  the  effect  indeed  of 
beholding  a  real  manifestation  of  the  Divine  glory;  nor 
can  we  witness  without  emotion  their  absorption  in  the 
sublime  vision  and  spectacle,  which  transfixed  them  and 


84  Belief  in  a  God  [Legt. 

made  them  mute,  imparting  to  their  wild  insatiable  life  its 
one  solitary  rest ;  but  this  ecstacy  was  not  worship,  because 
it  only  contemplated  the  Divine  glory  as  impressed  upon 
matter,  and  not  in  relation  to  its  Fountain-head.  Worship 
as  a  religious  act  implies  a  personal  object.  Can  we — I 
do  not  say  ought,  but  can  we  worship  a  force,  a  law,  a  prin- 
ciple ?  One  who  professed  to  do  so  would  stand  convicted 
not  of  a  foolish  act,  or  of  a  fanciful  act,  or  of  a  superstitious 
act,  but  of  a  total  mistake  in  imagining  that  he  had  done  tlie 
act  at  all.  Because  it  is  an  impossible  act.  If  men  worship, 
then,  if  they  pray,  if  they  address  themselves  to  the  Deity, 
if  they  make  petitions  to  Him,  they  acknowledge  Him  in 
that  very  act  as  a  personal  Deity.  Whatever  doubts  mere 
philosophers  and  inquirers  may  entertain,  believers  and 
worshippers,  those  who  admit,  rather  I  should  say  who  de- 
mand religion,  who  feel  it  to  be  necessary  for  them,  a  want 
of  their  nature,  which  nothing  else  can  supply — in  a  word, 
religious  men — grant  a  Deity  in  the  special  sense  now 
mentioned  ;  but  in  this  special  sense  is  involved  the  con- 
sequence now  mentioned,  viz.  that  a  Deity  in  this  sense 
must  possess  omnipotence,  and  power  over  nature,  to  sus- 
pend her  laws. 

The  primary  difficulty  of  philosophy  indeed  relating  to 
the  Deity  is  action  at  all ;  from  the  inconceivableuess  of 
which,  in  connection  with  the  Divine  nature,  it  was  that 
the  ancient  subtle  philosophical  conception  of  God  as  a 
mere  universal  substratum  arose.  If  action  is  conceded  at 
all,  there  is  no  difficulty  about  miraculous  action.  But 
prayer  certainly  implies  a  Deity  who  can  act,  who  can  do 
something  for  us ;  prayer,  therefore,  concedes  the  first  great 
point  relating  to  the  Deity,  and  in  conceding  that  concedes 
the  whole.  What,  indeed,  is  a  Deity  deprived  of  miraculous 
action  but  a  Deity  deprived  of  action  ;  and  what  is  a  Deity 
deprived  of  action  but  an  impersonal  force  which  is  no  object 
of  prayer  ?     (3.) 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  85 

•  Is  this  consequence  then  of  the  acceptance  of  a  personal 
Deity  intercepted  by  saying  that  this  special  conception  of 
a  Deity  is  derived  from  "  mystery  and  faith,"  and  that  "  all 
religion  as  such  ever  has  been  and  must  be  a  thing  entirely 
sui  generis  V  (4.)  No:  because  the  evidence  or  the  foun- 
dation of  a  conception  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  natural 
consequence  of  that  conception  if  admitted ;  the  pledge 
which  is  contained  in  believing  and  acting  upon  that  con- 
ception. Let  the  believer  say  that  his  belief  in  such  a 
Being  is  founded  upon  "  mystery  and  faith;"  well,  but 
upon  whatever  ground  he  believes  this  truth,  he  believes 
it ;  and  if  he  believes  it,  he  believes  it  with  its  natural  con- 
sequence involved  in  it.  Can  it  be  said  that  religion  does 
not  interfere  with  physics  ?  (5.)  Not  if  the  religion  be 
the  belief  here  mentioned ;  for  this  belief  is  the  belief  in  a 
God  who  can  interfere  with  nature, — in  a  Universal  Cause 
who  has  a  ivill ;  and  who  has,  with  that  will,  the  poioer  to 
suspend  physical  effects. 

On  the  fundamental  question,  indeed,  of  the  Divine 
Omnipotence,  we  assent  to  some  known  familiar  limitations  ; 
such  as  that  God  cannot  do  what  is  contrary  to  His  will 
and  nature,  and  cannot  do  what  is  contradictory  to  neces- 
sary truth :  but  these  are  no  precedents  for  the  kind  of 
limitation  which  the  withdrawal  of  an  interrupting  physical 
power  from  the  Divine  Omnipotence  is.  Because  these 
are  only  verbal  and  apparent  limitations  ;  power  implying 
will,  it  is  no  real  restraint  upon  Divine  power  that  it  cannot 
oppose  will ;  and  a  contradiction  to  necessary  truth  being 
nothing,  nothing  is  taken  away  in  the  abstraction  of  the 
power  to  effect  it.  Whereas  the  other  is  a  real  and  actual 
limitation  of  the  Divine  power — unless  indeed  it  is  as- 
sumed that  the  order  of  nature  is  necessary,  and  therefore 
its  case  a  case  of  necessary  or  mathematical  truth.  Upon 
the  assumption  that  these  two  cases  stand  upon  the  same 
ground,  it  would  indeed  foUow  that  the  denial  of  the  Divine 


86  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

power  to  interrupt  the  order  of  nature  was  no  more  a  real 
limitation  of  it,  than  the  denial  of  the  power  to  contradict  a 
mathematical  truth.  But  this  assumption  is  self-evideutly 
untenable  and  absurd. 

If,  therefore,  the  power  of  interrupting  the  order  of 
nature  is  to  be  severed  from  the  stock  of  the  Divine  Omni- 
potence, it  can  only  be  done  by  one  of  two  conceptions, 
either  the  conception  of  an  im'pdrsonal  Deity,  or  the  con- 
ception of  a  confessedly  and  avowedly  limited  Deity — 
limited  in  reality,  I  mean,  and  not  only  verbally.  With  the 
former  I  have  upon  my  assumption  nothing  to  do.  The 
latter  is  an  attempted  compromise  between  an  Omnipo- 
tent God  and  no  God :  denying  Him  absolute  power  over 
the  material  universe,  while  professing  to  leave  Him 
such  power  as  to  constitute  Him  an  object  of  prayer  and 
worship. 

A  limited  Deity  was  a  recognised  conception  of  antiquity. 
Confounded  and  astonished  by  the  vastness  of  a  real  Omni- 
potence, and  the  inconceivableness  of  the  acts  involved  in 
it,  the  ancients  took  refuge  in  this  idea  as  all  that  reason 
could  afford  of  that  Godship  M^hich  reason  could  not  deny. 
Two  great  difficulties  lay  at  the  bottom  of  this  conception, 
the  creation  of  matter  and  the  existence  of  evil ;  the  former 
producing  the  doctrine  of  the  coeternity  of  matter  with  the 
Deity ;  the  latter  producing  the  doctrine  of  the  coeternity 
of  evil  with  the  Deity,  as  a  rival,  antagonist,  and  check 
upon  Him :  whether  in  the  modified  form  of  an  original 
irrational  soul  or  refractoriness  of  matter;  or  the  more 
developed  form  of  Ditheism  and  Manichaeanism.  Of  these 
two  great  ancient  difficulties  one  is  now  obsolete.  A  man 
of  science  now  only  professes  to  ground  an  hesitation  to 
admit  a  leginning  in  nature  upon  observation,  not  upon  any 
antecedent  objection  to  creation.  It  is  indeed  an  instruc- 
tive fact,  and  shows  how  little  dependence  can  be  placed 
upon  first-sight  notions  of  impossibility  which  reign  supreme 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  87 

in  many  minds  for  their  day,  that  this  great  impossibility 
of  antiquity,  the  difficulty  of  difficulties  which  had  brooded 
like  a  nightmare  upon  the  philosophers  of  ages,  was  dis- 
missed by  Hume  in  these  two  words  of  a  footnote, — "  That 
impious  maxim  of  ancient  philosophy  e,x  nihilo  nihil  Jit,  by 
which  the  creation  of  matter  was  excluded,  ceases  to  be  a 
maxim  according  to  this  philosophy."  ^  The  existence  of 
evil,  however,  is  no  obsolete  difficulty,  but  still  retains  its 
ground,  and  suggests  even  to  modern  perplexity  the  idea  of  a 
limited  Deity.  One  who  excepts  the  physical  world  from 
the  Divine  power  may  still  appeal  to  the  alleged  parallel  of 
evil.  '  Here,  at  any  rate,'  he  may  say,  *  is  no  shadow  of 
fiction,  or  empty  abstraction ;  evil  is  not,  like  a  mathe- 
matical contradiction,  a  nothing,  however  called  so  by  the 
Schoolmen,  but  plainly  something,  a  fact,  a  palpable  fact. 
The  inability  to  prevent  evil,  therefore,  cannot  be  dealt 
witli  as  a  verbal  limit  only  to  the  Divine  power,  like  the 
inability  to  accomplish  a  mathematical  contradiction ;  it  is 
a  real  limit :  and  one  real  limit  is  a  precedent  for  another.' 

But  the  answer  to  this  is,  that  with  reference  to  the 
higher  ends  of  the  universe,  we  do  not  know  that  evil  is 
not  necessary,  and  its  prevention  a  contradiction  to  neces- 
sary truth — that  we  do  not  know,  therefore,  that  the  ina- 
bility to  dispense  with  it  does  not  come  under  the  head  of 
a  verbal  limit  to  Divine  omnipotence,  like  the  inability  to 
accomplish  a  mathematical  contradiction. 

Assuming  the  existing  constitution  of  man,  we  see  the 
necessity  here  mentioned  for  evil.  Any  plain  man  would 
say  that  for  high  moral  virtue  to  be  produced  without  evil, 
either  as  a  contingency  in  the  shape  of  trial  or  a  fact  in  the 
shape  of  suffering,  was  upon  the  existing  constitution  of 
man  an  utter  impossibility :  that  upon  this  datum  evil  was 
a  condition  of  the  problem. 

^or  is  this  only  a  didactic  truth  of  the  moralist,  but  a 

^  EncLuiry  concerning  the  Human  Understanding,  sec.  12. 


Belief  m  a  God  [Lect. 


descriptive  one  of  poetry.  Dramatic  poetry,  by  "which  I 
mean  all  which  takes  man  and  human  character  as  its  sub- 
ject, produces  its  captivating  impression  and  effect,  by  a 
representation  of  the  issue  of  the  struggle  with  evil ;  by 
the  final  image  which  it  leaves  on  the  mind  of  the  human 
character  as  it  comes  out  of  that  struggle,  strengthened  by 
difficulty,  softened  by  grief,  or  calmed  by  misfortune.  The 
truth  it  communicates  is  the  same  as  the  moralist's,  only 
put  into  a  pictorial  instead  of  a  disciplinarian  form,  and  in- 
tended mainly  to  impart  not  the  sense  of  responsibility, 
but  pleasure.  The  spectacle  which  delights  is  a  human 
character  which  is  the  production  of  trial.  Secure  for  the 
moment  ourselves,  we  enjoy  the  sight  of  the  sublime  result 
of  the  contest  with  evil  in  others,  the  conclusion  in  which 
the  process  of  pain  issues.  And  thus  it  is  that  men  admire 
the  very  opposites  of  themselves.  The  proud  who  shrink 
as  from  a  knife  from  their  own  slightest  humiliation,  are 
captivated  by  the  spectacle  of  humility  in  another.  The 
moral  images  of  the  ambitious  man,  which  he  raises  in  his 
own  mind  to  look  at  with  affection,  are  they  likenesses  of 
himseK?  No:  they  are  the  suffering,  the  sad,  the  fallen, 
those  who  by  adversity  have  been  raised  above  the  world. 
He  is  a  pleased  beholder  of  the  moral  effect  of  life's  evils, 
himseK  only  grasping  at  its  prizes ;  and  the  very  depriva- 
tions which  are  death  to  himself,  are  his  gratification  in 
their  result  upon  the  character  of  another.  He  bears  wit- 
ness against  himself,  and  "  delights  in  the  law  of  God  after 
the  inner  man,  but  sees  another  law  in  his  members." 

Assuming  the  existing  constitution  then  of  man,  we  account 
for  evil — forevil  in  the  general,  though  the  particulars  are  be- 
yond us — as  a  necessary  contingency  attaching  to  trial,  a  ne- 
cessary fact  for  discipline.  The  Bible,  in  assuming  this  con- 
stitution of  man,  assumes  with  it  this  solution  of  evil,  and 
incorporates  evil  in  the  Divine  scheme.  The  ancient  philo- 
sopher had  but  an  imperfect  discernment  of  the  necessity  of 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  89 

evil  even  xvipon  this  assumption,  even  unde,r  the  actual  con- 
ditions of  man's  nature ;  not  being  able  to  rid  himself  com- 
pletely of  the  idea  that  human  nature  could  be  cured  by- 
philosophy,  instead  of  by  the  chastening  rod.  He  did  but 
half  see  that  which  the  Christian  philosopher  sees  with  the 
utmost  distinctness — the  use  in  fact  of  evil ;  the  want  of 
which  partial  satisfaction  was  the  cause  of  the  desperate- 
ness  of  his  rationale  of  evil,  as  a  rival  of  the  Deity ;  for 
had  he  distinctly  seen  its  conditional  necessity,  he  would 
not  have  despaired  about  the  root  of  the  enigma. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  to  the  question  why  man  %oas  so 
constituted  as  to  render  evil  thus  necessary,  no  answer  can 
be  given.  TJ'pon  this  condition  evil  is  no  insoluble  mys- 
tery, but  is  accounted  for ;  upon  abstract  grounds  it  is  an 
insoluble  mystery.  The  argument,  however,  of  the  Divine 
Omnipotence  does  not  require  that  we  should  know  that 
evil  is  necessary ;  but  only  that  we  should  not  know  that 
it  is  not:  because  even  in  the  latter  case  we  are  under  the 
check  of  a  prohibition;  we  cannot  assert  that  the  exist- 
ence of  evil  does  not  stand  upon  the  same  grounds  as 
necessary  truth,  and  therefore  that  the  inability  to  dispense 
with  it  is  not,  like  the  inability  to  contradict  necessary 
truth,  a  mere  verbal  limitation  of  the  Divine  power. 

The  same  answer  applies  to  the  objection  to  the  Divine 
Omnipotence  arising  from  man's  free-will.  Is  a  physical 
limitation  of  that  Divine  attribute,  it  may  be  asked,  any 
greater  limitation  than  the  moral  one  involved  in  the 
power  of  the  human  will  to  resist  the  Divine  ?  But 
although  the  existence  of  such  a  power  in  the  creature  is 
incomprehensible  to  us,  we  do  not  know  that  his  posses- 
sion of  this  liberty  is  not  necessary  for  the  ultimate  forma- 
tion of  his  moral  character ;  and  therefore  that  the  forma- 
tion of  that  character  without  it  is  not  a  contradiction  to 
necessary  truth ;  analogous  to  a  mathematical  absurdity. 

Does  an  opponent  demand  the  same  rights  of  ignorance 


90  Belief  in  a  God  [Lect. 

on  the  side  of  liis  own  position  ?  Tliey  are  not  enough  for 
him ;  for  his  argument  requires  that  he  should  make  the 
positive  assertion  of  a  contradiction  to  necessary  truth  in  a 
suspension  of  physical  law;  nor  indeed  can  he  claim  them, 
for  by  our  reason  we  see  there  is  no  such  contradiction. 

The  conception  of  a  limited  Deity  then,  i.e.  a  Being 
really  circumscribed  in  power,  and  not  verbally  only  by  a 
confinement  to  necessary  truth,  is  at  variance  with  our 
fundamental  idea  of  a  God ;  to  depart  from  which  is  to 
retrograde  from  modern  thought  to  ancient,  and  to  go  from 
Christianity  back  again  to  Paganism.  The  God  of  ancient 
religion  was  either  not  a  personal  Being  or  not  an  omni- 
potent Being ;  the  God  of  modern  religion  is  both.  For, 
indeed,  civilization  is  not  opposed  to  faith.  The  idea  of 
the  Supreme  Being  in  the  mind  of  European  society  now 
is  more  primitive,  more  childlike,  more  imaginative,  than 
the  idea  of  the  ancient  Brahman  or  Alexandrian  philoso- 
pher :  it  is  an  idea  which  both  of  these  would  have  derided 
as  the  notion  of  a  child — a  ncgotiosns  Deus,  who  interposes 
in  human  affairs  and  answers  prayers.  So  far  from  the 
philosophical  conception  of  the  Deity  having  advanced 
with  civilization,  and  the  poetical  receded,  the  philoso- 
phical has  receded  and  the  poetical  advanced.  The  God 
of  whom  it  is  said,  "  Are  not  five  sparrows  sold  for  two 
farthings,  and  not  one  of  them  is  forgotten  before  God ; 
but  even  the  very  hairs  of  your  head  are  numbered,"  is  the 
object  of  modern  worship.  Nor,  again,  has  civilization 
shewn  any  signs  of  rejecting  doctrine.  Certain  ages  are 
indeed  called  the  ages  of  faith ;  but  the  bulk  of  society  in 
this  age  believes  that  it  lives  under  a  supernatural  dispen- 
sation ;  and  accepts  truths  which  are  not  less  supernatural, 
though  they  have  more  proof,  than  some  doctrines  of  the 
middle  ages :  and  if  so,  this  is  an  age  of  faith.  It  is  true 
most  people  do  not  live  up  to  their  faith  now;  neither  did 
they  in  the  middle  ages. 


IV]  Belief  in  a  God  91 

Has  not  modern  philosophy,  again,  shewn  both  more 
strength  and  acuteness,  and  also  more  faith,  than  the  ancient? 
I  speak  of  the  main  current.  Those  ancient  thinkers  who 
reduced  the  Supreme  Being  to  a  negation,  with  all  their 
subtlety  wanted  strength,  and  settled  questions  by  an 
easier  test  than  that  of  modern  philosophy.  The  merit  of 
a  modern  metaphysician  is,  like  that  of  a  good  chemist  or 
naturalist,  accurate  observation  in  noting  the  facts  of  mind. 
Is  there  a  contradiction  in  the  idea  of  creation  ?  Is  there 
a  contradiction  in  the  idea  of  a  personal  Infinite  Being  ? 
He  examines  his  own  mind,  and  if  he  does  not  see  one,  he 
passes  the  idea.  But  the  ancient  speculators  decided,  with- 
out examination  of  the  true  facts  of  mind,  by  a  kind  of 
philosophical  fancy ;  and  according  to  this  loose  criterion, 
the  creation  of  matter  and  a  personal  Infinite  Being  were 
impossibilities ;  for  they  mistook  the  inconceivable  for  the 
impossible.  And  thus  a  stringent  test  has  admitted  what 
a  loose  but  capricious  test  discarded ;  and  the  true  notion 
of  God  has  issued  safe  out  of  the  crucible  of  modern  meta- 
physics. Eeason  has  shewn  its  strength,  but  then  it  has 
turned  that  strength  back  upon  itself;  it  has  become  its 
own  critic ;  and  in  becoming  its  own  critic  it  has  become 
its  own  check. 

If  the  belief  then  in  a  personal  Deity  lies  at  the  bottom 
of  all  religious  and  virtuous  practice,  and  if  the  removal  of 
it  would  be  a  descent  for  human  nature,  the  withdrawal  of 
its  inspiration  and  support,  and  a  fall  in  its  whole  standard; 
the  failure  of  the  very  breath  of  moral  life  in  the  individual 
and  in  society;  the  decay  and  degeneration  of  the  very 
stock  of  mankind ; — does  a  theory  which  would  withdraw 
miraculous  action  from  the  Deity  interfere  with  that 
belief  ?  If  it  would,  it  is  but  prudent  to  count  the  cost  of 
that  interference.  Would  a  Deity  deprived  of  miraculous 
action  possess  action  at  all  ?  And  would  a  God  who  can- 
not act  be  God  ?     If  this  would  be  the  issue,  such  an  issue 


92  Belief  in  a  God 


is  the  very  last  which  religious  men  can  desire.  The 
question  here  has  been  all  throughout,  not  whether  upon 
any  ground,  but  whether  upon  a  religious  ground  and  by 
religious  believers,  the  miraculous  as  such  could  be  rejected. 
But  to  that  there  is  but  one  answer,  that  it  is  impossible 
in  reason  to  separate  religion  from  the  supernatural,  and 
upon  a  religious  basis  to  overthrow  miracles. 


LECTURE  V 

TESTIMONY 

Acts  i.  8 

Yc  shall  be  witnesses  itnto  Me  loth  in  Jerusalem,  ami  in  all  Judcca,  and  in 
Samaria,  and  unto  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  earth. 

THE  force  of  testimony  rests  upon  a  ground  of  reason ; 
because  our  reason  enables  us  to  discern  men's  char- 
acters and  understandings— that  they  are  honest  men  and 
men  of  sufficient  understanding ;  which  being  assumed,  the 
truth  of  their  reports  is  implied  and  included  in  this 
original  observation  respecting  the  men  themselves,  and 
may  be  depended  upon  so  far  as  this  observation  may  be 
depended  upon.  It  is  true  we  believe  many  things  which 
are  told  us  without  previous  knowledge  of  the  persons  who 
are  our  informants,  but  ordinarily  we  assume  honesty  and 
competency  in  men,  unless  we  have  reason  to  suppose  the 
contrary. 

But  such  being  the  nature  of  testimony,  it  may  be  asked, 
'  Do  we  receive  through  this  second-hand  channel  of  know- 
ledge, truths  upon  which  our  eternal  interests  depend  ? 
In  other  words,  can  we  suppose  that  these  truths  would  be 
embodied  in  visible  occurrences,  which  can  only  reach  us 
through  testimony  ?  Can  we  think  that  our  own  relations 
to  the  Divine  Being  depend  upon  such  a  medium,  that  is 
to  say,  upon  facts  brought  to  us  through  it  ?  that  human 
testimony  interposes  between  ourselves  and  God,  and  that 
His  communications  to  us  travel  by  this  circuitous  route. 


94  Testimo7iy  [Lect. 

going  Lack  to  a  distant  point  in  history,  and  returning 
thence  to  us  by  a  train  of  historical  evidence?'  The 
answer  to  tliis  is,  that  certainly  testimony  does  not  satisfy 
all  the  wants  of  the  human  mind  in  the  matter  of  evidence, 
because  upon  the  supposition  that  a  most  wonderful  event 
of  the  deepest  importance  to  us  has  taken  place,  we  have 
naturally  a  longing  for  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of 
that  event,  as  distinguished  from  knowing  of  it  through 
the  medium  of  other  persons,  especially  if  the  intervening 
chain  of  testimony  is  long.  In  the  matter  of  evidence, 
however,  the  question  is  not  what  satisfies,  but  what  is  suf- 
ficient ;  and  therefore  if  God  has  adopted  any  medium  or 
channel  of  evidence  by  which  to  convey  His  communica- 
tions to  us,  all  that  we  are  practically  concerned  to  ask  is 
— is  it  a  reasonaUe  one  ?  is  it  a  proof  of  a  natural  force  and 
weight,  such  as  is  accommodated  to  the  constitution  of  our 
minds  ?  If  testimony  be  this  kind  of  proof,  there  is 
nothing  incongruous  in  its  being  chosen  to  convey  even  the 
most  important  spiritual  truths  to  us ;  it  is  enough  if,  how- 
ever secondary  a  channel,  it  docs  convey  them  to  us. 

It  is  to  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  force  of  testimony 
has  certain  inherent  limits  or  conditions  when  applied  to 
the  proof  of  miracles.  And  first,  I  would  observe  in  limine 
that  that  which  testimony  is  capable  of  proving  must  be 
something  within  the  bounds  of  reason;  i.e.  something 
which,  in  the  fair  exercise  of  reasonable  supposition,  we 
can  imagine  possible.  The  question  is  sometimes  put — 
'  What  if  so  many  apparently  competent  witnesses  were  to 
assure  you  that  they  had  seen  such  and  svich  a  miracle — 
mentioning  the  most  monstrous,  absurd,  fantastic,  and 
ludicrous  confusion  of  nature,  of  which  mere  arbitrary 
conception  could  raise  the  idea  in  the  mind — would  you 
believe  them  V  But  the  test  of  mere  conception  is  not  in 
its  own  nature  a  legitimate  test  of  the  force  of  testimony ; 
because  conception  or  fancy  is  a  simply  wild  and  unlimited 


V]  Testimony  95 

power  of  imagining  anything  whatever,  and  putting  to- 
gether any  forms  we  please  in  our  minds ;  but  such  a 
power  is  in  no  sort  of  correspondence  with  actual  possi- 
bility in  nature.  In  the  universe,  under  the  Divine 
government,  there  can  be  nothing  absolutely  wild  or  out- 
landish :  if  physical  lav/  does  not  constitute  the  bound  of 
possibility,  some  measure  of  possibility  there  must  be,  and 
our  very  idea  of  God  is  such  a  measure.  Pure,  boundless 
enormity,  then,  is  itself  incredible,  and  therefore  out  of  the 
reach  of  testimony,  although  it  is  imaginable.  Nor  indeed 
is  the  supposition  of  sound  and  competent  testimony  to 
such  merely  imaginable  extravagances  and  excesses  of 
deviation  from  order  a  lawful  one,  because  it  is  practically 
impossible  that  there  should  be  a  body  of  men  of  good 
repute  for  understanding  and  honesty  to  witness  to  what  is 
intrinsically  incredible.  We  are  only  concerned  with  the 
miraculous  under  that  form  and  those  conditions  under 
which  it  has  actually  by  trustworthy  report  taken  place,  as 
subordinated  to  what  has  been  called  "  a  general  law  of 
wisdom,"  i.e.  to  a  wise  plan  and  design  in  the  Divine 
Mind ;  under  which  check  the  course  of  miracles  has,  so  to 
speak,  kept  near  to  nature,  just  diverging  enough  for  the 
purpose  and  no  more. 

But  besides  this  preliminary  limit  to  the  force  of  testi- 
mony, which  excludes  simple  monstrosity  and  absurdity, 
another  condition  has  also  been  attached  to  it  by  divines, 
which  applies  to  it  in  the  case  of  any  miracle  whatever, 
viz.  that  all  evidence  of  miracles  assumes  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  God.  (i.)  It  may  be  urged  that,  according 
to  the  argument  of  design  (which  does  not  apply  to  the 
coincidences  in  nature  only,  but  to  any  case  of  coincidence 
whatever),  a  miracle,  supposing  it  true,  j9?-ovcs  and  need  not 
assume  a  supernatural  agent.  But  were  this  granted,  the 
evidence  of  a  Universal  Being  must  still  rest  on  a  universal 
basis ;  a  miracle  being  only  a  particular  local  occurrence  ; 


96  Testimony  [Lect. 

and  therefore  for  the  proof  of  a  God  we  should  still  have  to 
fall  back  upon  the  evidence  of  natvire.  Even  the  imaginary 
case,  which  has  been  put,  of  its  being  written  in  our  very- 
sight  on  the  sky  by  a  wonder-working  agency — There  is  a 
God,  could  not  upon  this  account  prove  the  existence  of  a 
God.  But  even  could  a  miracle  legitimately  prove  it,  it 
must  still  assume  the  belief  in  it  to  begin  with ;  because 
it  could  not  prove  it  to  an  atheist  who  had  already  v:itli- 
stood  the  proof  of  it  in  nature.  A  mind  that  had  not  been 
convinced  by  the  primary  evidence  of  a  Deity,  must  con- 
sistently reject  such  a  second  evidence,  and  therefore 
unless  a  man  brings  the  belief  in  a  God  to  a  miracle,  he 
does  not  get  it  from  the  miracle. 

But  the  admission  of  divines  that  the  evidence  of 
miracles  assumes  the  belief  in  a  God  was  not  made  with  a 
view  to  an  imaginary  instance,  but  with  reference  to  the 
actual  situation  of  mankind  at  large  upon  this  subject,  and 
the  medium  through  which  in  the  nature  of  the  case  the 
evidence  of  miracles  must  ordinarily  be  received,  which  is 
testimony.  This  admission  is  based  upon  the  relations  in 
which  an  atheist  necessarily  stands  to  human  testimony 
upon  this  subject,  and  the  mode  in  which  his  want  of 
belief  in  a  God  affects  the  value  of  that  testimony. 

The  effect,  then,  of  atheism  upon  the  value  and  weight 
of  human  testimony  to  miracles  must  be,  as  regards  the 
atheist  himself,  that  of  invalidating  such  testimony,  and 
depriving  it  of  all  cogency.  For  consider  the  light  in 
which  an  atheist  must  regard  the  whole  body  and  system 
of  religious  belief  in  the  world,  and  the  whole  mass  of 
religious  believers,  so  far  as  they  are  affected  by  their 
belief.  Wliat  other  view  can  he  take  of  religion  but  that 
it  is  simple  fanaticism,  or  of  religious  men  but  that  they 
are  well  meaning  but  unreasonable  and  mistaken  enthu- 
siasts ?  Let  a  man  decide,  not  that  there  is  not  a  God,  but 
oulv  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  there  is  one,  and  what 


V]  Testimony  97 

is  the  immediate  result  ?  He  looks  around  him,  and  he 
sees  that  a  conclusion  which  in  his  own  judgment  stands 
upon  no  rational  grounds,  is  embraced  by  all  religious 
people  with  the  firmest  practical  certainty,  and  treated  as  a 
truth,  which  it  is  almost  madness  to  doubt  of.  But  though 
he  could  not  condemn  men  as  enthusiasts  for  taking  a 
different  view  of  evidence  from  himself,  provided  they  only 
maintained  their  own  view  of  the  question  as  the  preferable 
and  more  probable  one,  he  must  look  upon  this  absolute 
unhesitating  and  vehement  faith  in  that  which  he  considers 
to  be  without  rational  proof,  as  passionate  and  blind  zeal. 
He  must  regard  systematic  devotion,  constant  addresses, 
prayer  and  service  to  a  Being  of  whose  existence  there  is 
not  evidence,  as  downright  fanaticism.  But  this  being  the 
case,  he  must  necessarily  estimate  the  testimony  of  such 
persons  in  matters  specially  connected  with  this  credulous 
belief  of  theirs,  at  a  very  light  rate :  upon  his  own  ground 
it  is  only  reasonable  that  he  should  treat  with  the  greatest 
suspicion  all  reports  of  miraculous  occurrences  from  re- 
ligious believers;  whose  evidence  upon  ordinary  subjects 
he  will  admit  to  be  as  sound  as  his  own,  inasmuch  as  in 
the  common  affairs  of  life  they  show  discretion  enough ; 
but  whom  he  must,  upon  his  own  liypothesis,  regard  as 
utterly  untrustworthy  upon  the  particular  topic  of  religion. 
That  is  their  weak  point,  the  subject  upon  which  they  go 
wild.  Are  we  to  believe  a  man  upon  the  very  theme  upon 
which  he  is  deluded  ?  No  :  upon  other  questions  he  may 
be  as  competent  a  witness  as  anybody  else,  but  upon  this 
particular  one  he  is  the  victim  of  hallucinations.  Such  is 
the  unavoidable  judgment  of  an  atheist,  and  upon  his  own 
ground  a  correct  judgment,  upon  the  testimony  of  religious 
and  devout  men  to  miraculous  interpositions  of  the  Deity. 
Suppose  one  of  these  to  come  to  him  and  say, '  I  have  seen 
a  miracle;'  he  would  reply,  'I  will  believe  you  or  not 
according  to  what  you  mean  by  a  miracle :  if  this  mu'acle 

G 


98  Tcstini07iy  [Lect. 

which  you  come  to  tell  me  of  is  only  an  extraordinary 
natural  fact,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  religion,  I  will 
believe  you  as  readily  as  I  would  anybody  else ;  but  if  it  is 
a  miracle  in  a  religious  sense,  I  do  not  consider  you  a  trust- 
worthy witness  to  such  a  fact ;  you  are  in  an  unreasonable 
condition  of  mind  upon  the  question  of  religion  altogether ; 
and  being  under  a  delusion  upon  the  very  evidence  of  a 
God  at  all,  you  are  not  likely  to  possess  discretion  or 
sobriety  as  a  spectator  of  what  you  call  an  interposition  of 
His.  Upon  that  subject  you  are  a  partial,  fancifid,  and 
liighty  witness.' 

The  evidence  of  miracles  thus  assumes  the  belief  in  a 
God,  because  in  the  absence  of  that  belief  all  the  testimony 
upon  which  miracles  are  received  labours  under  an  incur- 
able stigma.  And  this  it  is  which  constitutes  the  real 
argument  of  the  celebrated  Essay  of  Hume.  This  essay  is 
a  philosophical  attempt,  indeed,  to  decide  the  question 
whether  certain  events  took  place  eighteen  centuries  ago 
by  a  formula;  and  as  the  inductive  formula  places  a 
miracle  outside  of  possibility,  Hume's  evidential  formula 
secures  a  balance  of  evidence  against  it.  It  does  this  by 
establishing  a  common  measure  and  criterion  of  proba- 
bility, by  which  both  the  miracle  and  the  testimony  to  it 
are  to  be  tried,  viz.  experience.^  '  The  source  of  our  belief 
in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  experience,  and  this  experi- 
ence is  constant ;  the  source  of  our  belief  in  testimony  is 
also  experience,  but  this  experience  is  variable,  because 
testimony  has  sometimes  deceived  us :  we  follow  the  con- 
stant experience  which  is  against  the  miracle  in  preference 
-to  the  variable  which  is  in  favour  of  it.'  Testimony  is  thus 
reduced  to  a  mere  derivative  of  experience ;  and  then  the 

^  Because,  although  this  philosopher  has  expunged  the  argument  of 
experience  out  of  the  tablet  of  human  reason,  he  professes  that  he  has  no 
other  test  of  truth  to  fall  back  upon  but  that,  and  that  he  must  take 
either  that  or  none. 


V]  Testimony  99 

formula,  that  the  falsehood  of  the  testimony  is  less  contra- 
dictory to  experience  than  the  truth  of  the  miracle  settles 
the  question.  But  in  the  first  place  belief  in  testimony  is 
not  a  mere  derivative  from  experience,  but  is  an  original 
principle  in  our  nature  and  has  an  antecedent  ground  of 
reason ;  inasmuch  as  prior  to  all  observation  of  the  results 
of  testimony,  or  the  combinations  of  testimony  with  truth 
viewed  as  a  series  of  conjunctions,  we  believe  an  apparently 
honest  man  because  he  is  such.  And  in  the  next  place  a 
rule  which  would  oblige  everybody  to  disbelieve  fresh  intel- 
ligence, W'henever  the  facts  were  unprecedented,  is  an  im- 
possible one ;  it  could  not  work  in  human  affairs ;  and  it 
in  fact  breaks  down  in  the  writer's  own  hands ;  who  gives 
in  an  hypothetical  instance  a  formal  specimen  of  that  kind 
of  marvel  which  is  capable  of  being  proved  by  testimony ; 
and  in  so  doing  describes  a  fact  which  is  totally  contrary  to 
human  experience.  But  though  his  formula  encounters 
the  natural  fate  of  infallible  rdcipes  and  solutions,  every 
reflecting  reader  must  see  the  force  and  the  truth,  upon  the 
writer's  own  ground,  of  his  assertion  of  the  obliquity,  the 
exaggeration,  and  the  passion  of  religious  testimony ;  and 
must  admit  that  a  philosopher  who  thinks  that  mankind 
are  under  a  delusion  in  worshipping  God,  has  a  right  to 
think  them  under  an  equal  delusion  when  they  testify  to 
Divine  interpositions. 

Having  stated  the  fundamental  admission  of  divines  that 
the  evidence  of  miracles  assumes  the  belief  in  Supernatural 
Power,  I  next  observe  that  this  condition  of  miraculous 
evidence  gives  us  the  distinction  between  miracles  and 
ordinary  facts  as  matters  of  credit.  A  miracle  differs  from 
an  ordinary  fact  in  the  first  place  as  a  subject  of  credit, 
simply  as  being  an  extraordinary  fact,  and  we  naturally  re- 
quire a  greater  amount  of  evidence  for  it  on  that  account. 
There  is,  indeed,  the  greatest  unlikeliness  that  any  occur- 
rence whatever,  which  comes  into  our  head  by  chance  or 


I  oo  Testi7nony  [Lect. 

intentional  conception,  though  it  is  of  the  commonest  kind, 
will  really  happen  as  it  is  imagined ;  and  from  this  great 
antecedent  improbability  of  the  most  ordinary  events,  it 
has  been  inferred  that  no  calculable  difference  exists  be- 
tween the  improbability  of  ordinary  facts  and  the  impro- 
bability of  miracles  ;  or  therefore  in  the  amount  of  evidence 
required  for  them.  But  to  draw  such  an  inference  is  to 
confound  two  totally  distinct  grounds  of  improbability.  If 
all  that  I  can  say  of  the  likelihood  of  an  event's  occun-ence 
is  that  it  comes  into  my  head  to  imagine  it,  that  is  no 
reason  whatever  for  it,  and  the  absence  of  all  reason  for 
expecting  an  event  constitutes  of  itself  the  improbability 
of  that  event.  But  this  kind  of  antecedent  improbability, 
being  simply  the  absence  of  evidence,  is  immediately 
neutralized  by  the  appearance  of  evidence,  to  which  it 
offers  no  resistance  :  while  that  improbability  which  arises 
from  the  marvellous  character  of  an  event  naturally  offers 
a  resistance  to  evidence,  which  must  therefore  be  the 
stronger  in  order  to  overcome  such  resistance.     (2.) 

But  if  we  take  in  the  whole  notion  of  a  miracle  not  as 
a  marvellous  event  only,  but  the  act  of  a  Supernatural 
Being,  a  miracle  is  still  more  widely  distinguished  from  an 
ordinary  event  as  a  subject  of  credit  and  evidence.  The 
evidence  of  an  ordinary  fact  does  not  assume  any  ground 
or  principle  of  faith  for  the  reception  of  it.  It  is  true  that 
all  belief  in  testimony  implies  faith  in  this  sense,  that  we 
accept  upon  the  report  of  other  persons  the  occurrence  of 
some  event  or  the  existence  of  some  object  which  we  have 
not  seen  with  our  own  eyes.  But  common  testimony  is  so 
complete  a  part  of  the  present  order  of  things  and  of  the 
M'hole  agency  by  which  natural  life  is  conducted,  and  the 
belief  in  it  is  so  necessary  and  so  matter-of-course  an  act 
in  us,  that  we  cannot  regard  the  mere  belief  in  testimony 
as  faith  in  the  received  sense  of  that  word.  We  may  never 
have   seen   a   well-knoM'n  place   in  our  own  country  or 


V]  Testimony  i  o  i 

abroad,  but  if  the  place  is  universally  talked  of,  if  it 
appears  in  all  maps  and  books  of  travels  and  geography, 
and  if  anybody  would  be  considered  to  be  out  of  his  mind 
if  he  doubted  its  existence  ;  it  would  be  a  misapplication 
of  language  to  call  the  journey  thither  an  act  of  faith. 
The  very  merit  of  faith  is  that  we  make  something  of  a 
venture  in  it ;  which  we  do  when  we  believe  in  testimony 
against  our  experience.  But  when  the  facts  which  are  the 
subject  of  testimony  are  in  full  accordance  with  our  experi- 
ence, then,  the  testimony  being  competent  and  sufficient, 
belief  is  unavoidable,  it  is  as  natural  to  an  atheist  or  a 
materialist  as  it  is  to  a  believer ;  and  therefore  in  such 
cases  belief  in  testimony  does  not  involve  the  principle  of 
faith.  But  a  miracle  in  assuming  the  existence  of  super- 
natural power,  assumes  a  basis  of  faith.  A  miracle  has  a 
foot,  so  to  speak,  in  each  world ;  one  part  of  it  resting  upon 
earth,  while  the  other  goes  down  beyond  our  intellectual 
reach  into  the  depths  of  the  invisible  world.  The  sensible 
fact  is  subject  to  the  natural  law  of  testimony,  the  Divine 
intervention  rests  upon  another  ground.  A  miracle  is  both 
an  outward  fact,  and  also  an  invisible  and  spiritual  fact, 
and  to  embrace  the  twofold  whole,  both  testimony  and 
faith  are  wanted. 

It  has  been  a  fault  in  one  school  of  writers  on  evidence, 
that  in  urging  the  just  weight  of  testimony,  they  have  not 
sufficiently  attended  to  this  distinction,  and  have  over- 
looked the  deep  gulf  which  divides  facts,  which  assume  a 
basis  of  religious  faith,  from  ordinary  facts  as  subjects  of 
evidence.  These  writers  are  too  apt  to  speak  of  miracles 
as  if  they  stood  completely  on  a  par  with  other  events  as 
matters  of  credit,  and  as  if  the  reception  of  them  only 
drew  upon  that  usual  and  acknowledged  belief  in  testi- 
mony by  which  we  accept  the  facts  of  ordinary  history. 
But  this  is  to  forget  the  important  point  that  a  miracle  is 
on  one  side  of  it  not  a  fact  of  this  world,  but  of  the  in- 


I02  Testimony  [Lect. 

visible  world  ;  the  Divine  interposition  in  it  being  a  super- 
natural and  mysterious  act :  that  therefore  the  evidence  for 
a  miracle  does  not  stand  exactly  on  the  same  ground  as  the 
evidence  of  the  witness-box,  which  only  appeals  to  our 
common  sense  as  men  of  the  world  and  actors  in  ordinary 
life ;  but  that  it  requires  a  great  religious  assumption  in 
our  minds  to  begin  with,  without  which  no  testimony  in 
the  case  can  avail ;  and  consequently  that  the  acceptance 
of  a  miracle  exercises  more  than  tlie  ordinary  qualities  of 
candour  and  fairness  used  in  estimating  historical  evidence 
generally,  having,  in  the  previous  admission  of  a  Super- 
natural Power,  hrst  tried  our  faith. 

This  admission  of  divines,  again,  that  the  evidence  of 
miracles  assumes  the  belief  in  a  Personal  Deity,  supplies 
us  with  the  proper  ground  on  which  to  judge  of  some  posi- . 
tions  which  have  been  recently  promulgated  on  the  subject 
of  miracles  and  their  evidence.  "  No  testimony,"  it  has 
been  said,  "  can  reach  to  the  supernatural :  testimony  can 
only  apply  to  an  apparent  sensible  fact ;  that  it  is  due  to 
supernatural  causes  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  previous 
belief  and  assumption  of  the  parties."     (3.) 

Does  then  this  statement  only  mean  to  distinguish  in  the 
case  of  a  miracle  between  the  fact  and  the  cause,  that  the 
fact  alone  can  be  a  subject  of  testimony,  not  a  super- 
natural cause  ?  It  is,  in  that  case,  an  undeniably  true 
statement ;  for  the  supernatural  cause  of  a  fact  is  a  truth 
which  in  its  own  nature  cannot  be  reached  by  ocular  evi- 
dence or  attestation.  Testimony  does  not  pretend  to  in- 
clude in  its  report  of  an  extraordinary  fact  the  rationale  of 
that  fact ;  it  does  not  j)rofess  to  penetrate  beyond  the 
phenomenon,  and  put  itself  in  contact  with  the  source  and 
original  of  it,  and  thence  bring  back  the  intelligence  that 
that  source  lies  outside  of  physical  law  in  a  special  act  of 
tlie  Divine  M'ill.  This  species  of  evidence  has  its  own 
office,  whicli  is  to  attest  visible  and  sensible  occurrences ; 


V]  Teslimony  1 03 

unless  it  is  worthless  testimony  it  can  do  no  less,  and  if  it 
is  the  best  conceivable  testimony  it  can  do  no  more.  What 
those  facts  amount  to,  how  they  are  to  be  interpreted,  what 
they  prove,  depends  upon  another  argument  altogether  than 
that  of  testimony.  I  accept  upon  the  report  of  eye- 
witnesses certain  miraculous  occurrences  ;  that  these  occur- 
rences are  interpositions  of  the  Deity  depends  upon  the 
existence  of  a  Deity  to  begin  with,  and  next  upon  the 
argument  of  design  or  iinal  causes ;  because  the  extra- 
ordinary coincidence  of  miraculous  occurrences  with  a  pro- 
fessed Divine  commission  on  the  part  of  the  person  who 
announces  or  commands  them,  proves  a  Divine  intention 
and  act.  That  which  constitutes  a  miraculous  occurrence 
a  miracle  in  the  common  or  theological  acceptation,  is 
therefore  not  obtained  from  simple  testimony  ;  though  it  is 
obtained  immediately  by  our  reason  from  the  data  which 
testimony  supplies.  Thus  understood,  the  position  to 
wliich  I  have  referred  amounts  to  the  statement  that 
testimony  is  testimony,  and  not  another  kind  of  evidence  ; 
it  does  not  deny  the  supernatural  cause  of  the  occurrences 
in  question,  but  only  that  testimony  itself  proves  it ;  the 
supernatural  explanation  of  a  miracle  depending  upon 
reasons  which  are  at  hand,  but  which  are  not  contained 
within  the  simple  report  of  the  witness. 

2.  The  position,  therefore,  that  "  no  testimony  can  reach 
to  the  supernatural,"  if  it  accepts  recorded  miracles  as 
facts,  and  only  excludes  from  the  department  of  testimony 
their  cause,  is  a  true  though  an  unpractical  distinction. 
Xor  can  this  position  be  objected  to  again  if  it  is  only  to 
be  understood  as  meaning  that  testimony  is  not  sutiicient 
to  prove  the  facts,  without  the  previous  assumption  of 
Supernatural  Power  or  the  existence  of  God  in  the  mind 
of  the  receiver  of  such  testimony.  For  in  that  case  it  only 
amounts  to  the  admission  which  divines  have  always  made 
upon  the  very  threshold  of  the  subject  of  miracles.     The 


I04  Testhnony  [Lect. 

great  truth  upon  wliich  the  evidence  of  all  lesser  instances 
of  supernatural  power  depends  is  the  truth  of  the  super- 
natural origin  of  this  world — that  this  world  is  caused  by 
the  will  of  a  Personal  Being ;  that  it  is  sustained  by  that 
will,  and  that  therefore  there  is  a  God  who  is  the  object  of 
prayer  and  worship.  A  man  who  does  not  hold  the  exist- 
ence of  this  Supernatural  Being  cannot  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  attach  much  weight  to  reports  of  amazing 
preternatural  occurrences,  laid  before  him  as  rclirjious  facts 
connected  with  their  own  religious  interests  and  feelings  and 
persuasions  by  earnest  believers  in  religion,  who  can  only 
figure  in  his  eye  as  devotees  and  enthusiasts.  And  if 
atheism  thus  invalidates  the  testimony  to  miracles,  the  be- 
lief in  a  God  is  wanted  as  a  condition  of  its  validity. 

3.  But  is  the  statement  that  no  "  testimony  can  reach 
to  the  supernatural"  made  upon  the  ground  that  the  mira- 
culous fact  is  intrinsically  incredible  and  impossible,  and 
that  a  violation  of  pliysical  law  is  no  more  capable  of  being 
proved  by  testimony  than  a  mathematical  absurdity  ?  In 
that  case  the  position  is  both  religiously  and  philosophically 
untenable ;  because  a  fact  which  is  contrary  to  the  order  of 
nature  is  not  thereby  contradictory  to  reason ;  and  what  is 
not  contradictory  to  reason  is  a  subject  of  testimony.  But 
it  is  replied  that  the  rule  that  "  no  testimony  can  reach  to 
the  supernatural"  does  not  exclude  the  miraculous  fact 
from  the  province  of  testimony,  but  only  the  interpretation 
of  that  fact  as  a  violation  of  laio ;  that  the  extraordinary 
occurrence  need  not  be  in  reality  a  physical  anomaly,  in 
which  case  this  rule  still  leaves  it  a  subject  of  testimony ; 
"  that  it  is  not  the  mere  fact  but  the  cause  or  explanation 
of  it  which  is  the  point  at  issue."  (4.)  If  this  however  is 
to  be  taken  as  the  intended  scope  and  force  of  this  rule,  it 
escapes  the  charge  of  violating  common  sense  only  to  incur 
that  of  being  futile,  unmeaning,  and  nugatory.  Testimony 
cannot,  as  has  been  said,  reach  to  more  than  the  occurrence 


V]  Testimony  105 

itself;  the  explanation  of  this  occurrence,  whether  it  is  or 
is  not  anomalous,  and  whether  it  does  or  does  not  proceed 
from  a  supernatural  cause,  depends  on  other  considerations 
which  are  not  included  in  the  report  of  a  witness.  If  this 
rule  then  means  no  more  than  this,  its  meaning  is  a  great 
falling  short  of  its  pretension.  It  certainly  appears  at  first 
sight  to  deny  that  miraculous  facts  are  subjects  of  testi- 
mony, and  with  this  meaning  it  is  a  distinct  and  intelli- 
gible position,  though  a  false  one.  If  it  only  signifies  that 
testimony  cannot  reach  to  more  than  its  very  nature  admits 
of  its  reaching  to,  the  rule  is  in  that  case  chargeable  with 
the  great  fault  of  appearing  to  mean  a  great  deal,  and  really 
meaning  nothing. 

It  may  however  be  suggested  that  in  many  cases  cer- 
tainly this  distinction  between  miraculous  facts  and  viola- 
tions of  law  is  practically  untenable,  because  whatever 
may  be  said  of  some  kind  of  miracles,  others  are — the  fads 
themselves  are — plainly  violations  of  physical  law,  and  can 
be  nothing  else ;  they  are  plainly  outstanding  and  anoma- 
lous facts,  which  admit  of  no  sort  of  physical  explanation. 
Admit  the  real  external  occurrence  of  our  Lord's  Eesurrec- 
tion  and  Ascension,  and  the  interpretation  of  it  as  a  miracle 
or  contradiction  to  the  laws  of  nature  is  inevitable.  Lan- 
guage has  been  used  indeed  as  if  all  the  facts  of  the  Gos- 
pel history  could  be  admitted  and  the  miracles  denied ; 
but  when  we  examine  the  sense  in  which  the  word  '  fact ' 
is  used  in  that  language,  we  find  that  it  is  not  used  in  the 
ordinary  sense,  but  in  the  sense  of  an  inexplicable  erroneous 
impression  on  the  minds  of  the  witnesses. 

For,  indeed,  this  distinction  is  no  sooner  made  than 
abandoned;  it  is  asserted  that  some  kind  of  miraculous 
facts  are  intrinsically  as  facts  incredible ;  and  in  the  place 
of  the  distinction  between  the  miraculous  fact  and  the  vio- 
lation of  law,  is  substituted  the  distinction  between  the 
fact,  and  the  impression  of  the  fact  upon  the  minds  of  the 


io6  Testimo7iy  [Lect. 

witnesses.  (5.)  Testimony,  it  is  said,  can  prove  the  im- 
pression npon  tlie  minds  of  the  witnesses,  but  cannot  "  from 
the  nature  of  our  antecedent  convictions"  prove  the  real 
occurrence  of  the  fact,  that  "  the  event  really  happened  in 
the  way  assigned."  This  indeed,  upon  the  supposition  of 
the  intrinsic  incredibility  of  the  facts,  is  the  only  hypo- 
thesis left  to  account  for  honest  testimony  to  them.  We 
have  no  alternative  then  but  to  fall  back  upon  something 
unknown,  obscure,  and  excejjtional  in  the  action  of  human 
nature,  in  the  case  of  the  witnesses ;  some  hidden  root  of 
delusion,  some  secret  disorganization  in  the  structure  of 
reason  itself,  or  interference  with  the  medium  and  cliannel 
between  it  and  the  organs  of  sense ;  whence  it  must  have 
arisen  that  those  wdio  did  not  see  certain  occurrences,  were 
fully  persuaded  that  they  did  see  them.  But  such  an 
explanation  requires  the  intrinsic  incredibility  of  the  facts, 
and  is  illegitimate  without  it ;  because  if  they  are  not  in 
their  own  nature  incredible,  no  occasion  has  come  for  re- 
sorting to  such  an  explanation ;  there  is  no  reason  why  I 
should  resist  the  natural  effect  of  testimony,  and  institute 
tliis  unnatural  divorce  between  the  impression  and  the  fact 
at  all. 

The  position  then  that  "no  testimony  can  reach  to  the 
supernatural,"  is  correct  or  incorrect  according  as  it  is 
based  upon  the  impossibility  of  the  supernatural,  or  the 
inadequacy  of  mere  testimony — its  inherent  defectiveness 
upon  such  subject-matter,  unless  supplemented  by  a  ground 
of  faith  within  ourselves.  We  allow  the  need  of  a  pre- 
vious assumption  to  give  force  to  the  evidence  of  miracles ; 
at  the  same  time  we  are  prepared  to  vindicate  the  validity 
and  the  force  of  testimony,  upon  that  previous  assumption 
being  made.  Upon  tl^e  supposition  of  the  existence  of  a 
God  and  of  Supernatural  Power  in  the  first  instance,  com- 
petent testimony  to  miraculous  facts  possesses  an  obliga- 
tory force;  it  becomes  by  virtue  of  that  supposition  the 


VJ  Testimony  107 

testimony  of  credible  witnesses  to  credible  facts ;  for  the 
facts  are  credible  if  there  is  a  power  equal  to  being  their 
cause ;  and  the  witnesses  are  credible  if  we  assume  the 
truth  and  reasonableness  of  their  religious  faith  and  wor- 
ship. Untrustworthy  and  passionate  informants  upon  the 
atheistic  theory,  liable  to  any  delusion  and  mistake,  because 
upon  this  theory  their  very  belief  in  religion  in  the  first 
instance  is  a  delusion ;  upon  the  assumption  of  the  truth 
of  religion  they  become  sound  informants ;  the  change  of 
the  hypothesis  is  a  change  in  the  character  of  the  testi- 
mony ;  the  stigma  which  attached  to  it  upon  the  one  basis  is 
reversed  upon  the  other,  and  what  was  bad  evidence  upon 
the  irreligious  is  good  upon  the  religious  rationale  of  the 
world.  In  this  state  of  the  case,  then,  testimony,  when  it 
speaks  to  the  miraculous,  has  a  natural  weight  and  credit 
of  the  same  kind  as  that  which  it  possesses  in  ordinary 
matters:  and  the  attested  visible  fact  is  the  important 
thing,  upon  the  truth  of  which  the  conclusion  that  it  is  a 
miracle  follows  by  the  natural  laws  of  reasoning.  For  I 
have  shewn  it  to  be  a  practically  untenable  distinction  that 
"  it  is  not  the  mere  fact,  but  the  cause  or  explanation  of  it, 
which  is  the  point  at  issue." 

But  if  the  evidence  of  miracles  demands  in  the  first 
instance,  as  the  condition  of  its  validity  and  force,  the  belief 
in  the  existence  of  a  God ;  if  it  begs  the  question  at  the 
very  outset  of  Infinite  and  Supernatural  Power,  as  involved 
in  a  personal  Author  of  the  universe;  it  may  be  urged 
that  so  great,  so  inconceivable  an  assumption  as  this,  amounts 
to  placing  miracles  upon  a  ground  of  faith  instead  of  a 
ground  of  historical  evidence.  You  profess,  it  may  be  said, 
to  prove  the  credibility  of  the  supernatural,  and  you  do  so 
by  assuming  in  limine  the  actual  existence  of  it — the  exist- 
ence of  supernatural  power.  Let  this  only  be  understood, 
then,  and  there  need  be  no  further  controversy  on  this  sub- 
ject.    "  A  miracle  ceases  to  be  capable  of  investigation  by 


io8  Testi77iony  [Lect. 

reason  or  to  own  its  dominion :  it  is  accepted  on  religious 
grounds,  and  can  appeal  only  to  the  principle  and  influ- 
ence of  faitli."  (6.) 

I  reply  that  miracles  undoubtedly  rest  upon  a  ground  of 
faith  so  far  as  they  assume  a  truth  which  it  requires  faith 
to  adopt,  viz.  the  existence  of  a  God :  but  that  such  a 
ground  of  faith  is  compatible  with  historical  evidence  for 
them.  Do  we  mean  by  faith,  a  faculty  wholly  distinct 
from  reason,  which  without  the  aid  of  premisses  founds 
conclusions  purely  upon  itself,  which  can  give  no  account 
of  itself,  or  its  own  convictions  ?  Is  faith,  in  short,  only 
another  word  for  arbitrary  supposition  ?  In  that  case  to 
relegate  miracles  to  a  ground  of  faith  is  simply  to  deprive 
them  of  all  character  of  matters  of  fact.  A  matter  of  faith 
is  then  specially  not  a  matter  of  fact,  and  miracles  could 
only  take  place  in  the  region  and  sphere  of  faith  by  not 
taking  place  at  all.  The  individual  uses  the  totally  dis- 
tinct principles  of  faith  and  reason  according  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter before  him.  In  the  world  of  reason  he  judges 
according  to  evidence,  he  believes  wliatever  he  believes  on 
account  of  certain  reasons ;  in  the  world  of  faith  he  believes 
because  he  believes.  Faith  in  this  case  is  no  basis  for  a 
matter  of  fact ;  a  miracle  of  this  sphere  is  not  an  occur- 
rence of  time  and  place,  within  the  pale  of  history  and  geo- 
graphy, but  an  airy  vision  which  evaporates  as  the  eye  of 
reason  rests  upon  it,  and  melts  into  space.  The  fact  of 
faith  is  adapted  to  the  eye  of  faith  only. 

But  does  faith  mean  belief  upon  reasonable  grounds  ? 
Is  it  as  much  reason  as  the  most  practical  common  sense 
is,  though  its  grounds  are  less  sensible  and  more  connected 
with  our  moral  nature  ?  In  this  sense  faith  can  support 
matter  of  fact,  and  a  miracle  in  resting  upon  it,  is  not 
thereby  not  an  event  of  history.  If  a  God  who  made  the 
world  is  not  a  mere  supposition,  a  notion  of  the  mind,  but 
a  really  existing  Being,  this  Being  can  act  upon  matter 


V]  Testimony  109 

either  in  an  ordinary  way  or  in  an  extraordinary  way ;  and 
His  extraordinary  action  on  matter  is  a  visible  and  his- 
torical miracle,  "  For  evidence,"  it  has  been  said,  "  of  a 
Deity  working  miracles,  we  must  go  out  of  nature  and  be- 
yond reason."  (7.)  If  this  is  true,  a  miracle  cannot  rest 
upon  rational  evidence ;  but  if  an  Omnipotent  Deity  is  a 
conclusion  of  reason,  it  can. 

But  if  a  miracle  is  itself  a  trial  of  faith,  how,  it  is  asked, 
can  it  serve  as  the  evidence  of  something  farther  to  be 
believed  ?  "  You  admit,"  it  is  said,  "  that  this  evidence  of 
a  revelation  is  itself  the  subject  of  evidence,  and  that  not 
certain  but  only  probable  evidence ;  that  it  is  received 
through  a  chain  of  human  testimony ;  that  the  belief  in  it 
is  against  all  our  experience,  and  demands  in  the  first 
instance  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  supernatural 
power ;  in  a  word,  that  a  miracle  must  be  proved  in  spite 
of  difficulties  itself,  before  it  can  prove  anything  else. 
But  how  can  a  species  of  evidence  which  is  thus  encum- 
bered itself,  be  effective  as  the  support  of  something  else  ? 
So  far  from  miracles  being  the  evidence  of  revelation,  are 
they  not  themselves  difficulties  attaching  to  revelation  ? "  (8  ) 

This  double  capacity,  then,  of  a  miracle  as  an  object  of 
faith,  and  yet  evidence  of  faith,  is  inherent  in  the  principle 
of  miraculous  evidence;  for  belief  in  testimony  against 
experience  being  faith,  a  miracle  which  reaches  us  through 
testimony  is  necessarily  an  obicd  of  faith  ;  while  the  very 
purpose  of  the  miracle  being  to  prove  a  revelation,  the  same 
miracle  again  is  evidence,  of  faith.  But  the  objection  to  this 
double  attitude  of  a  miracle  admits  of  a  natural  answer. 
My  own  reflection  indeed  upon  my  own  act  of  belief  here, 
my  own  consciousness  of  the  kind  of  act  which  it  is  in  me, 
is  witness  enough  that  belief  in  a  miracle  is  an  exercise  and 
a  trial  of  faith.  But  if  faith  is  not  mere  supposition,  but 
reasonable  belief  upon  premisses,  there  is  no  reason  why  a 
conclusion  of  faith  should  not  be  itself  the  evidence   of 


1 1  o  Testimony  [Lect. 

something  else.  It  is  sufficient  that  I  am  rationally  con- 
vinced that  such  an  event  happened  ;  that  whatever  diffi- 
culties I  have  had  in  arriving  at  it  that  is  my  conclusion. 
That  being  the  case,  I  cannot  help  myself,  if  I  would,  using 
it  as  a  true  fact,  for  the  proof  of  something  farther  of  which 
it  is  calculated  in  its  own  nature  to  be  proof.  A  probable 
fact  is  probable  evidence.  I  may  therefore  use  a  miracle 
as  evidence  of  a  revelation,  though  I  have  only  probable 
evidence  for  the  miracle.  The  same  fact  may  try  faith  in 
one  stage  and  ground  faith  in  another,  be  the  conclusion  of 
certain  premisses  and  the  premiss  for  a  farther  conclusion ; 
i.e.  may  be  an  object  of  faith  and  yet  an  evidence  of  faith. 

It  is  not  indeed  consistent  with  truth,  nor  would  it  con- 
duce to  the  real  defence  of  Christianity,  to  underrate  the 
difficulties  of  the  Christian  evidence ;  or  to  disguise  this 
characteristic  of  it,  that  the  very  facts  which  constitute  the 
evidence  of  revelati(jn  have  to  be  accepted  by  an  act  of 
faith  tliemselves,  before  they  can  operate  as  a  proof  of  that 
further  truth.  More  than  two  centuries  ago  this  subject 
exercised  the  deep  thoughts  of  one  whom  we  may  almost 
call  the  founder  of  the  philosopliy  of  Christian  evidence  ; 
and  who  now  in  the  writings  of  Bishop  Butler  rules  in  our 
schools,  gives  us  our  point  of  view,  and  moulds  our  form  of 
reflection  on  this  subject.  The  answer  of  Pascal  to  the 
objection  of  the  difficulties  of  the  Christian  evidence,  was 
that  that  evidence  was  not  designed  for  producing  belief  as 
such,  but  for  producing  belief  in  connection  with,  and  as 
the  token  of,  a  certain  moral  disposition ;  that  that  moral 
temper  imparted  a  real  insight  into  the  reasons  for  and  the 
marks  of  truth  in  the  Christian  scheme,  and  brought  out 
proof  which  was  hidden  without  it :  which  proof,  therefore, 
though  it  did  not  answer  every  purpose  which  evidence  can 
answer,  answered  its  designed  purpose  :  in  other  words  that 
the  purpose  of  evidence  was  qualified  by  the  purpose  of 
trial;  it  being  the  Divine  intention  that  the  human  heart 


V]  Testimony  1 1 1 

itself  should  be  the  illuminating  principle,  throwing  light 
upon  that  evidence,  and  presenting  it  in  its  real  strength.^ 
This  position  then  requires  the  caution  to  go  along  with 
it,  that  we  have  no  general  liberty  in  individual  cases  of 
unbelief  to  attribute  this  result  to  moral  defects,  because 
we  do  not  know  what  latent  obstructions  of  another  kind 
there  may  have  been  to  the  perception  of  truth;  but  with  this 
caution  it  is  a  valid  reply  to  the  objection  made  ;  because  it 
supplies  a  reason  which  accounts  for  the  want  of  more  full 
and  complete  evidence  than  we  possess,  and  a  reason  which 
is  in  consistency  with  the  Divine  attributes.  (9.)  It  pre- 
sents the  Christian  evidence  as  under  Providence  limited  and 
measured  for  our  use.  One  school  of  writers  on  Christian 
evidence  has  assumed  too  confidently  that  any  average 
man,  taken  out  of  the  crowd,  who  has  sufficient  common 
sense  to  conduct  his  own  affairs,  is  a  fit  judge  of  that  evi- 
dence— such  a  judge  as  was  contemplated  in  the  original 
design  of  it.  One  great  writer  especially,  of  matchless  argu- 
mentative powers,  betrays  this  defect  in  his  point  of  view  : 
and  in  bringing  out  the  common-sense  side  of  the  Christian 
evidence — the  value  of  human  testimony — with  irresist- 
ible truth  and  force,  allows  his  very  success  to  conceal  from 
him  the  insufficiency  of  common  sense  alone. 

The  ground  of  Pascal  is  in  effect  that,  as  an  original  means 
of  persuasion,  the  Christian  evidence  is  designed  for  the  few, 
and  not  for  the  many.     Because  Christianity  is  the  religion 

^  "  II  n'etait  done  pas  juste  qu'il  pariit  d'une  maniere  manifestement 
divine  et  absoluraent  capable  de  convaincre  tons  les  hommes  ;  mais  il 
n'etait  pas  juste  aussi  qu'il  vint  d'une  maniere  si  cachee,  qu'il  ne  put  etre 
reconnu  de  ceux  qui  le  chereheraient  siucerement.  II  a  voulu  se  rendre 
parfaitement  connaissable  a  ceux-la  ;  et  aiusi,  voulant  paraitre  a  decouvert 
a  ceux  qui  le  cherclient  de  tout  leur  cceur,  et  cache  a  ceux  qui  le  fuient  de 
tout  leur  cceur,  il  tempere  sa  connaissance  en  sorte  qu'il  a  donne  des 
marques  de  soi  visibles  a  ceux  qui  le  cherchent,  et  obscures  a  ceux  qui  ne 
le  cherchent  pas.  II  y  a  assez  de  lumiere  pour  ceux  qui  ne  desirent  que 
de  voir,  et  assez  d'obscurite  pour  ceux  qui  ont  uue  disposition  contraire. " 
— Pascal,  cd.  Faucjcrc,  vol.  ii.  p.  151.  (9.) 


1 1 2  Testimony  [Lect. 

of  a  large  part  of  the  world,  and  prophesies  its  own  p    ses- 
sion of  the  whole  world,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  evio      ',e 
of  it  must  be  adaj)ted  to  convince  the  mass ; — I  mef       i 
convince  them,  on  the  supposition  of  their  coming  wj 
any  bias  of  custom  and  education  to  decide  the  questic 
evidence  alone.     It  is  enough  if  that  argument  is  addrei 
to  the  few,  and  if,  as  the  few  of  ever}'  generation  are  cc 
vinced,  their  faith  becomes  a  permanent  and  hereditary 
belief  by  a  natural  law  of  transmission.      The  Christian 
body  is  enlarged  by  growth  and  stationariness  combined ; 
each  successive  age  contributing  its  quota,  and  the  acquisi- 
tion once  made  remaining.     This  is  the  way  in  which,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  Christianity  became   the   religion   of  the 
Eoman  empire.     In  no  age,  from  the  apostolic  downwards,  I 
did  the  evidence  of  the  Gospel  profess  to  be  adapted  to  j 
convince   the  mass ;  it  addressed  itself  to  the  few,  and  the  ' 
hereditary   belief  of    the    mass    followed,       Christianity; 
has    indeed    at   times   spread   by  other  means   than   its 
evidences,  by  the  sword,  and  by  the  rude  impulse  of  un- 
civilized people  to  follow  their  chiefs ;  but  whenever  it  has  j 
spread  by  the  power  of  its  evidences,  this  has  been  their  5 
scope.     The  profession  of  the  world  has  been  the  result, 
but  the  faith  of  the  few  has  been  the  original  mark  of  the 
Gospel  argument ;  though  doubtless  many  who  would  not 
have  had  the  strength  of  mind  to  acknowledge  the  force  of 
that  argument,  by  an  original  act  of  their  own,  have  by  a 
Christian  education  grown  to  a  real  inward  perception  of  it ; 
and  hereditary  belief  has  thus,  by  providing  a  more  indul- 
gent trial,  sheltered  individual  faith.     And  the  same  prin- 
ciple of  growth  can  at  last  convert  the  world  ;  however  slow 
the  process  the  result  will  come,  if  Christianity  always 
keeps  the  ground  it  gets ;  for  that  which  always  gains  and 
never  loses  must  ultimately  win  the  whole. 


LECTURE  yi 

T 

UNKNOWN    LAW 

St.  John  v.  17 
My  Father  icorkcth  hitherto,  and  I  worTc. 

MIEACLES  are  summarily  characterized  as  violations  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  But  may  not  the  Scripture  mir- 
acles, however  apparently  at  variance  with  the  laws  of 
nature,  be  instances  of  unknown  law  ?  This  question  is 
proposed  in  a  different  spirit  by  different  persons  ;  by  some 
as  a  question  upon  which  their  belief  in  these  miracles 
depends ;  by  others  only  as  a  speculative  question,  though 
one  answer  to  it  would  be  more  in  accordance  with  their 
intellectual  predilections  than  another. 

In  entering  upon  this  question,  however,  we  must  at  the 
outset  settle  one  important  preliminary,  viz.  what  we  mean 
by  the  Scripture  miracles.  The  distinction  proposed  in  our 
question  is  a  distinction  between  those  miracles  as  facts, 
and  those  miracles  as  miracles,  in  the  popular  sense ;  but 
if  we  only  regard  the  miracles  as  facts  at  first,  we  must  still 
know  what  those  facts  are  respecting  which  the  question, 
whether  they  are  properly  miraculous,  i.e.  violations  of  law 
or  not,  is  raised.  Are  we  to  take  those  facts  as  they  stand 
in  Scripture,  or  as  seen  to  begin  with  through  an  interpre- 
tative medium  of  our  own,  reduced  to  certain  supposed 
rue  and  original  events,  of  which  the  Scripture  narrative 
^s  a  transcendental  representation  ?     As  a  previous  condi- 

H 


114  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

tiou  of  the  consistency  of  those  facts  with  law,  are  the  facts 
themselves  to  undergo  an  alteration  ?  I  reply,  that  in  an 
inquiry  into  the  particular  question  whether  the  Scripture 
miracles  may  or  may  not  be  instances  of  unknown  law,  the 
question  whether  those  miracles  originally  took  place,  or 
not,  in  the  way  in  which  they  are  recorded — in  other  words, 
the  question  of  the  authenticity  of  those  miracles,  is  one 
with  which  I  have  nothing  to  do.  Whether  or  not  the 
facts  of  the  Scripture  narrative  are  the  true  and  original 
facts  which  took  place  is  a  question  which  belongs  to  the 
department  of  evidence,  and  one  which  must  be  met  in  its 
own  place  ;  but  a  philosophical  inquiry  into  the  consistency 
or  not  of  the  Scripture  miracles  with  law  must  take  those 
miracles  as  they  stand.  If  not,  what  are,  the  facts,  the 
physical  interpretation  of  which  is  in  dispute  ?  We  have 
not  got  them  before  us,  and  the  inquiry  must  stop  for  want 
of  material.  It  is  important  to  understand  the  necessity 
which  there  is  for  separating  these  two  questions,  because 
the  mind  of  an  inquirer  at  first  is  very  apt  to  confuse  them, 
and  to  suppose  that  the  speculation  upon  the  question  of 
unknown  law  gives  him  a  right  in  the  first  instance  par- 
tially to  reduce  the  facts  of  Scripture,  in  order  to  accommo- 
date them  to  the  inquiry.  It  must  therefore  be  understood 
that  the  ulterior  question  as  to  law  in  miracles  assumes  the 
miraculous  facts  as  recorded.  Even  if  the  unknown  law 
affects  the  facts  themselves,  as,  upon  the  theory  that  they  are 
only  impressions  upon  the  mind  of  the  witnesses,  it  does, 
still  the  facts  which  are  supposed  to  be  accounted  for  hy 
impression  are  the  facts  stated  in  Scripture,  and  not  other 
facts. 

Upon  the  question  then  of  the  referribleness  of  miracles 
to  unknown  law,  we  must  first  observe  that  the  expression 
'  unknown  law,'  as  used  here,  has  two  meanings,  be- 
tween which  it  is  important  to  distinguish  ;  i.e.  that  it 
means  either  iinhwwn  law,  or  unknown  connexion  with 


VI]  Unknown  Law  1 1 5 

known  law.     I  will  take  the  latter  of  these  two  meanings 
first. 

1.  With  respect  then  to  unknown  connexion  with  known 
law,  the  test  of  the  claim  of  any  extraordinary  isolated  and 
anomalous  fact  to  this  connexion  is,  whether  it  admits  of 
any  hypothesis  being  made  respecting  it,  any  possible 
physical  explanation,  which  would  bring  it  under  the  head 
of  any  known  law.  A  law  of  nature  in  the  scientific  sense, 
which  is  the  sense  in  which  we  understand  the  term  in 
this  inquiry,  is  in  its  very  essence  incapable  of  producing 
single  or  insulated  facts ;  because  it  is  the  very  repetition 
and  recurrence  of  the  facts  which  makes  the  law,  which 
law  therefore  implies  and  is  a  class  of  facts.  It  follows 
that  no  single  or  exceptional  event  can  come  ly  direct 
observation  under  a  law  of  nature;  but  that  if  it  comes 
under  it  at  all  it  can  only  do  so  by  the  medium  of  some 
explanation  by  which  it  is  brought  out  of  its  apparent 
isolation  and  singularity  into  the  same  situation  with  a 
class  of  facts,  i.e.  some  explanation  which  shows  that  the 
exceptional  character  of  the  fact  is  owing  to  a  peculiarity 
in  the  situation  of  its  subject-matter,  and  not  in  tlie  laws 
which  act  upon  it.  It  may  be  that  there  is  something  ex- 
traordinary in  the  position  of  a  natural  substance,  upon 
which,  however,  the  known  laws  of  nature  are  operating  all 
the  time,  producing  their  proper  effects  only  under  un- 
wonted circumstances ;  as  in  the  case  of  the  explained 
descent  of  a  meteoric  stone,  where  the  laws  which  act  are 
the  common  laws  of  gravity  and  motion,  and  the  only 
thing  singular  is  the  situation  of  the  stone.  There  is  thus 
an  important  distinction  between  insulated  and  anomalous 
facts,  and  the  common  current  facts  of  nature,  with  respect 
to  their  reduction  to  law.  Tlie  common  current  facts  of 
nature,  where  not  yet  reduced  to  law,  are  brought  under 
law,  if  they  are  brought  under  it,  by  direct  observation ;  by 
fixing  upon  the  invariable  conjunctions  of  antecedent  and 


Ii6  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

consequent,  wliicli  are  really  happening,  and  only  are  not 
as  yet  observed.  The  weather,  e.g.  is  part  of  the  order  of 
nature  of  which  the  law  alone  is  unknown  to  us,  the  facts 
being  of  constant  occurrence;  tlie  weather  therefore  comes 
under  law,  to  whatever  extent  it  does  come  under  it  at 
present,  by  direct  observation ;  the  invariable  conjunctions 
being  of  real  occurrence,  and  only  rec^uiring  to  be  seen. 
By  tracing  those  conjunctions  back  we  should  have  the 
law  of  weather  from  that  point ;  and  could  we  trace  them 
back  up  to  the  point  at  which  they  link  on  to  the  ascer- 
tained series  of  natural  causes,  then  we  should  have  the 
full  law  of  weather.  But  single  or  exceptional  facts  only 
come  under  a  law  of  nature  by  the  medium  of  an  explana- 
tion or  hypotliesis,  which  connects  the  deviation  with  the 
main  line,  and  engrafts  the  anomaly  upon  a  known  stock. 

There  is,  indeed,  besides  a  regular  hypothetical  explana- 
tion of  an  anomalous  fact  in  the  physical  world,  another  and 
more  obscure  condition  in  which  a  fact  may  lie  without 
suffering  total  disjunction  from  law  : — when  no  formal 
hypothesis  is  at  present  forthcoming,  but  the  fact  holds  out 
a  promise  of  one ;  presents  the  hints  or  beginnings  of  one, 
though  they  cannot  yet  be  worked  up  into  a  scientific 
whole.  The  phenomenon  is  not  wholly  dark  and  wanting 
in  all  trace  and  vestige  of  physical  type,  but  is  said  to 
await  solu'.'^n.  It  will  be  enougli,  however,  if  without 
express  me  'on  we  understand  this  modification  as  in- 
cluded unc^'       le  head  of  an  explanation  or  liyiiothesis. 

So  long'  as  an  eccentric  fact  admits  of  an  explana- 

tion  in  1-  "ith  known  law,  we  are  not  justified  in 

pronounr  be  contradictory  to  known  law ;    for 

though'.  ;'planation  is  liypothetical,  so  long  as  it  is 
admissiL  »'  'e  prohibited  from  asserting  tlie  contrary 
to  it,  or  t  J  a.  iute  lawlessness  of  the  fact.  But,  on  the 
other  ha  i,  take  a  supposed  or  imaginary  anomalous 
occurrcnc    —and  many  such  are  conceivable — to  which  this 


VI]  Utiknown  Law  117 

whole  ground  of  scientific  explanation  and  anticipation 
would  not  apply,  and  in  the  case  of  which  it  would  be  all 
obviously  out  of  place.  Such  an  anomalous  occurrence 
would  be  lawless,  and  a  contradiction  to  known  law,  and 
must  be  set  down  as  such.  Thus,  according  as  there  is 
room  or  no  room  for  scientific  explanation,  one  kind  of 
physical  miracle  ranks  as  in  latent  connexion  with  the 
system,  another  as  outside  of  it.  A  scientific  judgment 
discriminates  between  different  types  of  physical  marvels. 
An  eccentric  phenomenon  within  the  region  of  man — his 
bodily  and  mental  affections  and  impressions — is  set  down 
as  an  ultimately  natural  fact ;  because  there  the  system  of 
nature  is  elastic,  and  is  enabled  by  its  elasticity  to  accom- 
modate and  afford  a  place  for  it;  while  no  such  prospect  is 
held  out  to  an  imagined  instance  of  irregularity  in  inani- 
mate nature,  because  the  system  there  is  rigid  and  inflex- 
ible, and  refuses  to  accommodate  the  alien.  The  most  ex- 
traordinary case  of  suspended  animation  is  an  ultimately 
natural  fact ;  a  real  violation  of  the  law  of  gravity,  by  the 
ascent  of  a  human  body  into  the  sky,  is  an  ultimate 
anomaly  and  outstanding  fact,    (i.) 

Upon  the  question,  then,  whether  the  Gospel  miracles 
may  have  an  unknown  connexion  with  known  law,  the 
criterion  to  be  applied  is  whether  they  admit  or  not  of  a 
physical  hypothesis  being  constructed  about  them,  an  ex- 
planation being  given  of  them,  uiwn  which  t  >  connexion 
would  follow.  Upon  this  question  then  I  o^  ve,  to  begin 
with,  that  a  whole  class  of  Gospel  mirac'  'eets  us  in 
which  tlie  material  result  taken  by  itseF  part  from 

the  manner  and  circumstances  of  its  pr  cannot  be 

pronounced  absolutely  to  be  incapable  ot  ijlace  by 

the  laws  of  nature.     Indeed,  this  observp'-     ,  be  said 

to  embrace  the  largest  class  of  miracle?  .  .  zy  to  the 
bodily  cures  and  restorations  of  the  function  of  bodily 
organs,  by  which  the  blind  received  their  sigl     the  lame 


ii8  Unktiown  Law  [Lect. 

walked,  the  lepers  were  cleansed,  and  the  deaf  heard. 
Suppose  in  any  of  these  cases  the  physical  result  to  have 
taken  place  as  a  simple  occurrence  without  any  connexion 
with  a  personal  agent — there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of 
the  fact  itself  to  exclude  the  supposition  that  it  was  owing 
to  some  unknown  natural  cause.  A  blind  man,  even  one 
born  blind,  suddenly  recovers  his  sight.  Were  such  an 
occurrence  to  be  reported  upon  good  evidence  at  the  pre- 
sent day,  it  would  not  be  received  as  anything  physically 
incredible,  but  would  be  set  down,  however  extraordinary, 
even  if  quite  unique,  as  referrible  to  some  natural  cause : 
and  scientific  men  might  proceed  to  suggest  hypothetical 
explanations  of  it.  The  same  may  be  said  of  a  sudden  re- 
storation of  hearing,  of  a  sudden  recovery  of  speech,  of  a 
sudden  recovery  of  the  use  of  a  limb,  of  a  sudden  recovery 
from  an  issue  of  blood,  from  palsy,  from  madness. 

But  to  say  that  the  material  fact  which  takes  place  in  a 
miracle  admits  of  being  referred  to  an  unknown  natural 
cause,  is  not  to  say  that  the  miracle  itself  does.  A  miracle 
is  the  material  fact  as  coinciding  with  an  express  announce- 
ment or  with  express  supernatural  pretensions  in  the  agent. 
It  is  this  correspondence  of  two  facts  which  constitutes  a 
miracle.  If  a  person  says  to  a  blind  man,  '  See,'  and  he 
sees,  it  is  not  the  sudden  return  of  sight  alone  that  we  have 
to  account  for,  but  its  return  at  that  particular  moment. 
For  it  is  morally  impossible  that  this  exact  agreement  of 
an  event  with  a  command  or  notification  could  have  been 
by  a  mere  chance,  or,  as  we  should  say,  been  an  extraordi- 
nary coincidence,  especially  if  it  is  repeated  in  other 
cases. 

The  chief  characteristic,  indeed,  of  miracles  and  that 
which  distinguishes  them  from  mere  marvels,  is  this  cor- 
respondence of  the  fact  with  a  notification ; — what  we  may 
call  tlie  prophetical  jirinciple.  For  indeed,  if  a  prophecy  is 
a  miracle,  a  miracle  too  is  in  essence  a  prophecy ;  it  con- 


VI]  Unknown  Law  119 

tains  a  correspondence  between  an  event  and  an  announce- 
ment ;  and  the  essence  of  prophecy  is  the  correspondence, 
not  the  futurity,  of  the  event  predicted.  Consequently,  a 
miracle  can  afford  to  dispense  with  the  full  supernatural 
character  of  its  physical  result,  in  consideration  of  this 
other  source  of  the  miraculous  character,  i.e.  the  propheti- 
cal element.  JSTo  violation  of  any  law  of  nature  takes  place 
in  either  of  the  two  parts  of  prophecy  taken  separately ; 
none  in  the  prediction  of  an  event,  none  in  its  occurrence ; 
but  the  two  taken  together  are  proof  of  superhuman  agency; 
and  the  two  parts  of  a  miracle,  the  event  and  the  announce- 
ment of  it,  even  if  the  former  be  in  itself  reducible  to  law, 
are,  taken  together,  proof  of  the  same.  (2.) 

Can  any  physical  hypothesis  be  framed  then  accounting 
for  the  apparently  superhuman  knowledge  and  power  in- 
volved in  this  class  of  miracles, — in  these  instances,  i.e.  of 
fulfilled  prophecy  where  an  event  takes  place  in  correspond- 
ence with  an  announcement ;  in  these  immediate  cures  of 
diseases  by  personal  agency  ?  (3.)  It  must  be  evident  that 
none  can  be,  supposing  the  miraculous  facts  of  Scripture  to 
stand  as  they  are  recorded.  While  it  must  also  be  remem- 
bered that  no  hypothesis  which  ever  accounted  for  a  certain 
portion  of  the  Scripture  miracles,  if  one  such  could  be  ima- 
gined, would  be  of  any  service  on  this  side,  unless  it  also 
accounted  for  the  whole. 

But  could  any  scientific  hypothesis  be  constructed,  which 
would  account  for  the  conversion  of  water  into  wine,  the 
multiplication  of  the  loaves,  and  the  resurrection  of  dead 
men  to  life  ?  Undoubtedly  if  the  supposition  could  be 
entertained  that  these  miracles  as  recorded  in  the  Gospels 
were  untrue  and  exaggerated  representations  of  the  facts 
which  really  took  place,  a  physical  explanation  might  be 
proposed,  and  might  even  be  accepted  as  a  very  probable 
one,  of  the  facts  which  were  supposed  to  be  the  real  ones. 
But  in  that  case  the  reduction  of  the  Gospel  miracles  to 


120  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

physical  law  would  liave  been  indebted  for  its  success,  not 
to  any  hypothesis  of  pliilosophy,  but  simply  to  an  altera- 
tion of  the  facts,  in  accordance  with  a  supposed  more 
authentic  and  historical  estimate  of  them. 

Upon  one  theory  alone,  if  a  tenalile  one,  could  such  facts 
be  reconcileable  with  known  law ;  and  that  is  the  theory 
that  they  were  not  facts,  but  impressions  upon  the  minds 
of  the  witnesses — though  impressions  so  strong  and  perfect 
that  they  were  equivalent  to  facts  to  those  who  had  them. 
This  explanation,  then,  resorts  for  its  ground  to  that  more 
elastic  and  obscure  department  of  nature  above  mentioned 
— the  mixed  bodily  and  mental  organization  of  man  with 
its  liability  to  eccentric  and  abnormal  conditions,  and  with 
them  to  delusions,  and  disordered  relations  to  the  external 
world.  But  this  is  a  tlieory  which  is  totally  untenable 
upon  the  supposition  of  the  truth  of  the  facts  of  Scripture 
as  they  are  recorded.  An  abnormal  condition  of  the  senses 
is  in  the  first  place  connected  with  positive  disease,  and 
with  particular  diseases  ;  or  else — if  such  a  strange  result 
has  really  ever  arisen  from  such  processes — with  professedly 
artificial  conditions  of  the  man,  produced  by  premeditated 
effort  and  skill ;  of  which  even  the  asserted  effects  are  very 
limited  and  fragmentary.  But  that  numbers  of  men  of 
serious  character,  and  apparently  in  their  ordinary  natural 
habit,  should  be  for  years  in  a  disordered  state  of  relations 
to  the  outward  worid ;  in  particular  that  they  should  think 
that  for  a  certain  period  they  had  been  frequently  seeing 
and  conversing  with  a  Person,  whose  disciples  they  had 
been,  who  had  returned  to  life  again  after  a  public  death ; 
when  they  never  saw  Him  at  that  time,  or  spoke  to  Him, 
— this  is  absolutely  incredible.  And  therefore  the  theory 
of  impression  is  untenable  upon  the  facts  of  Scripture  as 
they  stand,  and  supposes  different  facts.  I  speak  of  the 
theory  of  impression  as  a  physical  theory :  some  speculative 
divines  have  joroposed  the  hypothesis  of  a  miraculous  im- 


VI]  Uiiknoujii  Law  1 2 1 

pression  produced  for  the  occasion  upon  the  minds  and 
senses  of  the  witnesses,  as  one  mode  of  the  production  of 
miracles  in  certain  cases ;  but  such  a  theory,  to  whatever 
criticism  it  may  be  open,  has  nothing  in  common  with  tlie 
physical  explanation  here  noticed.  (4.) 

2.  But  now  let  us  shift  the  inquiry  from  the  ground 
which  it  has  taken  hitherto,  to  the  other  and  different  ques- 
tion, whether  miracles  may  not  be  instances  of  laws  which 
are  as  yet  wholly  unknown ; — this  defers  the  (juestion  of 
the  physical  explanation  of  a  miracle  to  anotlier  stage, 
when  not  only  the  connexion  of  a  particular  fact  with  law 
has  to  be  discovered,  but  the  law  with  which  it  is  con- 
nected has  to  be  discovered  too. 

This  question,  then,  is  commonly  called  a  question  of 
"higher  lav/."  "All  analogy,"  we  are  told,  "leads  us  to 
infer,  and  new  discoveries  direct  our  expectation  to  the 
idea,  that  the  most  extensive  laws  to  which  we  have 
hitherto  attained  converge  to  some  few  simple  and  general 
principles,  by  which  the  whole  of  the  material  universe  is 
sustained."  ^  A  "  higher  law,"  then,  is  a  law  which  com- 
prehends under  itself  two  or  more  lower  or  less  wide  laws  : 
and  the  way  in  which  such  a  rationale  of  higher  law  would 
be  applicable  to  a  miracle  would  be  this ; — that  if  any  as 
yet  unknown  law  came  to  light  to  which  upon  its  appear- 
ance this  or  that  miracle  or  class  of  miracles  could  be  re- 
ferred as  instances;  in  that  case  we  could  entertain  the 
question  whether  the  newly  discovered  law  nnder  which 
the  miracles  came,  and  the  old  or  known  law  under  which 
the  common  kind  of  facts  come,  were  not  both  reducible 
to  a  still  more  general  law,  which  comprehended  them 
both.  But  before  we  can  entertain  the  question  of  "  higher 
law"  as  applicable  to  miraculous  and  to  common  facts,  we 
must  first  have  this  lower  law  of  the  miraculous  ones. 
Could  we  suppose,  e.g.,  the  possibility  of  some  higher  law 

^  Babbage's  Kinth  Bridgwater  Treatise,  p.  32. 


122  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

into  which  both  electricity  and  gravitation  might  merge ; 
yet  the  Laws  of  electricity  and  tlie  law  of  gravitation  both 
exist  in  readiness  to  be  embraced  under  such  higher  law, 
should  it  ever  be  discovered.  And  in  the  same  M'ay,  if 
miracles  and  the  laws  of  nature  are  ever  to  be  compre- 
hended under  a  higher  law,  we  must  first  have  hoth  the 
laws  underneath  the  latter,  both  the  laws  of  nature  and  the 
laws  of  the  miracles. 

Could  we  then  suppose  the  possibility  of  any  unknown 
laws  coming  to  light  which  would  embrace  and  account 
for  miracles,  one  concomitant  of  this  discovery  is  inevit- 
able, viz.,  that  those  fresh  laws  will  involve  fresh  facts.  A 
law  of  nature,  in  the  scientific  sense,  cannot  exist  without 
a  class  of  facts  which  comes  under  it ;  because  it  is  these 
facts  which  arc  the  law.  A  law  of  nature  is  a  repetition  of 
the  same  facts  with  the  same  conjunctions ;  but  in  order 
for  the  facts  to  take  place  with  the  same  conjunctions,  they 
must  in  tlie  first  instance  take  place.  A  law  of  miraculous 
recoveries  of  sight  without  such  recoveries  of  siglit,  a  law 
of  real  suspensions  of  gravitation  without  such  suspensions 
of  gravitation,  a  law  of  miraculous  productions  of  material 
substances  without  such  productions,  a  law  of  resurrections 
from  the  dead  without  resurrections  from  the  dead, — these 
laws  are  absurdities.  To  make  an  imaginative  supposition 
— Could  we  conceive  that  in  a  future  age  of  the  world  it 
were  observed,  that  persons  who  had  passed  through  cer- 
tain extraordinary  diseases  which  had  then  shewed  them- 
selves in  the  human  frame,  returned  to  life  again  after 
shewing  the  certain  signs  of  death ; — this  observation,  made 
upon  a  proper  induction  from  recurring  instances,  would 
be  a  law  of  resurrection  from  the  dead ;  but  nothing  short 
of  this  would  be :  and  this  would  imply  a  new  class  of 
facts,  viz.,  recurring  resurrections. 

ISTo  new  class  of  facts,  indeed,  is  required  when  an  ex- 
ceptional phenomenon  is  explained  by  a  hioivn  law;  for  a 


VI] 


Uiiknoivn  Law  123 


known  law  only  involves  known  facts :  and  no  new  class 
of  facts  is  required  when  frequent  phenomena  are  traced  to 
a  new  law,  because  the  new  discovered  law  is  already  pro- 
vided with  the  facts  which  come  under  it,  which  have  been 
seen  always  themselves  though  their  law  has  been  un- 
known ;  but  when  both  the  phenomenon  is  exceptional  and 
its  law  new,  that  new  law  implies  a  new  class  of  facts ;  for 
facts  a  law  must  have  ;  which  therefore  if  they  do  not  now 
exist,  must  come  into  existence  in  order  to  make  the  law.^ 
But  such  being  the  case,  what  does  this  whole  supposi- 
tion of  the  discovery  of  such  an  unknown  law  of  miracles 
amount  to,  but  to  the  supposition  of  a  future  new  order  of 
nature  ?  It  would  indeed  be  ditticult  to  say  what  was  a 
new  order  of  nature,  if  recurrent  miracles  with  invariable 
antecedents  did  not  constitute  one.  But  a  new  order  of 
nature  being  involved  in  this  supposition,  it  immediately 
follows  that  this  whole  supposition  is  an  irrelevant,  a  futile, 
and  nugatory  one  as  regards  the  present  question.  A  law 
of  nature  in  the  scientific  sense  has  reference  to  our  expe- 
rience alone :  when  I  speak  of  a  law  of  nature,  I  mean  a 

^  It  is  true  that  old  and  familiar  classes  of  miraculous  facts,  so  to  call 
tlieni,  exist  in  that  constant  current  of  supernatural  pretension  which  is  a 
feature  of  history,  and  has  been  a  running  accompaniment  of  human  nature. 
And  it  is  true  also  that  a  vague  attempt  has  always  been  going  on  to  con- 
nect this  supernaturalism  with  law.  The  science  of  magic  in  its  way  made 
this  profession  ;  it  mixed  this  object  indeed  with  relations  to  demons  and 
unearthly  beings  ;  but  still  it  treated  supernaturalism  as  a  secret  of  nature, 
and  pretended  to  search  and  in  some  degree  to  have  penetrated  into  this 
secret.  Again,  the  more  exalted  kind  of  heathen  thaumaturgy  connected 
miraculous  powers  with  the  development  of  human  nature,  and  deduced 
them  from  a  higher  humanity,  as  a  specimen  of  which  the  celebrated  Apol- 
louius  Tyanffius  had  them  assigned  to  him.  And  the  belief  of  rude  tribes 
has  subordinated  mj'stical  gifts  of  prophecy  and  second  sight  to  the  law  of 
family  descent.  But,  making  allowance  for  exceptional  cases  in  which  it 
may  have  pleased  the  Divine  power  to  interpose,  the  mature  judgment  of 
mankind  has  set  aside  the  facts  of  current  supernaturalism,  except  so  far 
as  they  are  capable  of  being  naturally  accounted  for ;  and  has,  with  the 
facts,  set  aside  all  pretension  to  acquaintance  with  the  law  of  them. 


124  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

law  of  nature  with  tliis  reference.  A  miracle  therefore  as 
a  violation  of  tlie  laws  of  nature  assumes  the  same  condi- 
tion, and  is  relative  to  our  knowledge.  A  miracle  is  thus 
not  affected  by  any  imaginary  supposition  of  a  future  diffe- 
rent order  of  nature,  of  which  it  would  not  be  a  violation ; 
it  is  irrespective  of  such  an  idea.  For  no  new  order  of 
things  could  make  the  present  order  different :  and  a 
miracle  is  constituted  by  no  ulterior  criterion,  no  criterion 
which  lies  beyond  the  course  of  nature  as  it  comes  under 
our  cognizance,  but  simply  by  this  matter-of-fact  test.  It 
is  opposed  to  custom, — to  that  universal  custom  which  we 
call  experience.  But  experience  is  the  experience  which 
we  liavc.  A  miracle,  could  we  suppose  it  becoming  the 
ordinary  fact  of  another  different  order  of  nature,  would 
not  be  the  less  a  violation  of  the  present  one  ;  or  therefore 
the  less  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature  in  the  scientific 
sense. 

Bishop  Butler  has  indeed  suggested  "  that  there  may  be 
beings  in  the  universe  whose  capacities  and  knowledge 
and  %dews  may  be  so  extensive  as  that  the  whole  Christian 
dispensation  may  to  them  appear  natural,  i.e.,  analogous  or 
conformable  to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of  His 
creation,  as  natural  as  the  visible  known  course  of  things 
appears  to  us."^  And  with  respect  to  the  beings  who  are 
here  supposed,  who  have  the  knowledge  of  other  parts  of 
the  universe,  and  of  God's  dispensations  there,  this  sugges- 
tion holds  good ;  for  the  occurrence  of  the  same  dispensa- 
tions, with  the  same  antecedents  in  the  different  parts  of 
the  universe,  would  constitute  an  order  of  nature  in  the 
universe  to  those  who  were  acquainted  with  it.  But  we 
do  not  possess  this  knowledge,  and  an  order  of  nature  being 
relative  to  knowledge,  in  the  absence  of  this  condition  there 
does  not  exist  this  naturalness.^ 

Tlie  relation  of  a  miracle  to  the  laws  of  nature  also  fixes 

1  Aualo'rv,  Part  i.  cli.  i.  ^  Vid.  Preface  to  Second  Edition. 


VI]  Unknown  Law  125 

its  relations  to  general  laws.  Tlie  only  intelligible  meaning 
which  we  can  assign  to  general  laws  is,  tliat  they  are  the 
laws  of  nature  with  the  addition  of  a  particular  theory  of 
the  Divine  mode  of  conducting  them ;  the  theory,  viz.,  of 
secondary  causes.  The  question  whether  the  Deity  operates 
in  nature  by  second  causes,  or  by  immediate  single  acts,  is 
not  a  question  which  at  all  affects  the  laws  of  nature  in  the 
scientific  sense.  Those  laws  being  simply  recurrent  facts, 
are  exactly  the  same,  whatever  be  the  Divine  method  em- 
ployed in  producing  those  facts.  But  divines  take  up  the 
subject  at  the  point  at  which  natural  science  stops,  and 
inquire  whether  the  Deity  operates  in  the  laws  of  nature 
by  a  constant  succession  of  direct  single  acts,  or  through 
the  medium  of  general  laws  or  secondary  causes,  which, 
once  set  in  motion,  execute  themselves.  This  is  an  entirely 
speculative  question  then,  and,  inasmuch  as  the  real  mode 
of  the  divine  action  is  inconceivable,  an  insoluble  one. 
The  uniformity  of  all  the  facts  which  constitute  a  law  of 
nature  is  suggestive  of  one  originating  act  on  the  part  of 
the  Deity,  but  it  is  also  consistent  with  a  series  of  similar 
single  acts  ;  nor  is  a  universal  action  in  particulars  in  the 
abstract  more  inconceivable  than  a  Universal  Beino-.  The 
language  of  religion,  however,  has  been  framed  upon  the 
principle  of  what  is  most  becoming  to  conceive  respecting 
the  Deity ;  and  therefore  has  not  attributed  to  Him  an 
incessant  particular  action  in  the  ordinary  operations  of 
nature,  which  it  hands  over  to  secondary  causes  ;  but  only 
assigned  this  direct  action  to  Him  in  His  special  inter- 
positions.    (5.) 

General  laws,  then,  being  only  the  laws  of  nature  with  a 
particular  conception  appended  to  them  ;  if  miracles  are 
not  reducible  to  the  laws  of  nature,  they  are  not  reducible 
to  general  laws.  Nor,  indeed,  considering  what  has  been 
said,  would  such  a  reduction  be  very  consistent  with  the 
reason  upon  which  general  laws  stand.      For  if  general 


126  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

laws  have  been  separated  from  the  direct  action  of  the 
Deity  for  the  very  purpose  of  reserving  the  latter  as  the 
peculiar  mark  of  His  special  interpositions  ;  to  reduce  these 
special  interpositions  back  again  from  direct  action  to 
general  law,  Avould  be  to  undo  the  object  of  this  distinction, 
and  after  drawing  a  line  of  demarcation  to  efface  it  again. 

The  notion  of  general  laws  naturally  fits  on  indeed  to 
God's  uniform  operations,  but  is  a  forced  addition  to 
irregular  and  extraordinary  acts.  The  subordination  of 
miracles  indeed  to  "  general  laws  of  wisdom,"  ^  if  we  under- 
stand by  that  plnase  a  plan  or  scheme  in  tlie  Divine  Mind 
which  controls  the  production  of  miracles,  those  considera- 
tions of  utility  which  regulate  their  frequency,  as  well  as 
limit  and  check  their  type,  may  well  be  allowed;  but  this 
is  a  different  use  of  the  term. 

The  inquiry  has,  indeed,  been  raised  whether  in  the 
original  design  and  mechanism  of  creation,  the  law  or  prin- 
ciple of  the  system  may  not  have  been  so  contrived  that 
miracles,  when  they  occur,  are  as  much  the  inevitable  con- 
sequences of  that  law  as  its  regular  and  ordinary  effects  ; 
the  same  cause  or  original  plan  which  produces  the  order 
of  nature,  producing  also  the  exceptions  to  it.  It  is  ob- 
served, in  the  first  place,  that  the  history  of  our  planet, 
being  composed  of  successive  stages  or  periods  of  animal 
and  vegetable  life,  widely  different  from  each  other,  these 
several  orders  of  nature  may  have  been  but  the  gradual 
evolution  of  one  primary  law,  impressed  upon  nature  on  its 
first  construction ;  the  highest  law  of  the  system  being  such 
that  it  includes  all  these  changes  under  it,  and  that  no  one 
formation  singly,  but  the  whole  series,  constitutes  the  full 

^  Bishop  Butler  observes  that  "God's  miraculous  interpositions  may 
have  been  all  along  by  general  laivs  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous 
powers  should  be  exerted  at  such  times,  upon  such  occasions,  in  such 
degrees,  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to  such  persons,  rather  than  to 
others,  &c.,  all  this  may  have  been  by  general  laws." — Analogy,  Part  ii. 
ch.  iv,     Vid.  Preface  to  Second  Edition. 


VI J  Unknown  Law  127 

and  adequate  expression  of  it.  And  from  this  application 
to  successive  orders  of  nature,  the  same  rationale  is  then 
applied  to  the  order  of  nature  and  the  deviation  from  it,  or 
miracle.  Neither  the  order  of  nature  nor  the  exception  to 
it  alone,  it  is  suggested,  but  both  together,  express  that 
highest  generalization  in  the  structure  of  nature  which  is 
the  law  of  the  system  and  the  whole.  A  calculating 
machine  is  so  adjusted  as  to  produce  one  unbroken  chain 
of  regularly  succeeding  numbers,  wdien  the  law  which 
governed  the  series  fails,  and  another  law  comes  in,  pro- 
ducing another  succession  of  numbers,  or  operating  only 
in  a  single  instance ;  after  which  it  gives  way  again  to  the 
first  law.  Neither  of  the  two  successions  alone,  nor  the 
succession  or  the  insulation  alone,  expresses  the  highest 
law  of  the  machine,  which  includes  them  both.  So,  it  is 
said,  the  order  of  nature  and  the  exception  to  it,  or  miracle, 
may  both  be  included  under  the  original  law  which  was 
impressed  upon  the  structure  of  nature.  "  That  one  or 
more  men  at  given  times  shall  be  restored  to  life,  may  be 
as  much  a  consequence  of  the  law  of  existence  appointed 
for  man  at  his  creation,  as  the  appearance  and  reappearance 
of  the  isolated  cases  of  apparent  exception  in  the  arithmeti- 
cal machine."  1     (6.) 

If  this  hypothesis,  then,  of  the  origin  of  miracles  is 
entertained  as  a  truth  of  natural  science,,  an  intermitting 
law  of  nature  as  much  implies  recurrent  facts,  with  the 
same  invariable  antecedents,  as  any  other  law  of  nature 
does ;  for  if  the  exception  is  not  as  regular  as  the  rule,  the 
exception  is  not  known  as  a  rule  or  law  at  all.  A  clock  is 
so.  constructed  as  to  strike  every  hour  but  one,  when  it 
omits  the  stroke ;  but  it  always  omits  the  same  hour.  A 
calculating  engine  injects  into  a  lengthened  series  of  regu- 
larly succeeding  numbers  an  insulated  deviation  ;  but  upon 

^  Passages  from  tlie  Life  of  a  Philosopher,   p.  390.     Vid.   Preface  to 
Second  Edition. 


128  Unknozun  Lazu  [Lect, 

the  same  adjustment  of  the  machine  the  deviation  is 
repeated.  Upon  first  seeing  the  exceptional  number,  our 
impression  would  be  that  the  machine  was  out  of  order,  i.e. 
that  this  was  an  occurrence  contrary  to  the  law  of  the 
machine,  nor  should  we  be  persuaded  that  it  was  not  but 
by  the  repetition  of  the  same  exception  in  the  same  place. 
But  miracles  do  not  thus  recur  at  the  same  physical  junc- 
tures, and  therefore  do  not  come  under  an  intermitting  law 
of  nature. 

This  hypothesis,  then,  of  the  origin  of  miracles  cannot 
be  maintained  as  a  truth  of  natural  science,  and  can  only 
be  entertained  as  a  speculation  respecting  the  action  of  the 
Deity,  the  mode  of  operation  attributable  to  tlie  Universal 
Cause  in  the  production  of  a  miracle — that  His  action  in 
the  matter  is  not  contemporary  but  original  action.  It  can 
only  be  entertained  as  a  speculation  respecting  the  mode 
of  the  causation  of  a  miracle.  But  all  this  is  a  distinct 
question  for  that  of  a  miracle's  referribleness  to  a  law  of 
nature,  which  law  is  concerned,  not  with  causation,  but 
with  facts.  As  a  speculation  respecting  the  Divine  action, 
and  the  mode  of  the  causation  of  a  miracle,  this  hypothesis 
■would  not,  if  adopted,  make  the  slightest  difference  in  the 
nature  and  character  of  a  miracle.  The  date  of  its  causa- 
tion would  be  put  back,  but  the  miracle  itself  would  remain 
exactly  what  it  was  before  upon  the  ordinary  hypothesis : 
it  would  be  as  much  an  excej^tion  to  the  order  of  nature  as 
before ;  an  exception  as  much  the  result  of  tlie  Divine 
intention  and  design  as  before ;  and  to  answer  the  same 
specific  oltject  which  it  answered  before.  Indeed,  it  is  not 
the  design  of  this  hypothesis  to  make  any  difi'erence  in  the 
miracle  itself,  or  explain  it  away,  but  only,  leaving  it  as 
miraculous  as  ever,  to  suggest  a  more  jjhilosophical  rationale 
of  its  origin.  Nor  must  such  an  hypothesis  be  confounded 
with  attempts  at  physical  explanations  of  miracles. 

I  have  throughout  this  inquiry  taken  the  term  '  law  of 


VI]  Ufiknozvit  Law  129 

nature  '  in  the  scientific  sense,  as  referring  to  that  order  of 
nature  of  which  we  have  experience ;  but  if  by  the  laws  of 
nature  we  understand  the  laws  of  the  universe,  w"e  then 
arrive  at  a  totally  different  conclusion  upon  the  question 
of  the  contrariety  of  miracles  to  the  laws  of  nature.  In 
that  case,  "  Nothing,"  as  Spinoza  says,  "  can  take  place  in 
nature  which  is  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature,"  and  a  sus- 
pension of  the  laws  of  nature  is  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
A  law  cannot  be  suspended  but  by  a  force  which  is 
capable  of  suspending  it ;  and  that  force  must  act  accord- 
ing to  its  own  nature ;  and  the  second  force  cannot  sus- 
pend the  first  unless  the  law  of  its  nature  enables  it  to  do 
so.  The  law  of  the  Divine  nature  enables  it  to  suspend 
all  physical  laws ;  but,  the  existence  of  a  God  assumed, 
the  law  of  the  Divine  nature  is  as  much  a  law  of  nature  as 
the  laws  which  it  suspends. 

Is  the  suspension  of  physical  and  material  laws  by  a 
Spiritual  Being  inconceivable  ?  We  reply,  that  however 
inconceivable  this  kind  of  suspension  of  physical  law  is, 
it  is  a  fact.  Physical  laws  are  suspended  any  time  an 
animate  being  moves  any  part  of  its  body;  the  laws  of 
matter  are  suspended  by  the  laws  of  life.  If  there  is 
anything  I  am  conscious  of,  it  is  that  I  am  a  spiritual 
being,  that  no  part  of  my  tangible  body  is  myself,  and  that 
matter  and  I  are  distinct  ideas.  Yet  I  move  matter,  i.e. 
my  body,  and  every  time  I  do  so  I  suspend  the  laws  of 
matter.  The  arm  that  w^ould  otherwise  hang  down  by  its 
own  w^eight,  is  lifted  up  by  this  spiritual  being — myself. 
It  is  true  my  spirit  is  connected  with  the  matter  which  it 
moves  in  a  mode  in  which  the  Great  Spirit  who  acts  upon 
matter  in  a  miracle  is  not;  but  to  what  purpose  is  this 
difference  so  long  as  any  action  of  spirit  upon  matter 
is  incomprehensible.  The  action  of  God's  Spirit  in  the 
miracle  of  walking  on  the  water  is  no  more  inconceivable 
than  the  action  of  my  own  spirit  in  holding  up  my  own 

I 


130  Unknown  Law  [Lect. 

hand.  Antecedently  one  step  on  the  ground  and  an  ascent 
to  heaven  are  alike  incredible.  But  this  appearance  of 
incredibility  is  answered  in  one  case  literally  amlidando. 
How  can  I  place  any  reliance  upon  it  in  the  other  ? 

The  constitution  of  nature,  then,  disproves  the  incredi- 
bility of  the  Divine  suspension  of  physical  law ;  but  more 
than  this,  it  creates  a  presumption  for  it.  For  the  laws 
of  which  we  have  experience  are  themselves  in  an  ascend- 
ing scale.  First  come  the  laws  which  regulate  unorganized 
matter;  next  the  laws  of  vegetation;  then,  by  an  enormous 
leap,  the  laws  of  animal  life,  with  its  voluntary  motion, 
desire,  expectation,  fear ;  and  above  these,  again,  the  laws 
of  moral  being  which  regulate  a  totally  different  order  of 
creatures.  Now  suppose  an  intelligent  being  whose  ex- 
perience was  limited  to  one  or  more  lower  classes  in  this 
ascending  scale  of  laws,  he  would  be  totally  incapable  of 
conceiving  the  action  of  the  higher  classes.  A  thinking 
piece  of  granite  would  be  totally  incapable  of  conceiving 
the  action  of  chemical  laws,  which  produce  explosions, 
contacts,  repulsions.  A  thinking  mineral  would  be  totally 
incapable  of  conceiving  the  laws  of  vegetable  growth;  a 
thinking  vegetable  could  not  form  an  idea  of  the  laws  of 
animal  life ;  a  thinking  animal  could  not  form  an  idea  of 
moral  and  intellectual  truth.  AU  this  progressive  succes- 
sion of  laws  is  perfectly  conceivable  backward  and  an 
absolute  mystery  forward;  and  therefore  when  in  the 
ascending  series  we  arrive  at  man,  we  ask.  Is  there  no 
higher  sphere  of  law  as  much  above  Mm  as  he  is  above  the 
lower  natures  in  the  scale  ?  The  analogy  would  lead  us 
to  expect  that  there  was,  and  supplies  a  presumption  in 
favour  of  such  a  belief 

And  so  we  arrive  again  by  another  route  at  the  old 
turning  question ;  for  the  question  whether  man  is  or  is 
not  the  vertex  of  nature,  is  the  question  whether  there  is 
or  is  not  a  God.     Does  free  agency  stop  at  the  human 


VI]  Unknown  Law  131 

stage,  or  is  there  a  sphere  of  free-will  above  the  human, 
in  which,  as  in  the  human,  not  physical  law  but  spirit 
moves  matter  ?  And  does  that  free-will  penetrate  the 
universal  frame  invisibly  to  us,  an  omnipresent  agent  ?  If 
so,  every  miracle  in  Scripture  is  as  natural  an  event  in  the 
universe  as  any  chemical  experiment  in  the  physical 
world ;  if  not,  the  seat  of  the  great  Presiding  Will  is  empty, 
and  nature  has  no  Personal  Head:  man  is  her  highest 
point ;  he  finishes  her  ascent ;  though  by  this  very  supre- 
macy he  falls,  for  under  fate  he  is  not  free  himself;  all 
nature  either  ascends  to  God,  or  descends  to  law.  Is  there 
above  the  level  of  material  causes  a  region  of  Providence  ? 
If  there  is,  nature  there  is  moved  by  the  Supreme  Free 
Agent;  and  of  such  a  realm  a  miracle  is  the  natural 
production.     (7.) 

Two  rationales  of  miracles  thus  present  themselves  to 
our  choice ;  one  more  accommodating  to  the  physical 
imagination  and  easy  to  fall  in  with,  on  a  level  with  cus- 
tom, common  conceptions,  and  ordinary  history,  and  re- 
quiring no  ascent  of  the  mind  to  embrace,  viz.  the  solution 
of  miracles  as  the  growth  of  fancy  and  legend ;  the  other 
requiring  an  ascent  of  the  reason  to  embrace  it,  viz.  the 
rationale  of  the  supremacy  of  a  Personal  Will  in  nature. 
The  one  is  the  explanation  to  which  we  fall  when  we  dare 
not  trust  our  reason,  but  mistake  its  inconceivable  truths 
for  sublime  but  unsubstantial  visions ;  the  other  is  that  to 
which  we  rise  when  we  dare  trust  our  reason,  and  the 
evidences  which  it  lays  before  us  of  the  existence  of  a 
Personal  Supreme  Being. 


LECTURE  VII 

MIRACLES  EEGARDED  IN  THEIR  PRACTICAL 
RESULT 

EOMANS  vi.   17 

But  God  be  tlianlrA,  that  ye  were  the  servants  of  siv,  but  ye  have  obeyed 
from  the  heart  tliatfwm  of  doctrine  which  was  delivered  you. 

IN"  judging  of  the  truth  of  miracles  the  revelation  of 
which  they  were  designed  to  be  the  proof  necessarily 
comes  into  consideration ;  and  specially  the  practical  result 
of  that  revelation.  Without  assuming  the  truth  of  revela- 
tion, we  can  consider  this  result.  It  is  a  reasonable  in- 
quiry which  arises  in  the  mind  upon  first  hearing  of  an  era 
of  miracles— "What  is  the  good  of  them  ?  what  end  and 
purpose  have  they  answered  ?  If,  then,  some  who  had 
diseases  were  cured,  that  is  something.  But  if  there  has 
been  a  permanent,  enormous,  and  incalculable  practical 
result — such  a  result  that  no  other  change  in  the  world  is 
to  be  compared  with  it — that  is  a  very  serious  thing  to  take 
into  account.  We  cannot  avoid  attaching  weight  to  it,  giv- 
ing it  a  place  in  the  proof,  and  feeling  impressed  by  the  im- 
portance of  such  a  circumstance  in  relation  to  the  question. 
Without  using — which  we  have  no  right  to  do — tins  result 
as  direct  evidence  of  the  facts  in  dispute ;  if  the  miraculous 
system  has  been  a  practical  one,  with  immense  practical 
effects  upon  mankind,  it  plainly  ought  to  have  the  benefit 


Miracles  in  their  Practical  Restilt         133 

of  this  consideration  in  the  estimate  of  its  claims  to  be  re- 
ceived as  true. 

It  is  admitted,  then,  that  Christianity  has  produced  the 
greatest  change  that  has  been  ever  known  in  the  world, 
with  reference  to  moral  standard  and  moral  practice ;  and 
when  we  inquire  further,  we  find  this  change  attributed  by 
universal  consent  to  the  power  of  the  great  doctrines  of 
Christianity  upon  the  human  heart ;  which  doctrines  could 
not  have  been  communicated  without  the  evidence  of 
miracles. 

And,  first,  a  religion  founded  on  miracles  as  compared 
with  a  religion  founded  upon  the  evidences  of  a  God  in 
nature,  has  a  much  superior  motive  power  in  the  very  fact 
of  its  supernatural  origin.  Undoubtedly  the  love  of  the 
supernatural  may  become  a  mere  idle  pleasure,  and  when 
it  does  it  is  condemned  in  Scripture.  "  If  they  hear  not 
Moses  and  the  Prophets,  neither  will  they  be  persuaded 
though  one  rose  from  the  dead."  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
this  affection  is  in  itself  religious,  and  a  powerful  instru- 
ment of  religion.  A  supernatural  fact,  a  communication 
from  the  other  world,  is  a  potent  influence  ;  it  rouses,  it 
solemnizes ;  it  is  a  strong  motive  to  serious  action.  The 
other  w^orld  stands  before  us  in  a  more  real  aspect  im- 
mediately. The  notion  of  God  as  a  Personal  Being  must 
be  beyond  all  comparison  greater  in  a  religion  founded 
upon  miracles,  than  in  one  founded  upon  nature  :  because 
a  miracle  is  itself  a  token  of  personal  agency,  of  a  Will  and 
Spirit  moving  behind  the  veil  of  matter,  in  a  way  which 
the  works  of  nature  do  not  present.  The  tendency  of  a 
religion  founded  on  nature,  or  Deism,  is  to  establish  as  the 
world  of  God  and  man  nature  alone,  the  religious  principle 
being  adopted,  but  made  to  coincide  with  the  sphere  of 
this  world.  Such  a  religion  is  weak  in  influence.  The 
voice  of  God  must  come  out  of  another  world  to  command 
with  authority ;  such  a  voice  spake  to  Abraham,  Isaac,  and 


1 34  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

Jacob ;  their  religion  had  its  root  in  the  Invisible  ;  but  a  God 
in  nature  only  does  not  strike  awe.  One  single  real  miracle 
is  another  ground  in  religion ;  if  the  walls  of  nature  have 
been  broken  through  but  once,  we  are  divided  by  a  whole 
world  from  a  mere  physical  basis  of  religion.  Do  we  in 
imagination  assign  a  certain  extraordinary  depth  and 
seriousness  to  those  who  have  seen  supernatural'  facts  ? 
The  language  of  the  Apostles  embodies  our  idea  and  type 
of  the  effect  of  so  unearthly  an  experience  upon  the 
recipients. 

But  the  remarkable  change  which  Christianity  made  in 
the  world  was  owing  mainly,  not  to  the  miracles,  but  to  the 
doctrines  of  which  they  were  the  proof. 

Undoubtedly  the  principal  portion  of  the  Go.spel  miracles 
were,  besides  being  proofs  of  doctrine,  also  acts  of  mercy, 
sympathy,  and  beneficence;  and  attention  has  been  pro- 
perly directed  to  the  philanthropical  character  of  them — 
that  they  were  not  mere  acts  of  power  but  acts  of  love. 
Indeed,  the  philanthropical  purpose  was  the  primary  and 
principal  purpose  of  each  of  these  miracles  as  a  single  act, 
and  with  reference  to  the  occasion  on  which  it  was  wrought : 
while  the  evidential  object  belongs  to  them  only  as  a  body 
and  a  whole.  The  evidential  object  of  miracles,  indeed, 
was  naturally  achieved  by  the  medium  of  the  philanthropical 
object ;  the  general  purpose  was  fulfilled  by  the  very  same 
acts  which  also  served  the  special,  particular,  and  occa- 
sional purposes.  The  one  object  adapted  itself  to  the  times 
and  opportunities  of  the  other,  followed,  waited  upon,  and 
linked  itself  on  to  them ;  the  proof  of  a  dispensation  was 
communicated  in  the  form  of  miracles  for  the  temporary 
relief  and  benefit  of  individuals.  The  evidential  object  of 
miracles  was  not  executed  in  a  forced  and  unnatural  way, 
by  set  feats  of  thaumaturgy,  and  exhibitions  of  miraculous 
power  as  such,  challenging  the  astonishment  of  beholders  : 
it  was  accomplished  in  correspondence  with  the  whole  scale 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Residt  135 

of  the  Divine  character ;  the  acts  of  power  were  performed 
for  those  purposes  which  love  pointed  out,  were  elicited 
naturally  by  the  several  occasions,  and  fitted  on  to  the 
course  of  events,  the  incidents  of  the  hour,  and  the  cases  of 
infirmity  which  came  in  the  way.  Still,  however  naturally 
and  in  whatever  connexion  with  other  objects  the  evidential 
function  of  miracles  was  introduced,  that  function  was  not 
the  less  the  principal  object  of  miracles ;  that  on  which  they 
depended  for  any  advantage  ensuing  from  them  extending 
beyond  the  original  and  local  occasions,  any  permanent 
advantage  to  the  world  at  large,  any  result  affecting  the 
interests  of  mankind.  Will  it  be  said  that  these  philan- 
thropical  miraculous  acts  were  a  revelation  of  the  character 
of  God  to  man  as  a  God  of  mercy  and  love  ?  They  could 
not  be  tliat,  however,  except  by  the  medium  of  the  eviden- 
tial function.  Tor  they  could  only  be  a  revelation  in  act 
of  the  Divine  character,  on  the  supposition  that  the  Person 
who  wrought  them  was  "  God  manifested  in  the  flesh" — a 
truth  for  which  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation,  which  is 
the  result  of  evidence,  is  assumed. 

That  the  Gospel  miracles,  then,  founded  a  system  of 
doctrine  which  was  lasting,  and  did  not  pass  away  like  a 
creature  of  the  day,  is  justly  noticed  by  writers  on  evidence 
as  an  important  note  in  favour  of  them ;  but  what  I  remark 
now  is  not  the  permanent  doctrine  which  was  the  effect  of 
the  miracles,  but  the  great  permanent  change  which  was 
the  effect  of  the  doctrine  ;  that  this  doctrine  did  not  leave 
mankind  as  it  found  them,  but  was  a  fresh  starting-point 
{a.<^opiir\)  of  moral  practice,  whence  we  date,  not  cer- 
tainly the  complete  regeneration  of  the  world,  but  such  an 
alteration  in  it  as  divides  the  world  after  the  Christian  era 
from  the  world  before  it. 

The  Epistle  to  the  Eomans  is  in  substance  a  declaration 
of  this  power  and  effect  of  Christian  doctrine,  a  prophecy, 
if  we  may  call  it  so,  of  the  actual  result  which  has  followed 


136  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

it.  This  Epistle  is  distinguished  as  the  great  doctriDal 
Epistle,  and  truly ;  but  this  is  not  an  adequate  description 
of  it ;  because  the  writer  sets  forth  there  Christian  doctrine, 
not  in  itself  as  truth  merely,  but  as  tliat  great  new  motive 
to  action  which  was  the  prominent  and  conspicuous  want 
and  need  of  mankind.  Tlie  Epistle  to  the  liomans  is  one 
long  assertion  of  this  power  of  doctrine  as  a  motive  to 
action.  First  comes  the  statement,  that  the  world  up  to 
that  moment  had  been,  morally  speaking,  a  failure,  and 
had  utterly  disappointed  the  design  for  which  it  was  made; 
not  because  man  was  without  the  knowledge  of  his  duty, 
but  because,  the  knowledge  existing,  there  was  between 
knowledge  and  action  a  total  chasm,  which  nothing  yet  had 
been  able  to  fill  up.  The  Apostle  looks  upon  that  as  yet 
unbridged  gulf,  this  incredible  inability  of  man  to  do  what 
was  right,  with  profound  wonder ;  yet  such  was  the  fact. 
The  sublime  moral  maxims  of  Oriental  nations  strike  us 
now;  it  is  impossible  to  deny  the  liglit,  the  height  of  pure 
knowledge  which  they  shew ;  but  can  the  transcendent 
code  of  duty  get  itself  acted  on  ?  Is  it  looked  upon  even 
in  that  point  of  view  ?  Has  it  even  a  practical  intention 
that  deserves  to  be  called  so  ?  No  ;  it  is  a  beautiful  erec- 
tion of  moral  sentiment,  but  there  it  ends.  Man  possesses 
a  moral  nature,  and,  if  he  has  intellect  enough,  he  can  put 
his  moral  ideas  into  words,  just  as  he  can  put  metaphysical 
ideas ;  nor  is  his  doing  so  any  test  of  his  moral  condition. 
Take  any  careless  person  of  corrupt  habits  out  of  the  thick 
of  his  ordinary  life,  and  ask  him  to  state  in  words  what  is 
his  moral  creed  ?  Has  he  any  doubt  about  it  ?  None :  he 
immediately  puts  down  a  list  of  the  most  sublime  moral 
truths  and  principles.  But  as  regards  their  being  a  law  to 
himself,  he  feels  that  he  has  more  to  do  with  that  than  with 
anything  else  which  is  impossible.  Between  them  and 
action  there  exists  in  his  eyes  an  impassable  interval ;  and 
so  far  as  relates  to  himself,  as  soon  as  ever  these  truths  are 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  137 

formally  and  properly  enunciated,  their  whole  design  and. 
purpose  is  fulfilled. 

Such  was  the  contrast  which  met  St.  Paul  in  the  condi- 
tion of  the  whole  world  Jew  and  Gentile — knowledge  with- 
out action.  What  was  there  to  fill  up  this  void,  and  effect 
a  junction  between  these  two  ?  Now  when  a  man  feels 
something  to  be  wholly  out  of  his  reach,  and  that  he  has 
nothing  to  do  with  it,  because  he  cannot  do  it ;  the  first 
notion  of  a  remedy  for  this  sense  of  utter  impotence  is  an 
appeal  to  his  will — Believe  that  you  can  do  it,  and  you  can 
do  it.  But  how  can  a  man  believe  simply  because  he  is 
told  to  do  so  ?  Believe  upon  no  foundation  ?  On  the 
other  hand,  if  you  can  tell  him  anything  new  about  him- 
self, any  actual  fresh  source  of  strength  from  which  he  has 
not  drawn  but  now  may  draw,  this  is  a  ground  for  a  new 
belief  about  himself  and  what  he  can  do.  And  this  ground 
for  a  new  belief  about  himself  is  what  St.  Paul  proceeds  to 
lay  before  impotent  and  despairing  man,  whose  cry  was, 
"To  will  is  present  with  me,  but  how  to  perform  that 
which  is  good  I  find  not.  For  the  good  which  I  would  I 
do  not,  but  the  evil  which  I  would  not  that  I  do.  Who 
shall  deliver  me  from  the  body  of  this  death  ? "  Nothing 
but  some  wholly  new  agency,  some  effective  and  powerful 
motive  not  yet  known  to  the  world,  could  set  this  sluggish 
nature  in  action ;  but  that  motive  St.  Paul  could  supply. 

The  force,  then,  which  Christianity  applied  to  human 
nature,  according  to  St.  Paul,  and  by  which  it  was  to  pro- 
duce this  change  in  the  moral  state  of  man,  was  a  new  doc- 
trine. This  new  impulse  and  inspiration  to  goodness,  able 
to  lift  him  above  the  power  of  sin,  the  love  of  the  world, 
and  the  lusts  of  the  flesh,  was  contained  in  the  great  truth 
of  the  Incarnation  and  Death  of  the  Son  of  God.  God  was 
by  this  transcendent  act  of  mediation  reconciled  to  man, 
pardoned  him,  and  sent  him  forth  anew  on  his  course,  with 
the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  his  heart.     This  new  founda- 


138  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

tion,  then,  upon  which  human  life  is  raised  is  an  actual 
event  which  has  taken  place  in  the  invisible  world ;  but 
inasmuch  as  God  communicates  the  advantage  of  that 
event  to  man  by  the  medium  of  man's  own  knowledge  of 
and  belief  in  it,  this  event  necessarily  becomes  a  doctrine ; 
and  that  doctrine  is  the  new  impulse  to  human  nature. 
"  The  righteousness  of  God  is  manifested  unto  all  and  upon 
all  them  that  hclicve."  The  knowledge  of  and  fiiith  in  the 
new  supernatural  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  God,  is 
henceforth  the  moral  strength  of  man,  that  which  enables 
liim  to  obey  the  Divine  law.  That  new  relation  does  not 
produce  its  effect  without  his  own  convictions,  but  knowing 
it  and  believing  it,  he  experiences  a  movement  from  it  so 
forcible,  so  elevating,  and  so  kindling,  that  he  is  raised 
above  himself  by  it.  "Sin  has  not  dominion  over  him." 
*'  The  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life  hath  made  him  free  from  the 
law  of  sin  and  death.  For  what  the  law  could  not  do,  in 
that  it  was  Aveak  through  the  flesh,  God  sending  His  own 
Son  in  the  likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for  sin,  condemned 
sin  in  the  flesh :  that  the  righteousness  of  the  law  might 
be  fulfilled  in  us."  "  He  that  raised  up  Christ  from  the 
dead  shall  quicken  our  mortal  bodies,  by  His  Spirit  that 
dwelleth  in  us."  "  He  that  spared  not  His  own  Son,  but 
delivered  Him  up  for  us  all,  how  shall  He  not  with  Him 
also  freely  give  us  all  things  ?  "  ^  He  appeals  to  men's  be- 
lief in  the  great  facts  and  doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  as  that 
which  is  henceforth  to  constitute  the  motive  power  to  urge 
them  to  and  fix  them  in  moral  practice.  The  prefaces, 
"  How  shall  we,"  "  Know  ye  not,"  "  Eeckon  yourselves," 
"  Ye  are  debtors  to,"  "  Ye  are  servants  to,"  express  the 
sense  of  an  impossibility  of  acting  against  such  a  belief  if 
it  is  genuine. 

If  we  examine  the  mode  in  which  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation  and  Death  of  the  Son  of  God  is  adapted  to  act 

^  Rom.  viii.  2,  3,  il,  32. 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  139 

upon  moral  conduct,  first  comes  the  influence  and  the 
motive  contained  in  the  character  of  the  Divine  Being,  of 
which  this  is  a  new  and  striking  revelation.  The  Atone- 
ment stamps  upon  the  mind  with  a  power,  with  which  no 
other  fact  could,  the  righteousness  of  God.  To  trifle  with 
a  Being  who  has  demanded  this  Sacrifice  is  madness  ;  and 
hence  arises  awe :  but  from  the  acceptance  of  the  Atone- 
ment arises  the  love  of  God.  A  strict  master  is  a  stimulus 
to  service  if  he  is  just;  servants  wish  to  please  him:  his 
pardon,  again,  is  the  greater  stimvilus,  on  account  of  his 
very  strictness,  because  it  is  the  greater  prize.  Thus  the 
belief  in  the  Atonement  becomes  that  inspiring  motive  to 
action  which  St,  Paul  represents  it  as  being.  Man  appears 
in  his  Epistles  as  a  pardoned  being, — pardoned  by  that 
very  God  of  whom  he  thus  stands  in  awe, — and  as  a  par- 
doned being  a  rejoicing  being;  rejoicing,  not  because  he 
has  nothing  to  do,  but  because  having  much  to  do,  he  feels 
himself  possessed  of  a  high  spirit,  and  strength  enough  to 
do  it.  The  sense  of  pardon  is  the  inspiriting  thing.  "  For 
if  when  we  were  enemies  we  were  reconciled  to  God  by  the 
death  of  His  Son,  much  more  being  reconciled  we  shall  be 
saved  by  His  life."  ^  From  that  event  man  dates  his  adop- 
tion, his  glorious  liberty,  the  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life,  the 
witness  of  that  Spirit  in  his  own  heart,  the  expectation  of 
that  glory  which  shall  be  revealed  in  him,  and  the  gift  of 
eternal  life. 

We  thus  observe  it  as  a  remarkable  characteristic  of 
Scripture,  and  especially  of  St.  Paul's  language,  that  it 
takes  what  may  be  called  the  high  view  of  human  nature  ; 
i.e.,  of  what  human  nature  is  capable  of  when  the  proper 
motive  and  impulse  is  applied  to  it.  In  this  sense  St. 
Paul,  if  I  may  use  the  expression,  helicves  in  human  nature ; 
■  he  thinks  it  capable  of  rising  to  great  heights  even  in  this 
life,  he  sees  that  in  man  which  really  can  triumph  over  the 

^  Eom.  V.  10. 


I40  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

world,  the  flesh,  and  the  devil ;  which  can  struggle,  and 
which  can  conquer  in  tlie  struggle.  His  is  what  may  be 
called  the  enthusiastic  view  of  human  nature,  though  tem- 
pered by  the  wisdom  of  inspiration.  He  sees  in  Christian 
doctrine  tliat  strong  force  which  is  to  break  down  the  vis 
incrticc  of  man,  to  kindle  into  life  the  dormant  elements  of 
goodness  in  him,  to  set  human  nature  going,  and  to  touch 
the  spring  of  man's  heart.  Hence  it  is  that  the  writer  is 
borne  along  at  times  breathless  with  vehemence  and  with 
rapture,  as  the  visions  of  hope  rise  up  before  him,  and  man 
is  seen  in  the  prospect  over  all  the  face  of  the  earth,  as- 
cending in  mind  to  heaven.  Hence  it  is  that  the  flood  of 
thought  becoming  too  rapid  for  the  medium  which  conveys 
it,  struggles  with  and  interrupts  itself;  though  at  the  same 
time  he  is  equally  arrested  by  the  mystery  of  limitation 
which  adheres  to  Divine  grace,  and  sees  the  true  Church 
of  God  as  separate  from  the  world. 

How  marked  the  contrast,  when  from  this  high  estimate 
of,  this  ardent  faith  in,  the  capabilities  of  human  nature 
which  a  doctrinal  foundation  imparts,  we  turn  to  the  idea 
of  man  presented  to  us  in  a  religion  of  pure  Deism.  The 
religion  of  Mahomet  is  not  a  doctrinal  religion ;  it  is  with- 
out an  Incarnation,  without  an  Atonement ;  no  sacrifice  for 
sin  reveals  the  awful  justice  of  God,  no  pardon  upon  a 
sacrifice  His  awful  mercy  ;  in  the  high  court  of  heaven  the 
Deity  sits  enthroned  in  the  majesty  of  omnipotence  and 
omniscience,  but  without  the  great  symbol  of  His  Infinite 
Eighteousness  by  His  side — the  Lamb  that  was  slain.  And 
now  observe  the  effect  of  this  doctrinal  void  upon  the  idea 
of  God  and  the  idea  of  man  in  that  religion.  If  one  had 
to  express  in  a  short  compass  the  character  of  its  remarkable 
founder  as  a  teacher,  it  would  be  that  that  great  man  had 
no  faith  in  human  nature.  There  were  two  things  which 
he  thought  man  could  do  and  would  do  for  the  glory  of 
God — transact  religious  forms,  and  fight ;  and  upon  those 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  141 

two  points  he  was  severe ;  but  within  the  sphere  of  com- 
mon practical  life,  where  man's  great  trial  lies,  his  code 
exhibits  the  disdainful  laxity  of  a  legislator,  who  accom- 
modates his  rule  to  the  recipient,  and  shews  his  estimate 
of  the  recipient  by  the  accommodation  which  he  adopts. 
Did  we  search  history  for  a  contrast,  we  could  hardly  dis- 
cover a  deeper  one  than  that  between  St.  Paul's  overflow- 
ing standard  of  the  capabilities  of  human  nature  and  the 
oracular  cynicism  of  the  great  false  Prophet.  The  writer 
of  the  Koran  does  indeed,  if  any  discerner  of  hearts  ever 
did,  take  the  measure  of  mankind ;  and  his  measure  is  the 
same  that  Satire  has  taken,  only  expressed  with  the  majes- 
tic brevity  of  one  who  had  once  lived  in  the  realm  of 
Silence.  "  Man  is  weak,"  says  Mahomet.  And  upon  that 
maxim  he  legislates.  "  God  is  minded  to  make  his  reli- 
gion light  unto  you,  for  man  was  created  weak" — "  God 
would  make  his  religion  an  ease  unto  you" — a  suitable 
foundation  of  the  code  which  followed,  and  fit  parent  of 
that  numerous  offspring  of  accommodations,  neutralizing 
qualifications,  and  thinly-disguised  loopholes  to  the  fraud 
and  rapacity  of  the  Oriental,  which  appear  in  the  Koran, 
and  shew,  where  they  do  appear,  the  author's  deep  ac- 
quaintance with  the  besetting  sins  of  his  devoted  followers. 
The  keenness  of  Mahomet's  insight  into  human  nature  ;  a 
wide  knowledge  of  its  temptations,  persuasives,  influences 
under  which  it  acts ;  a  vast  immense  capacity  of  forbear- 
ance for  it,  half  grave  half  genial,  half  sympathy  half  scorn, 
issue  in  a  somewhat  Horatian  model,  the  character  of  tlie 
man  of  experience  who  despairs  of  any  change  in  man,  and 
lays  down  the  maxim  that  we  must  take  him  as  we  find 
him.  It  was  indeed  his  supremacy  in  both  faculties,  the 
largeness  of  the  passive  meditative  nature,^  and  the  splen- 

^  Shakespeare  represents  the  largeness  of  the  passive  nature  in  Hamlet, 
but  a  disproportionate  largeness  which  issues  in  feebleness,  because  he  is 
always  thinking  of  the  whole  of  things.     ' '  A  mind  may  easily  be  too  large 


142  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

dour  of  action,  that  constituted  the  secret  of  his  success. 
The  breadth  and  flexibility  of  mind  that  could  negotiate 
with  every  motive  of  interest,  passion,  and  pride  in  man  is 
surprising ;  there  is  boundless  sagacity ;  what  is  wanting  is 
hope,  a  belief  in  the  capabilities  of  human  nature.  There 
is  no  upward  flight  in  the  teacher's  idea  of  man.  Instead 
of  wliich,  the  notion  of  the  power  of  earth,  and  the  impos- 
sibility of  resisting  it,  depresses  his  whole  aim,  and  the 
shadow  of  the  tomb  falls  upon  the  work  of  the  great  false 
Prophet,  (i.) 

The  idea  of  God  is  akin  to  the  idea  of  man.  "  He  knows 
us,"  says  Mahomet.  God's  knowledge,  the  vast  cxjjcricnce, 
so  to  speak,  of  the  Divine  Being,  His  infinite  acquaintance 
with  man's  frailties  and  temptations,  is  appealed  to  as  the 
oTound  of  confidence.  "  He  is  the  Wise,  the  Knowing 
One,"  "  He  is  the  Knowing,  the  Wise,"  "  He  is  easy  to  be 
reconciled."  Thus  is  raised  a  notion  of  the  Supreme  Being 
which  is  rather  an  extension  of  the  character  of  the  large- 
minded  and  sagacious  man  of  the  world,  than  an  extension 
of  man's  virtue  and  holiness.  He  forgives  because  He 
knows  too  much  to  be  rigid,  because  sin  universal  ceases 
to  be  sin,  and  must  be  given  way  to.  Take  a  man  who 
has  had  large  opportunity  of  studying  mankind,  and  has 
come  into  contact  with  every  form  of  human  weakness  and 
corruption;  such  a  man  is  indulgent  as  a  simple  conse- 
quence of  his  knowledge,  because  nothing  surprises  him. 
So  the  God  of  Mahomet  forgives  by  reason  of  His  vast 
knowledge.  The  absence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Atonement 
makes  itself  felt  in  the  character  of  that  Being  who  forgives 
without  a  Sacrifice  for  sin ;  shewing  that  without  that  doc- 

for  effectiveness,  and  energy  suffer  from  an  expansion  of  the  field  of  view. 
The  miud  of  Hamlet  lies  all  abroad  like  the  sea — an  universal  reflector — 
but  wanting  the  self-moving  principle.  Musing,  reflection,  and  irony  upon 
all  the  world  supersede  action,  and  a  task  evaporates  in  philosophy." — 
Chr Mian  Remembrancer,  No.  63,  p.  178. 


VII]  in  their  Practical  ResiLlt  143 

trine  tliere  cannot  even  be  high  Deism,     So  knit  together 
is  the  whole  fabric  of  truth  ;  without  a  sacrifice,  a  pardon- 
ing God  becomes  an  easy  God :  and  an  easy  God  makes  a 
low  human  nature.     No  longer  awful  in  His  justice,  the 
Wise,  "the  Knowing  One,"  degrades  His  own  act  of  for- 
giveness by  converting  it  into  connivance ;  and  man  takes 
full  advantage  of  so  tolerant  and  convenient   a  master. 
"  Man  is  weak,"  and  "  God  knows  him," — these  two  maxims 
taken  together  constitute  an  ample  charter  of  freedom  for 
human  conduct.     "  God  knows  us,"  says  man ;  He  knows 
that  we  are  not  adapted  to  a  very  rigid  rule,  He  does  not 
look  upon  us  in  that  light,  He  does  not  expect  any  great 
things  from  us ;  not  an  inflexible  justice,  not  a  searching 
self-denial,  not  a  punctilious  love  of  our  neighbour ;  He  is 
considerate,  He  is  wise,  He  knows  what  we  can  do,  and 
what  we  cannot  do  ;  He  does  not  condemn  us.  He  makes 
allowance  for  us,  "  He  knows  us."     So  true  is  the  saying 
of  Pascal  that  "  without  the  knowledge  of  Jesus  Chiist  we 
see  nothing  but  confusion  in  the  nature  of  God  and  in  our 
own  nature."  ^ 

The  force  which  Christianity  has  applied  to  the  world, 
and  by  which  it  has  produced  that  change  in  the  world 
which  it  has,  is,  in  a  word,  the  doctrine  of  grace.  There 
has  been  a  new  power  actually  working  in  the  system,  and 
that  power  has  worked  by  other  means  besides  doctrine : 
but  still  it  is  the  law  of  God's  dealings  with  us  to  apply 
His  power  to  us  by  means  of  our  faith  and  belief  in  that 
power ;  i.e.  by  doctrine.  Faith  in  his  own  position,  the  be- 
lief at  the  bottom  of  every  Christian's  heart  that  he  stands 
in  a  different  relation  to  God  from  a  heathen,  and  has  a 
supernatural  source  of  strength — this  it  is  which  has  made 
him  ad,  has  been  the  rousing  and  elevating  motive  to  the 
Christian  body,  and  raised  its  moral  practice. 

If  we  go  into  particulars,  the  force  of  the  great  Example 

^  Pensees,  vol.  ii.  p.  317. 


1 44  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

of  the  Incarnation,  which  we  include  in  the  effect  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Incarnation,  has  founded  the  great  order  of 
Christian,  as  distinguished  from  heatlien  virtues.  It  is 
evident  what  power  the  great  act  of  forgiveness  in  the 
Atonement  has  had  in  stamping  the  great  law  of  forgive- 
ness upon  human  hearts ;  what  power  the  Incarnation,  as  a 
great  act  of  humiliation,  has  had  in  creating  another  esti- 
mate of  human  rank  and  glory ;  what  effect  again  the  same 
great  doctrine  has  had  in  producing  that  interest  in -the 
poor  and  whole  difference  of  relations  to  them  which  has 
characterized  Christian  society.  For  whence  has  that  idea 
of  the  poor  and  their  claims  come,  but  from  the  idea  of 
man's  brotherhood  to  man  which  the  Incarnation  has 
founded,  and  the  recommendation  of  a  low  estate  contained 
in  the  Humiliation  of  the  Incarnation.  There  has  been 
deep  in  men's  minds  the  notion  that  they  were  uniting 
themselves  to  that  Act,  and  attaching  to  themselves  the 
benefit  of  it,  by  copying  it ;  by  transferring  it  to  Christian 
life,  and  reproducing  it,  so  to  speak,  in  an  act  of  their  own, 
— the  descent  from  their  own  position  to  that  of  a  lower 
fellow-creature.  The  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  again, 
has  enlightened  man  with  respect  to  his  body,  and  the  re- 
spect due  to  it  as  the  temple  of  that  Divine  Spirit ;  and 
has  thus  produced  that  different  estimate  of  sins  of  the 
body  which  so  distinguishes  the  Christian  from  the  heatlien 
world.  The  doctrine  of  a  future  life,  as  attested  by  the 
miracle  of  the  Eesurrection,  was  practically  a  new  doctrine 
in  the  world  :  it  has  inspired  a  belief  and  a  conviction  of  a 
world  to  come,  altogether  distinct  from  any  notion  enter- 
tained by  the  heathen  ;  and  it  has  acted  as  the  most  power- 
ful motive  to  moral  practice. 

It  must  be  observed  that  the  gTcat  public  causes,  which 
have  produced  the  moral  movements  of  communities  and 
of  society  in  the  modern  world,  have  leaned  upon  doctrine ; 
and  relied  upon  that  power  for  the  propagating  energy 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  145 

necessary  for  them.  Hence  has  arisen  the  inoculation  of 
hearts,  the  excitement  of  genuine  interest.  The  cause  of 
the  poorer  classes,  as  just  stated,  has  had  a  doctrinal  foun- 
dation. The  cause  of  the  slave  has  had  the  same.  The 
doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  has,  through  the  idea  of  man's 
brotherhood  to  man,  also  founded  the  rights  of  man.  Chris- 
tianity tolerated  slavery  in  the  days  of  the  Apostles,  and  it 
does  so  now,  because  it  tolerates  all  conditions  of  life  which 
admit  of  Christian  devotion  and  practice  being  conducted 
in  them.  But  Christianity  has  always  opposed  this  abuse : 
the  Church  was  the  great  manumitter  and  improver  of  the 
condition  of  the  serf  in  the  middle  ages  ;  and  in  the  present 
age  religious  feeling  has  been  at  the  bottom  of  the  great 
movement  against  slavery.  Tor  was  that  being  to  be 
bought  and  sold  whose  nature  Christ  assumed,  and  for 
whom  Christ  died  ?  Thus  the  public  effort  which  ended 
in  relieving  this  country  from  the  stigma  of  the  capture 
and  ownership  of  slaves,  received  its  impulse  from  doc- 
trine ;  and  the  great  leader  of  it  was  himself  the  leader  of 
a  doctrinal  revival.  Public  education  has  been  partly  a 
movement  of  charity  and  benevolence  to  man,  and  partly  a 
movement  for  the  advance  of  science.  As  a  movement  of 
charity  to  impart  knowledge  to  and  elevate  the  minds  of 
the  poor,  it  has  been  indebted  principaEy  and  primarily  to 
a  religious  motive ;  for  George  III.  caught  the  animus  of 
society  and  represented  it  correctly  in  his  well-known  pro- 
phecy of  the  day  "  when  every  man  in  England  would  be 
able  to  read  his  Bible."  And  whence  has  the  relief  of 
sickness  obtained  its  dignity  and  loftiness  as  a  duty  under 
Christianity  ?  Whence  but  from  the  same  great  doctrine 
which  makes  mankind  one  body,  as  members  of  "  Him  who 
filleth  all  in  all  ? "  Hence  every  individual  member  par- 
takes of  the  dignity  of  the  whole  ;  and  the  act  of  minister- 
ing to  him  becomes  a  noble  service,  paid  to  the  whole  body, 
and  to  its  Head.     "  I  was  sick  and  ye  visited  Me,  I  was  in 

K 


146  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

prison  and  ye  came  unto  ]\Ie."  The  idea  of  the  dignity  of 
man  as  such,  tlie  equality  of  man  with  man  in  the  sight  of 
God,  the  nobility  of  ministry  and  service  to  him,  for  the 
relief  of  his  wants  and  diseases,  did  not  exist  in  the  world 
before  the  Gospel ;  the  heathens  had  no  value  for  man  as 
such,  but  only  for  man  under  certain  flattering  circum- 
stances, as  developed  by  knowledge  or  greatness.  Reduced 
to  his  own  nature,  he  was  nothing  in  their  eyes :  the  elave 
was  another  being  from  his  master.  The  light  of  truth 
first  broke  through  this  blindness  and  stupor  in  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Incarnation,  and  that  doctrine  is  the  historical 
date  of  the  modern  idea  of  man.  To  say  that  the  inspira- 
tion of  the  missionary  cause  has  been  the  belief  in  Chris- 
tian doctrine  is  almost  superfluous  ;  because  we  can  hardly 
in  imagination  conceive  missionaiy  enterprise  without  it. 
Zeal  in  this  cause  is  essentially  the  child  of  faith ;  and 
without  the  conviction  in  the  Church  of  a  supernatural 
truth  to  communicate,  and  a  supernatural  dispensation  to 
spread,  Christianity  must  give  up  the  very  pretension  of 
propagating  itself  in  the  world.  The  great  public  causes 
which  are  part  of  modern  history  and  distinguish  modern 
society  from  ancient,  thus  witness  to  the  power  of  doc- 
trine ;  but  public  causes  are  but  one  channel  in  which 
Christian  action  has  flowed ;  they  do  but  exhibit  in  aggre- 
gate forms  that  Christian  disposition  and  practice  which 
goes  on  principally  in  private. 

Christianity  simply  regarded  as  a  code  of  morals  will  not 
account  for  this  mural  change  in  the  world ;  for  men  do  not 
do  right  things  because  they  are  told  to  do  them.  Mere 
moral  instruction  does  not  effect  its  purpose  unless  it  is 
seconded  by  some  powerful  force  and  motive  besides  the 
lesson  itself.  Nor  is  this  change  in  the  world  accounted 
for  by  the  natural  law  of  example,  by  saying  that  a  body 
of  men  of  high  moral  character  and  aims,  under  a  remark- 
able leader,  set  up  a  high  model,  which  model  spread  ori- 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  147 

ginally  and  transmitted  itself  age  after  age  by  its  own 
power  and  influence  as  a  model  and  pattern.  The  force  of 
example  has  a  natural  tendency  to  wear  out.  We  see  this 
in  institutions  and  in  states.  Particular  societies  have  in 
different  ages  been  set  going  by  earnest  men,  who  infused 
at  first  their  own  spirit  and  put  men  of  tlieir  own  type 
into  them;  but  the  force  of  example  became  gradually 
weaker  in  the  process  of  transmission ;  at  every  stage  of 
the  succession  something  of  it  was  lost,  till  at  last  the  body 
wholly  degenerated.  So  a  great  example  set  by  founders 
and  their  associates  has  imparted  a  mould  and  character  to 
political  communities,  which  has  lasted  some  time;  but 
this  mould  has  altered  as  the  original  influence  by  little 
and  little  died  away;  and  the  state  has  become  corrupt. 
Thus  the  pattern  of  public  spirit  and  devotion  to  the  public 
good  which  was  originally  stamped  upon  Sparta,  Eome,  and 
Venice,  gradually  lost  its  hold,  and  those  states  degenerated. 
The  force  of  example,  then,  is  not  self-sustaining ;  and 
therefore  when  a  moral  change  in  society  is  made  for  a 
perpetuity,  and  is  a  permanent  characteristic,  lasting 
through  and  surviving  all  other  changes  and  transitions, 
this  effect  must  be  owing  to  some  other  principle  than  that 
of  example,  some  permanent  force  from  another  root,  by 
which  example  itself  is  kept  up.  I  may  add  that  the 
source  of  Christian  practice  in  Christian  truth  does  not 
agree  with  any  settled  principle  of  decay  in  Christian  prac- 
tice, and  with  extreme  statements  of  the  inferiority  of 
modern  Christians  to  ancient.  For  though  doubtless,  with 
the  same  truth  to  move  the  human  heart,  its  energies  may 
be  brought  out  in  one  age  more  than  in  another ;  still  the 
idea  of  a  regular  tendency  of  Christian  practice  to  degene- 
rate with  time,  combines  with  the  explanation  of  example 
as  its  cause,  rather  than  with  the  operation  of  a  constant 
cause  in  revealed  truth. 

What  I  remark,  then,  is  that  the  prophecy  in  the  Epistle 


148  Aliracks  regarded  [Lect. 

to  the  Eomans  has  been  fulfilled,  and  that  doctrine  has 
been  historically  at  the  bottom  of  a  great  change  of  moral 
practice  in  mankind.  By  a  prophecy  I  mean  that  St.  Paul 
assigns  a  cortain  property  and  effect  to  doctrine,  viz.  that 
of  eliciting  the  good  element  in  man,  setting  man's  moral 
nature  in  action ;  and  that  this  property  has  been  realized. 
The  world,  he  says,  has  been  hitherto  a  failure,  everything 
has  gone  wrong,  because  man  has  not  been  able  to  act ;  he 
could  not  do  the  thing  that  he  would :  he  has  laboured 
under  an  insurmountable  weakness,  and  defect  of  some 
motive  power  adequate  to  tell  upon  him.  But  this  is  what 
is  to  change  man ;  this  is  what  is  to  touch  the  seat  of  action 
in  his  heart,  the  truth  which  is  now  revealed  from  heaven 
— the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  and  Death  of  Christ. 
This  doctrine  will  rouse  and  awaken  human  nature,  and 
give  it  what  it  now  wants — the  great  practical  impulse. 
This  account,  I  say,  of  the  power  of  doctrine  in  St.  Paul 
has  been  fulfilled  by  the  fact.  The  history  of  man  coin- 
cides with  this  assertion  of  St.  Paul's  of  the  property  of 
doctrine.  Not  that  the  result  has  been  by  any  means  a 
complete  one,  or  that  St.  Paul  expected  it  to  be ;  far  other- 
wise. His  doctrine  of  election  shews  that ;  that  doctrine 
evidently  represents  the  body  of  really  good  and  holy  men 
in  the  world,  the  spiritual  Church,  as  always  insulated  in 
the  world,  always  a  small  number  in  comparison  with  the 
great  mass  of  mankind ;  and  a  dark  shadow  rests  upon  one 
portion  of  the  field  of  prophecy,  contrasting  remarkably 
with  tlie  light  and  glory  of  tlie  other.  But  the  issue  of  the 
Gospel,  though  not  a  complete  result,  has  still  been  a  great 
result ;  such  a  result  as  divides  the  world  after  the  Chris- 
tian era  morally  iVom  the  world  before  it.  A  stimulus  has 
been  given  to  liuman  nature,  which  has  extracted  an 
amount  of  action  from  it  which  no  Greek  or  Poman  could 
have  believed  possible,  but  which,  had  it  been  placed  in 


VI I  j  in  their  Practical  Result  149 

idea  before  him,  lie  would  have  set  aside  as  the  dream  of 
an  enthusiast. 

Undoubtedly,  the  doctrines  of  false  religions  have  ex- 
tracted remarkable  action  out  of  human  nature ;  especially 
the  doctrines  of  Oriental  religions.  The  Hindoo  doctrine 
of  Absorption,  e.g.  has  produced  a  great  deal  of  extraordi- 
nary action.  But  what  sort  of  action  is  it  ?  Is  it  action 
upon  the  scale  of  our  whole  moral  nature,  worthy  of  that 
nature,  or  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  as  the  Scripture  calls 
it  ?  No,  it  is  such  wild,  eccentric,  one-sided  energy  of  the 
erratic  will  as  is  more  allied  to  phrenzy  than  morals.  The 
fruits  of  the  doctrine  of  Absorption  are  gigantic  feats  of 
self-torture  and  self-stupefaction,  ending  in  themselves,  and 
unconnected  with  charity  to  man :  a  fruit  worthy  of  its 
source.  For  the  doctrine  of  Absorption  is  itself  a  false- 
hood :  no  man  can  wish  for  the  loss  of  his  own  personality, 
i.e.  his  own  annihilation :  no  man  ever  did  wish  for  it,  what- 
ever length  of  torture  he  may  have  undergone  to  obtain  it. 
The  conception  is  a  counterfeit ;  it  wants  truth,  and  "  the 
tree  is  known  by  its  fruits."  Do  men  gather  grapes  of 
thorns,  or  figs  of  thistles  ?  So  neither  can  moral  practice 
issue  out  of  the  doctrine  of  Absorption ;  but  a  fiction  pro- 
duces the  wild  and  poor  fruit  of  extravagance.  (2.) 

In  attributing  this  effect  to  Christian  doctrine,  we  must 
at  the  same  time  remember  that  the  old  Law  foreshadowed 
that  doctrine.  The  religion  of  the  Jew  was  not  Deism. 
In  the  first  place  it  was  founded  on  miracles,  and  on  that 
higher  revelation  of  the  personality  of  the  Deity  which 
miracles  are.  In  the  next  place  it  was  accompanied  by  the 
institution  of  sacrifice,  which  was  a  peculiar  revelation  of 
the  righteous  character  of  God,  as  a  riU;  and  an  intimation 
of  the  real  Atonement  as  a  type.  From  these  sources  was 
derived  the  deep  doctrine  of  repentance  and  forgiveness, 
which  penetrates  the  Psalms  and  Prophecy ;  the  sense  of 


150  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

the  necessity  of  an  act  of  pardon  on  God's  part,  in  order  to 
allay  the  trouble  in  man's  heart,  and  reinstate  him  in  peace 
of  mind  ;  the  intimate  communion  with  God  iqwn  this 
sense  of  the  necessity  of  His  favour  and  acceptance ;  the 
language  of  tender  complaint  and  remonstrance  with  Him 
founded  upon  wliat  we  may  call  the  devotional  fiction  of 
His  hardness  and  inflexibility — the  affectionate  irony  of 
prayer.  In  this  whole  relation  to  God  lay  the  motive 
power  of  the  old  Law,  the  stimulus  to  goodness  in  it ;  to 
the  force  of  which  the  Jew  was  indebted  for  raising  him 
above  the  pagan  in  morals ;  and  which  actually  issued  in 
producing  a  hochj  or  class  of  holy  men  in  every  generation 
of  the  people.  Whereas  paganism  had  high  individual  ex- 
amples, but  not  a  class.  But  this  relation  under  the  old 
Law  was  an  anticipation  of  Cliristian  light.  The  Law  as 
such  could  not  "  give  life,"  nor  "  could  rigliteousness  come 
by  the  Law,"  as  a  law ;  but  so  far  as  the  old  law  contained 
the  germ  of  Gospel  truth,  so  far  it  gave  life ;  so  far  it  sup- 
plied an  effective  motive  to  rouse  the  heart  of  man  to  ex- 
ertion. (3.) 

The  relation  of  religion  to  morals  has  indeed  been  exem- 
plified most  conspicuously  under  Christianity.  Morality 
may  in  the  abstract  exist  without  religion,  and  is  not  iden- 
tical with  it ;  but  religion  has  been  the  practical  producer 
of  it ;  the  practical  motive  to  morals  in  the  world.  Our 
moral  nature  is  not  its  own  moving  principle ;  it  is  so  at 
least  very  inadequately ;  and  so  we  find  that  in  jDoint  of 
fact  doctrine  has  been  the  impulse  which  has  set  it  in 
action.  It  is  not  in  human  nature  to  set  about  its  work 
wholly  in  the  dark ;  it  wants  a  vision  of  the  invisible  world, 
a  revelation  of  God  and  of  its  own  prospects  and  destiny, 
to  set  it  to  work.  The  revelation  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ, 
and  of  life  eternal  in  the  same  Jesus  Christ,  is  tliis  vision 
or  supernat\iral  truth  which  has  produced  action.  The 
strong  need  of  the  sense  of  favour  with  God,  which  the 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Resttlt  151 

Gospel  manifestation  of  Him  has  created  ;  the  overpower- 
ing disclosure  of  man's  destiny,  that  lie  was  made  for  a 
state  of  endless  glory  and  happiness,  has  forced  men,  in 
spite  of  themselves,  to  do  good  acts.  And  therefore  doc- 
trine has  been  a  part  of  human  progress,  a  fresh  ground- 
work, a  higher  level  gained ;  analogous  in  morals  to  civili- 
zation in  social  and  political  life.  And  to  give  up  doctrine 
would  be  a  retrograde  movement  for  the  human  race,  the 
surrender  of  ground  made,  a  relapse  from  a  later  to  an 
earlier  stage  of  humanity ;  the  abandonment  of  a  superior 
motive  power  which  commands  the  spring  of  action  in  the 
human  heart,  for  an  inferior  one  which  did  not  touch  it.^ 

But  still  it  will  be  asked — Would  not  all  this  result  of 
Christianity  have  been  just  the  same  without  the  peculiar 
doctrines  ?  are  not  these  merely  the  accidental  appendages 
of  a  spirit  which  rose  up  in  man,  which  has  been  the  ener- 
gizing power  throughout  ?  But  though  it  is  always  open 
to  men,  when  great  results  have  taken  place  in  connexion 
with  certain  apparent  causes,  to  say  that  they  would  have 
taken  place  all  tlie  same  without  those  causes,  this  cannot 
in  the  nature  of  the  case  be  more  than  a  conjecture.  We 
have  an  obvious  and  matter-of  fact  coincidence  of  a  higher 
state  of  mankind  with  doctrine ;  which  coincidence  is  of 
itself  a  strong  argument.  And  we  have,  moreover,  man's 
own  witness  to  doctrine,  as  being  the  cause  which  has  pro- 
duced this  effect.  If  we  are  to  take  men's  own  account  of 
their  own  action,  and  their  own  power  of  action,  this  has 
been  the  impulse  to  them :  the  call  which  has  awakened 
them  to  moral  life  has  been  a  doctrinal  one;  what  has 

^  Scott  in  his  "Force  of  Truth"  mentions,  what  is  remarkable,  that 
while  he  held  Socinian  principles  himself,  he  still  purposely  discarded 
them  as  his  basis  of  preaching,  because  he  saw  they  were  not  enough  for 
moral  purposes,  i.e.  for  making  him  a  successful  preacher  of  morality, 
which  he  was  very  desirous  of  being.  "  I  concealed  them  in  a  great  mea- 
sure both  for  my  credit's  sake  and  from  a  sort  of  desire  I  entertained  of 
successfully  inculcating  the  moral  duties  upon  those  to  whom  I  preached." 


152  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

enabled  them  to  maintain  this  action  has  been  the  support 
of  certain  truths,  in  the  absence  of  which  they  would  not 
have  been  able  to  do  what  they  did.  In  this  state  of  the 
case,  to  say  that  all  this  change  would  have  gone  on  with- 
out doctrine,  is  unsatisfactory,  and  suppositional  only. 
Let  us  conceive  for  a  moment  Christian  doctrine  obliter- 
ated, and  mankind  starting  afresh  without  it,  with  only  the 
belief  in  a  Benevolent  Deity,  and  a  high  moral  code.  "With 
the  fact  before  us  of  what  has  been  the  working  power  of 
doctrine  upon  man's  heart,  and  what  has  been  the  weak- 
ness of  our  moral  nature  without  doctrine,  could  we  com- 
mit mankind  to  a  moral  Deism  without  trembling  for  the 
result  ?  Could  we  deprive  human  nature  of  this  powerful 
aid  and  inspiring  motive,  and  expect  it  to  act  as  if  it  had 
it  ?  Could  we  look  forward  without  dismay  to  the  loss  of 
this  practical  force  which  has  been  acting  upon  human 
nature  for  eighteen  centuries  ?  Would  any  one  in  his 
heart  expect  that  Christianity  deprived  of  its  revealed 
truths  would  retain  its  old  strength,  would  produce  equal 
fruits,  the  same  self-sacrificing  spirit,  zeal,  warmth,  earnest- 
ness ?  that  it  would  give  the  same  power  of  living  above 
the  world  ?  that  its  effects  on  the  heart,  its  spiritualizing 
influence,  would  be  the  same  without  its  doctrines  ?  No  ! 
When  men  speculate  they  want  to  get  rid  of  doctrine ;  but 
when  they  want  practical  results  to  be  produced,  then  they 
fall  back  upon  doctrine,  as  that  alone  which  can  produce 
them,  which  can  awaken  man  from  his  lethargy,  and  sup- 
ply a  constraining  motive  to  him.  I  do  not  mean  to  say 
that  many  have  not  taken  an  active  part  in  the  great  ob- 
jects and  movements  of  Christian  society  who  have  not 
accepted  Christian  doctrine  ;  but  such  men  have  acted  upon 
an  idea  obtained  from  revelation,  although  they  have  ceased 
to  believe  the  revelation  from  which  it  came.  Example  is 
not  the  full  account  of  the  origin  of  Christian  practice,  but 
still  that  practice  existing,  its  example  tells,  and  inoculates 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  153 

many  who  reject  the  creed.  A  moral  standard  is  imbibed 
with  the  atmosphere  of  life.  Such  men  are  the  production 
of  Christian  doctrine,  however  they  may  disclaim  it : — so 
far  at  least  as  concerns  this  practical  zeal. 

What  is  offered  as  a  substitute  for  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation,  to  set  man's  moral  nature  in  action,  is  the  en- 
thusiastic philosophical  sentiment  of  the  divinity  of  human 
nature.  But  though  I  would  not  say  that  this,  like  other 
ideas  which  have  an  element  of  truth  in  them,  has  not 
given  a  high  impulse  to  some  minds ;  that  it  has  been  a 
forcible  engine  for  impelling  mankind  to  the  practice  of 
duty  would  be  plainly  overrating  its  results.  And  there  is 
a  reason  for  its  weakness  and  want  of  power,  viz.  that  the 
idea  does  not  stand  the  test  of  observation.  For  let  us 
suppose  a  sagacious  man  of  great  experience  and  know- 
ledge of  the  world,  who  had  had  opportunity  of  observing 
human  nature  upon  a  large  scale — its  expressions  and  its 
disguises,  the  corruption  of  men's  motives,  and  all  those 
well-known  traits  and  characteristics  of  mankind  which 
acute  men  have  embodied  in  various  sayings — let  us  sup- 
pose such  a  person  having  laid  before  him  for  his  accept- 
ance the  above  idea  of  the  divinity  of  human  nature.  He 
would  treat  it  with  derision  and  ridicule  ;  representing  that 
though  men  of  the  profoundest  sagacity  have  in  all  ages 
believed  in  mysteries,  it  is  another  thing  to  ask  them  to 
believe  that  facts  themselves  are  different  from  what  they 
are  seen  to  be.  But  let  us  suppose  again,  the  same  pene- 
trating observer  not  wholly  satisfied  with  the  low  estimate 
of  man  as  the  full  account  of  him,  but  catching  also  obscure 
signs  of  a  different  element  in  the  being,  working  its  way 
under  great  disadvantages,  and  not  to  be  left  out  of  the  cal- 
culation, though  he  cannot  tell  what  it  may  turn  out  to  be, 
and  what  it  may  shadow  and  prognosticate  in  the  destiny 
of  this  creature.  Were  then,  at  this  stage,  the  idea  of  a 
Divine  scheme  for  the  elevation  of  this  creature  to  a  parti- 


154  Miracles  regarded  [Lect, 

cipation  of  the  Divine  nature  to  be  offered  to  liim,  what- 
ever astonishment  the  thought  might  excite,  conscious  that 
he  had  no  solution  of  his  own  of  the  enigma  before  him,  he 
would  not  wholly  reject  it;  but  one  condition  he  M'ould 
think  indispensable — he  would  not  listen  to  the  notion  of 
this  creature's  exaltation  except  through  the  passage  of 
some  deep  confession  first,  by  which  he  would  condemn 
himself  utterly,  and  in  condemning  cast  off  his  old  vileness. 
Without  this  tribute,  this  sacrifice  to  truth,  such  an  idea 
would  appear  a  mockery. 

Such  a  distinction  as  this  divides  one  doctrine  of  ex- 
alted liumanity  from  another.  A  deification  of  humanity 
upon  its  own  grounds,  an  exaltation  which  is  all  height 
and  no  depth,  wants  power  because  it  wants  truth.  It  is 
not  founded  uj^on  the  facts  of  human  nature,  and  therefore 
issues  in  vain  and  vapid  aspiration,  which  injures  the 
solidity  of  man's  character.  That  serious  doctrine  of  man's 
greatness,  which  lays  hold  on  man's  moral  nature,  and 
brings  it  out,  is  one  which  lays  its  foundation  first  in  his 
guilt  and  misery;  his  exaltation  is  remedial,  a  restoration 
from  a  fall.  Thus  the  school  of  experience  accepts  man's 
'vileness  in  the  Gospel  portrait,  the  sanguine  school  his 
loftiness ;  tlie  one  depresses  man,  the  other  inflates  him ; 
the  Gospel  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  and  its  effects  alone 
unites  the  sagacious  view  of  liviman  nature  with  the  enthu- 
siastic. It  is  the  only  doctrine  of  man's  exaltation  which 
the  observer  of  mankind  can  accept;  while  also  it  is  only 
as  a  mystery  transacted  in  the  highest  heaven  that  mari's 
exaltation  has  ever  been  cared  for  by  himself,  ever  com- 
manded his  serious  energies.  (4.) 

But  if,  as  the  source  and  inspiration  of  practice,  doctrine 
has  been  the  foundation  of  a  new  state  of  the  world,  and 
of  that  change  which  distinfjuishes  the  world  under  Chris- 
tianity  from  the  world  before  it ;  miracles,  as  the  proof  of 
that  doctrine,  stand  before  us  in  a  very  remarkable  and 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  155 

peculiar  light.  Far  from  being  mere  idle  feats  of  power  to 
gratify  the  love  of  the  marvellous ;  far  even  from  being 
mere  particular  and  occasional  rescues  from  the  operation 
of  general  laws ;  they  come  before  us  as  means  for  accom- 
plishing tlie  largest  and  most  important  practical  object 
that  has  ever  been  accomplished  in  the  history  of  mankind. 
They  lie  at  the  bottom  of  the  difference  of  the  modern  from 
the  ancient  world ;  so  far,  i.e..  as  that  difference  is  moral. 
We  see  as  a  fact  a  change  in  the  moral  condition  of  man- 
kind, which  marks  ancient  and  modern  society  as  two 
different  states  of  mankind.  What  has  produced  this 
change,  and  elicited  this  new  power  of  action  ?  Doctrine. 
And  what  was  the  proof  of  that  doctrine,  or  essential  to 
the  proof  of  it  ?  Miracles.  The  greatness  of  the  result 
thus  throws  light  upon  the  propriety  of  the  means ;  and 
shews  the  fitting  object  which  was  presented  for  the  intro- 
duction of  such  means ;  the  fitting  occasion  which  had 
arisen  for  the  use  of  them;  for  indeed  no  more  weighty, 
grand,  or  solemn  occasion  can  be  conceived,  than  the  foun- 
dation of  such  a  new  order  of  things  in  the  world.  Extra- 
ordinary action  of  Divine  power  for  such  an  end  has  the 
benefit  of  a  justifying  object  of  incalculable  weight;  which 
though  not  of  itself  indeed  proof  of  the  fact,  comes  with 
striking  force  upon  the  mind  in  connexion  with  the  proper 
proof.  It  is  reasonable,  it  is  inevitable  that  we  should  be 
impressed  by  such  a  result;  for  it  shews  that  the  miracu- 
lous system  has  been  a  practical  one ;  that  it  has  been  a 
step  in  the  ladder  of  man's  ascent,  the  means  of  introduc- 
ing those  powerful  truths  which  have  set  his  moral  nature 
in  action. 

Nor,  must  it  be  observed,  can  professed  subsequent 
miracles  for  the  conversion  of  particular  populations,  after 
the  original  miraculous  proof  and  propagatiom  of  the 
Gospel,  avail  themselves  of  the  argument  which  applies  to 
those  original  miracles  themselves.     Because  the  argument 


15^  J\Ii racks  regarded  [Lect. 

for  these  miracles,  which  is  thus  extracted  from  the  great 
result  of  them,  is  based  upon  the  necessity  of  those  miracles 
for  this  result.  But  though  the  original  miracles  are 
necessary  for  the  proof  of  doctrine,  subsequent  miracles 
cannot  plead  the  same  necessity ;  because  when  that  doc- 
trine has  been  once  attested,  those  original  credentials, 
transmitted  by  the  natural  channels  of  evidence,  are  the 
permanent  and  perpetual  proof  of  that  doctrine,  not  want- 
ing reinforcements  from  additional  and  posterior  miracles ; 
which  are  therefore  without  the  particular  recommendation 
to  our  belief,  of  being  necessary  for  the  great  result  before 
us.  The  Anglo-Saxon  nation  was  doubtless  as  important  a 
nation  to  convert  as  the  Jewish  or  Greek ;  but  the  miracles 
of  our  Lord  and  His  Apostles  were  necessary  to  convert 
the  Jews  and  the  Greeks;  St.  Augustine's  reputed  miracles 
were  not  necessary  to  convert  the  Anglo-Saxons.  First 
miracles  in  proof  of  a  new  dispensation,  and  miracles  in  a 
subsequent  age  for  the  spread  of  it,  stand  upon  different 
grounds  in  this  respect ;  the  latter  are  without  that  par- 
ticular note  of  trutli  which  consists  in  a  necessary  connexion 
with  great  permanent  ends.  First  credentials  cannot  be 
dispensed  with,  second  ones  can  be.  It  may  be  said  that 
second  ones  are  useful  for  facilitating  and  expediting  con- 
version;  but  we  are  no  judges  of  the  Divine  intentions 
with  reference  to  the  speed  or  gradualness  of  the  conver- 
sion of  mankind  to  the  Gospel;  which  considerations 
therefore  stand  on  a  different  ground  from  the  fundamental 
needs  of  a  dispensation.  The  saying  of  our  Lord,  "  Blessed 
are  they  that  have  not  seen  and  yet  have  believed,"  evi- 
dently contemplates  the  future  growth  of  the  Christian 
faith  by  means  of  testimony  to,  as  distinguished  from  the 
actual  sight  of,  the  miraculous  evidences  of  the  Gospel. 

This  view  of  miracles,  as  the  indispensable  means  for 
producing  that  great  result  which  we  have  before  us,  and 
that  new  moral  era  of  the  world  under  which  we   are 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  157 

living,  meets  again  another  objection  wliicli  is  sometimes 
raised  against  the  truth  of  miracles.  '  The  general  sense 
of  society,'  it  is  stated,  '  rejects  the  notion  of  miracles 
taking  place  now-a-days ;  these  extraordinary  actions  of 
Omnipotence  are  conveniently  located  in  the  past.  But 
why  this  sort  of  general  consent  that  a  supernatural  event 
is  impossible  now,  if  it  was  really  possible  then  ?  It  is 
evident  that  the  imagination  is  only  less  scandalized  by  a 
miracle  now  than  by  a  miracle  then,  because  it  realizes 
present  time,  and  does  not  realize  past.  But  if  so,  the 
modern  acceptance  of  miracles  is  convicted  of  being  unreal, 
and  therefore  whatever  speculative  arguments  may  be 
urged  for  the  possibility  of  such  events,  the  matter-of-fact 
test  of  human  educated  belief  rejects  them.'     (5.) 

It  is,  then,  to  be  admitted  that  the  mind  of  society  now 
is  adverse  to  the  notion  of  an  hodiernal  supernatural  event. 
But  I  remark  in  the  first  place  that  this  position  is  taken 
with  a  reserve.  For,  not  to  mention  tlie  undovibting  belief 
in  special  Providences  now,  let  a  reported  instance  of  a 
communication  in  later  times  between  the  world  of  de- 
parted spirits  and  the  visible  world  be  discussed;  a  fair 
representative  of  the  established  standard  of  belief  does 
not  commit  himself  to  any  absolute  position  against  the 
possibility  of  such  an  occurrence.  The  relations  between 
the  seen  and  the  unseen  worlds,  the  state  of  the  dead,  and 
what  channels  are  capable  of  being  opened  between  un- 
clothed spirit  and  the  mind  which  still  tenants  the  frame 
of  the  Hesh — all  this  lies  so  completely  out  of  our  know- 
ledge, that  to  decline  to  lay  down  the  principle  of  an  im- 
passable boundary  between  one  portion  of  the  Divine 
dominion  and  another,  is  felt  to  be  not  superstition,  but 
caution. 

Of  the  weight,  importance,  and  significance  of  a  reserve, 
indeed,  different  estimates  Avill  be  formed.  To  some  a 
reserved   ground   appears   but   a   light    appendage    to    a 


158  Miracles  regarded  [Lect. 

dominant  decision,  a  formality,  a  piece  of  argumentative 
etiquette,  not  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  general  cal- 
culation; but  to  others,  a  reserved  ground  is  a  weighty 
thing :  it  represents  some  claim  which  is  only  weak  in  the 
scale  at  present  because  it  happens  to  be  distant,  but  which 
is  strong  in  its  own  place,  and  which  we  may  have  some 
day  to  meet  in  that  place.  An  argumentative  reserve 
speaks  to  them  with  the  force  of  silent  prophecy ;  it  points 
to  some  truth  whose  turn  will  come  some  day,  perhaps 
when  we  least  expect  it,  and  remind  us  of  our  proviso. 
All  minds  that  require  to  be  individually  satisfied  about 
the  matter  of  their  belief,  must  hold  some  truth  or  other 
under  the  form  of  a  reserve,.  All  truths  do  not  come 
equally  beneath  our  focus ;  but  if  in  this  state  of  the  case 
a  mind  ignores  whatever  hovers  about  the  dim  region  of 
the  circumference  and  meets  the  vision  imperfectly,  it  con- 
demns itself  to  that  barrenness  which  results  from  seeing 
a  very  little  clearly,  and  seeing  nothing  else  at  all.  A 
thoughtful  mind  sees  in  these  distant  reserves  of  the  reason 
the  skirts  of  great  arguments,  the  borders  of  large  regions 
of  truth ;  and  the  shadowy  and  imperfect  vision  supports 
the  clear,  enriching  it  with  additional  significance  and 
important  bearings.  Thus  in  the  wider  circuit  of  religious 
doctrine  M"e  may  see  enough  in  one  or  other  particular 
matter  of  belief  to  think  that  there  may  be  more  wliich  we 
do  not  see ;  and  a  theological  mind  will  make  allowance 
for  its  own  defect  of  scope,  admit  such  matter  partially 
into  its  system,  and  give  the  benefit  of  a  reserve  to  truths 
which  lie  in  the  distance  and  in  the  shadow. 

When,  tlien,  it  is  said  tliat  society  neutralizes  its  belief 
in  past  miracles  by  a  practical  disbelief  in  the  possibility 
of  present,  we  reply  that  society  does  not  reject  the  idea 
of  the  hodiernal  supernatural,  but  expresses  its  judgment 
on  that  subject  with  a  reserve.  But  we  next  observe,  that 
if  the  mind  of  Christian  society  at  the  present  day  is 


VII]  in  their  Practical  Result  159 

adverse  to  the  notion  of  hodiernal  miracles,  and  scrutinizes 
with  great  rigour  all  pretensions  of  that  kind,  there  is  a 
sound  and  sufficient  reason  which  may  be  assigned  for  this 
fact;  viz.  that  the  great  end  for  which  miracles  were 
designed  is  now  accomplished ;  and  that  we  are  now  living 
under  that  later  providential  era,  and  amidst  those  results, 
to  which  miracles  were  the  first  step  and  introduction. 
If  we  do  not  expect  miracles  now,  there  is  a  natural  reason 
for  it,  viz.  that  the  great  purpose  of  them  is  past.  Of  our 
different  attitude  to  past  and  present  time  upon  this  point, 
one  account  is,  that  our  belief  in  the  miraculous  does  not 
stand  the  touchstone  of  the  actual  present;  but  there  is 
another  explanation  of  it  which  is  just  as  obvious,  and 
which  a  believer  can  give,  viz.  that  any  set  of  means  what- 
ever unavoidably  becomes  retrospective  and  a  thing  of  the 
past  when  the  end  is  achieved.  So  far  as  miraculous 
agency  is  regarded  as  'A.imst  agency  by  us,  there  is  a  reason 
to  give  for  this  view  of  it,  arising  from  the  facts  of  the  case. 
We  are  living  amid  mighty  and  deep  influences,  which 
were  originally  set  agoing  by  that  agency;  but  which 
having  been  set  going,  no  longer  want  it ;  and  at  such  a 
stage  it  is  natural  to  us  to  look  upon  the  irregular  and 
extraordinary  expedients  employed  in  laying  the  founda- 
tion as  superseded ;  just  as  we  remove  the  scaffolding 
when  the  edifice  is  raised,  and  take  away  the  support  of 
the  arch  when  the  keystone  has  been  inserted. 

The  preparatory  and  introductory  period  to  a  final  dis- 
pensation is  a  natural  period  of  miracles,  such  as  the  period 
which  succeeds  is  not.  In  the  antecedent  state  there  was 
a  great  want  felt,  a  void  which  the  existing  dispensation 
did  not  satisfy ;  and  the  religious  thought  of  the  day  was 
cast  forward  into  a  mysterious  future,  not,  as  Christian 
thought  is  now,  heavenwards,  but  towards  a  consummation 
of  revelation  here  below.  The  ancient  Jew  saw  in  his  own 
dispensation  an  imperfect  structure,  the  head  of  which  wae 


1 60  Miracles  Remrded 


still  wanting — the  Messiah :  all  pointed  to  Him ;  its  cere- 
monial was  typical ;  and  the  whole  system  was  an  adum- 
bration of  a  great  approaching  Divine  kingdom,  and  a 
great  crowning  Divine  act.  The  very  heart  of  the  nation 
was  thus  the  seat  of  a  great  standing  prophecy ;  all  was 
anticipation  and  expectation;  prophets  kept  alive  the 
sacred  longing ;  miracles  confirmed  the  prophetical  office ; 
and  in  prospect  was  the  miraculous  outbreak  of  Divine 
power  in  the  great  closing  dispensation  itself.  But  this 
whole  expectant  attitude  is  in  our  case  reversed.  Ours  is 
not  a  state  of  expectancy,  and  a  day  of  forecastings  and 
foreshadowings :  we  feel  no  void,  throwing  us  on  the  future. 
On  the  contrary,  w^e  repose  in  Christian  doctrine  as  the 
final  stay  of  the  human  soul,  and  we  are  conscious  that  in 
this  doctrine  is  contained  all  that  can  develop  man ;  we 
know  that  it  Iwa  developed  man,  and  that  Christianity  has 
made  a  moral  change  in  the  state  of  the  world.  With  us, 
then,  miracles  are  passed,  so  far  as  they  are  connected  with 
the  principal  oliject  with  which  miracles  are  concerned — 
revelation.  It  would  be  wholly  unnatural,  it  would  be 
contrary  to  the  very  account  Avhich  we  give  of  our  own 
position,  for  us  at  this  day  to  sinjulate  the  expectant  state 
of  the  old  Law,  and  throw  ourselves  back  into  the  pro- 
spective stage.  This  would  be  doing  violence  to  our  whole 
knowledge  and  sense  of  reality.  Though  we  cannot  restrict 
the  scope  of  miracles  to  one  object,  still,  to  cease  to  expect 
them  when  their  cliicf  end  is  gained,  is  only  to  do  justice 
to  the  greatness  of  that  end,  to  appreciate  the  truth  and 
power  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  to  observe  what 
Christian  doctrine  has  done  for  man. 


LECTURE  VIII 

FALSE  MIEACLES 

Matt.  vii.  22 

Many  will  say  to  Me  in  that  day,  Lord,  Lord,  have  we  not  p'ophesied  in 
Thy  name  ?  and  in  Thy  name  have  cast  out  devils  ;  and  in  Thy  name 
done  many  wonderful  works  ? 

ALAEGE  class  of  miraculous  pretensions  is  not  con- 
fined to  one  religion,  or  even  to  religion  altogether, 
but  belongs  to  human  nature.  Does  man  desire  a  miracle 
as  a  proof  that  a  revelation  is  true  ?  That  is  a  legitimate 
want.  Does  he  desire  one  merely  to  gratify  his  curiosity 
and  love  of  the  marvellous,  for  excitement  and  not  for  use  ? 
That  is  a  morbid  want.  For  though  the  innate  love  of  the 
supernatural  in  man's  heart  is  legitimately  gratified  by  a 
miracle,  man  has  no  right  to  ask  for  miracles  in  order  to 
gratify  this  affection,  any  more  than  he  has  to  ask  for  them 
even  as  evidence,  idly  and  treacherously,  when  he  does  not 
intend  to  accept  them  as  such  even  when  done.  On  both 
accounts  "  an  adulterous  generation"  which  "  sought  after 
signs"  was  once  rebuked.  This  morbid  want,  however, 
joined  to  the  eager  expectation  that  God  would  constantly 
interpose  to  prevent  the  injurious  effects  of  His  general 
laws,  has  produced  a  constant  stream  of  miraculous  preten- 
sion in  the  world,  which  accompanies  man  wherever  he  is 
found,  and  is  a  part  of  his  mental  and  physical  history. 
Curiosity,  imagination,  misery,  helplessness,  and  indolence, 
have  all  conspired  to  throw  him  upon  this  support,  which 

L 


1 62  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

he  has  sought  in  order  to  penetrate  into  the  secrets  of  the 
future,  to  lift  up  the  veil  of  the  invisible  world,  and  to  ob- 
tain under  calamity  and  disease  that  relief  which  God 
either  did  not  design  to  give  at  all,  or  only  to  give  through 
the  instrumentality  of  human  skill  and  industry. 

This  perpetual  phenomenon  of  miraculous  pretension, 
this  running  accompaniment  of  human  nature,  takes  indeed 
different  forms,  according  to  the  religious  belief,  or  the  pre- 
vailing notions  and  movements  of  different  ages ;  to  which 
it  joins  itself  on,  and  which  supply  it  with  a  handle.  The 
affection  for  the  marvellous  has  been  successively  heathen, 
Christian,  and  philosophical  or  scientific.  Heathenism  had 
its  running  stream  of  supernatural  j)retensions  in  the  shape 
of  prophecy,  exorcism,  and  the  miraculous  cures  of  diseases 
which  the  temples  of  Esculapius  recorded  with  pomjious 
display.  The  Christian  Church  inherited  the  common  fea- 
tures and  characteristic  impulses  of  human  nature,  for 
Christians  were  men,  and  became  a  scene  of  the  same  kind 
of  display : — I  speak  of  the  miracles  of  the  early  and  later 
Church  so  far  as  they  come  under  the  head  of  this  standing 
result  of  human  nature,  without  inqviiring  at  present  which 
of  them  have  evidence  of  a  peculiar  and  distinguishable 
kind.  The  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  was  the  instrument 
of  this  human  affection  under  Christianity  ;  it  joined  itself 
on  to  that  doctrine,  and  used  the  virtues  of  the  saints,  or 
the  fruits  of  man's  participation  through  the  Incarnation  of 
the  Divine  nature,  for  its  own  purpose.  The  same  affec- 
tion in  our  own  day,  abandoning  its  connexion  with  doc- 
trine, and  even  with  religion,  adopts  philosophical  ground, 
and  avails  itself  of  a  scientific  handle ;  and,  the  trace  of  an 
occult  law  of  our  sentient  being  having  been  discovered, 
which  resulted  in  some  extraordinary  bodily  conditions  and 
affections,  has  raised  upon  this  basis  a  wild  superstructure 
of  Supernaturalism,  extending  at  last  to  a  systematic  inter- 
course with  the  invisible  M'orld.     This  strong  human  affec- 


VIII]  False  Miracles  163 

tiou  has  thus  flourished  successively  upon  heathen,  upon 
Christian,  and  upon  scientific  material ;  because  in  truth  it 
is  neither  heathen,  nor  Christian,  nor  scientific,  but  human. 
Springing  out  of  the  common  stock  of  humanity,  which  is 
the  same  in  all  ages,  it  adapts  itself  to  the  belief,  the  specu- 
lations, and  the  knowledge  of  its  own  day.  It  avails  itself 
of  every  opening  which  religious  truth  or  obscure  laws  of 
nature  may  afford,  and  every  fresh  growth  of  supernatural- 
ism  borrows  the  type  of  the  age.  And  thus  is  produced 
that  constant  succession  of  miraculous  pretensions,  which, 
varying  in  shade  and  form,  and  taking  its  colour  from  hea- 
then mythology,  or  Christian  truth,  or  Gothic  or  Celtic 
fancy,  or  scientific  mystery,  is  a  perpetual  and  standing 
phenomenon  of  human  nature  ;  its  evidences  being  of  one 
homogeneous  type  and  one  uniform  level,  which  lies  below 
a  rational  standard  of  proof. 

The  criterion,  therefore,  which  evidential  miracles,  or 
miracles  which  serve  as  evidence  of  a  revelation,  must 
come  up  to,  if  they  are  to  accomplish  the  object  for  which 
they  are  designed,  involves  at  the  very  outset  this  condi- 
tion,— that  the  evidence  of  such  miracles  must  be  distin- 
guishable from  the  evidences  of  this  permanent  stream  of 
miraculous  pretension  in  the  world;  that  such  miracles 
must  be  separated  by  an  interval  not  only  from  the  facts 
of  the  order  of  nature,  but  also  from  the  common  running 
miraculous,  which  is  the  simple  offshoot  of  human  nature. 
Can  evidential  miracles  be  inserted  in  this  promiscuous 
mass,  so  as  not  to  be  confounded  with  it,  but  to  assert 
their  own  truth  and  distinctive  source  ?  If  they  cannot, 
there  is  an  end  to  the  proof  of  a  revelation  by  miracles :  if 
they  can,  it  remains  to  see  whether  the  Christian  miracles 
are  thus  distinguishable,  and  whether  their  nature,  their 
object,  and  their  evidence  Adndicate  their  claim  to  this  dis- 
tinctive truth  and  Divine  source. 

1.  The  first  great  point,  then,  in  the  comparison  of  one 


1 64  False  Miracles  [Lect, 

set  of  miracles  with  the  other,  is  the  nature  and  character  of 
the  facts  themselves.  Supposing  both  sets  of  facts  to  be 
true,  are  we  equally  certain  that  both  of  them  are  miracles  ? 
Now  on  this  head  we  have  to  notice  first  a  spontaneous  ad- 
mission and  confession  on  the  part  of  the  running  miracu- 
lous, viz.,  that  the  believers  in  it  appear,  in  the  case  of  a 
clear  and  undoubted  miracle,  i.e.  a  fact  M'hich  if  it  is  a  true 
occurrence  is  such,  to  see  almost  as  strong  a  distinction  be- 
tween such  a  miracle  and  their  own  supernatiiralism  as 
they  do  between  that  miracle  and  the  order  of  nature. 
When  the  heathens  of  the  patristic  age  were  confronted  by 
the  assertion  of  Christ's  Eesurrection,  they  answered  at 
once  that  it  was  impossible  that  a  dead  man  should  come 
to  life  again,  although  they  had  their  own  current  super- 
naturalism  going  on.  But  this  was  to  admit  a  broad  in- 
terval between  the  latter  and  the  genuine  miraculous. 
Jewish  supernaturalism  was  indeed  going  on  side  by  side 
with  our  Lord's  miracles ;  and  thence  the  inference  has 
been  drawn  that  His  miracles  could  not  in  the  very  nature 
of  the  case  be  evidences  of  His  distinctive  teaching  and 
mission,  inasmuch  as  miracles  were  common  to  Himself 
and  His  opponents.  But  the  same  record  which  refers  to 
Jewish  thaumaturgy,  also  reveals  the  enormous  distinction 
which  those  who  practised  or  believed  that  thaumaturgy 
themselves  made  between  it  and  our  Lord's  miracles.  The 
restoration  of  sight  to  the  man  born  blind  was  obviously 
regarded  as  a  miracle  in  a  sense  quite  distinguished  from 
that  in  which  they  would  have  applied  the  term  to  a  Jew- 
ish exorcism  :  it  excited  much  the  same  resistance  in  their 
minds  as  if  they  had  not  had  their  own  standing  superna- 
turalism as  a  rival  at  all.  And  when  our  Lord's  prophecy 
of  His  own  resurrection  was  reported  to  the  Boman  gover- 
nor, the  statement  was — "  Sir,  this  deceiver  said."  Why 
"  deceiver  ? "  Why  was  this  reported  as  a  pretended 
mu'acle  and  an  imposture,  if  the  real  miracle  would  have 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 6 5 

made  no  difference  to  them,  being  neutralized  and  reduced 
to  the  measure  of  an  ordinary  current  instance  of  superna- 
turalism  by  tlieir  own  thaumaturgy  ?  Why  instead  of  in- 
volving themselves  in  ditiiculties  by  resisting  testimony  to 
the  facts  of  our  Lord's  miracles,  did  the  Jews  not  accept 
the  facts,  and  only  deny  the  argument  from  them  ?  What 
reason  could  there  be  but  one,  viz.  that  they  recognized  a 
true  miraculous  character  in  our  Lord's  miracles  "which  was 
wanting  in  their  own  ?  And  so  when  we  come  to  the  cur- 
rent miracles  of  tlie  esirly  Church,  we  meet  with  the  same 
admission  and  confession  of  the  broad  distinction  between 
them  and  the  Gospel  miracles,  only  not  extracted  unwit- 
tingly from  Christian  writers,  but  volunteered  with  full 
knoAvledge.  The  Fathers,  while  they  refer  to  extraordi- 
nary Divine  agency  going  on  in  their  own  day,  also  with 
one  consent  represent  miracles  as  having  ceased  since  the 
Apostolic  era.  But  what  w^as  this  but  to  confess  that 
though  events  which  pointed  to  the  special  hand  of  God, 
and  so  approximated  to  the  nature  of  the  miraculous,  were 
still  of  frequent  occurrence  in  the  Church  ;  miracles  of  that 
decisive  and  positive  character  that  they  declared  them- 
selves certainly  to  he  miracles  no  longer  took  place,  (i.) 

But  this  spontaneous  admission  on  the  part  of  the  run- 
ning miraculous  having  been  noticed,  we  next  see  that  the 
very  nature  and  type  of  the  facts  themselves  account  for 
and  explain  the  admission.  A  deep  latent  scepticism  ac- 
companies the  current  supernaturalisra  of  mankind,  wdiich 
betrays  itself  in  the  very  quality  and  rank  of  the  reputed 
marvels  themselves, — that  they  never  rise  above  a  low 
level,  and  repeat  again  and  again  the  same  ambiguous 
types.  There  is  a  confinement  to  certain  classes  of  occur- 
rences, which,  even  if  true,  are  very  ambiguous  miracles. 
The  adhesion  to  this  neutral,  doubtful,  and  indecisive  type, 
evinces  a  want  of  belief  at  the  bottom  in  the  existence  of 
a  real  right  in  the  system  to  assert  a  true  dominion  over 


l66  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

nature.  Tlie  system  knows  what  it  can  do,  and  keeps 
within  a  safe  line.  INIiraculous  cures,  vaticinations,  visions, 
exorcisms,  comjjose  the  current  miracles  of  human  history  ; 
but  these  are  just  the  class  which  is  most  susceptible  of 
exaggerating  colour  and  interpretation,  and  most  apt  to 
owe  its  supernatural  character  to  the  imaginations  of  the 
reporters.  Hence  tlie  confession  of  inferiority,  when  this 
running  supernaturalism  was  confronted  by  real  miracles  ; 
the  admission  of  the  distinction  which  existed  between 
itself  and  the  latter.  The  heathen  saw  that  a  resurrection 
from  the  dead  was  a  fact  about  which,  if  it  was  true,  there 
could  be  no  mistake  that  it  was  a  miracle ;  Mdiereas  that 
some  out  of  the  crowds  of  sick  that  were  carried  to  the 
temple  of  Esculapius  afterwards  recovered,  was,  notwith- 
standing the  insertion  of  their  cures  in  the  register  of  the 
temple,  no  proof  of  miraculous  agency  to  any  reasonable 
man.  Exorcism,  which  is  the  contemporary  Jewish  miracle 
referred  to  in  the  Gospels,  is  evidently,  if  it  stands  by  itself 
and  is  not  confirmed  by  other  and  more  decided  marks  of 
Divine  power,  a  miracle  of  a  most  doubtfLd  and  ambiguous 
character.  However  we  may  explain  demoniacal  posses- 
sion, whether  we  stop  at  the  natural  disorder  itself,  or 
carry  it  on  to  a  supernatural  cause,  in  either  case  a  sudden 
strong  impression  made  upon  the  patient's  mind,  such  as 
would  awaken  his  dormant  energy  and  enable  him  to  re- 
collect the  scattered  powers  of  his  reason,  would  tend  to 
cast  off  the  disorder.  The  disease  being  an  obstruction  of 
the  rational  faculties,  whatever  resuscitated  the  faculties 
thoroughly  would  expel  the  disease ;  and  an  agency  whicli 
was  not  miraculous  but  only  moral,  might  be  equal  in  cer- 
tain cases  to  thus  reawakening  the  faculties :  a  moral  power 
miglit  dismiss  the  demon  that  brooded  upon  the  under- 
standing, as  it  does  tlie  demon  that  tempts  to  sin.  Exor- 
cism therefore,  even  the  legitimate  practice,  did  not  neces- 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 6  7 

sarily  involve  miraculous  power ;  and  the  Jewish  practice 
was  replete  with  imposture. 

When  we  come  to  the  miracles  of  the  early  Church  we 
have  to  deal  with  a  body  of  statement  which  demands  our 
respect,  on  account  of  the  piety  and  faith  of  those  from 
whom  we  receive  it ;  but  it  is  still  open  to  us  to  consider 
the  rank  and  pretension  of  these  miracles, — whether  the 
very  type  and  character  of  them  does  not,  upon  the  very 
point  of  the  claim  to  be  miraculous,  radically  distinguish 
them  from  the  Gospel  miracles ;  as  the  very  confession 
of  the  Fathers,  just  noticed,  implies.  The  current  miracles 
of  the  jDatristic  age  are  cures  of  diseases,  visions,  exorcisms  : 
the  higher  sort  of  miracle  being  alluded  to  only  in  isolated 
cases,  and  then  with  such  vagueness  that  it  leaves  a  doubt 
as  to  the  fact  itself  intended.  But  these  are  of  the  ambi- 
guous type  which  has  been  noticed.  Take  one  large  class 
— cures  of  diseases  in  answer  to  prayer.  A  miracle  and  a 
special  providence,  as  I  remarked  in  a  previous  Lecture,^ 
differ  not  in  kind  but  in  degree ;  the  one  being  an  inter- 
ference of  the  Deity  with  natural  causes  at  a  point  removed 
from  our  observation ;  the  other  being  the  same  brought 
directly  home  to  the  senses.  When,  then,  the  Fathers 
speak  of  sudden  recoveries,  in  answer  to  prayers  of  the 
Churcli  or  of  eminent  saints,  as  miracles,  they  appear  to 
mean  by  that  term  special  providences  rather  than  clear 
and  sensible  miracles.  And  remarkable  visions  would 
come  under  the  same  head. 

The  very  type,  then,  of  the  facts  themselves  which  com- 
pose the  current  miracles  of  human  history,  the  rmiform 
low  level  which  they  maintain,  stamps  the  impress  of  un- 
certainty upon  them,  in  striking  contrast  with  the  freedom 
and  range  of  the  Gospel  miracles.  About  the  latter,  sup- 
posing them  to  be  true,  tliere  can  be  no  doubt, — that  they 

^  Page  7. 


1 68  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

are  a  clear  outbreak  of  miraculous  energy,  of  a  mastery  over 
nature ;  but  we  cannot  be  equally  assured  upon  this  point 
in  the  case  of  the  current  miracles  of  the  first  ages  of  the 
Church,  even  supposing  the  truth  of  the  facts. 

It  M'ill  be  urged  perhaps  that  a  large  portion  even  of  the 
Gospel  miracles  are  of  the  class  here  mentioned  as  ambi- 
guous :  cures,  visions,  expulsions  of  evil  spirits :  but  this 
observation  does  not  affect  the  character  of  the  Gospel 
miracles  as  a  body,  because  we  judge  of  the  body  or  whole 
from  its  highest  specimens,  not  from  its  lowest.  The  ques- 
tion is,  what  power  is  it  which  is  at  work  in  this  whole 
field  of  extraordinary  action  ?  what  is  its  nature,  what  is 
its  extent  ?  But  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  this  power 
is  obviously  decided  by  its  greatest  achievements,  not  by 
its  least.  The  greater  miracles  are  not  cancelled  by  the 
lesser  ones ;  more  than  this,  they  interpret  the  lesser  ones. 
It  is  evident  that  this  whole  miraculous  structure  hangs 
together,  and  that  the  same  power  which  produces  the 
highest,  produces  also  the  lowest  type  of  miracle.  The 
lower,  therefore,  I'eceives  an  interpretation  from  its  con- 
nexion with  the  higher  which  it  would  not  receive  by  it- 
self. If  we  admit,  c.cj.  our  Lord's  Eesurrection  and  Ascen- 
sion, what  could  be  gained  by  struggling  in  detail  for  the 
interpretation  of  minor  miracles ;  as  if  these  could  be  judged 
of  apart  from  that  great  one  ? 

The  difference,  again,  in  the  very  form  of  the  wonder- 
working power  in  the  case  of  the  Gospel  miracles,  as  com- 
pared with  later  ones,  makes  a  difference  in  the  character 
of  the  miracles  themselves.  A  standing  miraculous  power 
lodged  in  a  Person,  and  through  Him  in  other  persons  ex- 
pressly admitted  to  the  possession  of  it ;  not  making  trials, 
in  some  of  which  it  succeeds,  in  others  not,  but  always 
accomplishing  a  miracle  upon  the  will  to  do  so, — this, 
which  is  the  Gospel  fact  or  phenomenon  asserted,  is  un- 
doubtedly, if  true,  miraculous.     But  when   the  wonder- 


VIII]  Fa  he  Miracles  1 6  9 

working  power  comes  before  us  as  a  gift  residing  in  the 
whole  Christian  multitude  and  sown  broad-east  over  the 
Church  at  large,  the  miracles  which  issue  out  of  this  popu- 
lar mass  are  only  a  certain  number  of  attempts  which  have 
succeeded  out  of  a  vastly  greater  number  which  have  failed. 
But  such  tentative  miracles  are  defective  in  the  miraculous 
character  from  the  very  nature  of  the  facts ;  because  chance 
accounts  for  a  certain  proportion  of  coincidences  happening 
out  of  a  whole  field  of  events. 

When  the  running  miraculous  is  raised  above  the  low 
level,  which  betrays  its  own  want  of  confidence  in  itself 
and  its  professed  command  over  nature,  it  is  by  a  pecu- 
liarity which  convicts  it  upon  anotlier  count.  There  is  a 
wildness,  a  puerile  extravagance,  a  grotesqueness,  and  ab- 
surdity in  the  type  of  it  such  as  to  disqualify  it  for  being 
a  subject  of  evidence.  The  sense  of  what  is  absurd,  ridi- 
culous, and  therefore  impossible  as  an  act  of  God,  is  part  of 
our  moral  nature  :  and  if  a  miracle  even  seen  with  our  own 
eyes,  cannot  force  us  to  accept  anything  contrary  to  mora- 
lity or  a  fundamental  truth  of  religion,  still  less  can  pro- 
fessed evidence  force  us  to  believe  in  Divine  acts,  which 
are  upon  the  face  of  them  unworthy  of  the  Divine  author- 
ship.^    It  is  true  that  of  this  discrediting  feature  there  is 

^  We  observe  indeed  in  the  region  of  God's  animate  creation,  various 
animal  natures  produced  of  a  grotesque  and  wild  type  ;  but  to  argue  from 
this  that  we  are  to  expect  the  same  type  in  bodies  and  classes  of  miracles, 
is  to  apply  the  argument  of  analogy  without  possessing  that  condition 
which  is  necessary  for  it — a  parallel  case  (see  p.  37).  We  can  argue  from 
one  Divine  act  to  the  probability  or  not  improbability  of  another  like  it, 
provided  the  cases  with  which  the  two  are  concerned  are  parallel  cases  ; 
but  the  creation  of  an  animal  is  no  parallel  case  to  the  Divine  act  in  a 
miracle  ;  nor  therefore  can  wildness,  enormity,  and  absurdity  in  a  miracle 
plead  the  precedent  of  the  singuhar  types  which  occur  in  the  animal  king- 
dom. The  latter  has  been  diversified  for  reasons  and  for  ends  included 
within  the  design  of  creation  :  but  a  miracle  is  not  an  act  done  by  God  as 
Creator :  it  is  a  communication  to  man,  it  is  addressed  to  him,  and  there- 
fore it  must  be  suited  to  him  to  whom  it  is  addressed,  and  be  consistent 
with  that  character  which  our  moral  sense  and  revelation  attribute  to  the 


1 70  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

no  definite  standard  or  criterion,  and  that  when  we  refuse 
to  believe  in  a  miracle  on  account  of  the  absurdity  and 
puerility  in  the  type  of  it,  we  do  so  upon  the  responsibility 
of  our  own  sense  and  perceptions;  but  many  important 
questions  are  determined  in  no  other  way  than  this ;  in- 
xleed  all  morality  is  ultimately  determined  by  an  inward 
sense. 

A  fact,  however,  is  not  in  itself  ridiculous,  liecause  a 
ridiculous  aspect  can  be  put  upon  it.  The  dumb  brute 
speaking  witli  man's  voice  to  forbid  the  madness  of  the  pro- 
phet, the  dismissal  of  a  legion  of  foul  spirits  out  of  their 
usurped  abode  in  man  into  a  herd  of  swine, — whatever  be 
the  peculiarity  in  these  two  miracles  which  distinguishes 
them  from  the  usual  scriptural  model,  it  is  no  mean,  trivial, 
or  vulgar  character.  Did  we  meet  with  these  two  simply 
as  poetical  facts  or  images  in  the  great  religious  poem  of 
the  middle  ages,  they  would  strike  us  as  full  of  force  and 
solemnity,  and  akin  to  a  graud  eccentric  type  which  occurs 
not  rarely  in  portions  of  that  majestic  work,  and  serves  as  a 
powerful  and  deep  instrument  of  expression  in  the  hands 
of  the  poet.  Looking  then  simply  to  their  type,  these 
miracles  stand  their  ground.  While  it  must  also  be  ol)- 
served  that  in  the  case  of  miracles  of  an  eccentric  type,  the 
quantity  of  them  and  the  proportion  which  they  bear  to 
the  rest  is  an  important  consideration.  The  same  type 
which  in  unlimited  profusion  and  exuberance  marks  a 
source  in  human  fancy  and  delusion  is  not  extravagant  as 
a  rare  and  exceptional  feature  of  a  dispensation  of  miracles 
just  emerging  and  then  disappearing  again,  as  a  fragmentary 
deviation  from  a  usual  limit  and  pattern,  to  which  it  is  in 
complete  subordination.  One  or  two  miracles  of  a  certain 
form  in  Scripture  have  indeed  been  taken  full  advantage  of. 

Divine  Being.  Upon  this  ground  a  solemn,  a  high  stamp  must  always 
recommend  a  miracle,  while  a  ridiculous  type  is  inconsistent  with  the  in- 
trinsic dignity  of  a  Divine  interposition. 


V 1 1 1  ]  False  Miracles  1 7 1 

as  if  they  supplied  an  ample  justification  of  any  number 
and  quantity  of  the  most  extravagant  later  miracles  ;  but, 
supposing  in  our  estimate  we  even  reduced  the  eccentricity 
of  the  latter  to  this  exceptional  Scripture  type,  quantity 
and  degree  make  all  the  difference  between  what  is  im- 
pressive and  what  is  puerile,  what  is  weighty  and  what  is 
absurd.  The  miraculous  providence  of  Scripture,  it  must 
be  remembered,  covers  the  whole  period  from  the  creation 
of  the  world  to  the  Christian  era.  The  very  rare  occurrence 
of  a  type  in  a  long  reach  of  Providential  operations,  is  no 
precedent  for  it  as  the  prevailing  feature  of  whole  bodies 
and  classes  of  miracles.  The  temper  of  the  course  and 
system  of  supernatural  action  is  shewn  by  the  proportion 
preserved  in  it,  and  by  the  check  and  limit  under  which 
such  a  type  appears. 

2.  In  comparing  two  different  bodies  of  miracles  their 
respective  objects  and  results  necessarily  come  into  con- 
sideration. I  have,  however,  in  a  previous  Lecture  con- 
sidered the  great  moral  result  of  the  Gospel  miracles, 
exhibited  in  that  new  era  of  the  world  and  condition  of 
human  society  which  they  were  the  means  of  founding. 
Any  comparison  of  this  great  result  with  the  objects  of 
current  supernaturalism  can  only  reveal  the  immense  in- 
feriority of  the  latter; — even  when  these  objects  are  not 
volatile,  morbid,  or  mean.  But  in  how  large  a  proportion 
do  motives  of  the  latter  kind  prevail !  Motives  of  mere 
curiosity  and  idle  amusement !  Motives  even  worse  than 
these — impatience  and  rebellion  against  the  boundaries 
which  separate  the  visible  and  invisible  worlds  !  What  is 
the  chief  avowed  object,  e.g.  of  the  supernaturalism  of  this 
day  ?  To  open  a  regular  systematic  intercourse  between 
the  living  and  the  dead  !  But  how  does  such  a  fantastic 
and  extravagant  object,  as  that  of  breaking  down  the  barriers 
of  our  present  state  of  existence,  at  once  convict  and  con- 
demn such  pretensions  themselves  as  fallacious  !     As  much 


172  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

so  as,  on  the  other  hand,  their  grand  and  serious  moral 
result  recommends  and  is  an  argument  for  the  Gospel 
miracles. 

3.  When  from  the  type  and  character  of  the  professed 
miracles  of  subsequent  ages,  and  their  dejects,  as  compared 
with  the  miracles  of  Scripture,  we  turn  to  the  evidence  on 
whicli  they  respectively  rest,  we  meet  with  various  dis- 
tinctions which  liave  been  very  ably  brought  out  and  com- 
mented on  by  writers  on  evidence.  And  in  the  first  place, 
a  very  large  proportion  of  the  miracles  of  subsequent  ages 
stop  short  of  the  very  first  introduction  to  valid  evidence, 
that  preliminary  condition  which  is  necessary  to  qualify 
them  even  to  be  examined ; — viz.  contemporary  testimony. 
That  certain  great  and  cardinal  Gospel  miracles — which  if 
granted  clear  away  all  antecedent  objection  to  the  reception 
of  the  rest — possess  contemporary  testimony,  must  be 
admitted  by  everybody,  at  the  peril  of  invalidating  all 
historical  evidence,  and  involving  our  whole  knowledge  of 
the  events  of  the  past  in  doubt.  That  the  first  promulgators 
of  Christianity  asserted  as  a  fact  which  had  come  under  the 
cognizance  of  their  senses  the  Eesurrection  of  our  Lord  from 
the  dead,  is  as  certain  as  anything  in  history.  But  the 
great  mass  of  later  miracles  do  not  fulfil  even  this  preliminary 
condition,  or  reach  even  this  previous  stage  of  evidence. 

But,  the  level  of  contemporary  testimony  gained,  the 
character  of  the  witnesses,  and  the  extent  to  whicli  their 
veracity  is  tested  by  pain  and  suffering,  make  an  immense 
difference  in  the  value  of  that  testimony. 

1.  In  estimating  the  strength  of  a  witness  we  must  begin 
by  putting  aside  as  irrelevant  all  those  features  of  his  char- 
acter, however  admirable,  striking,  and  impressive,  which 
do  not  bear  upon  the  particular  question  whether  his  report 
of  a  fact  is  likely  to  be  correct.  We  have  only  to  do  with 
character  in  one  point  of  view,  viz.  as  a  guarantee  to  the 
truth  of  testimony;  but  a  reference  to  this  simple  object  at 


V 1 1 1 J  False  Miracles  173 

once  puts  on  one  side  various  traits  and  qualities  in  men 
which  m  themselves  are  of  great  interest,  and  excite  our  ad- 
miration. We  value  an  ardent  zeal  in  itself,  but  not  as  a 
security  for  this  further  object,  because  men  under  the 

influence  of  enthusiasm  are  apt  to  misstate  and  exaggerate 
facts  which  favour  their  own  side.  So,  again,  an  aflectionate 
disposition  is  beautiful  and  admirable  in  itself,  but  it  does 
not  add  weight  to  testimony ;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of 
other  high  and  noble  moralgifts  and  dispositions — generosity, 
courage,  enterprising  spirit,  perseverance,  loyalty  to  a  cause 
and  to  persons.  Even  faith,  only  regarded  as  one  specific 
gift  and  power,  in  which  light  it  is  sometimes  spoken  of  in 
Scripture,  the  power,  viz.  of  vividly  embracing  and  realizing 
the  idea  of  an  unseen  world,  does  not  add  to  the  strength 
of  a  witness,  though  in  itself,  even  as  thus  limited,  a  high 
and  excellent  gift.  And  thus  might  be  constructed  a  char- 
acter which  would  be  a  striking  and  interesting  form  of  the 
religious  mind,  would  lead  the  way  in  high  undertakings, 
would  command  the  obedience  of  devoted  followers,  and 
would  be  in  itself  an  object  of  singidar  admiration ;  but 
which  would  not  be  valuable  as  adding  solid  weight  to 
testimony.  Perfect  goodness  is  undoubtedly  goodness  in 
all  capacities  and  functions,  and  stands  the  test  of  relation 
to  all  jDurposes ;  but,  taking  human  nature  as  we  find  it,  a 
good  man  and  a  good  witness  are  not  quite  identical.  For 
all  this  assemblage  of  high  qualities  may  exist,  and  that 
particular  characteristic  may  be  absent  upon  which  we  de- 
pend when  we  rely  upon  testimony  in  extreme  and  crucial 
cases. 

That  characteristic  is  a  strong  perception  of  and  regard 
to  the  claims  of  truth.  Truth  is  a  yoke.  If  we  would  wish 
facts  to  be  so  and  so,  and  they  are  not,  that  is  a  trial ;  there 
is  a  disposition  to  rebel  against  this  trial ;  and  this  disposi- 
tion has  always  a  ready  instrument  in  the  faculty  of  speech, 
to  whose  peculiar  nature  it  belongs  to  state  facts  either  as 


1 74  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

they  are  or  as  they  are  not,  with  equal  facility.  To  suhiuit 
theu  to  the  yoke  of  truth  under  the  temptation  of  this 
singularly  simple  and  ready  agency  for  rejecting  it,  requires 
a  stern  and  rigorous  fidelity  to  fact  in  the  mind,  as  part  of 
our  obedience  to  God.  But  where  there  are  many  excellent 
affections  and  powers, sometimes  this  solid  and  fixed  estimate 
of  truth  is  wanting;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are 
characters  not  deficient  in  these  affections  and  powers,  into 
whose  composition  it  deeply  enters,  and  whose  general 
moral  conformation  is  a  kind  of  guarantee  that  they 
possess  it. 

Such  a  character  is  that  which  lives  in  the  pages  of  the 
New  Testament  as  the  Apostolic  character.  If  we  com- 
pare that  model  with  the  model  set  up  in  later  times,  the 
popular  pattern  of  Christian  perfection  which  ruled  in 
the  middle  ages,  we  find  a  great  difierence.  There  is 
undoubtedly  deep  enthusiasm,  if  we  may  call  it  so,  in  the 
character  of  the  Apostles,  an  absorption  in  one  great  cause, 
a  depth  of  wonder  and  emotion,  high  impulse,  ardent  long- 
ing and  expectation ;  and  yet  with  all  this  what  striking 
balance  and  moderation,  which  they  are  able  too — a  very 
strong  test  of  their  type — to  maintain  amid  circumstances 
just  the  most  calculated  to  upset  these  virtues !  At  war 
with  the  whole  world,  lifted  up  above  it,  and  trampling  its 
affections  beneath  their  feet ;  living  upon  heavenly  hopes, 
and  caring  for  one  thing  alone,  the  spread  of  the  Gospel, — 
theirs  was  indeed  a  grand  and  elevating  situation ;  but  at 
the  same  time  it  was  just  one  adapted  to  throw  them  off 
their  balance,  and  narrow  their  standard.  Mere  enthusi- 
astic men  would  have  been  carried  away  by  their  an- 
tagonism to  the  whole  existing  state  of  society  to  set  up 
some  visionary  model  of  a  Christian  life,  wholly  separated 
from  all  connexion  with  the  cares  and  business  of  earth. 
But  although  the  Apostles  certainly  gave  scope  to  ■  and 
assort  the  duty  of  an  extraordinary  and  isolated  course  of 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 7  5 

life,  under  certain  circumstances  and  with  reference  to 
particular  ends,  their  standard  is  wholly  free  from  contrac- 
tion ;  their  view  of  life  and  its  duties  is  as  sensible  and 
as  judicious  as  the  wisest  and  most  prudent  man's ;  nor  do 
they  say — '  You  may  be  an  inferior  Christian  if  you  live 
in  the  world,  but  if  you  want  to  be  a  higher  Christian  you 
must  quit  it;'  but  they  recognize  the  highest  Christian 
perfection  as  consistent  with  the  most  common  and  ordin- 
ary form  of  life.  Their  great  lessons  are,  that  goodness 
lies  in  the  heart,  and  that  the  greatest  sacrifices  which  a 
man  makes  in  life  are  his  internal  conquests  over  vain 
desires,  aspirations,  and  dreams  of  this  world;  which 
deepest  mortifications  consist  with  the  most  common  out- 
ward circumstances.  This  plain,  solid,  unpretending  view 
of  human  life  in  conjunction  with  the  j^ursuit  of  an  ideal, 
the  aim  at  perfection,  is  indeed  most  remarkable, — if  it  was 
not  a  new  combination  in  the  world.  What  I  would  observe^ 
however,  now  is  that  such  men  are  weighty  witnesses  ; 
that  their  testimony  has  the  force  of  statements  of  fact 
from  men  of  grave  and  solid  temperament,  who  could  stand 
firm,  and  maintain  a  moderate  and  adjusted  ground  against 
the  strong  tendencies  to  extravagance  inherent  in  their 
whole  situation  and  aim. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  I  come  to  a  later  type  of  char- 
acter which  rose  up  in  the  Christian  Church,  I  see  in  it 
much  which  is  splendid  and  striking — high  aim  and  enter- 
prise, courageous  self-denial,  aspiring  faith,  but  not  the 
same  guarantee  to  the  truth  of  testimony.  Ambition  or 
exaggeration  in  character  is  in  its  own  nature  a  divergence 
from  strict  moral  truth ;  which,  though  it  is  more  effective 
in  challenging  the  eye,  and  strikes  more  instantaneously  as 
an  image,  detracts  from  the  authority  of  the  character,  and 
the  dependence  we  place  upon  it  for  the  purpose  now 
mentioned. 

The  remark  may  be  made,  again,  that  the  original  pro- 


1 76  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

limitation  of  Christianity  was  one  of  those  great  under- 
takings which  react  upon  the  minds  of  those  engaged  in  it, 
and  tend  to  raise  them  above  insincerity  and  delusion. 
The  cause  itself  was,  so  far  as  any  cause  can  be,  a  guaran- 
tee for  the  truthfulness  of  its  champions ;  its  aim  was  to 
renovate  the  liuman  race  sunk  in  corruption ;  it  proclaimed 
a  revelation  indeed  from  heaven,  but  that  revelation  was 
still  in  connexion  with  the  most  practical  of  all  aims.  But 
this  cannot  be  said  of  most  of  the  later  causes  in  behalf  of 
which  the  professed  evidence  of  miracles  was  enlisted  : 
spurious  and  corrupt  developments  of  Christian  doctrine 
do  not  give  the  same  security  for  the  truthfulness  of  their 
propagators.  The  quality  of  the  cause,  the  nature  of  the 
object,  is  not  in  fact  wholly  separable  from  the  character  of 
the  witness ;  and  one  of  these  heads  runs  into  the  other. 
But  this  consideration  of  itself  goes  far  to  dispose  of  whole 
bodies  of  later  miracles ;  for  if  we  liold  certain  later  doc- 
trines, the  deification  of  the  Virgin  Mother,  Transubstantia- 
tion,  and  others,  to  be  corruptions  of  Christianity,  we  are 
justified  in  depreciating  the  testimony  of  the  teachers  and 
spreaders  of  these  doctrines  to  the  alleged  miracles  in  sup- 
port of  them.  The  nature  of  the  cause  affects  our  estimate 
of  the  propagators.  Indeed,  let  the  human  intellect  once 
begin  to  busy  itself  not  only  about  false  deductions  from 
Christian  doctrine,  but  even  about  doubtful  ones,  nay  even 
about  true  but  minute  and  remote  ones,  and  the  spirit  and 
temper  of  the  first  promulgators  of  Christianity  is  soon 
exchanged  for  another.  Propagandism  has  not  a  reputa- 
tion for  truthfulness.  As  doctrine  diverges  from  the 
largeness  of  the  Scripture  type  into  narrow  points,  the 
active  dissemination  of  it  interests,  excites,  and  elates  as  a 
speculative  triumph. 

Wlien  from  the  character  of  the  witnesses  to  the  Gospel 
miracles  we  turn  to  tlie  ordeal  wliich  they  underwent,  we 
find   another   remarkable    peculiarity   attaching   to   tlieir 


Y 1 1 1  ]  Fa  Ise  Miracles  I'j'j 

testimony,  viz.  that  it  was  tested  in  a  manner  and  to  an 
extent  which  is  without  parallel:  because,  in  truth,  the 
whole  life  of  sacrifice  and  suffering  which  the  Apostles  led 
was  from  beginning  to  end  the  consequence  of  their  belief 
in  certain  miraculous  facts  which  they  asserted  themselves 
to  have  witnessed  ;  upon  which  facts  their  whole  preaching 
and  testimony  was  based,  and  without  which  they  would 
have  had  no  Gospel  to  preach.  In  all  ages,  indeed,  dif- 
ferent sects  have  been  persecuted  for  their  opinions,  and 
given  the  testimony  of  their  suffering  to  the  sincerity  of 
those  opinions ;  but  here  are  whole  lives  and  long  lives  of 
suffering  in  testimony  to  the  truth  of  particular  facts ;  the 
Eesurrection  and  Ascension  being  the  warrant  to  which 
the  Apostles  appeal  for  the  authority  and  proof  of  their 
whole  ministry  and  doctrine. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  mere  current  assertions  of 
supernatural  effects  produced,  which  prevail  in  all  days, 
and  in  our  own  not  least,  but  which  are  made  irresponsibly 
by  any  persons  who  choose  to  make  them,  without  any 
penalty  or  risk  to  the  assertors  to  act  as  a  test  of  their 
truthfulness,  have  hardly,  in  strict  right,  a  claim  even 
upon  our  grave  consideration ;  because  in  truth  upon  such 
subjects  untested  evidence  is  worthless  evidence.  We  can 
conceive  a  certain  height  of  character  which  would  of 
itself  command  the  assent  of  individuals,  but  the  world  at 
large  cannot  reasonably  be  satisfied  without  some  ordeal  of 
the  witnesses.  We  apply  an  ordeal  to  testimony  even  to 
ordinary  facts,  when  the  life  or  liberty  of  another  depends 
upon  it,  and  in  this  case  cross-examination  in  a  court  is 
the  form  of  ordeal ;  but  pain  and  sacrifice  on  the  part  of 
the  witnesses  is  also  intrinsically  an  ordeal  and  probation 
of  testimony;  which  condition  current  supernaturalism 
does  not  fulfil,  but  which  the  Gospel  miracles  do.  The 
testimony  to  the  latter  is  tested  evidence  of  a  very  strong 
kind ;  because  the  trials  which  the  Apostles  endured  were 

M 


1 78  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

both  lasting,  and  also  owing  directly  to  their  belief  in 
certain  facts,  to  which  they  bore  witness ;  thus  going 
straight  to  the  point  as  guarantees  for  the  truth  of  that 
attestation.  But  it  would  be  difficult  to  discover  any  set 
of  later  miracles  which  stand  upon  evidence  thus  tested  ; 
which  can  appeal  to  lives  of  trial  and  suffering  undergone 
by  the  witnesses  as  the  direct  result  of  their  belief  in  and 
witness  to  such  miracles.     (2.) 

One  consideration,  however,  of  some  force  remains  to  be 
added.  It  is  confessed  that  the  medieval  record  contains 
a  vast  mass  of  false  and  spurious  miracles, — so  vast  indeed 
that  those  who  wish  to  claim  credence  for  some  particular 
ones,  or  who,  without  mentioning  particular  ones,  argue 
that  soriie  or  other  out  of  the  whole  body  may  have  been 
true,  still  virtually  abandon  the  great  body  as  indefensible. 
The  mediaeval  record  therefore  comes  before  us  at  the  very 
outset  as  a  maimed  and  discredited  authority — discredited 
because  it  has  adopted  and  thrown  its  shield  over  an 
immense  quantity  of  material  admitted  to  be  untrue  and 
counterfeit,  and  so  identified  itself  with  falsehood.  So  far 
as  any  informant  takes  up  and  commits  himself  to  false 
intelligence,  so  far  he  destroys  his  own  credit.  An 
immense  mass  of  admitted  spurious  miracles  therefore 
adoj)ted  by  the  mediaeval  record  throws  doubt  upon  all  the 
accounts  of  such  facts  transmitted  to  us  through  the  same 
channel ;  because  to  that  extent  it  affects  the  general 
character  of  the  record  as  an  informant,  and  invalidates  its 
authority.  The  Scripture  record,  on  the  other  hand,  does 
not  at  any  rate  come  before  us  with  this  admitted  blot 
upon  its  credit  in  the  first  instance.  The  information  it 
contains  has  doubtless  to  be  examined  with  reference  to 
the  evidence  upon  wliich  it  rests;  that  is  to  say,  the 
authority  of  the  record  has  to  be  investigated ;  but  it  does 
not  present  itself  with  any  admitted  discrediting  stain  in 
the  first  instance;   whereas  such  an  admitted  stain  does 


VI 11]  False  Miracles  179 

in  limine,  attach  to  the  mediaeval  record.  But  this  con- 
sideration receives  additional  force  when  we  take  into 
account  two  great  causes  of  miraculous  pretensions  which 
were  deeply  rooted  in  the  character  of  the  middle  ages, 
but  fi'om  which  Christianity  at  its  original  promulgation 
was  free. 

1.  It  is  but  too  plain  that  in  later  ages,  as  the  Church 
advanced  in  worldly  power  and  position,  besides  the  mis- 
takes of  imagination  and  impression,  a  temper  of  deliberate 
and  audacious  fraud  rose  up  within  the  Christian  body,  and 
set  itself  in  action  for  the  spread  of  certain  doctrines,  as 
well  as  for  the  great  object  of  the  concentration  of  Church 
power  in  one  absolute  monarchy.  Christianity  started  with 
the  sad  and  ominous  prophecy  that  out  of  the  very  bosom 
of  the  religion  of  humility  should  arise  the  greatest  form  of 
pride  that  the  world  should  ever  know — one,  "  as  God 
sitting  in  the  temple  of  God,  shewing  himself  that  he  is 
God;"i  the  complete  fulfilment  of  which,  if  yet  in  store, 
has  certainly  not  been  without  its  broad  foreshadowings ; 
for  indeed  Christian  pride  has  transcended  heathen  by  how 
much  Christianity  is  a  more  powerful  stimulus  to  man 
than  heathenism ;  giving  a  depth  to  his  whole  nature,  which 
imparts  itself  even  to  his  passions,  to  his  ambition  and  love 
of  dominion,  and  to  his  propagation  of  opinion.  But  this 
formidable  spirit  once  arisen  in  the  Church,  falsehood,  which 
is  the  tool  of  the  strong  even  more  than  of  the  weak,  is  its 
natural  instrument.  Hence  tlie  bold  forgeries  of  the  middle 
ages,  which  were  the  acts  of  a  proud  will,  determined  that 
nothing  should  stand  in  the  way  between  it  and  certain 
objects,  and  that  if  facts  did  not  exist  on  its  side,  they 
should  be  made.  And  hence  also  counterfeit  miracles. 
But  mere  historical  criticism  must  admit  that  this  spirit  of 
daring,  determined,  and  presumptuous  fraud,  which  com- 
piled false  authorities,  and  constructed  false  marvels  simply 

^  2  Tliess.  ii.  4. 


1 80  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

because  they  were  wanted,  was  the  manifestation  of  a  later 
age ;  and  that  the  temper  of  the  first  promulgators  of  the 
Gospel  was  wholly  free  from  such  a  stain.     (3.) 

2.  Another  great  cause  of  miraculous  pretensions  in  later 
ages  was  the  adoption  of  miracles  as  the  criterion  and  test 
of  high  goodness;  as  if  extraordinary  sanctity  naturally 
issued  in  a  kind  of  dominion  over  nature.  This  popular 
idea  dictated  that  rule  of  canonization  which  required  that, 
before  a  saint  was  inserted  in  the  Calendar,  proof  should  be 
given  of  miracles  either  performed  by  him  in  his  lifetime 
or  produced  by  the  virtue  of  his  remains.  Such  a  criterion 
of  sanctity  is  intrinsically  irrelevant ;  for  in  forming  a 
judgment  of  a  man's  character,  motives,  and  dispositions, 
the  extent  of  his  charity  and  self-denial  and  the  like,  what 
can  be  more  beside  the  question  than  to  inquire  whether  or 
not  these  moral  manifestations  of  him  were  accompanied 
by  suspensions  of  the  laws  of  nature.  The  natural  test  of 
character  is  conduct ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  moral 
goodness  is  its  own  proof  and  evidence.  The  man  is  before 
us ;  he  reveals  himself  to  us  not  only  by  his  formal  outward 
acts,  but  by  that  whole  manifold  expression  of  himself, 
conscious  and  unconscious,  in  act,  word  and  look,  which  is 
synonymous  with  life.  The  very  highest  form  of  goodness 
is  thus  a  disclosure  to  us  which  attests  itself,  and  to  which 
miracles  are  wholly  extrinsic.  But  what  I  remark  now  is 
that  the  adoption  of  such  a  test  as  this  must  in  the  nature 
of  the  case  produce  a  very  large  crop  of  false  miracles. 
The  criterion  having  been  adopted  must  be  fulfilled ; 
providence  does  not  fulfil  it  because  providence  is  not 
responsible  for  it,  and  therefore  man  must ;  he  who  instituted 
the  test  must  look  to  its  verification.  But  this  whole 
notion  of  miracles  as  a  test  of  sanctity  was  a  complete 
innovation  upon  the  Scripture  idea.  The  Bible  never  re- 
presents miracles  as  a  tribute  to  character,  but  as  following 
a  principle  of  use,  as  means  to  certain  ends.     One  saint 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 8 1 

possesses  the  gift  because  it  is  wanted  for  an  object;  as 
great  a  saint  does  not  because  it  is  not  wanted.  The  fruits 
of  the  Spirit  always  figure  as  their  own  witnesses  in  Scrip- 
ture, superior  to  all  extraordinary  gifts,  and  not  requiring 
their  attestation.  The  Christian  is  described  as  gifted  with 
discernment.  There  needs  no  miracle  to  tell  Mm  who  is  a 
good  man  and  who  is  not;  he  knows  him  by  sure  signs, 
knows  him  from  the  hypocrite  and  pretender ;  "  he  that  is 
spiritual  judgeth  all  things,"  is  a  scrutinizer  of  hearts,  and 
is  not  deceived  by  appearances.     (4.) 

Between  the  evidence,  then,  upon  which  the  Gospel 
miracles  stand  and  that  for  later  miracles  we  see  a  broad 
distinction,  arising — not  to  mention  again  the  nature  and 
type  of  the  Gospel  miracles  themselves — from  the  contem- 
poraneous date  of  the  testimony  to  them,  the  character  of 
the  witnesses,  the  probation  of  the  testimony ;  especially 
when  we  contrast  with  these  points  the  false  doctrine  and 
audacious  fraud  wliich  rose  up  in  later  ages,  and  in  con- 
nexion with  which  so  large  a  portion  of  the  later  miracles 
of  Christianity  made  their  aj)pearance-  But  now  to  carry 
the  argument  into  another  stage,  "What  if — to  make  the 
supposition — it  was  discovered,  when  we  came  to  a  close 
examination  of  particulars,  that  for  several  of  the  later 
miracles  of  Christianity  there  was  evidence  forthcoming 
approximating  in  strength  to  the  evidence  for  the  Gospel 
miracles — what  would  be  the  result  ?  Would  any  dis- 
advantage ensue  to  the  Gospel  miracles,  any  doubtfulness 
accrue  to  their  position  as  a  consequence  of  this  discovery, 
and  additional  to  any  previous  intrinsic  ground  of  difficulty  ? 
None :  all  the  result  would  be  that  we  should  admit  these 
miracles  over  and  above  the  Gospel  ones  :  but  the  position 
of  the  latter  would  not  be  at  all  affected  by  this  conclusion : 
they  would  remain,  and  their  evidence  would  remain,  just 
what  they  were  before.  We  reject  the  mass  of  later 
miracles  because  they  want  evidence  ;  not  because  our  argu- 


1 82  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

ment  obliges  us  to  reject  all  later  miracles  whether  they 
have  evidence  or  not.  The  acceptance  of  the  Gospel 
miracles  does  not  commit  us  to  the  denial  of  all  other ;  nor 
therefore  would  the  discovery  of  strong  evidence  for  some 
other  miracles  at  all  imperil  the  ground  and  the  use  of  the 
Gospel  ones.  Many  of  our  own  divines  have  admitted  the 
truth  of  later  miracles,  only  raising  the  question  of  the  date 
up  to  which  the  continuance  of  miraculous  po^\'ers  in  the 
Church  lasted,  some  fixing  this  earlier,  and  some  later.  But 
were  our  divines  therefore  precluded  from  using  the  Gospel 
miracles  as  evidences  of  Christianity  ?  Do  our  brethren 
even  of  the  Eoman  communion,  because  they  accept  a 
much  larger  number  of  later  miracles  than  our  divines 
do,  thereby  cut  themselves  off  from  the  appeal  to  the 
miraculous  evidences  of  Christianity  ?  Pascal  accepted  a 
miracle  of  his  own  day,  of  which  he  wrote  a  defence  ;  and 
yet  he  prepared  the  foundation  of  a  treatise  on  the  Evidences 
of  Christianity,  and  the  evidences  of  miracles  with  the  rest : 
nor  was  he  guilty  of  any  error  of  logic  in  so  doing.  It  is 
true  our  divines  may  have  been  under  a  mistake  in  accept- 
ing some  miracles  which  they  did ;  and  certainly  our 
Koman  Catholic  brethren  are  in  our  judgment  very  much 
mistaken  in  a  great  number  of  miracles  which  they  accept : 
but  that  was  only  a  mistake  as  to  the  particular  later 
miracles  accepted  ;  they  were  neither  of  them  mistaken  in 
the  general  notion,  which  was  plainly  reasonable,  that  they 
could  accept  both  later  miracles  and  Gospel  miracles  too.  (5.) 
The  application  of  the  fact  of  the  crowd  of  later  and 
medieval  miracles  to  neutralize  the  evidences  of  the  Gos- 
pel mii^cles  proceeds  upon  the  assumption  that  the  crowd 
of  later  miracles  does  in  reality  rest  upon  as  strong  evi- 
dence as  the  Gospel  ones :  and  this  assumption  has  been 
met  in  the  body  of  this  Lecture  by  distinguishing  between 
their  respective  evidences.  But  if  we  leave  the  crowd  and 
single   out  'particular  later  miracles,  then  there    is    no 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 8  3 

obligation  upon  us  to  distinguish  at  all  between  the  evi- 
dences of  the  two.  Such  later  miracles  may  be  admitted  to 
have  evidence  of  a  substantial  character  and  approximating 
to  the  evidences  of  the  Gospel  miracles,  without  at  all  im- 
perilling the  credit  of  the  latter ;  because  one  set  of 
miracles  is  not  false  because  others  are  true.  We  assert 
indeed  that  no  later  miracles  have  equal  evidence  to  that 
of  the  great  miracles  of  the  Gospel :  but  could  even  an 
equal  amount  of  evidence  in  some  cases  be  shewn,  no  con- 
sequence would  ensue  unfavourable  to  the  latter.  We 
should  simply  have  to  accept  the  later  over  and  above  the 
earlier.  The  assumption  wliich  appears  to  exist  in  some 
quarters  that  we  are  obliged  to  disown  and  reject  all  later 
miracles,  as  being  a  degrading  connexion  for  and  a  source 
of  discredit  to  the  Gospel  miracles,  is  wholly  without 
authority.  Such  an  assumption  would  indeed  endanger  the 
position  of  the  Scripture  miracles ;  because  in  proportion  as 
the  evidence  for  later  miracles  assumed  weight  and  sub- 
stance and  approximated  to  the  evidence  of  the  Gospel 
miracles,  and  was  notwithstanding  rejected ;  in  that  pro- 
portion we  should  be  in  danger  of  having  in  consistency  to 
reject  the  Gospel  miracles  too.  But  there  is  no  ground  for 
such  an  assumption. 

One  conclusion,  however,  there  is  which  is  a  tempting 
one  to  deduce  from  the  multitude  of  spurious  miracles,  viz. 
the  impossibility  of  distinguishing  the  true  ones.  '  We 
cannot,'  it  may  be  said,  '  go  into  particulars  or  draw  minute 
distinctions.  Here  is  a  vast  crowd  of  miraculous  preten- 
sions, the  product  of  every  age  of  Christianity,  including 
that  of  its  very  birth.  Of  this  an  overwhelming  proportion 
is  confessed  to  be  false.  But  how  can  we  distinguish  be- 
tween what  is  false  and  what  is  true  of  this  promiscuous 
mass  ?  Miraculous  evidence  in  such  a  condition  defeats 
itself  and  is  unavailable  for  use ;  and  practically  we  must 
treat  Christianity  as  if  it  stood  without  it.' 


184  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

Nothing  then  can  be  more  certain  than  that,  granted 
true  miracles,  so  long  as  man  is  man,  these  true  miracles 
must  encounter  the  rivalry  of  a  growth  of  false  ones,  and 
the  evidential  disadvantage,  whatever  it  be,  thence  ensuing. 
And  therefore  this  position  amounts  to  saying  that  per- 
manent miraculous  evidence  to  any  religion  is  an  impossible 
contrivance. 

But  such  a  wholesale  inference  as  this  from  the  existence 
of  spurious  miracles  is  contrary  to  all  principles  of  evidence, 
and  to  the  whole  method  in  practice  among  mankind  for 
ascertaining  the  truth  of  facts.  Do  we  want  to  dispose  of 
all  cases  of  recorded  miracles  by  some  summary  rule  which 
decides  them  all  in  a  heap,  the  rule  that  a  sample  is  enough, 
that  on3  case  settles  the  rest,  and  that  the  evidence  of  one 
is  the  evidence  of  all  ?  We  have  no  such  rule  for  ordinary 
questions  of  moral  evidence  relating  to  human  actions  and 
events.  If  any  one  principle  is  clear  in  this  department, 
it  is  that  every  case  which  comes  under  review  is  a  special 
case.  In  civil  justice,  e.g.  every  case  is  determined  upon 
its  own  merits,  and  according  to  our  estimate  of  the  quality 
of  the  testimony,  the  situation  of  the  parties,  and  the  con- 
nexion and  coincidence  of  the  facts  in  that  particular  case. 
Xo  two  sets  of  witnesses,  no  tM^o  sets  of  circumstances  are 
exactly  alike.  Inasmuch,  then,  as  these  constitute  in  every 
case  the  grounds  of  decision,  every  case  of  evidence  in  our 
courts  is  a  special  case.  Two  successive  causes  or  trials 
might  be  pronounced  upon  a  inima  facie  view  to  be  exactly 
alike  as  cases  of  evidence ;  they  look  the  same  precise 
mixtures  of  evidence  and  counter  evidence,  probabilities 
and  counter  probabilities ;  and  a  person  would  be  tempted 
to  say  that  one  decided  the  other.  Yet  upon  a  close 
examination  the  greatest  possible  difference  is  discovered 
in  the  two  fabrics  of  evidence,  and  consequently  the  judg- 
ment is  different.  In  proportion  as  the  examination  pene- 
trates into  each  case  and  comes  into  close  quarters  with 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 8  5 

the  witnesses,  the  circumstances,  the  connexion  of  facts  in 
it,  the  common  type  of  the  two  is  cast  off,  the  special 
characteristics  of  each  come  out  into  stronger  and  stronger 
light,  the  different  weight  of  the  testimony,  the  different 
force  of  the  facts.  There  are  universal  rules  relating  to  the 
punishment  when  the  crime  is  proved,  and  to  the  right 
when  the  conditions  are  proved,  but  of  what  constitutes 
proof  there  is  no  rule.  This  is  a  special  conclusion, 
according  to  the  best  judgment,  from  the  special  premisses. 
There  is  no  royal  road  to  truth  in  the  evidence  of  facts  ; 
every  case  is  a  special  case.  It  is  true  that  main  features 
of  fact,  as  well  as  types  of  testimony,  repeat  themselves 
often ;  but  in  every  case  they  demand  and  we  give  them  a 
fresh  inspection. 

It  only  requires  the  advantage  of  this  principle  to  bring 
out  the  strong  points,  the  significant  features,  and  the  effec- 
tive weight  of  the  evidence  for  the  Gospel  miracles.  Upon 
the  summary  supposition  indeed  that  the  evidence  of 
miracles  is  a  class  of  evidence,  which,  after  the  sight  of 
some  samples,  dispenses  with  the  examination  of  the  rest, 
those  miracles  would  stand  little  chance ;  but  we  have  no 
right  to  this  summary  supposition;  the  evidence  of  the 
Gospel  miracles  is  a  special  case  which  must  be  decided  on 
its  own  grounds.  Were  the  annals  of  mankind  crowded 
even  much  more  than  they  are  with  spurious  cases,  Ave 
should  still  have  to  take  the  case  of  the  Gospel  miracles  by 
itself.  The  general  phrase  in  use,  "  the  value  of  testimony," 
conceals  degrees  of  strength ;  the  term  "  competent  witness" 
hides  all  the  interval  which  lies  between  an  average  wit- 
ness who  appears  in  court,  and  the  sublimest  impersona- 
tion of  the  grave,  the  holy,  the  simple  and  truthful  charac- 
ter. The  phrase  "ordeal  of  testimony"  covers  all  the 
degrees  in  severity  and  duration  of  such  ordeal.  Tliis 
degree,  in  the  strength  of  testimony  is,  however,  in  truth 
the  critical  and  turning-point  in  the  evidence  of  miracles ; 


1 86  False  Miracles  [Lect. 

for  miracles  are  a  weight  resting  upon  the  support  of  that 
evidence ;  but  whether  a  support  can  bear  a  particular 
weight  must  depend  on  the  degree  of  strength  residing  in 
that  support.  To  ascertain  however  the  degree  of  strength 
which  belongs  to  the  evidence  for  the  Gospel  miracles,  we 
must  go  into  the  special  case  of  that  evidence ;  and  what 
we  maintain  is,  that  when  we  do  go  specially  into  the 
evidence  for  those  miracles,  we  find  this  high  degree  of 
strength  in  it :  that  its  foundation  lies  so  deep  in  the  won- 
derful character  and  extraordinary  probation  of  the  wit- 
nesses, and  in  the  unique  character  and  result  of  the  reve- 
lation, that  it  sustains  the  weight  which  it  is  required  to 
sustain. 

The  truth  of  the  miraculous  credentials  of  Christianity 
rests  upon  various  arguments,  the  mutual  coherence  and 
union  of  which  forms  the  evidence  of  them.  Nor  in  a  case 
of  evidence  must  we  narrow  the  term  '  argument ;'  any- 
thing is  an  argument  which  naturally  and  legitimately 
produces  an  effect  upon  our  minds,  and  tends  to  make  us 
think  one  way  rather  than  another.  Nor  in  judging  upon 
the  force  and  weight  of  these  arguments,  can  we  dispense 
with  a  proper  state  of  the  affections.  It  is  no  condition  of 
a  sound  judgment  that  there  should  be  an  absence  of  feel- 
ing in  it ;  our  affections  are  a  part  of  our  judgment ;  an  argu- 
ment only  sinks  into  us  properly,  and  takes  proper  hold  of 
our  minds,  by  means  of  the  feelings  which  take  it  up  and 
carry  it  into  the  understanding.  One  man  thinks  nothing 
of  an  argument,  another  a  great  deal  of  it,  because  feeling 
enables  the  one  to  see,  the  argument,  the  other  wants  this 
light  by  which  to  see  it.  It  is  thus  a  great  mistake  to  sup- 
pose that  those  who  are  absorbed  in  the  pleasurable  exer- 
tion of  the  intellect  and  are  without  the  religious  emotions, 
who  do  not  hope,  wlio  do  not  fear  as  spiritual  beings,  are 
the  best  judges  of  religious  evidences.  For  the  truth  is,  in 
such  a  state  a  man  is  not  possessed  of  his  whole  nature ;  a 


VIII]  False  Miracles  1 8 7 

man  is  only  half  himself;  nay,  he  is  but  a  miserable  frag- 
ment of  himself.  Hope  and  fear  are  strong  impulses  to 
and  enliveners  of  the  understanding  ;  they  quicken  the  per- 
ce2:)tions;  under  their  purifying  and  sharpening  influence 
we  see  the  force  of  truths  and  arguments  which  otherwise 
we  are  too  dull  to  see.  Thus  half  of  a  man's  nature  may 
reject  the  Christian  evidence,  but  the  whole  accepts  it. 
When  every  part  of  us  is  represented  in  our  state  of  mind, 
when  the  religious  affections  as  well  as  the  intellect  are 
strong  and  lively,  then  only  is  our  state  of  mind  a  reason- 
able one,  then  only  are  we  our  proper  selves ;  but  the  issue 
of  this  collective  whole  is  Christian  belief. 


NOTES 


NOTES 


LECTUEE    I 


NOTE  1,  p.  II 

THE  necessity  of  miracles  to  prove  a  revelation  is  assiunecl  in  the 
general  language  of  divines.  Thus  Butler :  "  The  notion  of  a 
miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a  Divine  mission,  has  been  stated  with 
great  exactness  by  divines  ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by 
every  one.  There  are  also  invisible  miracles,  the  Incarnation  of  Christ, 
for  instance,  which,  being  secret,  cannot  be  alleged  as  a  j)roof  of  such  a 
mission,  but  require  themselves  to  beproved  by  visible  viiracles.  Revelation 
itself  too  is  miraculous  and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it."  {Analogy,  pt. 
ii.  ch.  ii.)  The  writer  assumes  here  that  for  the  revelation  of  things 
supernatural  and  undiscoverable  by  himian  reason,  miraculous  evi- 
dence is  necessary  to  attest  its  truth.  The  "invisible  miracle,"  i.e. 
the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation,  he  says,  "  requires  to  be  proved  by 
visible  miracles."  "  Miracles  are  the  proof  of  revelation,"  because  re- 
velation is  itseK  miraculous, — is  an  invisible  miracle  which  needs  the 
visible  to  serve  as  guarantee  to  it.  Again  :  "  Take  in  the  considera- 
tion of  religion,  or  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see 
distinct  particular  reasons  for  miracles  ;  to  afford  mankind  instruc- 
tion additional  to  that  of  nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it." 
{Analogy,  pt.  ii.  ch.  ii.)  Again  :  "  In  the  evidence  of  Christianity 
there  seem  to  be  several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the 
head  either  of  miracles  or  the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the  common 
acceptation  of  the  words.  But  these  two  are  its  direct  and  funda- 
mental proofs  :  and  those  other  things,  however  considerable  they  are, 
yet  ought  never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  direct  proofs,  but  always 
to  be  joined  to  them."  {Analogy,  pt.  ii.  ch.  vii.)  Leslie  writes:  "The 
deists  acknowledge  a  God,  of  an  Almighty  power,  who  made  all 
things.     Yet  they  would  put  it  out  of  His  power  to  make  any  revela- 


192  Note  I  [Lect, 

tion  of  His  will  to  mankind.  For  if  we  cannot  be  certain  of  any 
miracle,  how  slioukl  we  know  when  God  sent  anything  extraordinary 
to  us?"  {Short  and  Easy  Method  tcith  Deists.)  Paley  says  :  "Now 
in  what  way  can  a  revelation  be  made  but  by  miracles  ?  In  none 
which  we  are  able  to  conceive.  Conse(£uently  in  whatever  degree  it 
is  possible,  or  not  very  improbable,  that  a  revelation  should  be  com- 
municated to  mankind  at  all,  in  the  same  degree  it  is  probable,  or 
not  very  improbable,  that  miracles  should  be  Avrought."  {Evidences 
of  Christianity :  Preparatory  Considerations.) 

That  the  truth  of  the  Christian  miracles,  however,  is  necessary  for 
the  defence  of  Christianity  is  a  point  altogether  independent  of  the 
question  of  the  necessity  of  miracles,  for  a  revelation  in  the  first  in- 
stance, as  Mr.  Mansel  observes ; — 

"  Whether  the  doctrinal  truths  of  Cliristianity  could  or  could  not 
have  been  jiropagated  among  men  by  moral  evidence  alone,  without 
any  miraculous  accompaniments,  it  is  at  least  certain  that  such  was 
not  the  manner  in  which  they  actually  were  propagated,  according  to 
the  narrative  of  Scripture.  If  our  Lord  not  only  did  works  api)ar- 
ently  surpassing  human  power,  but  likewise  expressly  declared  that 
He  did  those  works  by  the  power  of  God,  and  in  witness  that  the 
Father  had  sent  Him  ; — if  the  Apostles  not  only  wrought  works  of  a 
similar  kind  to  those  of  their  Master,  but  also  expressly  declared  that 
they  did  so  in  His  name  ;  the  miracles,  as  thus  interpreted  by  those 
who  wrought  them,  become  part  of  the  moral  as  well  as  the  sensible 
evidences  of  the  religion  which  they  taught,  and  camiot  be  denied 
without  destroying  both  kinds  of  evidence  alike 

"  Tlie  scientific  question  relates  to  the  possibility  of  supernatural 
occurrences  at  all ;  and  if  this  be  once  decided  in  the  negative,  Chris- 
tianity as  a  religion  must  necessarily  be  denied  along  with  it.  Some 
moral  precepts  may  indeed  remain,  which  may  or  may  not  have  been 
first  enunciated  by  Christ,  but  which  in  themselves  have  no  essential 
connexion  with  one  person  more  than  with  another  ;  but  all  belief  in 
Christ  as  the  great  Example,  as  the  teacher  sent  from  God,  as  the 
crucified  and  risen  Saviour,  is  gone,  never  to  return.  The  perfect 
sinlessness  of  His  life  and  conduct  can  no  longer  be  held  before  us  as 
our  type  and  pattern,  if  the  works  which  He  ]irofessed  to  ]ierform  by 
Divine  j^ower  were  either  not  performed  at  all  or  were  jierformed  liy 
human  science  and  skill.  No  mystery  im])enetrable  l)y  human  rea- 
son, no  doctrine  iucapalde  of  natural  proof,  can  be  believed  on  His 
autliority  ;  for  if  He  ])rofessed  to  work  miracles,  and  A\T()nght  them 
not,  what  warrant  have  we  for  the  trustworthiness  of  other  parts  of 
His  teaching?"  {Aids  to  Faith,  pp.  4,  5.) 

An  able  and  thoughtful  writer  on  "  Sliracles,"  in  the  Christian 
Remembrancer,  puts  the  necessity  of  miracles  as  evidence  of  our 
Lord's  Divine  Nature  in  the  following  point  of  view: — 

"  Truths,  such  as  *  God  is  a  Spirit,'  or  '  Do  unto  others  as  you 


I] 


Note  I  19; 


•n'ould  they  should  do  unto  you,'  are  abstract  truths,  resting  on  funda- 
mental principles  in  the  human  mind.  They  therefore  appeal  to  the 
human  mind  for  theii'  evidence,  and  to  nothing  else.  By  a  mental 
process  they  are  transformed  from  the  sphere  of  feeling  or  intuition  into 
that  of  logic,  and  when  we  appeal  to  an  innate  sense  for  their  truth  we 
simply  appeal  to  the  consciousness  of  every  man  to  say  whether  this 
process  has  not  been  rightly  performed.  But  the  i>roposition,  God 
was  incarnate  in  Jesus  Christ  for  the  deliverance  of  the  world,  is  of  a 
totally  different  nature.  It  is  not  an  abstract  truth,  but  a  historical 
fact,  and  consequently  by  no  power  of  intuition  could  we  assure  our- 
selves of  its  truth.  However  much  the  fact  embodied  in  these  words 
may  answer  to  a  want  and  longing  in  the  heart,  however  much 
the  thought  of  it  may  thrill  our  nature  to  its  very  depth,  still  this  is 
no  proof  of  its  truth.  This  very  want  and  longing  has  given  rise  to 
many  pretensions,  which,  alas !  Ave  know  to  have  been  baseless.  That 
God  was  incarnate  in  Christ  Jesus  is  a  fact  which  must  rest  upon 
evidence  just  as  any  other  historical  fact.  There  is  no  power  of  clair- 
voyance in  the  human  mind  by  which  we  can  see  its  truth  indepen- 
dent of  evidence. 

"  But  this  writer  not  only  fails  to  perceive  that  the  Christianity  he 
adopts  is  a  historical  fact  resting  u^'o^  evidence,  but  that  it  is  a  sujjer- 
natural  fact,  and  consequently,  that  it  needs  evidence  of  a  peculiar 
kind.  It  is  evident  that  to  prove  that  our  Lord  was  Incarnate  God 
we  need  not  only  e^adence  that  He  lived  and  died,  that  His  life  was 
blameless,  and  that  He  spake  as  never  man  S23ake, — all  this  would 
prove  that  He  was  wonderful  among  the  sons  of  men, — but  we  need 
something  more  before  we  can  acknowledge  the  justice  of  His  claim 
to  be  the  Son  of  God.  That  he  was  God  Incarnate  was  a  fact  above 
nature  ;  it  could,  therefore,  only  be  proved  by  a  manifestation  above 
nature,  that  is  by  miracle. 

"  This  is  so  important  that  it  merits  fiu'ther  consideration.  We 
say  that  the  fact  that  Christ  was  God  being  a  supernatural  fact  could 
only  be  proved  by  a  supernatural  manifestation.  Now  this  assertion 
rests  upon  a  fundamental  principle  of  all  our  knowledge.  We  cannot 
know  things  according  to  that  which  they  are  in  themselves,  but  only 
in  and  through  the  phenomena  they  manifest ;  and  hence  our  judg- 
ment as  to  what  anything  is,  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  manifesta- 
tions connected  with  it.  How,  for  mstance,  do  we  satisfy  ourselves 
as  to  the  nature  and  identity  of  anything  \  Supposing  a  substance  is 
presented  to  a  chemist,  and  he  is  asked  to  determine  of  what  nature 
it  is,  how  does  he  proceed  ?  He  begins  by  carefully  observing  all  its 
qualities,  and  noting  the  phenomena  to  which  it  gives  rise,  in  any 
circumstances  in  which  it  may  be  placed.  He  places  it  in  every  pos- 
sible relation,  and  notes  the  signs  and  tokens  which  are  manifested. 
If  it  should  happen  that  these  phenomena  are  identical  with  those  of 
any  previously  known  substance,  the  identity  of  the  substance  in- 
quired about  AAdth  that  substance  is  determined.  But  should  the 
phenomena  manifested  be  altogether  rmknoA\Ti  and  strange,  it  is  im- 
mediately set  down  as  a  new  substance,  and  the  idea  we  have  of  that 


194  ^ote  I  [Lect. 

substance  is  constnicted  out  of  the  phenomena  it  manifests.  In  the 
same  way  the  naturalist  proceeds  in  determining  the  various  species 
of  plants  and  animals.  He  observes  not  only  physical  characteristirs 
and  relations,  Init,  in  the  case  of  animals,  actions  and  haluts  ;  and  fruui 
these  he  is  enabled  to  conclude  as  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  mind 
and  intelligence,  and  generally  as  to  the  inner  nature.  In  the  same 
Avay,  by  a  process  of  induction,  we  judge  of  the  characters  and  mental 
capacities  of  those  among  whom  we  mix.  We  are  in  no  doubt  when 
Ave  are  in  the  presence  of  a  fellow-being  with  human  nature  and  sym- 
pathies like  ourselves.  AVe  see  his  inmost  nature  manifested  in  a 
thousand  outward  tokens,  from  which  we  cLraw  an  ahuost  instantane- 
ous and  infiillible  conclusion. 

"  It  is  in  precisely  the  same  way  that  we  are  to  judge  of  the  nature 
of  Christ.  If  He  exhibited  in  His  words  and  actions  only  what  ^\  .1^ 
human,  our  unavoidable  conclusion  must  be  tliat  He  was  nothing 
more.  Whatever  reason  we  may  have  for  putting  faith  in  His  trutli 
and  goodness,  still  had  He  claimed  to  be  the  Son  of  God  and  ex- 
hibited no  sign,  we  must  have  supposed  that  He  was  under  a  delui^imi. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  in  His  words  and  deeds  He  exhibited  tokens 
above  man,  we  might  not  be  able  from  these  tokens,  taken  by  them- 
selves, to  conclude  that  He  was  God,  but  we  could  certainly  con- 
clude that  in  Him  was  more  than  man. 

"  But  the  matter  may  be  put  in  even  a  stronger  light.  As  we  can- 
not know  things  in  themselves,  but  only  in  and  through  their  outward 
manifestations,  so  we  cannot  think  the  existence  of  any  being  in  relation 
with  the  things  of  this  world  without  supposing  the  outward  tokens 
under  which  it  is  revealed  to  us.  According  to  this  principle,  miraeli  s 
are  the  natural  and  necessary  consequence  of  the  Godheail  in  Christ,  sd 
much  so  that  we  cannot  think  Him  truly  God  and  imagine  them  absent. 

"  Let  us  realize  to  ourselves  the  circumstances. 

"  Sitpposing  the  question  had  been,  not  whether  He  transcended, 
but  whether  He  fell  short  uf,  what  is  human  ;  every  one  coming  iiitn 
His  presence  and  conversing  with  Him  could  easily  satisfy  hiansclt'. 
A  hundred  outward  tokens  would  reveal  the  presence  of  a  living 
human  soul.  But  just  in  the  same  way  would  it  be  evident  to  those 
around  Him  that  His  nature  transcended  that  of  man.  If  He  were 
really  more  than  man,  there  would  be  some  outward  token  to  manifest 
that  higher  nature.  It  is  utterly  impossible  that  it  could  be  otherwise. 
However  much  He  might  hide  His  glory,  still  a  thousand  tokens, 
each  transcending  what  belongs  to  man,  would  be  visible.  His  very 
look,  His  air,  the  tone  of  His  voice,  His  wisdom  and  goodness,  His 
more  than  human  knowledge,  feeling,  and  sympathy,  all  these  super- 
added to  the  visible  assertion  of  His  authority  over  nature,  would 
combine  to  point  Hinr  out  as  one  moi'e  than  human.  We  do  not 
know  that  due  weight,  in  an  evidential  point  of  \new,  has  ever  been 
given  to  the  astonishing  fact  that  the  unanimous  verdict  of  every  one 
priA-ileged  to  come  near  our  Blessed  Lord  has  been  that  He  was  more 
than  man.  In  this,  friend  and  enemy,  Jew,  Ebionite,  Christian, 
Gnostic,  alike  agi-ee.     Amid  the  innumerable  theories  that  for  1800 


1] 


Note  2  195 


years  have  been  devised  to  explain  the  nature  of  that  manifestation 
tliat  took  place  in  Christ,  all  agree  in  this,  that  He  was  more  than  man. 
"  Miracles  are  thus  the  natural  and  necessary  consequence  of  the 
Godhead  in  Christ ;  so  necessary  indeed  that  it  is  imjiossible  to  think 
Him  truly  God  and  imagine  them  absent:  just  as  we  cannot  think 
man  existing  without  a  certain  conformation  of  body,  and  certain  acts 
which  are  the  apj^ropriate  expression  of  humanity,  so  no  more  can  we 
think  the  Godhead  in  Christ  without  imagining  those  manifestations 
which  are  the  tokens  of  God."  {Christian  Remembrancer,  October  1863.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  14. 

The  moral  results  of  Christianity  when  they  are  appealed  to  as 
evidence,  appear  more  strongly  in  that  light  when  regarded  in  con- 
nexion with  prophecy,  in  which  connexion  Pascal  views  them  : — 

"  Prophetie  avec  I'accomplissement.  Ce  qui  a  precede  et  ce  qui  a 
suivi  J.  C. 

"  Les  riches  quittent  leur  bien,  &c.  Qu'est-ce  que  tout  cela  ?  C'est 
ce  qui  a  ete  predit  si  longtemps  auparavant.  Depuis  2,000  ans  aucun 
paien  n'avait  adoi'e  le  Dieu  des  Juifs,  et  dans  le  temps  predit  la  foule 
des  paiens  adore  cet  unique  Dieu.  Les  temples  sont  detruits,  les  rois 
meme  se  soumettent  a  la  croix.    Qu'est-ce  que  tout  cela  ?   C'est  I'esprit 

de  Dieu  qui  est  rej^andu  sur  la  terre Effundam  spiritum 

meum.  {Joel  ii.  28.)  Tons  les  peuples  etaient  dans  I'infidelite  etdans 
la  concupiscence  ;  toute  la  terre  fut  ardente  de  charite  :  les  princes 
quittent  leurs  grandeurs  ;  les  filles  souffrent  le  martyre.  D'ou  vient 
cette  force  ?  C'est  que  le  Messie  est  arrive.  Voila  I'effet  et  les 
marques  de  sa  venue."     (vol.  ii.  ed.  Fougeres,  pp.  273,  277.) 

NOTE  3,  p.  17. 

General  statements  of  the  evidence  of  miracles  are  cnri-ent  in  the 
Fathers,  who  insist  upon  that  argument  in  their  controversies  with 
the  heathen,  as  modern  apologists  do  in  their  defence  of  Christianity 
against  the  infidel.  Tertuilian,  e.g.,  after  stating  the  Eternal  Sonship 
and  immaculate  Conception  of  our  Lord,  says;  "Recij^ite  interim 
banc  fabulam,  similis  est  vestris,  dum  ostendimus  quomodo  Christus 

probetur Quem  igitur  [Judeei]   solummodo  hominem 

prsesumpserant  de  humilitate,  seqnebatur  uti  magum  estimarent  de 
potestate,  cum  ille  verbo  dsemonia  de  hominibus  excuteret,  caecos 
reluminaret,  leprosos  purgaret,  paralyticos  restringeret,  mortuos 
denique  verbo  redderet  vitfe,  elementa  ipse  famularet,  compescens 
procellas  et  freta  ingrediens,  ostendens  se  esse  Logon  Dei,  i.  e.  Verbum 
illud  primordiale  primogenitum."  At  the  moment  of  His  death  upon 
the  cross, — "  Dies,  medium  orbem  signante  sole,  subducta  est.     .     . 


196  Note  3  [Lect. 

.  .  .  .  Eiim  niiindi  casum  relatum  iii  arcanis  vestris  habetis." 
The  crowning  miracles  of  the  Resurrection  and  Ascension  follow,  npon 
the  strength  of  which  Tertullian  says  :  "  Et  Ca9sares  credidissent 
super  Christo,  si  aut  Caisares  non  essent  seculo  necessarii,  aut  si  et 
Christiani  potuissent  esse  Ciesares."     (Apologeticus,  c.  21.) 

Aruuljius  appeals  to  the  evidence  of  miracles  :  "  Ergone  inquiet 
aliquis,  Deus  iUe  est  Christus  ?  Deus  respondehimus.  Postulabit, 
an  se  ita  res  habeat,  qiiemadmodum  dicimus,  comprobari.  Nulla  major 
est  comprobatio,  quam  gestarum  ab  eo  fides  rerum."  He  then 
enumerates  the  Gospel  miracles  :  "  Ergo  ille  mortalis  aut  unus  fuit  e 
nobis  cujus  imperium,  cujus  vocem,  invaletudines  morbi,  febres,  atque 
alia  corporum  cruciamenta  fugiebant  ?  Unus  fuit  e  nobis  qui  redire 
in  corpora  jumdudum  animas  prtecipiebat  inflatas  ?  .  .  .  .  Unus 
l"uit  e  nobis  qui,  deposito  corjiore  innumeris  se  hominum  promjita  in 
luce  detexit?  qui  sennonem  dedit  atque  accepit,  docuit,  castigavit, 
admonuit  ?  qui  ne  illi  se  falsos  vanis  imaginationibus  existimarent, 
semel,  iterum,  ssepius  familiari  coUocutione  monstravit."  {Adversus 
Gentes,  lib.  i.  c.  42,  et  seq.)  For  the  truth  of  the  miracles  he  refers  to 
the  e'sddence  of  testimony :  "  Sed  non  creditis  gesta  haec.  Sed  qui  ea 
conspicati  sunt  fieri,  et  sub  oculis  suis  viderunt  agi,  testes  optimi, 
certissimique  auctores  et  crediderunt  hsec  ijisi  et  credenda  posteris 
tradiderunt.  .  ,  .  Sed  ab  indoctis  hominibus  et  rudibus  scripta  sunt, 
et  idcii'co  non  sunt  facili  auditione  credenda.  Vide  ne  niagis  lirec 
fortior  causa  sit,  cur  ilia  sint  nullis  coinquinata  mendaciis,  mente 
simpUci  prodita,  et  iguara  lenociniis  ampliare."     (cc.  54,  58.) 

"  Abfuit  ergo  ab  liis,"  says  Lactantius,  "fingendi  voluntas  et  astutia, 
quoniam  rudes  fuerunt.  Quis  posset  indoctus  apta  inter  se  et 
cohaerentia  fingere.  Non  enim  qusestus  et  commodi  gratia  religionem 
istam  commenti  sunt,  qiiippe  qui  et  praeceptis  et  reipsa  eam  vitam 
secuti  sunt  quae  et  voluptatibus  caret,  et  omnia  quae  habentur  in 
bonis  spernit."     {Divin.  Inst.  v.  3.) 

Athanasius,  in  a  passage  in  the  "  De  Incarnatione  Verbi,"  marshals 
the  great  miracles  of  our  Lord's  ministry  and  life  into  one  long 
e\'idential  array,  the  conclusion  being  :  oiJrws  iK  rwv  Ipywv  civ  yvwcOd-q 
Sti  ovk  &vdpo3iro%  dXXa  deov  5vvaiJ,is  Kal  \6yos  icrrlv  6  ravra  ipya^6iJLevos.  .  .  . 
ris  loCcu   avrbv  ras  vScrovs   iwfievov,    ev    als    inrdKeirai   rb   dvdpwwivov  yivos 

In  dvOpuiwov  Kal  ov  Qebv  riyecTo rts  yap  loihv  avrbv  a,woSi.d6vTa  rh 

\diirov,  oh  i]  yiveai^  iv^Xeixf/e,  Kal  toD  €k  yeverrjs  rvcpXov  Toi/s  6(p9a\fxovs  dvoL- 
yovra,  ovk  cLv  evevdrpe  t7)v  dvOpdiirwv  viroK€ifj.ivr]v  avri^  yivfcnv,  Kal  rai/TT/s 
elvai  SrjjjLLovpybp  tovtov  Kal  voirfrjv.  (c.  1 8.)  A  modern  writer  would  have 
stated  the  argument  both  of  Athanasius  and  Tertullian  more  accurately, 
and  said  not  that  such  mii-acles  proved  that  the  worker  was  the  Word, 


I]  Note  3  197 

the  Son  of  God,  mere  men  having  been  Divine  agents  in  miraculous 
operations,  but  that  they  were  a  guarantee  to  the  truth  of  the  declara- 
tion of  the  worker,  if  He  pronounced  Himself  to  be  the  Son  of  God. 

Augustine  speaks  of  miraculous  evidence  as  the  evidence  upon 
wliich  the  Apostles  relied  in  commencing  the  conversion  of  the 
w^orld :  "  Qui  enim  Christum  in  carne  resurrexisse,  et  cum  ilia  in 

coelum   ascendisse  non  viderant,  id  se  vidisse   narrantibus 

credebant."  {De  Civit.  Dei,  xxii.  5.)  And  to  the  objection  why 
miracles  were  not  continued,  he  answers  that  miracles  were  necessary 
at  first  for  the  purpose  of  evidence,  but  not  afterwards  :  "  Necessaria 
fuisse  priusi|uam  crederet  mundus,  ad  hoc  ut  crederet  mundus." 
{Ibid.  c.  8.)  Origen,  whose  works  present  a  striking  mixture  of 
obsolete  fanciful  speculation  and  intellectual  modern  criticism, 
meets  Celsus  with  the  argument  of  miracles.  "  Celsus,"  he  says, 
"vmable  to  deny  the  miracles  of  Jesus,  calumniates  them  as 
works  of  magic ;  and  I  have  often  had  to  combat  him  on  this 
ground."  {Contra  Cels.  lib.  ii.  s.  48.)  He  appeals  in  the  spirit  of  a 
modern  writer  on  ewlences  to  the  deep  and  permanent  effects  of  our 
Lord's  Resurrection  upon  the  Apostles,  and  the  change  which  took 
place  in  their  whole  conduct  after  this  alleged  event,  as  evidence  of 
the  truth  of  that  event.  "  The  zeal  with  which  they  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  work  of  conversion,  encountering  every  danger,  is  a 
clear  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  Resurrection  of  Jesus  ;  for  they  could 
not  have  taught  with  this  earnestness  had  they  feigned  such  an  event ; 
they  could  not  have  inculcated  contempt  of  death  upon  others,  and 
exemplified  it  themselves."  {Ibid.  s.  56.)  He  observes  how  few  the 
cases  of  persons  raised  from  the  dead  in  the  Gospels  are,  and  that  if 
such  cases  were  spurious,  there  would  have  been  more  of  them. 
"On  S^  Kal  veKpovs  aviaT-q,  Kal  ovk  ^ctti  irXdcrpLa  tQv  to,  evayy^Xia  ypaxf/dvTcav, 
irapiararaL  eK  rod,  el  fiev  ir\dafxa  9jv,  iroWoiis  dvayeypdrpdai  tovs  dvaaravTas. 

iirel  5'  ovk  ^(Ttl  TrXdcr/xa  irdw  evapid/j.rjTovs  \e\ix9ai.     {Ibid.  C.  48.) 

Chrysostom  iises  Origen's  argument  :  "  Had  Christ  not  really  risen 
from  the  dead,  how  do  we  account  for  the  fact  that  the  Apostles,  who 
in  their  behaviour  to  Him  living  had  shewn  such  weakness  and 
cowardice  that  they  deserted  and  betrayed  Him,  after  His  death 
shewed  such  zeal  that  they  laid  down  their  lives  for  Him?"  {In  S. 
Ignatium,  tom.  ii.  p.  599.)  The  Resurrection  of  Christ,  as  being  His 
OAvn  act,  not  brought  about  by  the  instrumentality  of  another  agent, 
visibly  acting  in  His  behalf  as  the  medium  of  the  operation  of  the 
miracle  (which  was  the  manner  in  which  the  other  resurrections 
mentioned  in  Scripture  had  taken  place),  is  regarded  as  in  and  of 
itself  a  proof  of  His  Divinity.     "  His  body,"  says  Athanasius,  "  as 


198  Note  3  [Lect. 

having  a  common  nature  with  our  own,  was  mortal  and  died  ;  but, 
inasmuch  as  it  icas  united  u-ith  the  JFord,  could  not  incur  cornijHion, 
but  on  account  of  the  JFord  of  God  dwelling  in  it  was  incorruptible.  In 
the  same  Body  Avere  fulfilled  two  apparent  opposites,  both  that  it 
underwent  death,  and  that  death  and  corruption,  by  reason  of  the 

indwelling   JFord,  were  abolished Inasmuch   as  the   AVord 

could  not  die,  but  was  immortal,  He  assumed  a  Body  that  was  able 
to  die,  in  order  that  He  might  offer  it  up  for  the  sake  of  all,  and  that 
the  same  Word,  by  reason  of  His  junction  to  that  Body,  miglit  destroy 
him  that  hath  the  power  of  death."  (De  Incarn.  §  20.)  Chrysostom 
singles  out  the  peculiarity  of  the  miracle  of  the  Eesurrection — 
t6  iavT6v  Tiva  SvvacrdM  dvaa-rq^v.      (In  Joan.  xxiv.  tom.  viii.  p.  1 36.) 

But  while  the  Fathers  appealed  familiarly  to  the  evidence  of 
miracles  in  behalf  of  the  truth  of  Christianity,  there  were  particular 
kinds  of  belief  strong  in  the  minds  of  the  Fathers,  and  of  their  age, 
which  pi'evented  the  argument  of  miracles  from  assuming  in  their 
hands  the  compactness  and  stringency  which  it  has  gained  in  the 
hands  of  modem  writers  on  evidence.  Of  the  kinds  of  belief  to  which 
I  refer,  the  first  was  their  acceptance  to  a  certain  extent  of  the  "  dis- 
pensation of  Paganism,"  to  use  Dr.  Newman's  phrase  (Arians,  p.  89), 
and  with  it  of  certain  miraculous  pretensions  which  Paganism  had  put 
forth  ;  the  second  was  their  belief  in  magic.  A  writer  on  evidence 
in  the  present  age,  in  urging  the  evidence  of  miracles  to  the  divine 
nature  and  mission  of  Christ,  is  not  incommoded  by  any  strong 
belief  existing  either  in  his  own  mind  or  in  the  age,  in  the  reality  of 
any  supernatural  demonstrations  outside  of  the  course  of  miracles 
which  constitute  the  evidences  of  revelation,  and  standing  in  a  posi- 
tion of  rivalry  to  them.  The  Scripture  miracles,  if  proved,  thus 
stand  alone  in  his  plan  of  defence  as  true  and  admitted  miracles, 
and  the  inference  from  the  truth  of  the  miracles  to  the  truth  of  the 
doctrines  is  an  unimpeded  step,  there  being  no  counteracting  force  in 
the  confessed  existence  of  supernatural  action  under  a  false  religion, 
or  from  a  corrupt  and  evil  power,  which  has  to  be  allowed  and 
accounted  for,  in  drawing  the  evidential  conclusion.  But  the  Fathers 
believed  that  supernatural  powers  had  been  bestowed  by  Providence 
on  various  occasions,  under  Paganism ;  and  they  had  also  a  strong  and 
undoubting  belief  in  magic  and  a  diabolical  source  of  supernatiu'al  ex- 
hibitions. The  argument  of  miracles  in  their  hands  therefore  was  an 
obstructed  and  qualified  argument,  maintained  in  conflict  with  various 
counter  admissions  ;  and  the  conclusion  from  it,  though  undoubting 
and  full,  was  not  given  in  the  summary  and  rigorous  form  in  which 
a  popidar  school  of  writers  on  evidence  has  put  it. 


I] 


Note 


199 


1.  The  general  attitude  of  the  early  Church  toward  the  heathen 
world  somewhat  differed  from  that  of  modern  Christendom.  The 
doctrine  of  the  Logos  under  the  treatment  of  the  Alexandrian  school 
imparted  a  systematic  form  and  theological  basis  to  a  higher  estimate 
of  Paganism  :  for  in  |the  eye  of  that  school  "  the  dispensation  of 
Paganism,  so  far  as  it  contained  truth,  was  but  a  lower  part  of  one 
large  dispensation,  which  our  Lord,  as  the  Divine  Reason,  had  insti- 
tuted and  carried  on  for  the  enlightenment  of  the  human  race,  and  of 
which  the  Gospel  was  the  consummation  ;  heathens  and  Christians 
were,  though  in  a  different  measure,  still  alike  partakers  of  that 
one  '  Light  that  lighteth  every  man  that  cometh  into  the  world  ;'  and 
all  mankind,  as  brought  into  union  and  fellowship  by  that  common 
participation,  formed  one  religious  society  and  communion — one 
Church."  {Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Predestination,  p.  117.) 

Such  a  Divine  element  Ijeing  recognized  in  Paganism,  the  next 
step  was  that  a  certain  authority  was  attached  by  the  early  Fathers  in 
various  mstances  to  ancient  Pagan  legend  and  traditions  of  miraculous 
appearances  and  interpositions.  Cases  of  special  Divine  interposition 
in  the  Gentile  world  are  recognized  in  Scripture. 

"  Scripture  gives  us  reason  to  believe,"  says  Dr.  Newman,  "that  the 
traditions,  thus  originally  delivered  to  mankind  at  large,  have  been 
secretly  reanimated  and  enforced  by  new  communications  from  the 
unseen  world.  .  .  .  The  book  of  Genesis  contains  a  record  of  the  dis- 
pensation of  natural  religion,  or  paganism,  as  well  as  of  the  patriarchal. 
The  dreams  of  Pharaoh  and  Abimelech,  as  of  Nebuchadnezzar  after- 
wards, are  instances  of  the  dealings  of  God  with  those  to  whom  He  did 
not  vouchsafe  a  written  revelation.  .  .  .  Let  the  book  of  Job  be  taken 
as  a  less  suspicious  instance  of  tlie  dealings  of  God  with  the  heathen. 
Job  was  a  Pagan  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  Eastern  nations  are 
Pagans  in  the  present  day.  He  lived  among  idolaters,  yet  he  and  his 
friends  had  cleared  themselves  from  the  superstitions  with  which  the 
true  creed  was  beset:  and,  while  one  of  them  was  divinely  instructed 
by  dreams,  he  himself  at  length  heard  the  voice  of  God  out  of  the 
whirlwind.  ,  .  .  Scripture,  as  if  for  oiu'  full  satisfaction,  draws  back 
the  curtain  further  still  in  the  history  of  Balaam.  There  a  bad  man 
and  a  heathen  is  made  the  oracle  of  true  Divine  messages.  .  .  .  And 
so  in  the  cave  of  Endor,  even  a  saint  was  sent  from  the  dead  to  join 
the  company  of  an  apostate  king,  and  the  sorceress  whose  aid  he  was 
seeking.  Accordingly,  there  is  nothing  unreasonable  in  the  notion, 
that  there  may  have  been  heathen  poets  and  sages,  or  sil:)yls  again, 
in  a  certain  extent  divinely  illuminated,  and  organs  through  whom 
religious  and  moral  truth  was  conveyed  to  their  countiymen." 
{Avians,  p.  89.) 

But  the  Fathers  went  further,  and  recognized  Pagan  supernatural 
events  as  occurring  in  the  common  stream  of  Pagan  history,  apart 


200  Note  3  [Lect. 

from  any  connection  with  or  relation  to  the  sacred  people.  Certain 
Pagan  miracles,  especially  some  which  occur  in  Roman  historj',  had 
gained  a  respectable  place  in  the  works  of  heathen  historians,  the 
same  list  recurs  in  ditierent  Fathers,  and  Minutius  Felix  {Odatnus,  c. 
27),  Lactantius  {Divin.  Inst.  lib.  ii.  c.  8),  Tertullian  {Ajml.  c.  22),  and 
Augustine  (De  Civil.  Dei,  lib.  x.  c.  16),  extend  a  kind  of  acceptance  to 
them.^  The  latter  Father  exhibits  perhaps  more  of  a  critical  spirit 
than  his  predecessors,  and  in  touching  on  the  subject  of  natural 
marvels,  especially  the  existence  of  certain  extraordinary  nations 
which  was  asserted  in  geographical  books  of  that  age,  says, "  Sed  omnia 
genera  hominum  quoe  dicuntur  esse  credere  non  est  necesse."  (De 
Civit.  Dei,  xvi.  8.)  He  supposes  himself  pressed  by  an  objector  who 
reminds  him  that  if  he  discredits  the  marvels  of  secular  writers  he 
will  have  to  account  for  his  belief  in  those  of  Scripture,  but  he  dis- 
o'WTis  the  dilemma.  "  Quod  propterea  potenmt  dicere,  ut  respondendi 
nobis  ai-gustias  ingerant :  quia  si  dixerimus,  non  esse  credendum, 
scripta  ilia  miraculonim  infirmabimus  ;  si  autem  credendum  esse  con- 
cesserimus,  confirmabimus  numina  pagauorum.  Sed  nos  non  habemus 
necesse  omnia  credere  quae  continet  historia  gentium,  cum  et  ipsi  inter 
se  historici,  sicut  ait  Varro,  per  multa  dissentiant."  (De  Civ.  Dei,  xxi. 
6.)  Later  writers  however  of  reputation  have  acknowledged  Pagan 
miracles  ;  Dante  {De  Monarchia,  lib.  ii.  c.  3)  ranks  certain  recorded  in 
Roman  history  as  evidences,  among  other  proof,  of  the  divine  authority 
of  the.  Roman  empire.  And  even  our  theologian  Jacksou  entertains 
the  idea  of  supernatiu'al  visitations  under  Paganism. 

^  Such  a  partial  recognition  however  of  Pagan  legends  and  reports  of 
supernatural  occurrences  must  be  distinguished  from  the  appeals  whicli  the 
Fathers  sometimes  make  to  lieatlien  mythology,  in  defence  of  Christianity 
against  heathen  objections — appeals  whicli  have  the  force  of  an  argnmen- 
tinn  ad  homincm.  Thus  when  heathen  opponents  taimted  the  Christians 
with  the  ignominious  death  of  Him  wliom  they  asserted  to  be  the  Son  of 
God,  Justin  Martyr  encountered  them  with  facts  from  their  own  mytho- 
logy— the  miserable  earthly  fates  which  some  of  Jove's  sons  had  met — 
' A.(TK\y)WLhv  KoL  OepaTreiTriv  yevo/mevov,  Kepavviodivra  dvaXeXevdevai  (is  ovpafdv 
Aiovvaov  5e  OLaairapaxdivra'  HpaKXea  6^  'P'-'yV  '"'ovwi'  eavTOP  Tn>pi  dovra. 
Apol.  i.  21.)  Though  lie  also  considers  these  coarse  ami  falnilous  ]iictures 
of  the  sufferings  of  heroism  in  pagan  mythology  as  an  intentional  travesty 
of  the  suH'erings  and  persecutions  of  the  l^Iessiah,  inspired  by  diabolical  cun- 
ning, in  order  to  confuse  men,  and  blind  them  to  the  notes  of  tlie  Messiah 
wlien  He  came — to.  ixvOoiroi-qO^vra  vwb  tCiv  iroLrp-Qv  dwdTrj  Kal  aTrayuyrj  tou 
dvOpuTTilov  y^voi'S  dprjddai.  dirodeiKWixev  Kar'  ev4pyeiav  tQv  <pav\o}v  daipLovuv. 
(Apol.  i.  s.  54.)  So  Tertullian,  in  speaking  of  the  Incarnation  says, 
"  Eecipite  ham;  fabulam  ;  similis  est  vestris,  dum  ostendinms  quomodo 
Christus  probetur.  Sciebant  et([ui  ]>cnes  vos  ejusmodi  fahulas  aimdas  ad 
dcstrudionem  vcritatis  istiusmodi  pra;miuistravenint,  veutumm  esse  Chris- 
tum."    {Apol.  c.  xxi.) 


I]  Note  3  20 1 

"  As  the  end  and  jjurpose  which  Homer  assigns  for  the  apparitions 
of  his  gods,  so  are  hotli  these,  and  many  other  particuLir  circumstances 
of  Ids  gods  assisting  the  ancient  heroics,  siich  as  miglit  justly  breed 
offence  to  any  serious  reader,  if  a  man  shoukl  avouch  them  in  earnest, 
or  seek  to  persuade  liim  to  expect  more  than  mere  delight  in  them. 
Yet  I  cannot  think  that  he  would  have  feigned  such  an  assistance, 
unless  the  valour  of  some  men  in  former  times  had  l:)een  extraordinary, 
and  moi-e  than  natural.  Which  supernatural  excellency  in  some  before 
others,  coi;ld  not  ^jroceed  but  from  a  supernatural  cause.  And  thus 
far  his  conceit  agrees  with  Scripture  ;  that  there  were  more  heroical 
spirits  in  old  times  than  in  later,  and  more  immediate  directions  from 
God  for  managing  of  most  wars.  And  from  the  expeiience  hereof,  the 
ancient  poets  are  more  copious  in  their  hyperbolical  praises  of  their 
worthies,  than  the  discreeter  sort  of  later  poets  durst  be,  whilst  they 
wrote  of  their  own  times.  Not  that  tlie  ancient  were  more  licentious, 
or  less  observant  of  decorum  in  this  kind  of  fiction  than  the  other  ; 
but  because  the  manifestation  of  a  Divine  power  in  many  of  their 
victories  Avas  more  seen  in  ancient  than  in  later  times."  (Comments 
upon  the  Creed,  bk.  i.  ch.  xi.  xii.) 

I  quote  this  passage  from  Jackson  as,  though  a  milder  and  more 
modified  specimen,  a  specimen  in  a  modern  divine  of  the  spirit  favour- 
able to  Pagan  supernatural  events  in  the  Fathers. 

2.  But  the  difference  between  the  patristic  treatment  of  the  argu- 
ment of  miracles,  and  its  treatment  in  the  hands  of  our  OAvn  popular 
WTiters  on  evidence,  is  due  mainly  to  another  source,  YJz.,  the  belief  of 
the  Fathers  in  magic.  The  Fathers  held  the  popular  ideas  of  their 
age  on  this  subject,  and  wrote  under  a  strong  and  genuine  conviction 
that  there  was  such  an  art  as  magic,  and  that  it  had  real  powers  and, 
could  produce  real  supernatural  effects  ;  from  which  effects  they  were 
bound  to  distinguish  true  miracles,  which  came  from  a  Divine  source 
and  were  wrought  for  the  proof  of  a  Divine  revelation.  The  class  of 
enchanters  or  wizards — magi,2)rcestigiatores — did  not  figure  in  their  eyes 
as  the  mere  creation  of  legend  and  fancy,  but  as  a  class  jaossessed  of 
real  powers.  The  source  of  these  powers  was  held  to  be  the  relation 
in  which  these  persons  stood  to  da3mons  and  evil  spirits.  The  order 
of  doemons,  their  origin,  their  nature,  and  the  place  which  they  are 
permitted  to  occupy  in  the  world,  are  discussed  with  much  more 
boldness  and  more  attempt  at  accui'acy  and  detail  in  patristic  theology 
than  in  modern  ;  and  the  early  writers  introduce,  in  addition  to  the 
Scripture  notices  of  cle\dls,  the  material  of  tradition  and  the  theories  of 
Alexandrian  Platonism.  Augustine  (De  Civ.  Dei,  viii.  14  et  seq.)  com- 
ments upon  PorphjTy's  diA-ision  of  the  rational  universe,  which  was 
the  Platonic  one :  "  Omnium  mquiunt  animalium,  in  c|uibus  est  anima 
rationalis,  trijiartita  divisio   est,  in   Deos,  homines,  dsemones.      Dii 


202  Note  3  [Lect. 

excelsissiiniim  locum  teneiit,  homines  infimiim,  dajmones  medium. 
Nam  deorum  sedes  in  coclo  est,  hominum  in  terra,  in  aere  dajmonum." 
(c.  14.)  Augustine  does  not  object  to  the  existence  of  an  order  of 
daemons  so  situated,  but  only  to  the  Platonic  inference  from  it :  "  Jam 
vero  de  loci  altitudine,  (|Uod  da)mones  in  aere,  nos  autem  habitamus  in 
terra,  ita  iiermoveri  ut  hinc  eos  nobis  esse  prajponendos  existimemus, 
omnino  lidiculum  est.  Hoc  enim  pacto  nobis  et  onmia  volatilia 
prajiHininius."  {Ihul.  c.  15.)  He  identities  these  daiiuons  with  the 
evil  spirits  of  Scriptxire.  TertuUiau's  language  is  :  "  Ita([ue  corporibus 
fpiidem  et  valetudines  infligunt  [daimones]  et  ali(|Uos  casus  acerbos, 
auima)  vero  repentinos  et  extraordinarios  per  vim  excessus.  Suj^petit 
illis  ad  utramque  substantiam  hominis  adeundam  mii-a  subtilitas  et 
tenuitas  sua."  {Afol.  c.  22.)  Minutius  Felix  acquiesces  in  the 
Platonic  assertion  of  an  intermediate  class  of  beings  :  "  Siibstantiam 
inter  mortalein  immortalemque,  i.  e.  inter  corpus  et  spiritum,  medium, 
terreni  ponderis  etccclestis  levitatis  admixtione  concretam;"  which  he 
identifies  with  the  devils  of  Scripture  (Octnvius,  c.  26).  Lactantius 
aduj)ts  a  tradition  :  "  Cum  ergo  numerus  hominum  coepisset  increscere 
....  niisit  Deus  angelos  ad  tutelam  cultumque  generis  huniani, 
quibus  quia  libenim  arbitrium  erat  datum,  prajcepit  ante  omnia  ne 
terra)  contagione  maciUati,  substantise  coelestis  amitterent  dignitatem. 
....  Itaque  illos  cum  homimbus  commorantes  dominator  ille  terrae 
fallacissimus  [the  devil,  who  according  to  Lactantius  had  fallen  from 
envy  of  the  Son  of  God  pre\aously  to  the  creation  of  these  angels,  c.  9] 
consuetudine  ipsa  paulatim  ad  \atia  pellexit,  et  mulierum  congressibus 
inquinavit.  Turn  in  coelum  ob  peccata  non  recepti  ceciderunt  ad 
terram.  Sic  eos  Diabolus  ex  angelis  Dei  suos  fecit  satellites."  {Divin. 
Inst.  lib.  ii.  c.  15.) 

To  this  order  of  da3mons,  which  the  Platonists  revered,  but  which 
the  Fathers  identified  with  the  lost  spirits  of  Scripture,  both  Christian 
and  heathen  writers  in  common  assigned  the  authorship  of  the  super- 
natural effects  produced  by  magic.  "  Apuleius,"  says  Augustine, 
"  ascribes  to  these  the  divinations  of  the  augurs  and  soothsayers,  the 
foresight  of  prophets  and  dreams,  and  also  the  miracles  of  wizards" 
{miracula  viagorum).  {De  Civ.  Dei,  xiii.  16.)  TertuUian  attributes  the 
responses  of  the  heathen  oracles  and  other  Pagan  channels  of  prophecy, 
as  well  as  the  miracles  of  magic,  to  the  same  source.  "  Omnis  spiritus 
ales  est  :  hoc  angeli  etdtcmones  :  igitur  momento  ubicpie  sunt :  totus 
orbis  illis  locus  unus  est  :  quod  ubique  generatur  tani  facile  sciunt 
quam  enuntiant,  velocitas  divinitas  creditur,  quia  substantia  ignoratur, 
....  Porro  et  magi  phantasmata  edunt  ....  multa  mii'acula  cir- 
culatoriis   pra^stigiis  ludunt,    habentes   dtemonum  assistentem   sibi 


I]  Note  3  203 

IDotestatein."  {A'pol.  cc.  22,  23.)  Justin  Martyr  {Afol.  lib.  i.  s.  5), 
Irenseus  {Contra  Hmr.  ii.  c.  32),  Lactantius  {Divin.  Inst.  lib.  ii.  c.  15)  use 
the  same  language.  So  too  Minutius  Felix  :  "  Magi  quoque  non 
tantum  sciunt  daemonas,  sed  etiani  quicquid  miraculi  ludunt,  per 
dsemonas  faciunt ;  illis  adspirantibus  et  infundentibus."  {Odavius, 
c.  26.)  So  too  Augustine  :  "  Addinius  etiam  et  liuraanarum  et  niagi- 
carum,  id  est  per  homines  dsemonicarum  artium,  et  ipsorura  per 
seipsos  dajmonum  multa  miracula."  {De  Civ.  Dei,  xxi.  6.)  And  he 
argues  for  the  reality  of  true  or  divinely- wrought  miracles  from  the 
fact  of  these  miracles  of  inferior  and  diabolical  origin  :  "  Quamobrem 
si  tot  et  tanta  miritica  Dei  creatura  utentibus  humanis  artibus  fiunt, 
ut  ea  qui  nesciunt  opinentur  esse  divina  :  si  magorum  opera,  quos 
nostra  Scriptura  veneficos  et  incantatores  vocat,  in  tantum  dsemones 

extollere  potuerunt quanto  magis  Deus  potens  est  facere  quae 

infidelibus  sunt  incredibilia."  (Ibid.)  Origen  accounts  for  the  power 
of  magicians,  by  the  help  partly  of  his  mysterious  theory  of  ivorcls, 
which  he  applies  to  this  subject,  intimating  that  a  power  is  exerted 
over  daemons  by  the  knowledge  and  utterance  of  their  true  names,  in 
the  language  of  their  own  aj^propriate  regions  :  Al6  kuI  SiivctTctL  ravra 
TO,  ovofiara  Xeyofxeva  ixerd  rivos  toD  avfj.(pvovs  avrois  elpfiov'  dXXa  8i  Kara 
AiyvTTTiav    (pepofxeva   (pwvT]v,   iiri  tlvQv  bai.fi6vu3V  tQv  rdSe  iJ.6va  Swa/J-ifuv, 

Kai  dWa  Kara  tt]v  Hepffwv  didXeKTOv  iwl  dWuv  Swapieoov Ort 

oi  irepl  T7]u  XPW'-"  ''''^^  €Tr(^b€>v  Seivol  iaropovaiv,  6ti  t^v  avTT]v  eirwSrjt' 
elirovra  fj-ev  ry  oiKeiq,Sia\iKT(j},  ^ariv  evepyrjaai  oirep  iir ayyeWerai  ij  iirtpOT] 
{Contra  Cels.  lib.  i.  s.  24,  25. 1) 

Such  being  the  belief  of  the  Fathers  in  the  reality  of  magic,  a 
belief  which  they  expressed  either  with  simplicity  or  with  ingenious 
and  philosophical  additions,  according  to  the  character  of  the  writers, 
how  did  they  distinguish  true  miracles  wrought  in  evidence  of  a 
Divine  communication  from  the  supernatural  results  of  magic  ?  They 
had  different  modes  of  meeting  this  objection,  and  establishing  the 
Divine  source  of  the  Gospel  miracles.  They  appealed  to  the  greatness, 
majesty,  and  sublimity  of  the  latter,  which  were  of  such  a  kind  that 
no  magic  had  ever  professed  to  produce  anything  like  them.  Our 
Lord's  Resurrection  especially  was  regarded  as  intrinsicallj'  a  Divine 
act,  being,  as  it  was,  a  miracle  sui  generis,  not  wrought  by  any  interme- 

^  Professor  Blunt,  in  his  "  Lectures  on  the  Early  Fathers,"  has  a  note 
upon  this  theory  of  names  put  forth  by  Origen  ;  in  which,  however,  he 
erroneously  supposes  the  theory  to  be  connected  in  Origen's  meaning  with 
Christian  exorcism,  and  the  exertion  of  miraculous  powers  within  the 
Church,  whereas  Origen  is  not  speaking  of  Christian  miracles,  but  of  heathen 
anil  Jewish  magic,  and  only  proposes  the  theory  in  that  connection, 
(munt,  p.  399.) 


204  Note  3  [Lect. 

diate  agent,  any  person  intervening  between  the  Invisible  Supernatural 
Power  and  the  subject  of  that  power,  but  wrought  by  our  Lord  Him- 
self upon  Himself  :  Himself  in  death  restoring  Himself  to  life.  (See 
below,  p.  197.)  "  IMagicians,"  says  Chrysostom,  speaking  even  of  the 
miracles  of  our  Lord's  ministry,  "have   wrought  miracles,  but  not 

sucll  miracles" yrf77Tes    (njfj.e7a    Troiouffi,    dXX'   ov  Toiadra  voiovai  a-q/xela. 

(toni.  xii.  p.  32.)  "  Potestis  aliquem  nobis  designare,"  says  Arnobius, 
"  monstrare  ex  omnibus  illis  magis  qui  unquam  fuere  per  secula, 
consimile  aliquid  Christo  millesima  ex  parte  qui  fecerit  ?"  {Adv. 
Gentes,  lib.  i.  c.  43.)  The  manner  and  mode  in  which  Christ  wrought 
His  miracles,  without  any  of  the  low  forms  and  fantastic  utterances 
and  repetitions  of  magic,  by  a  simj^le  word  or  touch,  is  also  observed. 
"  We  may  also  with  St.  Irena3us^  observe," says  Barrow,  "that  Jesus, 
in  performing  His  cures  and  other  miraculous  works,  did  never  use 
any  profane,  silly,  fantastic  ceremonies  ;  any  muttering  of  barbarous 
names  or  insignificant  phrases ;  any  invocation  of  spirits,  or  inferior 
powers  ;  any  preparatory  purgations,  any  mysterious  circumstances 
of  proceeding,  apt  to  amuse  people  ;  any  such  unaccountable  methods 
or  instruments  as  magicians,  enchanters,  diviners,  circulatorious 
jugglers  and  such  emissaries  of  the  devil,  or  self-seeking  impostors, 
are  wont  to  use ;  but  did  proceed  altogether  in  a  most  innocent, 
simple,  and  grave  manner,  with  a  majestic  authority  and  clear  sin- 
cerity, becoming  such  an  agent  of  God  as  He  professed  Himself  to 
be.''     (Vol.  V.  p.  205.) 

But  the  great  token  by  which  the  Fathers  distinguished  the  miracles 
of  the  Gospel,  those  supernatural  works  which  bore  witness  to  our 
Lord's  Divine  mission,  from  the  miracles  jsroduced  by  thaumaturgy 
and  the  j)ower  of  inferior  spirits,  was  the  evidence  of  prophecy.  The 
body  of  miracles  which  testified  to  our  Lord  as  the  Messiah,  coincided 
and  fij^kd  in  with  a  whole  series  of  prophetical  indications  which  had 
commenced  with  the  beginning  of  things,  i.e.  with  the  fall  of  the  first 
man,  and  had  been  sustained  continuously  almost  to  the  very  advent 
of  our  Lord.  From  the  first  page  of  the  old  Testament  to  the  last  a 
constant  promise  was  held  out  of  the  coming  of  One  who  should  redeem 
mankind — a  Great  Deliverer  who  should  save  His  people  from  their 
sins,  and  plant  a  new  dispensation,  a  Divine  kingdom  in  the  world. 
It  was  evident  that  when  this  great  Personage,  so  long  pointed  out 
by  projihecy,  came,  there  must  be  tokens  by  which  He  could  be  re- 
cognised as  the  person  who  was  meant  by  such  prophecy,  who  was  the 
true  Messiah,  to  whom  all  these  intimations  belonged.  When  there- 
fore a  Personage  appeared  who  claimed  to  he  the  Messiah,  who  an- 
^  Contra  IIa;r.  ii.  58. 


I] 


Note  3  205 


nounced  Himself  as  tlie  Head  of  tliis  new  kingdom  in  the  world, — 
One  whose  whole  life  and  teaching  corresponded  to  that  pretension, 
and  who  moreover  authenticated  His  character  and  mission  by  the 
most  remarkable  and  astonishing  miracles  :  such  an  exhibition  of 
miraculous  power  must  plainly  in  reason  be  looked  upon  not  simply 
in  itself,  but  also  in  connection  with  that  constant  voice  of  prophecy 
Avhich  had  heralded  the  apjjroach  of  a  Messiah.  Here  was  a  coinci- 
dence— a  Great  Personage  with  an  extraordinary  mission  had  been 
jjredided,  One  who  professed  to  be  this  Great  Personage  had  come, 
bringing  the  testimony  of  miracles  to  the  truth  of  His  announcement. 
Such  a  miraculous  demonstration,  therefore,  could  not  be  regarded  in 
the  same  light  as  that  in  which  a  sudden  and  unlooked-for  outbreak 
of  sujjernatural  power  would  be,  some  wonderful  outburst  which 
came  isolated  and  disconnected  with  all  circumstances  preceding 
it ;  but  must  be  contemplated  in  conjunction  ^vith  the  antecedent 
posture  of  things  and  the  antecedent  course  of  revelation.  The 
miracles  fulfilled  prophecy ;  prophecy  therefore  was  a  guarantee  to  the 
miracles.  It  was  a  security  for  their  Divine  source — that  they  really 
were  tokens  from  God.  The  two,  as  in  every  case  of  coincidence, 
confirmed  each  other.  This  was  the  great  distinction  then  which  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Fathers  separated  the  Gospel  miracles  in  character 
from  those  miracles  which  magic  and  diabolical  power  coidd  produce. 
Magic  might  achieve  extraordinary  efi'ects  for  the  moment  and  at  the 
moment,  but  it  could  not  create  the  long  antecedent  flow  of  j^rophecy, 
the  long  expectancy  of  revelation,  the  intimations  of  the  Divine  Oracle 
from  the  beginning  of  things,  the  foreshadowings  and  anticiiDations 
which  had  from  the  first  signified  the  approach  of  a  Messiah,  and  had 
been  the  standing  oracle  in  the  heart  of  the  holy  nation,  and,  in  a 
sense,  of  mankind.  The  idea  was  that  miracles,  to  have  their  proper 
eflect  as  evidence,  must  not  be  a  mere  present  exhibition,  but  that 
they  must  have  a  root  in  the  past,  that  they  must  be  the  fulfilment 
of  and  carry  out  some  great  antecedent  plan  and  promise,  that  they 
must  fit  in  with  the  course  of  the  Divine  disjoensation,  and  that  they 
must  testify  to  some  truth  which  had  already  an  incii^ient  place  in 
the  authorized  religion. 

Such  is  the  current  answer  of  the  Fathers  by  which  they  meet  the 
objection  of  magic — prophecy.  "  Should  any  one  object  to  us,"  says 
Justin  Martyr,  "  that  Christ  wrought  His  miracles  by  magic,  we  refer 
him  to  the  Proj)liets."  (Apol.  i.  30.)  "  If,"  says  Irenpeus,  "  they  say 
that  the  Lord  wrought  these  wonders  by  illusion — (pauracnoiSQs — we 
refer  them  to  the  prophetical  writings,  from  which  we  shall  shew 
that  all  these  things  were  j)redicted  of  Him."     {Contra  Hcer.  lib.  ii.  c. 


2o6  Note  3  [Lect. 

32.)  "  Celsus,"  says  Origen,  "  asserts  that  il'  we  are  asked  why  we 
believe  Jesus  to  be  the  Son  of  God,  we  reply  that  He  healed  the 
lame  aud  the  l)liiul,  whereas  he  himself  attributes  these  works  to 
magic.  I  answer  that  we  hold  Jesus  to  be  the  Son  of  God  on  account 
of  these  miracles,  but  on  account  of  them  as  having  been  foretold  by 
the  prophets."  {Contra  Cds.  lib.  ii.  s,  48.)  "  Know,"  says  Lactan- 
tiuR,  "  that  Christ  is  believed  by  us  to  be  God,  not  only  on  account 
of  His  miracles,  but  because  we  see  in  Him  all  those  things  accom- 
plished which  were  announced  by  the  Prophets.  He  wrought 
miracles  :  we  might  have  thought  Him  a  magician  as  ye  think  Him, 
and  as  the  Jews  did,  if  all  the  Prophets  had  not  with  one  mouth  fore- 
told that  He  would  do  those  very  things.  Therefore  we  believe  Him 
to  be  God,  not  more  from  His  wonderful  deeds  than  from  the  Cross 
itself,  because  that  Avas  foretold.  Nor  therefore  do  we  repose  faith  in 
His  divinity  on  account  of  His  own  testimony,  but  on  account  of  the 
testimony  of  the  Prophets,  who  long  before  predicted  what  He  would 
do  and  suffer  ; — a  kind  of  proof  which  cannot  belong  to  ApoUonius, 
or  Apuleius,  or  any  of  the  magicians."  {Divin.  Inst  lib.  v.  c.  3.) 
Augustine  takes  his  stand  upon  miracles  and  prophecy  together  : 
"  Exceptis  enim  tot  et  tantis  miracuiis,  quae  persuaserunt  Deum  es^e 
Christum,  prophetiee  quoque  Divinse  fide  dignissimoe  proecesserunt, 
qua3  in  illo,  non  sicut  a  patribus  adhuc  creduntur  implenda),  sed  jam 
demonstrantur  impleta3."     {De  Civ.  Dei,  xxii.  6.) 

Jackson  represents  with  toleral)le  fidelity  the  patristic  view  : — 
"  By  Christ's  miracles  alone  considered,  they  v)ere  not  bound  abso- 
lutebj  to  believe  He  was  the  Messias,  hut  by  comparimj  them  with  other 
circumstances,  or  presupposed  truths,  especially  the  Scripture's  received 
and  approved  prophecies  of  the  Messias :  though  no  one  for  the  greatness 
of  power  manifested  in  it  could  of  itself,  yet  the  frequency  of  them  at 
that  time,  and  the  condition  of  the  parties  on  whom  they  were 
wrought,  might  absolutely  confirm  John  and  his  disciples  ;  because 
such  they  were  in  these  and  every  respect,  as  the  evangelical  prophet 

had  foretold  Messias  should  work Such  signs  and  wonders 

might  be  wrouglit  l)y  seducers If  any  man  say  to  you,  Lo,  here 

is  Christ,  or  Lo,  He  is  there;  believe  it  not :  for  false  Christs  shall  arise, 
and  false  prophets,  and  shall  shew  signs  and  loonders,  to  deceive,  if  it 
were  jiossihle,  the  very  elect.  And  possible  it  was  to  have  deceived  even 
these,  if  it  had  been  possible  for  these  not  to  have  ti'ied  their  wonders 
by  the  written  xvord."     {Comments  on  the  Creed,  bk.  iii.  ch.  20.) 

It  was  this  sense  and  deep  estimate  of  the  value  of  prophecy,  as  evi- 
dence of  the  Messiah,  and  as  a  voucher  for  the  Divine  design  in, 
and  the  authentic  nature  of  the  miraculous  evidence  accompanying 
Hini,  that  sent  the  Fathers  into  the  region  of  heathen  prophecy,  to 
discover  and  collect  the  scattered  traces  of  that  wider  and  earlier  reve- 


1 


1] 


Note  3  207 


lation  wliicli  Lad  from  the  first  shadowed  forth  this  mighty  Person, 
and  had  sjjread  dimly  and  irregularly  from  the  fountain-head  of 
prophecy.  Theii'  idea  was  to  carry  the  evidence  of  a  Messiah  hack  as 
far  as  possible — hack  into  the  infancy  of  time,  and  into  the  first  dawn 
of  inspiration  ;  not  only  that  inspiration  which  had  been  reposited  in 
the  sacred  books,  but  that  also  which  had  travelled  out  of  the  sacred 
line  of  testimony  into  the  world  at  large,  and  scattered  itself  with  the 
ramifications  and  migrations  of  the  human  race  :  it  was  to  connect  the 
Messiah  with  the  first  forecast  of  the  future  which  had  been  imparted 
to  mankind,  and  with  a  great  prophetic  wish  which  had  thus  from 
the  first  seated  itself  in  the  heart  of  mankind.  Thus  the  Sibylline 
prophecies,  which  contained  as  interpreted  by  Virgil  the  original  ele- 
ment of  a  great  anticipation,  but  which  had  become  corrupted  by  inter- 
polations, were  ajspealed  to  by  the  Fathers  with  the  interest  and 
fondness  of  writers  who  delighted  to  see  the  exj^ectation  of  a  Messiah 
rooted  in  the  mind  of  the  human  race.  (See  Augustine,  Be,  Civ.  JDei, 
xviii.  23  ;  Lactantius,  Divin.  Inst.  i.  6  ;  iv.  6,  15.) 

"  It  was  a  sound  and  healthy  feeling,"  says  Neander,  "  that  induced 
the  apologists  of  Christianity  to  assume  the  existence  of  a  prophetic 
element,  not  in  Judaism  alone,  but  also  in  Paganism ;  and  to  make 
appeal  to  this,  as  the  apostle  Paul  at  Athens,  in  proclaiming  the  God 
of  revelation,  appealed  to  the  presentiment  of  the  unknown  God  in  the 
immediate  consciousness  of  mankind,  and  to  those  forms  in  which 
this  consciousness  had  been  expressed  by  the  words  of  insjiired  poets. 
Christianity,  in  tnxth,  is  the  end  to  which  all  development  of  the 
religious  consciousness  must  tend,  and  of  which,  therefore,  it  cannot 
do  otherwise  than  oft'er  a  prophetic  testimony.  Thus  there  dwells 
an  element  of  prophecy  not  barely  in  revealed  religion,  unfolding 
itself  beneath  the  fostering  care  of  the  divine  vintager  (John  xv.)  as  it 
struggles  onward  from  Judaism  to  its  complete  disclosure  in  Chris- 
tianity ;  but  also  in  religion  as  it  grows  wild  on  the  soil  of  Paganism, 
which  l)y  nature  must  strive  unconsciously  towards  the  same  end. 
But  the  apologists  ....  allowed  themselves  to  be  imposed  upon  by 
sjjurious  and  interpolated  matter. 

"  Thus,  for  instance,  there  were  interpolated  writings  of  this  descrip- 
tion passing  under  the  name  of  that  mythic  personage  of  anti(|uity, 
the  Grecian  Hermes  (Trismegistus)  or  the  Egyptian  Thoth  ;  also 
under  the  names  of  the  Persian  Hystaspes  (Gushtasji),  and  of  the 
Sibyls,  so  celeljrated  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  legends,  which  were 
used  in  good  faith  by  the  apologists.  Whatever  truth  at  bottom 
might  be  lying  in  those  time-old  legends  of  the  Sibylline  prophecies,  of 
which  the  profound  Heraclitus,  five  hundred  years  before  Christ,  had 
said,  '  Their  unadorned,  earnest  words,  spoken  with  ins2:iired  mouth, 
reached  through  a  thousand  years  ; '  the  consciousness  of  such  a  pro- 
phetic element  in  Paganism,  that  which  in  these  predictions  was  sup- 
jjosed  to  refer  to  the  fates  of  cities  and  nations,  and  more  particularly 


2o8  Note  3  [Lect. 

to  a  last  and  golden  age  of  the  world,  gave  occasion  to  divers  interpreta- 
tions taken  from  Jewish  and  Christian  points  of  view."  {Church 
llistoi-y,  vol.  i.  p.  240.) 

Lactantius  claims  the  tribute  of  contemporary  oracles  to  our  Lord, 
and  reports  the  response  of  the  '' Milesian  Apollo"  to  the  question 
whether  Christ  was  "  God  or  man" — dvrfToz  irjv  Kara  crdpKa,  k.t.X.  (Divin. 
Inst,  iv,  13.)     The  patristic  feeling  is  again  represented  by  Jackson  : — 

"  Plutarch's  relation  of  his  demoniacal  S])irit3  mourning  for  great 
Pan's  deatli,  aboiit  this  time,  is  so  strange,  that  it  might  perhaps  seem 
a  tale,  unless  the  truth  of  the  common  bruit  had  been  so  constantly 
avouched  by  ear-witnesses  unto  Tiberiiis,  tliat  it  made  him  call  a 
convocation  of  wise  men,  as  Herod  did  at  our  Saviour's  birth,  to  re- 
solve him  who  this  great  Pan,  late  deceased,  should  be.  Thamous, 
the  Egyptian  master  (unknown  by  that  name  to  his  passengers,  until 
he  answered  to  it  at  the  third  call  of  an  uncouth  voice,  uttered  sine 
aidhore  from  the  land,  requesting  him  to  proclaim  the  news  of  great 
Pan's  death,  as  he  passed  Ijy  Palodes),  was  resolved  to  have  let  all 
pass  as  a  fancy  or  idle  message,  if  the  wind  and  tide  should  grant 
him  passage  by  the  place  appointed  ;  but  the  Avind  failing  him  on  a 
sudden,  at  his  coming  thither,  he  thought  it  but  a  little  loss  of 
breath  to  call  out  aloud  unto  the  shore,  as  he  had  been  requested, 
'  Great  Pan  is  dead.'  The  words,  as  Plutarch  relates,  were  scarce  out 
of  his  mouth  before  they  were  answered  with  a  huge  noise,  as  it  had 
been  of  a  multitude,  sighing  and  groaning  at  this  wonderment. 
,  .  .  The  circumstance  of  the  time  will  not  permit  me  to  doubt, 
but  that  under  the  known  name  of  Pan  was  intimated  the  great 
Shepherd  of  our  souls."    {Comments  on  the  Creed,  bk.  i.  ch.  10.) 

But  Ijecause  prophecy  was  in  the  judgment  of  the  Fathers  wanted 
to  guarantee  the  Divine  source  of  miracles,  and  give  them  their 
proper  eflect  as  evidence,  it  is  not  to  be  considered  that  the  Fathers 
superseded  the  intrinsic  force  of  miracles,  and  merged  it  in  prophecy. 
Each  of  these  kinds  of  evidence,  in  their  view,  stood  in  need  of  the 
other  ;  miracles  to  shew  who  was  the  object  of  prophecy,  prophecy 
to  mark  the  DiAdne  character  of  the  miracles  ;  but  neither  of  these 
Avas  regarded  as  sufficient  without  the  other.  It  was  not  supposed 
that  prophecy  of  itself  would  be  enough  to  point  out  the  Messiah  to 
the  world  upon  His  arrival,  and  give  mankind  a  justification  for 
fixing  ujion  a  particidar  individual  as  being  that  great  Personage. 
For  how  does  the  case  stand  ?  A  mighty  Deliverer  and  Redeemer  of 
mankind  from  sin  and  death  is  announced  beforehand,  but  how  is 
He  known  when  He  does  come?  His  office  is  principally  mysterious 
and  supernatural,  and  does  not  bear  witness  to  itself.  The  circum- 
stance therefore  that  One  who  will  fulfil  this  office  is  predicted  does 
not  supersede  the  necessity  of  some  adequate  marks  and  signs  at  the 
time  to  indicate  who  the  predicted  Person  is,  and  distinguish  Hiiu 


I] 


Note  3  209 


wlien  He  arrives  from  others.  And  the  natural  mark  of  such  a  Per- 
sonage is  miraculous  power.  This  in  the  idea  of  the  Fathers  is 
wanted  then  to  point  out  at  the  time  "  the  Lamb  of  God  that  taketh 
away  the  sin  of  the  world,"  as  prophecy  is  wanted  to  mark  that  mira- 
culous power  as  divinely  bestowed  and  indicative  of  the  Divine  will. 
Prophecy  announced  beforehand  that  such  a  Personage  would  come  ; 
the  signs  by  which  He  would  be  recognized,  when  He  did  come,  must 
depend  upon  other  considerations,  viz.  what  are,  the  natural  and 
adequate  evidences  of  such  a  Personage,  His  character  and  mission. 
This  is  a  question  of  judgment  and  reason,  mth  which  prophecy  has 
nothing  to  do.  Prophecy  in  proclaiming  Him  beforehand  implies  that 
He  will  be  known  and  distinguishable  upon  His  arrival ;  which  im- 
plies that  He  will  be  accompanied  at  the  time  by  sufficient  evidences  : 
but  prophecy  does  not  settle  what  those  evidences  are,  much  less  does 
it  supersede  the  need  of  them. 

The  patristic  structure  of  evidence  was  indeed,  like  the  modern,  a 
mixed  one,  consisting  of  dilferent  materials — prophecy,  miracles ;  the 
remarkable  peculiarity  of  the  spread  of  Christianity  in  the  world, 
that  it  ascended  from  the  lower  classes  of  society  to  the  upper,  an'l 
not  by  the  reverse  process  ;  and  that  the  new  religion  was  first  pro. 
mulgated  by  rude  men  unacquainted  with  learning*  and  rhetoric,  and 
gained  ground  by  the  force  of  jiersuasion,  amid  persecution  and  dis- 
couragement, m  spite  of  torture  and  death ;  the  moral  result  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  it  converted  men  from  the  lowest  sensuality  to  the 
practice  of  virtue  and  piety,  and  wherever  it  had  been  received  had 
"wrought  a  wonderful  change  in  the  habits  of  mankind.  The  patristic 
argument  consisted  of  all  these  considerations,  only  not  collected  into 
the  compact  body  of  statement  which  modern  writers  have  produced, 
but  given  out  as  each  point  happened  to  suggest  itself  to  the  writer's 
mind,  and  occurring  often  in  the  midst  of  other  and  extraneous  matter. 
Even  the  professed  Apologetic  treatises  of  the  ancients  are  deficient  in 
plan  and  method.  But  the  materials  of  the  modern  treatises  on 
evidence  are  there ;  and  with  the  direct  proofs  of  Christianity  the 
collateral  also  appear.  "  Ineruditos  liberalibus  disciplinis,  et  onmino, 
quantum  ad  istorum  doctrinas  attinet,  impolitos,  non  peritos  gram- 
matica,  non  armatos.  dialectica,  non  rhetorica  inflatos,  piscatores 
Christus  cum  retibus  fidei  ad  mare  hujus  seculi  paucissimos  misit." 
(Augustine,  J)e  Civit.  Dei,  xxii.  5.)  Lactantius  appeals  to  the  rude- 
ness and  simplicity  of  the  first  promulgators  of  the  Gospel  as  evidence 
of  the  genuineness  and  sincerity  of  their  own  belief  in  the  facts  which 
they  reported  (Div.  hist.  v.  3),  to  the  progress  of  the  faith  under  per- 
secution {Ibid,  v.    1 3),  to  the  virtues  of  Christians,  especially  their 

0 


2 1  o  N^ote  3  [Lect. 

humility  and  "  equity,"  i.e.  their  all  looking  upon  themselves  as  equal 
in  the  sight  of  God,  and  the  rich  and  gi-eat  among  them  lowering  them- 
selves to  the  level  of  the  poor  : — "  Dicet  alicpiis,  Nonne  sunt  apud  vos, 
alii  pauperes,  alii  divites  ;  alii  servi,  alii  domini  ?  Nonne  aliipiid  inter 
singulos  interest  ?  Nihil  :  nee  alia  causa  est  cur  nobis  invicein  fratrum 
nomen  impertiamus,  nisi  quia  pares  esse  nos  credimus."  (v.  i6.) 
Origen  retorts  upon  Celsus  the  taunt  of  the  lowly  l)irth  and  parentage 
of  Jesus,  and  draws  an  argument  jor  the  Gospel  from  the  circum- 
stance of  our  Lord's  surmounting  such  obstacles :  he  draws  attention 
to  the  rapid  spread  of  His  doctrine,  the  comprehensive  power  by 
which  it  has  drawn  over  to  itself  wise  and  unwise,  Greek  and  bar- 
barian, the  violent  persecutions  it  enabled  them  to  endure,  the  difficult 
moral  virtues  which  it  enabled  them  to  practise.  [Contra  Ccls.  i.  27  et 
seq.)  The  success  of  Christianity,  that  it  had  gained  ground,  that  it  icas 
believed  liy  such  a  large  jiart  of  the  world, — this  matter-of-fact  argu- 
ment has  a  place  in  the  jjatristic  evidences :  "  Nemo  Apollonium  pro 
Deo  colit,"  says  Lactantius  {Div.  Inst  v.  3).  This  argument  has  even 
more  of  a  place  than  might  have  been  expected  at  that  early  stage  of 
the  progress  of  Cluistianity  ;  and  even  before  Augustine  talked  of 
the  conversion  of  the  "  world,"  which  when  the  Roman  Emjoire  was 
gained  he  might  colourably  do,  Origen  boasted  of  the  "  world's " 
subjugation  to  the  Gospel — ws  fu-^crat  6\ov  Kua-fxav  aiVy  iirilBovXeiiovTa 
(Contra  Cels.  i.  3), 

Indeed,  Augustine  rhetoricallj^  pushes  the  argument  of  the  success 
of  the  Gospel  to  such  an  extent  that  he  appears  at  first  to  assert  that 
that  success  of  itself  is  evidence  enough  of  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
and  that  besides  the  miracle  of  this  success  no  other  miracle  is  wanted. 
'  Si  vero  per  Apostolos  Christi,  ut  eis  crederetur,  Resurrexionem  atque 
Ascensionem  pra3dicantibus  Christi,  etiam  ista  miracula'  facta  esse 
non  credmit ;  hoc  nobis  umivi  grande  miraculvvi  sufficit,  qnod  earn  ter- 
rarum  orhis  sine  ullis  miraculis  credidit."  (De  Civ.  Dei,  lib.  xxii.  c.  5.) 
But  when  we  examine  Augustine's  argument  w^e  find  that  what  he 
asserts  is  not  that  Christianity  is  independent  of  the  evidence  of 
miracles,  but  that  the  evidence  of  the  miracles  is  so  strong  and  over- 
whelming that  the  fact  of  their  falsehood,  in  spite  of  this  evidence, 
would  be  more  extraordinary  than  the  fact  of  their  truth.  He  is 
arguing  for  the  doctrine  of  the  resiirrection  of  the  body  against  the 

^  "  Ista  miracula  "  alludes  in  Augustine's  argument  to  the  miracles  of 
the  Apostles,  by  wliicli  they  con  finned  their  testimony  to  our  Lord's  Eesur- 
rection  and  Asrension.  "  If  you  do  not  believe  in  these  miracles,"  lie 
says,  "  you  have  to  believe  in  as  great  a  miracle,  the  beliel'  in  the  Kesur- 
rection  without  them."  Tlie  special  allusion,  however,  to  the  Apostolic 
miracles  is  not  necessary  to  the  argument. 


I] 


Note  3  2  11 


heathen  philosophers  who  thought  it  incredible  :  "  Sed  videlicet 
homines  docti  atque  sapientes  acute  sibi  argumentari  videntur 
contra  corporum  resurrexionem."  (De  Civ.  Dei,  xxii.  4.)  And  against 
this  notion  of  the  incredibility  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  he 
urges  the.  fact  of  our  Lord's  bodily  resurrection.  This  fact,  he  says, 
is  now  accepted  by  the  whole  world.  "  Sed  incredibile  fuerit  ali- 
([uando  :  eccejam  credidit  mundus  suhlatum  terrenum  Christi  corpus 
in  coelum,  resurrectionem  carnis  et  ascensionem."  (c.  5.)  But  that  the 
whole  world, he  says,should  believe  that  a  thing  intrinsically  incredible 
has  taken  place  is  itself  incredible.  He  thus  reduces  the  philosophers 
to  the  dilemma  that  they  must  believe  something  incredible,  either 
the  incredible  fact  itself  or  the  incredible  belief  in  it ;  and  therefore  that 
the  apparent  incredibility  of  the  miracle  of  Christ's  Resurrection  is 
no  reason  against  it.  The  argument  is  rhetorical  and  not  a  rigid 
specimen  of  evidential  reasoning  ;  but  what  the  argument  aims  at  is 
the  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  miracle  of  our  Lord's  Resurrection,  not 
the  conclusion  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  being  independent  of  that 
miracle.  "  Si  rem  incredibilem  crediderunt,  videant  cpiam  sint 
stolidi  [the  heathen  sceptics  against  whom  he  is  arguing]  qui  non  cre- 
dunt  :  si  autem  res  incredibilis  credita  est,  etiam  hoc  utique  incredi- 
bile est  sic  creditum  esse  quod  inci-edilnle  est."  (Ibid.)  Why  should 
the  resui-rection  of  the  body  and  the  particular  resurrection  of  our 
Lord's  body  be  disbelieved  as  incredible,  when  if  we  disbelieve  that 
we  must  believe  something  else  which  is  quite  as  incredilile.  We 
meet  the  same  argument  in  Chrysostom  :  Tld^e;'  t6  a^Loiria-Tov  ^axov ; 
Swep  yap  ^(pdrjv  elirwv,  el  aTjfjieluv  x'^P'-^  ^weiaav,  TrdXXy  fJ-eX^ov  to  davfia 
<t>alveTai.   {Horn.  vi.  in  Cor.  tom.  x.  p.  45.) 

So  again  Augustine  says  (Contra  Ep.  Mnniclioii,  c.  5) — "  Ego  vero 
Evangelio  non  crederem,  nisi  me  catholicse  ecclesioj  comrnoveret  auc- 
toritas," — which  some  might  interpret  to  mean  that  he  accepted  the 
Gospel  upon  the  testimony  of  the  Church  solely,  and  did  not  recjuire 
the  proof  of  miracles.  But  Thorndike  in  commenting  on  this 
passage  distinguishes  between  two  functions  and  capacities  of  the 
Church,  one  false,  the  other  true  ;  one,  according  to  which  the  Church 
was  an  infallible  asserter,  and  her  assertion  enough  ;  the  other,  accord- 
ing to  which  the  Church  was  a  body  of  men  witnessing  to  the  trans- 
mission of  certain  doctrines  and  scriptures,  upon  certain  evidence  ; 
witnessing,  i.e.  to  the  evidence  of  those  credenda,  as  well  as  to  the 
credenda  themselves — such  evidence  being  principally  miracles. 
This  is  Thorndike's  fundamental  distinction  in  treating  of  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Church  and  the  inspiration  of  Scripture — his  answer  to  the 
dilemma,  to  Avliich  the  Roman  diraies  profess  to  reduce  us  upon  the 


212 


Note  3  [Lect, 


latter  question,  urging  that  we  receive  the  inspiration  of  Scripture 
upon  the  autliority  of  tlie  Church  ;  and  that  therefore  we  stand  com- 
mitted to  tlie  princii)le  of  the  authority  of  the  Church  in  the  fact  of 
our  helief  in  the  Bi1)le.  We  do,  is  Thorndike's  reply,  but  not  to  the 
authority  of  the  Church  as  an  infallilde  asserter,  but  as  a  body 
vdtnessing  to  the  transmission  of  certain  evidence  for  the  inspir- 
ation of  Scripture,  contained  in  Apostolic  history, — viz.  the  assertion 
of  their  own  inspiration  by  the  Apostles,  attested  by  miracles.  He 
explains  then  Augustine's  statement  in  accordance  with  this  dis- 
criminating view,  "  The  question  is  whether  the  authority  of  the 
Church  as  a  corporation  would  have  moved  St.  Augustine  to  believe 
the  Gospel  because  they  held  it  to  be  true ;  or  the  credit  of  the  Church 
as  of  so  many  men  of  common  sense  attesting  the  truth  of  those  reasons 
which  the  Gospel  tenders,  why  we  ought  to  believe."  {Principles  of 
Christian  Truth,  1)k.  i.  cli.  iii.) 

Tlie  Fathers  indeed  assign  other  inferior  uses  to  miracles  besides 
the  most  imi^ortant  pui"i30se  of  evidence  ;  such  as  those  of  exciting 
and  stimulating,  awakening  men  from  the  torpor  of  custom  ;  and  in 
the  light  of  this  advantage  they  speak  of  miracles  as  an  accommoda- 
tion to  human  weakness.  Thus  Augustine  :  "  Quamvis  itaque 
miracula  visibilium  naturarum  videndi  assiduitate  viluerunt,  tamen 
cum  ea  sapienter  intueamur  inusitatissimis  rarissiniisque  majora  sunt. 
Nam  et  omni  miraculo  quod  fit  per  hominem  majus  miraculum  est 
homo.  Quapropter  Deus  qui  fecit  visibilia,  coclum  et  terrani,  non 
dedignatiir  facere  visibilia  miracula  in  coclo  et  terra  quibus  ad  se  invisi- 
bilem  colendum  excitet  animum  adhuc  visibilibus  deditum."  {De  Civ. 
Dei,  X.  13.)  Chrysostom  looks  upon  miracles  in  the  same  light, 
when  he  accounts  for  the  cessation  of  the  gift  of  tongues  by  remarking 
that  Christians  of  that  later  day  did  not  need  such  wonders  to  move 
their  faith.  "  Tongues,  as  Paul  saith,  are  for  a  sign  not  to  them 
that  believe,  but  to  them  that  believe  not.  Ye  see  that  God  has  re- 
moved this  sign,  not  to  disgrace  but  to  honour  you  ;  designing  to  shew 
that  your  faith  does  not  depend  wpon  tokens  and  signs."  (torn.  ii.  p.  464.) 

In  this  light  too  the  Fathers  would  seem  to  view  miracles,  when 
they  join  the  current  miracles  of  their  own  age  to  those  of  Scripture 
in  the  evidential  office.  The  Fathers  assert  uno  ore  that  miracles 
had  then  ceased  ;  yet  they  sjieak  of  miracles  taking  place  in  the 
Church  then,  and  even  of  these  miracles  witnessing  in  a  sense  to  the 
truth  of  the  Gospel.  We  must  reconcile  these  two  conflicting  state- 
ments by  supposing  that  they  recognized  certain  powers  working  in 
and  events  taking  place  in  the  Church,  which,  though  not  rising  uj) 
to  the  level  of  the  miracles  of  Scripture,  still  shewed  extraordinary 


I] 


Note 


21 


Divine  action,  and  in  the  degree  in  which  they  did  possessed  an  evi- 
dential function,  and  kept  alive  the  faitli  of  the  Church.  "  Christian 
doctrine,"  says  Origen,' "  has  its  proper  proof  in  the  demonstration, 
as  the  Apostle  says,  of  the  Spirit  and  of  power  \  of  the  Spirit  in 
prophecy,  of  power  in  the  miracles  which  Christians  could  then 
Avork,  and  of  which  the,  vestiges  still  remcmi  among  those  who  live 
according  to  the  Christian  precepts — t^vr)  'in  a-w^eadai."  {Contra  Gels. 
lib.  i.  s.  2.)  "  It  is  a  magnificent  act  of  Jesus,  that  even  to  this  day 
those  whom  He  wills  are  healed  in  His  name."  {Ihid.  ii.  33.)  Ire- 
nseus,  after  asserting  that  our  Lord's  miracles  were  verified  by  pro- 
phecy, which  shewed  Him  to  be  the  Son.  of  God,  adds,  "  Wherefore 
in  His  name  His  true  disciples  now  perform  deeds  of  mercy:"  he 
mentions  exorcisms,  cures,  &c.  {Contra  Hair.  ii.  32.)  "  That  Jesus," 
says  Justin  Martyr,  "  was  made  man  for  the  sake  of  the  believers,  and 
for  the  subversion  of  daemons,  is  manifest  from  what  is  done  before  your 
eyes  all  over  the  world  ;  when  those  who  are  vexed  by  daemons, 
whom  your  own  enchanters  could  not  cure,  are  healed  by  our  Chris- 
tians abjuring  and  casting  out  the  daemons  in  the  name  of  Jesus." 
{Apol.  ii.  s.  6.)     "  0  si  audire  eos  velles,"  says  Cyprian,  "  quando  a 

nobis  adjurantur  et  torquentur Videbis  nos  rogari  ab  eis  quos 

tu  rogas,  timeri  ab  eis  quos  tu  times."  {Ad  Demetr.  xv.)  Augustine, 
speaking  of  the  miracles  attributed  to  the  interference  of  the  martyrs, 
says,  "  Cui  nisi  huic  fidei  attestantur  ista  miracula  in  qua  jjreedicatur 
Christus  resurrexisse  in  carne,  et  in  coelum  ascendisse  in  carne  ? 
Quia  et  ipsi  martyres,  .  .  .  pro  ista  fide  mortui  sunt,  qui  ha3c  a 
Domino  impetrare  possunt,  propter  cujus  nomen  occisi  sunt."  {De 
Civ.  Dei,  xxii.  9.) 

I  have  endeavoured  to  state  the  j)atristic  use  of  the  evidence  of 
miracles,  and  the  characteristics  by  which  it  was  distinguished  from 
the  modern  popular  argument.  With  respect,  however,  to  the 
Fathers'  appeal  to  this  evidence,  it  must  be  remeinbered  that  their 
recognition  of  the  evidential  value  of  miracles,  and  of  the  need  of 
them  to  attest  the  truth  of  the  Divine  nature  and  office  of  our  Lord, 
is  seen  more  as  a  great  assumj^tion  underlying  the  whole  fal)ric  of 
patristic  reasoning  on  this  sulyect,  than  as  anything  formally  expressed 
and  developed  in  statement.  The  Fathers  undoubtedly  made  deduc- 
tions from  the  force  of  miracles  as  evidence ;  but  that  the  person  of  the 
Messiah  and  Son  of  God  who  came  to  be  the  Mediator  between  God 
and  man,  and  to  atone  by  His  death  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world, 
would,  when  He  came,  be  known  and  distinguished  wholly  without 
any  miraculous  element  in  His  birth,  life,  or  death,  simply  living  in 
and  passing  through  the  world  in  that  respect  like  an  ordinary  man 


214  Note  3  [Lect. 

— was  an  idea  which  never  even  occurred  to  the  mind  of  any  Father, 
and  whicli,  had  it  been  presented  to  him,  he  would  liave  at  once  dis- 
carded. The  ancients,  in  their  whole  representation  of  the  evidence 
of  Christ's  nature  and  supernatural  office — the  evidence  that  He  Was 
what  He  professed  to  be,  the  only -begotten  Son  of  God,  the  Lamb  of 
God  that  took  away  the  sin  of  the  world — assumed  the  gi-eat  miracles 
of  His  Birth,  Resurrection  and  Ascension ;  the  Creed  was  used  not  only 
as  a  statement  of  our  Lord's  Divine  character,  but  as  the  proof  of  it  as 
well.  Christ  as  a  superhimaan  Personage,  the  Head  of  a  supernatural 
dispensation,  must  be  known  from  other  men  by  some  ade([iuite  marks 
of  distinction  :  the  Fathers  always  took  for  granted  that  that  dis- 
tinction must  be  by  means  of  something  miraculous  :  that  where  there 
was  an  invisible  supernatural,  which  it  was  necessary  to  believe,  the 
sign  and  token  of  it  would  be  the  visible  supernatural.  The  Creed 
stated  this  miraciilous  proof,  so  far  as  it  attached  to  the  person  of  our 
Lord — His  Birth,  Resurrection,  and  Ascension.  The  Creed  was  thus 
in  essence  a  defence  as  well  as  an  assertion  of  our  Lord's  supernatural 
character — a  defence  of  it  upon  miraculous  grounds.  In  the  very 
act  of  worshipping  Jesus  Christ,  the  Fathers  indeed  assumed  the 
miraculous  evidence  of  who  Jesus  Christ  iras ;  for  to  worship  a  person 
who  had  liveil  and  died  like  an  ordinary  man,  with  however  excellent 
gifts  endowed,  was  an  idea  which  they  could  not  have  conceived ;  the 
miraculous  testimony  to  His  own  assertion  of  His  nature  was  taken 
for  granted  in  the  simple  prayer,  "  0  Son  of  David,  have  mercy 
upon  lis." 

"  The  facts  of  Christianity,"  says  Archdeacon  Lee, "  are  represented 
by  some  as  forming  no  part  of  its  'essential  doctrines ; '  they  rank,  it  is 
argued,  no  higher  than  its  '  external  accessories.'  It  is  imjjossible  to 
maintain  this  distinction.  In  the  Christian  revelation  the  fact  of  the 
Resurrection  is  the  cardinal  doctrine,  the  doctrine  of  tlie  Incarnation 
is  the  fundamental  fact.  Christianity  exhibits  its  most  momentous 
truths  as  actual  realities,  Ity  founding  them  upon  an  historical  basis, 
and  by  interweaving  them  with  transactions  and  events  whicli  rest 
ujion  the  evidence  of  sense."     {On  Miracles,  p.  5.) 

Let  us  beware,  in  conclusion,  of  depreciating  the  groundwork  of 
Christian  evidence  laid  down  by  the  Fathers,  because  these  ancient 
writers  entertained  some  points  of  belief  relating  to  the  class  of  inferior 
spirits  and  the  art  of  Magic  which  are  not  accepted  at  the  present  day. 
Such  partial  thaumaturgic  pretensions  as  the  art  of  Magic  displayed, 
even  could  we  suppose  them  real,  would  not  interfere  with  the 
l)roper  force  of  the  miraculous  evidences  of  the  Gospel ;  nor  therefore 
was  the  belief  in  them  inconsistent  with  a  true  insiLrht  into  Chi'istian 


I]  Note  4  215 

evidence.  Nor  must  we  forget  that  the  most  indiscriminating  belief  in 
magic  and  witchcraft  continued  up  to  very  recent  times  in  the  Chris- 
tian workl.  Tlie  divines  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries, 
wli  ether  English  or  Continental,  must  have  been  singularly  removed 
from  the  prejudices  and  ideas  of  their  times  if  they  were  not  more  or 
less  under  the  influence  of  the  belief  in  these  powers.^  Yet  we  should 
justly  complain  if  upon  this  ground  any  one  refused  to  allow  those 
divines  the  credit  of  being  able  to  weigh  Christian  evidence.  Jackson, 
Hamniond,  Thorndike,  and  others  lived  when  the  popular  impression 
of  the  power  of  witchcraft  to  produce  sensible  supernatm-al  effects  upon 
human  bodies  and  minds  was  strong,  and  not  confined  to  the  lower 
and  untaught  classes,  but  shared  by  the  educated.  Yet  Christian 
evidence  was  in  their  day  a  definite  department  of  theology.  Grotius 
had  produced  a  treatise  which  reigned  in  our  schools,  and  Pascal 
meditated  another,  of  which  the  fragmentary  beginnings  are  pre- 
served in  his  "  Thoughts."  Our  divines  all  that  time  discussed  the 
miraculous  proofs  of  Christianity,  and  shewed  themselves  quite  ade- 
quate to  that  task.  Sir  Matthew  Hale,  in  the  year  1665,  declared 
his  own  belief  in  witchcraft  upon  the  occasion  of  condemning  two 
women  to  ■  death  for  that  crime  ;  yet  it  would  be  a  very  mistaken 
inference  to  draw  from  the  existence  of  such  a  belief  in  that  eminent 
Christian  lawyer,  that  he  could  not  have  a  correct  percejjtion  of  the 
evidences  of  Christianity,  or  was  unequal  to  draw  up  a  sound  and 
rational  statement  of  those  evidences.  The  Fathers  j)artook  of  the 
popular  ideas  of  their  age,  which  did  not  however  incapacitate  them 
for  judging  of  Christian  evidences,  or  neutraUze  their  statements  on 
this  subject. 

NOTE  4,  p.  19. 

"  I  THEREFORE  proceed,"  says  Spinoza,  "  to  the  consideration  of 
the  four  principles  which  I  here  propose  to  myself  to  demonstrate, 
and  in  the  following  order  :  ist,  I  shall  begin  by  shewing  that 
nothing  happens  contrary  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  that  this  order 
su.bsists  without  pause  or  interruption,  eternal  aiid  unchangeable.  I 
shall  at  the  same  time  take  occasion  to  explain  what  is  to  be  under- 
stood by  a  miracle.  2nd,  I  shall  prove  that  mii-acles  cannot  make 
known  to  us  the  essence  and  existence  of  God,  nor  consequently 
His  providence,  these  great  truths  being  so  much  better  illustrated 
and  proclaimed  by  the  regular  and  invariable  order  of  nature.  .  .  . 

^  "  All  the  nations  of  Christendom,"  says  Dr.  Hey  (Norrisiau  Professor 
1 780- 1 795),  "have  so  far  taken  these  powers  for  granted,  as  to  provide  legal 
remedies  against  them.  At  this  time  there  subsist  in  tliis  Universitj^  one 
if  not  several  foundations  for  annual  sermons  to  be  preached  against  them. " 
{Bishop  Kay's  Tertullian,  p.  171.) 


2i6  Note  4  [Lect. 

"  (i)  .  .  .  .  As  nothing  is  absolutely  true  save  by  Divine  decree 
alone,  it  is  evident  that  the  universal  laws  of  nature  are  the  very 
decrees  of  God,  whicli  result  necessarily  from  the  perfection  of 
the  Divine  nature.  If  therefore  anything  happened  in  nature 
at  large  repugnant  to  its  universal  laws,  this  would  be  equally 
repugnant  to  the  decrees  and  intelligence  of  God  ;  so  that  any  one 
who  maintained  that  God  acted  in  opposition  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
would  at  the  same  time  be  forced  to  maintain  that  God  acted  in  op- 

})osilion  to  His  proper  nature,  an  idea  than  which  nothing  can 
)e  imagined  more  al)surd.  I  miglit  shew  the  same  thing,  or  strengthen 
what  I  have  just  said,  by  referring  to  the  truth  that  the  power  of  iiiiture 
is  in  fact  the  Divine  Power  ;  Divine  Power  is  the  very  essence  of  God 
Himself.  But  this  I  pass  by  for  the  present.  Nothincj,  then,  happens 
in  nature  xchich  is  in  contradiction  with  its  universal  laivs.^  Nor  this 
only  ;  nothing  hapjiens  which  is  not  in  accordance  with  these  laws, 
or  does  not  follow  them  :  for  whatever  is,  and  whatever  happens,  is 
and  happens  by  the  will  and  eternal  decree  of  God  ;  that  is,  as  has 
been  already  shewn,  whatever  ha2)pens  does  so  according  to  rules  and 
laws  which  involve  eternal  truth  and  necessity.  Nature  consequently 
always  observes  laws,  although  all  of  these  are  not  known  to  us,  which 
involve  eternal  truth  and  necessity,  and  thus  preserves  a  fixed  and 
immutable  course 

"  From  these  premises,  therefore,  viz.  WvAi  nothinrj  ha-ppens  in  nature 
which  doea  not  follmv  from  its  laws ;  that  these  laws  extend  to  all 
which  enters  into  the  Divine  mind  ;  and,  lastly,  that  nature  proceeds 
in  a  fixed  and  changeless  course  ;  it  follows  most  obviously  that  the 
word  miracle  can  only  be  understood  in  relation  to  the  opinions  of 
mankind,  and  signifies  nothing  more  than  an  event,  a  ]ihenomenon, 
the  cause  of  which  cannot  be  explained  by  another  familiar  instance, 
or,  in  any  case,  which  the  narrator  is  unable  to  ex])lain.  I  might 
say,  indeed,  that  a  miracle  was  that  the  cause  of  which  cannot  be 
ex}>lained  by  our  natural  understanding  from  the  known  principles  of 
natural  things 

"  (2)  But  it  is  time  I  passed  on  to  my  second  proposition,  which  was 
to  shew  that  from  miracles  we  can  neither  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the 
existence  nor  of  the  providence  of  God  ;  on  the  contrary,  that  these 
are  much   better   elicited  from  the   eternal  and  changeless  order  of 

nature But   sup])ose  that  it  is  said  that  a  miracle  is  that 

which  cannot  be  explained  by  natural  causes  ;  this  may  be  understood 
in  two  ways  :  either  that  it  has  natural  causes  wliich  cannot  be  inves- 
tigated by  the  human  understanding,  or  that  it  acknowledges  no 
cause  save  God,  or  the  will  of  God.  But  as  all  tliat  happens,  also 
happens  by  the  sole  will  and  power  of  God,  it  were  then  necessary  to 
say  that  a  miracle  either  owned  natural  causes,  or  if  it  did  not,  that  it 
was  inexplicable  by  anj^  cause  ;  in  other  words,  that  it  Avas  something 
which  it  surpassed  the  human  capacity  to  understand.     But  of  any- 

^  Spinoza  says  in  a  note, — "  By  nature  here  I  do  not  understand  tlie 
material  universe  only,  and  its  affections,  but  besides  matter  an  iuiiuity 
of  other  tliiiitrs." 


I]  Note /\.  217 

tiling  in  general,  and  of  the  particular  thing  in  question,  viz.  the 
miracle,  which  surpasses  our  jjowers  of  comprehension,  nothing  what- 
ever can  be  known.  For  that  which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  under- 
stand must  become  known  to  us  either  of  itself,  or  by  something  else 
which  of  itself  is  clearly  and  distinctly  understood.  Wherefore,  from, 
a  miracle,  as  an  incident  surpassing  our  powers  of  comprehension,  we 
cannot  understand  anything,  either  of  the  essence  or  existence,  or  any 

other  quality  of  God  or  nature 

"  Wherefoi'e,  as  regards  our  understanding,  those  events  which  we 
clearly  and  distinctly  comprehend,  are  with  much  better  right  en- 
titled works  of  God,  and  referred  to  His  will,  than  those  which  are 
wholly  unintelligible  to  us,  although  they  strongly  seize  upon  our  ima- 
gination and  wrap  us  in  amazement ;  inasmuch  as  those  works  of 
nature  only  which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  apprehend  render  our 
knowledge  of  God  truly  sublime,  and  point  to  His  will  and  decrees 

with  the  greatest  clearness For  if  miracles  be  understood  as 

interruptions  or  abrogations  of  the  order  of  nature,  or  as  subversive  of 
its  laws,  not  only  could  they  not  give  us  any  knowledge  of  God,  hut,  on 
the  contrary,  they  toould  destroy  that  ivhichtve  naturally  have,  and  would 
induce  douljt  both  of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  everything  else." 
{Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus,  c.  vi.) 

The  argument  of  Spinoza  under  the  first  head  is  based  upon  an 
ambiguity  in  the  meaning  of  "Nature,"  one  sense  of  which  it  uses  in  the 
premiss,  and  another  in  the  conclusion.  In  the  premiss,  Spinoza  uses 
"  Nature  "  in  the  sense  of  the  universe  both  spiritual  and  material ;  in 
which  sense  it  is  true  that  "  nothing  hapi:)ens  in  nature  which  is  in  con- 
tradiction with  its  universal  laws."  For  even  a  miracle,  though  con- 
trary to  the  order  of  the  material  world,  or  an  interruption  of  it,  is  in 
agTeeraent  with  the  order  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  as  proceeding 
from  the  Power  of  the  Head  of  that  universe,  for  a  purpose  and  end 
included  in  the  design  of  the  imiverse.  In  the  conclusion  he  slides 
from  the  universal  sense  of  nature  to  the  sense  of  nature  as  this  ma- 
terial order  of  things.  The  miracle,  or  violation  of  the  order  of  nature 
wliich  is  pronounced  impossible,  is  the  literal  historical  miracle,  which 
is  only  a  contradiction  to  this  visible  order  of  nature.  The  conclusion, 
then,  is  not  got  legitimately  out  of  the  premiss.  God  cannot  act  in 
opposition  to  the  law  and  order  of  the  whole  universe,  in  which  case 
He  would  be  acting  against  His  own  intelligence  and  will.  But  it 
does  not  follow  that  God  may  not  act  in  contradiction  to  the  order  of 
a  part,  because  the  part  is  subordinate  to  the  whole  :  and  therefore  an 
exception  to  the  order  of  a  part  may  be  subservient  to  the  order  and 
design  of  the  whole.  Spinoza,  it  may  be  added,  from  the  term  "  law  " 
extracts  "  a  fixed  and  immutable  course  of  tilings,"  or  necessity  :  but 
"  law"  in  this  sense  is  a  pure  hypothesis,  without  proof. 

The  argument  of  Spinoza  under  the  second  head  is  based  upon 


2i8  Note  \  [Lect. 

overlooking  a  miracle  as  an  instrument,  its  acting  as  a  note  and  sign 
of  the  Divine  will,  and  only  regarding  it  as  an  anomaly  beginning  and 
ending  with  itself.  Emerson  adopts  Spinoza's  aspect  of  a  miracle, 
when  he  says, — "The  word  Miracle,  as  pronounced  by  Christian 
Churches,  gives  a  false  impression  ;  it  is  a  Monster.  It  is  not  one 
with  tlie  Idowing  clouds  and  the  falling  rain."  (Lee  on  Miracles, 
p.  92.) 

NOTE  5,  p.  24. 

Whether  or  not  Mahometanism  stands  in  need  of  miracles  to 
attest  its  truth,  must  de2)end  upon  what  Mahnmetanisni  is ;  Avhether 
or  not  it  pretends  to  be  a  revelation  in  the  stiict  sense  ;  i.e.  a  revela- 
tion which  communicates  truths  undiscoverable  by  human  reason. 
Were  Mahometanism  simply  Deism,  or  rather  Monotheism ;  did  it 
only  inculcate  upon  mankind  the  great  principle  of  the  Unity  of  God  ; 
impressing  together  with  that  doctrine  the  obligation  of  worship  and 
other  moral  and  religious  duties  wdiicli  were  obvious  to  reason ;  in 
that  case  Mahometanism  could  not  require  the  evidence  of  miracles 
to  witness  to  its  truth.  Because  the  principle  of  the  Unity  of  God  is 
one  which  naturally  approves  itself  to  the  reason  of  man. 

I.  But  Mahomet  did  not  adopt  this  position  :  he  did  not  confine 
himself  to  the  ground  of  human  reason,  but  professetl  to  have  a  new 
and  exjjress  revelation  of  his  own  to  communicate  to  maiddnd,  a  reve- 
lation which  came  to  him  straight  from  heaven.  "We  reveal  unto 
thee  this  Koran,"  ^  God  is  represented  as  saying  to  Mahomet  in  that 
book  ;  "  Thou  hast  certainly  received  the  Koran  from  the  presence  of  a 
wise  and  knowing  God."  (chap,  xxvii.)  He  professed  to  have  had  this 
revelation  imparted  to  him  by  the  medium  of  an  angel,  tlie  angel 
(iabriel :  "  Galniel  (God  is  rejjresented  as  speaking)  hath  caused  the 
Koran  to  descend  upon  thine  heart,  by  the  permission  of  God."  (chap. 

^  "  Which  wc  have  sent  down  in  the  Arabic  tongue."  {Koran,  chap, 
xii.)  Sale  says  :  "  Tlic  Mahonimcdans  aljsolutcly  deny  tlmt  the  Koran  was 
cDniposed  by  their  prophet  hiinseU',  or  any  other  for  him  ;  it  being  their 
general  and  orthodox  belief  that  it  is  of  divine  original,  nay,  that  it 
is  eternal  and  uncreated,  remaining,  as  some  express  it,  in  the  very 
essence  of  God  ;  that  the  first  transcrij)t  li;is  been  from  everlasting  by 
God's  throne,  written  on  a  table  of  vast  bigness,  called  the  preserved  table, 
in  which  are  also  recorded  the  divine  decrees  j)ast  and  future  ;  tliat  a  copy 
from  this  tahh?,  in  one  volume  on  paper,  was,  by  the  ministry  of  the  angel 
Gal)riel,  sent  down  to  the  lowest  heaven,  in  the  month  of  Ibtmadam,  on  tlie 
night  of  power:  from  whence  Galjriel  revea!e<l  it  to  Mahommcd  by  parcels, 
some  at  Mecca  and  some  at  Medina,  at  dilferent  times,  during  the  space 
of  twenty-three  years,  as  the  exigency  of  affairs  required."  {Preliminary 
Discoiirnc,  sec.  iii.) 


1]  Note  5  219 

ii.)  It  is  true  that  this  revelation  to  Mahomet  is  exliibited  as  a  supple- 
mentary one,  not,  i.e.  as  a  revelation  which  contradicts  and  supersedes 
the  former  revelations  of  the  Law  and  the  Gospel,  but  wliich  carries 
them  out  and  advances  a  further  step  upon  them  ;  but  this  light  in 
which  the  Koran  is  p\it,  does  not  shew  that  it  does  not,  but  that  it  dot^ 
profess  to  be  an  express  and  separate  revelation  to  Mahomet.  It  is  plain 
that  the  GosjDel,  though  a  development  of  the  Law,  was  a  separate 
revelation  from  the  Law,  on  which  account  it  was  attested  by  its  own 
special  and  appropriate  credentials  :  the  revelation  to  Mahomet  there- 
fore, if  it  stood  in  a  like  supplementary  relation  to  both  of  these  former 
revelations  together,  was  a  revelation  additional  to  both,  a  new  reve- 
lation to  mankind  which  required  its  own  credentials,  as  the  Gospel 
did  when  it  succeeded  to  the  Law, 

"  The  Koran,"  says  Mr.  Forster,  "  was  delivered  by  Mahomet,  pro- 
fessedly as  the  complement  of  the  former  Scriptures  of  the  Law  and 
the  Gospel,  as  a  further  revelation,  that  is  to  say,  perfective  of  both  ; 
and  advancing  in  its  turn  on  the  revelation  of  the  Gospel,  as  this  had 

previously  advanced  on  that  of  the  Mosaic  Law Passages  in 

the  Koran  directly  class  the  Mahometan  Bible  so-called  with  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments."     (Mahometanisvi  Unveiled,  vol.  ii.  p.  14.) 

The  supernatural  communication  then  of  God  to  Mahomet,  the 
Divine  Mission  of  Mahomet,  needed  attestation,  to  oblige  a  rational 
assent  to  and  belief  in  it.  That  Mahomet  stood  in  these  supernatural 
relations  to  the  Divine  Being  was  a  mysterious  truth  which  no  man 
could  ascertain  by  the  natural  exercise  of  his  reason.  The  Di^ane 
intercourse  with  him  was  a  fact  which  belonged  in  its  own  nature  to 
the  invisible  and  supernatural  world.  Mahomet's  assertion  then  was 
not  proof  of  it,  neither  was  his  success  :  it  required  the  guarantee  of 
miracles. 

2.  But  besides  the  Divine  mission  of  Mahomet  to  establish  a  new  dis- 
pensation, the  substance  of  the  Mahometan  revelation  itself  is  in  many 
parts  wholly  undiscoverable  by  human  reason.  The  great  principle  of 
Monotheism  is  so  prominent  in  Mahometanism,  as  a  system  of  religious 
belief,  that  we  are  aj^t  to  regard  it  as  the  only  one,  and  so  to  look 
iipon  the  I'eligion  in  a  light  in  which  it  can  dispense  with  miraculous 
evidence.  But  besides  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Unity,  many 
most  important  articles  of  belief  are  divulged  in  the  Koran — articles 
relating  to  the  intermediate  state,  the  mode  of  the  general  resurrection, 
the  proceedings  of  the  last  judgment,  the  state  of  purgatory,  its  pains 
and  duration  ;  the  happiness  of  heaven  and  the  torments  of  hell. 
]\Iinute  revelations  are  made  on  these  subjects,  which  are  of  overpower- 
ing interest  to  the  Mahometan  believer  ;  but  wliich  are  entu'ely  super- 


2  20  Note  5  [Lect. 

natural  communications,  and  undiscoverable  by  human  reason.  Such 
information  then  rchiting  to  the  m^'sterious  and  invisible  world  stands 
in  need  of  some  maik  or  guarantee  to  attest  its  correctness :  nor  can  it 
rationally  oblige  the  l)elief  of  those  to  whom  it  is  given,  unless  it  can 
produce  such  a  voucher.     But  no  such  is  produced  in  Mahometanism. 

But  besides  tlie  doctrines  and  revelations  relating  to  the  invisible 
world,  Mahometanism  also  contains  a  large  mass  of  rules  and  usages  re- 
lating to  ijractice,  all  of  which  rest  upon  a  ground  of  express  revelation, 
and  are  regarded  ujion  that  account  as  obligatory  ;  and  which  therefore 
imply  some  direct  guarantee  attaching  to  them,  in  proof  that  they  are 
Divine  commands.  General  precepts  indeed  for  the  observance  of  the 
<luty  of  prayer,  almsgiving,  &c.,  do  not  require  any  S2:)ecial  voucher  for 
their  authority,  because  moral  duties  carry  their  own  evidence  witli 
them,  and  conscience  accepts  them  upon  their  own  intrinsic  ground. 
But  i^ositive  institutions  and  regidations,  which  are  not  binding  u^ion 
any  moral  or  natural  ground,  can  only  be  rendered  obligatory  by 
some  direct  sign  and  wan-ant  that  the  command  to  observe  them 
comes  from  God.  What  tokens  then  do  the  positive  institutions  of 
Mahometanism  present  as  credentials  of  their  Divine  origin,  and  in 
])roof  of  their  obligatoriness?  The  positive  rules  and  institutions  of 
the  Mosaic  law  exhibited  the  warrant  of  miracles,  but  those  of 
Mahometanism  do  not.  The  minute  regulations  prescribed  for  the 
])erformance  of  prayer,  the  observance  of  sacred  seasons  and  days,  the 
institution  of  pilgrimage,  and  much  other  ceremonial  matter,  all  stand 
in  the  Mahometan  religion  upon  the  exjjress  ground  of  a  Divine  com- 
mand ;  so  do  the  proliibitions  or  negative  ordinances  of  external 
observance  in  that  religion  ;  a  large  body  even  of  civil  law  stands 
upon  the  same  footing.  But  of  this  special  Divine  authority  no 
rational  proof  is  given. 

Should  the  Mahometans  ever  alter  the  basis  of  their  religion,  and 
place  their  creed  and  their  institutions  upon  another  footing  ;  should 
they  reduce  the  inspiration  of  their  Prophet  to  the  insight  of  a  deep 
religious  mind  into  the  great  truth  of  the  Unity  of  God  ;  acce])t 
tliat  belief  as  resting  upon  grounds  of  reason,  and  discard  all 
the  revelations  of  the  Koran  relating  to  the  invisible  world  and  a 
future  state  ;  should  they  transfer  the  positive  institutions  of  Maho- 
metanism from  the  ground  of  a  Divine  command  to  that  of  expediency, 
and  so  from  being  sacred  and  unchangeable  lower  them  into  alterable 
human  arrangements ;  in  that  case  their  religion  would  not  need 
miracles,  but  then  their  religion  would  cease  to  be  Mahometanism. 
Such  a  religion  would  be  Deism,  or  natural  religion.  But  Mahome- 
tanism as  it  is,  is  more  than  Deism  ;  it  is  a  professed  revelation,  and 


irj 


Note  I  2  2  [ 


the  revelation  of  what  is  uncliscoverable  by  human  reason  ;  tlie 
belief  in  which,  not  only  without  that  degree  but  without  that  Idml 
of  proof  which  a  revelation  requires,  is  in  its  very  form  irrational 
belief,  though  thousands  not  only  of  rational  but  intelligent  persons 
may  hokl  it. 


LECTUEE     II. 

NOTE  1,  p.  27. 

Bishop  Butler  in  the  introduction  to  tlie  "  Analogy"  called  atten- 
tion to  the  deficiency  in  the  philosophical  treatment  of  the  argument 
from  experience,  that  the  nature  and  ground  of  it  had  not  been  gone 
into  ; — a  part  of  the  subject  however  which  he  declines  jjursuing 
himself  as  not  being  necessary  to  the  particular  object  with  which  he 
was  concerned.  "  It  is  not  my  design,"  he  says,  "  to  inquire  further 
into  the  nature,  the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability,  or  whence 
it  proceeds  that  likeness  should  beget  that  presumptive  opinion  and 
full  conviction  which  the  human  mind  is  formed  to  receive  from^  it, 
and  which  it  does  produce  in  every  one.  This  belongs  to  the  subject  of 
Logic,  and  is  a  part  of  that  subject  which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly 
considered."  The  "Analogy"  came  out  in  1736,  and  Hume's 
"  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  which  entered  upon  this  new  field  of 
inquiry,  and  took  up  for  the  first  time  in  philosophy  the  question  of 
the  ground  of  the  argument  of  experience,  by  a  curious  coincidence, 
followed  the  notice  of  the  want  in  the  "  Analogy  "  by  an  interval  of 
only  two  years,  coming  out  in  1738. 

NOTE  2,  p.  42. 

The  general  definition  of  Induction,  that  it  is  "a  process  of  in- 
ference from  the  known  to  the  unknown  ; "  the  operation  of  the  mind 
by  wliich  we  infer  that  what  we  know  to  be  true  in  particular  cases 
will  be  true  in  all  similar  cases,  that  what  is  true  at  certain  times  will 
be  true  in  similar  circumstances  at  all  times  (Mill's  Logic,  vol.  i.  p. 
297),  is  universally  assented  to.  The  peculiarity  of  the  process  is 
confessed  to  be  that  it  gets  out  of  facts  something  more  than  what 
they  actually  contain  ;  extends  them  further  than  they  actually  go. 
To  pronounce  upon  what  is  wholly  unknoAvn,  and  say  that  it,  the 
iinknown  thing,  is  or  will  be  so  and  so,  because  the  known  is  so  and 
so,  is  thus  to  extend  known  facts  beyond  themselves  ;  but  unless 


222  Note  2  [Lt;cT. 

this  is  iIdiio,  tliere  is  no  induction.  "  Any  operation  involving  no 
inference,  any  jirocess  in  which  what  seems  the  conclusion  is  no  wider 
than  the  ])reniissos  from  which  it  is  drawn,  does  not  fall  within  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "  (Mill,  i.  297).  "  Did  he  [a  philosopher]  infer 
anything  that  had  not  been  observed,  from  something  else  which  liadl 
Certainly  not."  There  was  no  induction  then  (p.  301).  "  There  was 
not  that  transition  from  known  cases  to  unknown  which  constitutes 
induction"  (p.  313)-  "  The  process  of  induction,"  says  Dr.  Whewell, 
"  includes  a  mysterious  step  by  which  we  pass  from  jjarticulars  to 
generals,  of  which  step  the  reason  always  seems  to  be  inade([uately 
rendered  by  any  words  which  we  can  use."  (Philosojjhij  of  Discovery, 
p.  28+). 

But  after  the  first  general  definition  of  induction  Dr.  Whewell  and 
Mr.  Mill  disagree.  In  Mr.  Mill's  view  induction  is  in  its  essence  a 
simple  dii'ect  process  of  arguing  from  some  things  to  other  things, 
from  particulars  to  particulars,  without  the  medium  of  the  conscious 
contemplation  of  those  known  particulars  in  a  general  form,  that  is  to 
say,  the  medium  of  language  or  general  propositions.  The  mind  simply 
passes  on  from  several  individual  cases  known  to  another  individual 
case  not  known.  "  Not  only  may  we  reason  from  particulars  to  par- 
ticidars  without  passing  through  generals,  but  we  perpetually  do  so 
reason.  All  our  earliest  inferences  are  of  this  nature.  From  the 
first  dawn  of  our  intelligence  we  draw  inferences,  but  years  elapse 
before  we  learn  the  use  of  general  language.  The  chihl  who,  having 
burnt  his  fingers,  avoids  to  thrust  them  again  into  the  fire,  has 
reasoned  or  inferred,  thougli  he  has  never  thought  of  the  general 
maxim,  *  Fire  burns.'  He  knows  from  memory  that  he  has  been 
burnt,  and  on  this  evidence  believes,  when  he  sees  a  candle,  that 
if  he  puts  his  finger  into  the  flame  of  it  he  will  be  burnt  again. 
He  believes  this  in  every  case  which  happens  to  arise,  but  without 
hjoking  in  each  instance  beyond  the  present  case.  He  is  not 
generalizing,  he  is  inferring  a 'particular  from  particulars.  In  the  same 
vay  also  brutes  reason.  There  is  no  ground  for  attributing  to  any  of 
the  lower  animals  the  use  of  signs,  of  such  a  natiu'e  as  to  render 
general  propositions  possible.  But  those  animals  profit  by  experi- 
ence, and  avoid  what  they  have  found  to  cause  them  pain,  in  the  same 
manner,  though  not  always,  with  the  same  skill,  as  a  human  creature. 
Not  only  the  burnt  child,  but  the  burnt  dog  dreads  the  fire  "  (Mill,  i. 
210).  "  All  inference  is  from  particulars  to  particulars.  General  pro- 
positions are  merely  registers  of  such  inferences  already  made,  and 
short  fonuula3  for  making  more  ....  the  real  logical  antece- 
dent or  premisses  being  the  ^xirticular  facts  from  which  the  general 


n] 


Note 


22 


proposition  was  collected  by  induction"  (p.  216).  "  If  we  have  a 
collection  of  particulars  sufficient  for  grounding  an  induction,  we  need 
not  frame  a  general  proposition  :  wq  may  reason  at  once  from  those  par- 
ticulars  to  other  'particulars"  (jj.  220).  The  idea  of  the  essence  of  the 
inductive  process  contained  in  these  passages  agrees  with  that  of 
Hume,  who  regards  it  as  an  instinctive  process,  performed  in  no  argu- 
mentative way,  or  by  any  argumentative  medium.  The  idea  also 
agrees  with  Hume's  idea  of  the  process  as  being  no  part  of  the  distinc- 
tive human  reason,  or  resting  upon  grounds  of  human  reason,  but 
being  common  to  rational  and  irrational  natures.  "  Experimental 
reasoning,"  says  Hume,  "  we  possess  in  common  with  beasts  ; "  JVIr. 
^lill  says,  "  In  this  way  {i.e.  in  inferring  unknown  particulars  from 
known  ones)  brutes  reason." 

Dr.  Wliewell,  however,  differs  from  this  account'of  induction  as  being 
an  inference  direct  from  particulars  ;  as  well  as  from  the  idea  of  in- 
duction as  a  process  in  essence  common  to  rational  and  irrational 
natures ;  he  regards  it  as  essential  to  the  idea  of  induction  that  it 
should  be  a  conscious  philosopliical  process,  carried  on  by  means  of 
"  general  propositions,  or  observations  consciously  looked  at  in  a 
general  form."  "  Not  only  a  general  thought  but  a  general  icord  or 
phrase  is  a  requisite  element  in  induction."'  {Philosophy  of  Disco- 
very, pp.  241,  245.) 

Whether  then  a  "  general  proposition  "  or  "  word  "  or  "  conscious 
general  form  of  knowledge  "  is  essential  to  induction  as  a  process  carried 
on  in  intelligent  minds,  is  a  question  which  must  be  decided  by  the 
examination  of  the  fact — the  consideration  of  what  by  the  insj^ection  of 
our  own  minds  we  perceive  ourselves  to  do  in  induction.  On  examining 
then  what  goes  on  in  our  own  minds,  when  as  intelligent  and  rational 
Icings  from  known  particulars  we  infer  what  is  unkno^vu  and  beyond 
them — which  is  induction,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  at  all  necessary 
or  essential  to  that  proceeding,  that  those  particular  observations 
should  pass  through  the  medium  of  a  general  proposition.  The  in- 
ductive inference  naturally  and  with  full  projiriety  attaches  itself  to  an 
observation  a  certain  number  of  times  made  ;  upon  the  mere  repetition 
of  the  fact  observed  the  mind  goes  on  to  an  inference  respecting 
what  is  not  observed,  viz.  that  the  latter  wUl  be  like  the  former  ;  the 
observations  may  be  rational  and  intelligent  ones,  made  with  sagacity 
and  discernment,  but  that  they  should  have  been  made  time  after 

^  "The  elements  and  materials  of  science,"  the  writer  adds,  "are  nccs- 
sary  truths  contemplated  by  the  intellect:  it  is  by  consisting  of  sucli 
elements  and  such  materials  that  science  is  science."  (p.  244.)  But  has 
inductive  science  to  do  with  necessary  truths  ? 


2  24  Note  2  [Lect. 

time,  and  should  simply  exist  in  the  memory  as  a  series  or  succession 
of  particular  facts,  is  enough  in  order  that  the  inductive  inference  may 
attach  constitutionally  to  them.  It  has  happened  so,  this  and  that 
and  the  other  time,  therefore  it  will  so  happen  aj,'ain  under  the  same 
circumstances.  A  physician  has  observed  in  so  many  i)atients  the  con- 
nection of  a  disease  with  certain  symptoms  ;  he  expects  the  same  con- 
nection in  the  next  patient.  This  an  inference  from  particulars  simply, 
but  it  is  rational  induction. 

Indeed,  as  Mr.  Mill  observes,  particulars  are  not  only  enough  to  infer 
from,  and  tlie  inductive  inference  legitimate  from  them,  without  any 
medium  of  a  general  proj^osition,  but  in  the  nature  of  the  case  parti- 
culars are  the  only  ground  which  we  really  have  for  induction  to 
proceed  upon,  and  the  essential  argument  is  in  every  case  of  induction 
from  particulars.  Particulars  are  all  we  know  of,  and  therefore  all 
we  can  jiossildy  argue  from.  It  is  true  we  may  introduce  if  Ave  please 
a  general  proposition  into  the  affair,  and  instead  of  proceeding  straight 
from  the  particular  facts  and  getting  the  inference  from  them  as  an 
ijiduction,  turn  the  particular  facts  into  a  general  proposition  from 
which  we  obtain  the  inference  as  a  deduction.  Instead  of  saying,  'Alex- 
ander, Ceesar,  Queen  Elizabeth,  Peter,  Robert,  WilUam,  (the  list  might 
be  supposed  extended  to  all  who  ever  lived,  and  still  be  only  a  list  of 
particular  persons,)  have  died  ;  therefore  I  shall  die  ;'  I  may  say,  'All 
men  die,'  which  is  a  general  proposition,  and,  infer  my  own  death  as 
included  in  it.  But  this  is  a  mere  difference  of  form  or  arrangement 
which  does  not  affect  the  substance  of  an  inductive  argument,  or 
divorce  it  from  its  real  1)asis  in  jiarticulars.  "  The  mortality  of  John, 
Thomas,  and  company,"  says  Mr  Mill,  "  is,  after  all,  the  only  evidence 
we  have  for  the  mortality  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  Not  one  iota 
is  added  to  the  proof  by  interpolating  a  general  proposition.  Since 
the  individual  cases  are  all  the  CAddence  we  can  possess,  evidence 
which  no  logical  form  into  which  we  choose  to  throw  it  can  make 
greater  than  it  is  ....  I  am  unable  to  see  why  we  should  l)e  for- 
bidden to  take  the  shortest  cut  from  these  premisses  to  the  conclu- 
sion, and  constrained  to  travel  the  '  high  priori  road '  by  the  arbitrary 
fiat  of  logicians."  (vol.  i.  p.  209.) 

A  general  proposition  introduced  into  an  inductive  argument  can- 
not be  inserted  as  any  real  or  true  ground  of  it;  for  if  it  is  inserted 
as  a  truth,  it  is  a  j)etitio  j^rincipii,  and  should  therefore  be  immediately 
ejected.  But  if  it  is  only  introduced  as  a  formal  medium  or  mode  of 
statement,  it  is  not  of  the  essence  of  the  rational  and  scientific  argu- 
ment of  induction. 

The  general  proposition,  so  far  as  it  comes  in  correctly  at  all,  is 


li] 


Note  2  225 


indeed  the  conclusion  of  the  inductive  argument,  and  therefore  cannot 
be  the  premiss  of  it.     A  general  proposition  however,  i.e.  a  universal 
proposition,  is  not  properly  even  the  conclusion  of  the  inductive  argu- 
ment, i.e.  it  is  only  used  as  such  Irom  the  necessities  of  language,  and 
because  we  have  no  other  available  formula  for  exj^ressing  the  true 
conclusion  in  our  mind.     The   inductive  conclusion  which  really 
exists  in  the  mind  is  indeed  neither  a  general  proposition  nor  a  par- 
ticular proposition.     It  is  a  vague  indetinite  expectation  of  a  practical 
kind  that  when  a  thing  has  happened  so  repeatedly,  it  will  continue 
to  happen  so  under  the  same  circumstances.     But  this  indefinite  ex- 
pectation in  our  minds,  this  anticipatory  look-out  into  the  future  or 
unknown,  is  not  correctly  expressed  by  a  general  proposition  ;  because 
this  is  more  than  the  true  internal  conclusion.     A  general  proposition 
is  the  universal  statement  that  the  sun  will  always  rise,  but  this  is  a 
statement  which  we  do  not  really  make  in  our  minds,  and  is  in  excess 
of  and  beyond  our  actual  mental  condition  and  attitude  on  the  sub- 
ject.    A  general  proposition  is  thus  to  the  real  inductive  conclusion 
within  the  mind  a  case  which  is  too  large  for  its  contents,  which  sticks 
out  on  all  sides  with  unsubstantial  amplitude.     The  inductive  con- 
clusion is  not  knowledge,  and  therefore  if  we  give  it  the  form  of 
knowledge  by  means  of  a  universal  assertion,  we  still  do  not  make  it 
knowledge  any  the  more  by  so  doing,  but  only  use  a  formula,  with 
an  understanding  with  ourselves  about  it.     But  neither,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  the  inductive  conclusion  a  'particular' in  the  strict  sense; 
•we  reason  from  particulars,  but  not  properly  to  particulars.     If  be- 
cause the  sun  has  always  risen  hitherto,  I  say  it  will  rise  to-morrow 
morning,  or  the  morning  after  ;  that  is  a  limitation  of  the  real  induc- 
tive conclusion  in  the  mind,  just  as  the  general  jaroposition  is  an 
excess  of  it.     I  do  not  adequately  express  the  anticipation  ot  which  I 
am  possessed,  by  this  particular, — to-morrow  morning,  or   another 
morning.     When  I  make  this  particular  prophecy,  I  plainly  make  it 
on  the  ground  of  a  more  general  one.     It  is  indeed  exactly  the  same 
really,  whether  I  say  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  or  the  sun  will  rise 
always  ;  I  have  the  same  meaning  in  my  mind  in  both  exjjressions. 
The  same  general  anticipation  speaks  under  both  forms.     All  men 
hitherto  have  died  ;  /  shall  die.     This  latter  is  a  particular.     But  it 
is  evidently  exactly  the  same  really,  whether  I  say,  *  /  shall  die,'  or 
'  All  men  will  die  ;'  it  is  actually  in  the  mind  the  same  anticipation 
in  either  case. 

For  the  argument  of  the  Second  Lecture  it  is  enough,  if  without 
entering  into  the  comparison  of  the  inductive  jjrocess  as  it  goes  on  in 
rational  creatures  with  the  same  process  as  it  goes  on  in  irrational, 

P 


2  26  Note  2  [Lect. 

that  process  looked  at  in  itself  is  admitted  to  be  iinaccoimtable  and 
not  founded  on  reason  :  for  if — that  wliieh  is  identical  with  this  pro- 
cess— the  belief  in  the  order  of  nature  does  not  rest  upon  reason,  the 
ground  is  gone  upon  which  it  can  be  maintained  that  a  contradiction 
to  that  order  is  as  such  contrary  to  reason.  The  language  however 
of  philosophers,  even  when  most  cautious  upon  this  subject,  shews 
that  if  we  look  only  to  the  inductive  inference  iisc// purely  and  simjily, 
as  distinguished  from  the  facts  from  which  it  is  an  inference,  and  as 
unaifected  by  the  difference  in  the  character  and  rank  of  these  facts  ; 
that  if  we  regard  it  only  as  the  attaching  of  continuance  to  whatever 
it  is  which  has  been  repeated  ;  it  is  im^aossible  to  make  out  any  posi- 
tive difference  between  that  inference  in  rational  natures  and  irra- 
tional. It  is  so  difficult  wholly  to  abstract  the  inference  from  the 
facts /ro77i  xchich  it  is  an  inference,  that  we  do  not  get  the  idea  of  the 
pure  inference  itself  into  our  minds.  According  to  the  received  lan- 
guage however  of  philosophers  this  inference  is  Avholly  unaccountable 
and  altogether  non-logical  in  rational  natures  :  "  to  pass  from  parti- 
culars to  generals  is  a  mysterious  step,"  says  Dr.  Whewell,  however 
scientific  the  material  to  which  it  is  apjjlied  : — "  there  must  neces- 
sarily be  a  logical  defect  in  it" — "the  rules  of  the  syllogism  do  not 
authorize  the  answers  of  the  inductive  generalizing  impulse."  [Philo- 
sophy of  Discover ij,  pp.  284,  451,  457.)  But  if  the  inductive  impulse 
is  thus  in  rational  natures  instinctive,  mechanical,  and  non-logical,  in 
what  does  it  differ  from  the  same  impulse  in  irrational  natures  ? 
Man  is  a  rational  being,  but  if  he  does  not  draw  the  inductive  infer- 
ence loith  his  reason,  that  inference  is  not  affected  by  his  peculiar  and 
distinctive  gdft  of  the  rational  faculty.  Man  knows  indeed,  when  he 
contemplates  himself  and  compares  his  actions  and  calculations  with 
the  grounds  and  motives  upon  which  they  rest,  that  he  is  the  subject 
of  a  mechanical  impression,  which  brutes,  who  have  not  the  self-con- 
templative faculty,  do  not  know  ;  and  he  shews  that  this  ojseration 
has  taken  place  in  his  mind  by  proi^ositions,  whereas  irrational  beings 
only  shew  that  it  has  by  action  ;  but  do  consciousness  and  language 
touch  the  nature  of  the  operation  itself?  Mr.  Mill,  though  he  has 
admitted  that  brutes  "reason"  (vol.  i.  p.  210)  and  draw  instinctively 
the  inductive  inference,  yet  "objects"  with  Dr.  Whewell  "to  the 
application  of  the  tenn  induction  to  any  operation  jjerformed  by 
mere  instinct ;  that  is  from  an  animal  impulse,  without  the  exer- 
tion of  any  intelligence."  {Note,  vol.  i.  p.  295.)  Nor  is  such  a  restric- 
tion in  the  application  of  the  term  otherwise  than  projjer,  because 
we  associate  with  the  term  induction  not  only  the  mji^terious  and 
unreasoning   step    beyond    the  facts  which  have  been    described 


n] 


Note 


227 


but  also  the  scientific  search  for  and  discovery  of  the  facts  them- 
selves ;  but  this  restriction  of  the  term  does  not  touch  the  question 
Avhich  we  have  been  considering  : — a  question  however  which,  as 
I  have  observed,  is  more  a  curious  than  important  one,  if  only  the 
main  fact  of  the  unreasoning  natiu'e  of  the  inductive  inference  is 
admitted. 

What  it  is  which  constitutes  the  ground  of  induction  or  the  infer- 
ence from  the  known  to  the  unknown  has  been  since  Hume's  time  a 
matter  of  dispute  among  j)hilosophers,  all  of  whom  however  agree  in 
the  negative  j)oint,  that  the  inference  does  not  rest  upon  any  ground 
of  reason.  "  The  ingenious  author  of  the  Treatise  of  Human  Nature," 
saj^s  Dr.  Eeid,  "  first  observed  that  our  belief  of  the  continuance  of  the 
laws  of  nature  cannot  be  founded  either  upon  knowledge  or  proba- 
bility ;  but  far  from  conceiving  it  to  be  an  original  principle  of  the 
mind,  he  endeavours  to  account  for  it  from  his  favourite  hypothesis. 
....  However,  we  agree  with  the  author  of  the  Treatise  of  Human 
Nature  in  this,  that  our  belief  in  the  continuance  of  nature's  laws  is 
not  derived  from  reason.  It  is  an  instinctive  prescience  of  the  opera- 
tions of  nature Antecedently  to  all  reasoning  we  have  by  our 

constitution  an  anticipation  that  there  is  a  fixed  and  steady  course  of 

nature And   this  prescience  I  call  the  inductive  princi2)le." 

{Reicl  on  Human  Mind,  sect,  xxiv.)  Brown  disagrees  with  Hume's 
rationale  of  custom  as  the  ground  of  the  inference  from  the  known  to 
the  unknoAvn.  "  Custom  may  account  for  the  mere  suggestion  of  one 
object  by  another,  as  a  part  of  a  train  of  images,  but  not  for  that 
belief  of  future  reality  which  is  a  very  different  state  of  mind.  The 
phenomenon  A,  a  stone  has  a  thousand  times  fallen  to  the  earth  j 
the  phenomenon  B,  a  stone  will  always,  in  the  same  circumstances, 
fall  to  the  earth — are  propositions  that  differ  as  much  as  the  proposi- 
tions, A,  a  stone  has  once  fallen  to  the  earth  ;  B,  a  stone  will  ahcays 
fall  to  the  earth.  At  whatever  link  of  the  chain  we  begin,  we  must 
still  meet  mth  the  same  difficulty- — the  conversion  of  the  jaast  into  the 
future.  If  it  be  absurd  to  make  this  conversion  at  one  stage  of  in- 
qi\iiy,  it  is  just  as  absurd  to  make  it  at  any  other  stage."  His  own 
rationale  is  "  succession  of  thought" — "  the  natural  tendency  of  the 
mind  to  exist  in  certain  states  after  existing  in  certain  other  states." 
The  general  exj^ectation  which  succeeds  to  the  facts  of  experience,  he 
conceives,  is  only  an  instance  of  this  principle,  "  This  belief  is  a  state 
or  feeling  of  the  mind  as  easily  conceivable  as  any  other  state  of  it — 
a  new  feeling  arising  in  certain  circumstances,"  in  the  same  way  in 
which  other  states  of  feeling  arise.  "  To  have  our  nerves  of  taste  or 
hearing  affected  in  a  certain  manner,  is  not  indeed  to  taste  or  to  hear, 


2  28  Note  2  [Lect. 

but  it  is  immediately  afterwards  to  have  those  particular  sensations  ; 
and  this  merely  because  the  mind  was  originally  so  constituted,  as  to 
exist  directly  in  the  one  state  after  existing  in  the  other.  To  observe, 
in  like  manner,  a  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  is  not,  in  the 
very  feeling  of  the  moment,  to  believe  in  the  future  similarity,  but, 
in  consequence  of  a  similar  original  tendency,  it  is  immediately  after- 
wards to  believe,  that  the  same  antecedents  will  invariably  be  followed 
by  the  same  consequents.  That  this  belief  of  the  future  is  a  state  of 
mind  very  different  from  the  mere  perception  or  memory  of  the  past, 
from  which  it  flows,  is  indeed  true  ;  but  what  resemblance  has  sweet- 
ness, as  a  sensation  of  the  mind,  to  the  solution  of  a  few  particles  of 
sugar  on  the  tongue  ;  or  the  harmonies  of  music  to  the  vibration  of 
particles  of  air.  All  which  we  know,  in  both  cases,  is,  that  these  succes- 
sions regularly  take  place ;  and  in  the  regular  successions  of  nature,  which 
could  not,  in  one  instance  more  than  in  another,  have  been  predicted 
without  experience,  nothing  is  mysterious,  or  everything  is  mysterious. 
It  is  wonderful,  indeed, — for  what  is  not  wonderful  ? — that  any  belief 
should  arise  as  to  a  future  which  as  yet  has  no  existence  ;  and  which 
therefore  cannot,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  Avord,  be  an  object  of  our 
knowledge.  But  when  M'e  consider  who  it  was  who  formed  us,  it 
would  in  truth  have  been  more  wonderful  if  the  mind  had  been  so 
differently  constituted  that  the  belief  had  not  arisen  ;  because,  in  that 
case,  the  phenomena  of  nature,  however  regularly  arranged,  would 
have  been  arranged  in  vain."  {Broivn's  Pliilosojjhy  of  the  Human 
Mind, — Chapter  on  Objects  of  Physical  Enquiry,  \o\.  i.  p.  190.)  The 
criticism  to  which  both  these  explanations  of  the  inference  from  expe- 
rience is  open,  is  that  they  are  only  ingenious  statements  of  the  fact. 
Eeid's  "  instinctive  prescience"  is  as  a  phrase  inaccurate,  because  we 
have  not  prescience  or  knoidedge  of  the  future  ;  such  prescience  can 
oidy  really  mean  expectation  ;  and  then  the  exjilanation  becomes 
only  a  statement  of  the  fact  that  we  do  expect  the  future  to  be  like 
the  past.  Brown's  explanation  apjiroaclies  more  to  the  nature  of  an 
explanation,  and  yet  at  bottom  it  is  only  the  statement  that  after 
experience  of  the  past  we  have  expectation  of  the  future,  that  the 
former  state  of  mind  succeeds  the  latter.  Hume's  rationale  of  custom, 
though  undoubtedly  deficient,  has  the  advantage  of  connecting  the 
argument  of  experience  with  a  great  princijile  in  nature,  which  is  not 
identical  with  it,  with  which  however  it  appears  to  be  connected  ; 
and  thus  ajsproaches  more  to  the  nature  of  an  exijlanation  than  these 
two.  The  question,  however,  what  is  the  nature  of  the  inductive 
inference,  and  to  what  principle  we  are  to  refer  it,  is  an  ulterior 
question  which  does  not  affect  the  argument  of  this  Lecture,  for 


"] 


Note  2  229 


wliicli  it  is  enough  to  say  what  it  is  not,  viz.  that  it  is  not  gi-ounded 
on  reason. 

The  nature  of  this  remarkable  assumption,  again,  upon  which  all 
induction  rests,  is  discussed  in  the  article  on  the  "  Immutability  of 
Nature,"  in  the  Quarterly  Keview  (No.  220,  1S61): — 

"But  then  Science  will  turn  to  that  axiom  upon  which,  after  all, 
the  cogency  of  induction  must  rest.  From  the  human  mind,  not 
from  outward  exjjerience,  as  Dr.  Whewell  so  wisely  reiterates,  we 
must  derive  the  idea  that  '  similar  causes  will  produce  similar  effects.' 
Our  belief  in  the  universality  and  immutaljility  of  the  operations  of 
nature  must  rest  ultimately  upon  this  internal  instinct.  Trace  that 
belief,  with  Hume,  to  custom ;  or  with  others  to  association ;  or  with 
others  to  a  separate  principle  in  the  human  mind ;  call  it  the  general- 
izing jjrinciple,  or  the  inductive  principle  :  whatever  account  we  give 
of  it,  this  only,  and  not  experience,  can  be  our  authority  for  assuming 
the  coutinuitj^  and  stability  of  nature.  And  if  it  be  a  law  of  mind, 
a  law  like  our  moral  2)rinciples,  so  stamped  upon  our  being  as  to  bear 
the  marks  of  a  revelation  from  God,  then  upon  our  faith  in  the 
veracity  of  God,  upon  our  conviction  that  He  would  never  engrave 
ineffaceably  and  unalterably  upon  the  tables  of  our  hearts  and  souls 
anything  but  truths  (in  one  word,  after  all,  upon  faith,  and  not  on 
proof),  we  may  found  our  science  of  induction.  But  is  it  so  stam^ied 
by  God?  Is  it  more  than  an  instinct,  a  tendency,  an  impulse,  recpxir- 
ing,  Like  so  many  other  tendencies  of  our  nature,  to  be  nan'owly 
watched,  balanced,  and  corrected  by  opposite  tendencies  ?  All  our 
sins  and  vices  may  be  traced  up  to  tendencies  and  principles,  all 
implanted  in  our  being  by  nature,  but  not  therefore  to  be  blindly 
followed  without  control  or  qualification.  Are  we  yet  sufficiently 
acquainted  with  the  nature  of  this  princijsle  to  decide  this  question  ? 
Are  there  not  obvious  marks  which  class  it  rather  with  our  instincts 
than  with  our  reason — with  imperfect  impulses  of  our  compound 
nature,  rather  than  with  absolute  revelations  from  God  ?  We  can 
break  its  links.  We  cannot  believe  gratitude  to  be  a  sin,  or  falsehood 
meritorious ;  but  we  can  imagine  and  Ijelieve  in  the  existence  of  a 
world,  where  all  the  combinations  of  natm-e  may  be  totally  difi"erent 
from  GUI'  present  experience.  The  connexion  between  death  and  the 
swallowing  of  arsenic  is  of  a  totally  difterent  kind  from  that  between 
injustice  and  the  punishable  character  of  injustice.  No  one  would 
affirm  of  moral  truths,  as  Science  affirms  of  material  causes  and  efli'ects, 
that  our  knowledge  of  them  rests  wholly  upon  experience. 

"  That  the  principle  has  been  so  little  studied,  is  so  little  under- 
stood, would  suffice  to  ^\•arn  us  against  asserting  at  once  its  Divine 
authority  and  sanction  for  the  universal  immutability  of  Nature.  It 
would  seem  partly  to  be  a  result  of  the  mechanical  association  of 
ideas,  by  which  the  mind  spontaneously  and  unconsciously  recalls 
and  suggests  combinations  once  observed,  forming  thus  our  memory, 
our  habits,  our  character,  our  pleasures,  our  imagination,  and  a  very 
large  proportion  of  oiu'  practical  reasoning.     But  every  step  we  take 


230  Note  2  [Lect. 

in  life  compels  us  to  keep  this  associating  tendency  under  the 
strictest  control,  to  regard  it,  as  a  hundred  other  tendencies  in  our 
nature,  necessary  to  existence — valuable  as  a  prompter — but  ...  re- 
quiring at  every  stejj  to  be  kej^t  in  check  by  experience,  by  faith  in 
testimony." 

It  may  be  objected  to  the  ordinary  account  of  induction  as  based 
upon  repetition  and  recurrence,  that  in  the  case  of  experiments  repeti- 
tion is  not  wanted  to  produce  the  feeling  of  assurance  in  the  mind  ; 
i.e.  that  this  is  not  the  basis  of  the  practical  certainty  we  have  in  the 
result  of  experiments:  that  our  assurance  of  this  is  not  gradually 
acquired,  slight  at  first  and  increasing  afterwards  every  time  the 
experiment  is  tried  ;  but  that  after  one  chemical  exj)eriment,  shewing 
the  projierties  of  a  suljstance,  or  the  effects  of  the  union  of  two  sub- 
stances, we  feel  as  sure  that  the  same  proijerties  and  effects  will 
appear  agam  as  we  do  after  the  experiment  has  been  fifty  times  re- 
peated ;  or  that  if  we  do  not,  the  want  of  such  certainty  arises  from 
the  doubt  whether  the  experiment  has  been  properly  tried,  it  being 
possible,  e.g.  that  some  chance  ingredient  may  have  got  in  ;  not  from 
the  need  of  repetition  supposing  the  accuracy  of  the  experiment. 

This  is  a  question,  then,  which  does  not  at  all  concern  the  nature 
of  the  ground  of  induction  or  the  inference  from  experience,  that  it 
is  instinctive  and  not  founded  on  reason.  Because  were  it  true  that 
the  certainty  of  an  experiment  after  one  j^erformance  is  as  great  as  it 
is  ever  after,  and  that  this  certainty  is  strictly  of  an  inductive  kind, 
the  instance  would  only  shew,  not  that  inductive  certainty  was  not 
of  the  instinctive  kind  asserted,  but  only  that  inductive  certainty, 
bemg  of  this  nature,  sometimes  arose  upon  one  case,  instead  of  always 
requiring  repetition.  The  difference  would  shew  that  there  were 
difficulties  in  the  interior  of  the  subject  of  induction  which  were  not 
yet  S(jlved,  but  it  would  not  shew  that  the  inductive  inference  from 
experience,  whether  arising  upon  a  smgle  case  or  upon  repetition, 
rested  upon  a  groiind  of  reason. 

It  admits,  however,  of  a  considerable  question,  whether  in  tlie  in- 
telligent attitude  of  the  mind  toward  an  exj^eriment,  the  certainty 
reposed  in  an  experiment  is  an  inductive  certainty.  There  is  indeed 
a  posture  of  mind  in  which  experiments  are  regarded  simply  as 
phenomena  of  experience,  phenomena  presented  to  the  eye  apart  from 
their  object  and  rationale;  and  the  confidence  in  experiments,  re- 
garded in  this  light,  does  not  seem  other  than  an  inductive  confidence  ; 
but  then  in  this  light  exjieriments  do  not  seem  free  from  but  to  come 
under  the  law  of  repetition;  for  we  should  anticipate  the  issue  of  an 
old  familiar  experiment  that  1  ad  been  performed  in  all  laboratories 


II]  Note  I  231 

and  lecture-rooms  for  years,  ■with  more  confidence  and  more  as  a 
matter  of  course  than  we  should  the  issue  of  a  new  one  wliich  had 
only  been  tried  once  or  twice.  But  in  the  intelligent  attitude  of  the 
mind  toward  an  experiment  it  draws  a  distinction  between  the  natural 
projierties  of  a  substance  which  are  supposed  and  taken  for  granted  as 
being  such  and  such,  and  their  mere  exhibition  to  the  eye  by  means 
of  an  experimental  process.  We  take  it  for  granted  uj^on  the  ordinary 
instinctive  ground,  that  the  substance  before  us  is  exactly  the  same 
substance  with  exactly  the  same  properties  as  the  substance  upon 
which  the  late  experiment  was  tried ;  but  ujwn  this  assumption,  the 
fact  that  such  and  such  is  the  property  of  the  substance  before  us,  is, 
after  the  late  exi^eriment,  no  step  of  induction,  but  an  article  of 
knoivkdge.  We  know  that  the  property  is  there,  which  the  second 
experiment  only  makes  visible  to  the  eye  and  does  not  prove  to  the 
mind.  It  must  be  observed  that  in  the  case  of  an  experiment  we 
have,  to  begin  with,  the  advantage  of  the  common  instinctive  induc- 
tion of  the  identity  of  the  substance  before  us  with  the  last  substance, 
already  existing  as  our  groundwork;  and,  vijwn  this  gi'oundwork 
assumed,  the  result  of  the  second  experiment  is  contained  in  the 
result  of  the  first ;  and  therefore  this  result  is  not,  upon  this  ground 
assumed,  an  inductive  one.  If  it  be  said  that  the  inductive  nature  of 
this  groundwork  still  continues,  that  is  true,  and  so  far  the  result  of 
the  experiment  is  inductive.  So  far  as  it  is  not  an  absolute  certainty 
that  this  is  the  same  substance,  with  the  same  properties,  as  the  last 
one,  so  far  it  is  not  a  certainty  that  the  result  of  the  experiment  will 
be  the  same :  but  in  attending  to  the  experiment  the  mind  puts  aside 
the  uncertainty,  Avhatever  there  may  be,  of  the  groundwork  of  it,  and 
does  not  consider  it. 


NOTE  3,  p.  42. 

I  SAY,  "  The  first  part  of  the  inductive  process  is  not  reasoning,  but 
observation;  the  second  is  not  reasoning,  but  instinct."  The  first 
part  of  the  inductive  process  may  with  general  truth  be  described  as 
"  observation,"  in  distmction  to  reasoning,  because  the  sagacious 
observation  of  facts  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  found  an  induction,  and 
the  great  mass  of  inductions  are  founded  simply  upon  facts  of  observa- 
tion. Such  facts,  i.e.  facts  of  scientific  observation,  Dr.  WheweU  calls 
"  selected  facts,"  the  selection  of  them  being  by  means  of  certain  con- 
ceptions of  the  mind,  by  which  facts  are  perceived  in  their  proper 
relation,  which  he  calls  "  colligation."  {Philosophy  of  Ind.  Sciences, 
vol.  ii.  chaps,  ii.-iv.)     "  In  the  progress  of  science,"  says  Dr.  Whewell, 


232  Note  3  [Lect. 

"  facts  are  bound  together  by  the  aid  of  suitable  conceptions.  This 
part  of  the  formation  of  our  knowledge  I  call  the  colligation  of  facts  ; 
and  we  may  apply  the  terra  to  every  case  in  which  by  an  act  of  the 
intellect  we  establish  a  precise  connexion  among  the  phenomena 
which  are  presented  to  our  senses."  (p.  36.)  Even  to  the  old,  and  as 
it  happens  untrue,  Aristotelian  fact  of  the  longevity  of  "  acholous " 
animals,  the  writer  applies  the  term  "  conception."  "  It  is  a  selected 
fact,  a  fact  selected  and  compared  in  several  cases,  wliich  is  what  we 
mean  by  a  conception.  .  .  .  He  apj^lied  the  conception  acholous 
to  his  observation  of  animals.  This  conception  divided  them  into 
two  classes,  and  these  classes  were,  he  fancied,  long-lived  and  short- 
lived respectively."     {Philosophy  of  Discovery,  p.  455.) 

It  may,  however,  happen  that  particular  facts  upon  wliich  induc- 
tions are  founded,  are  not  the  results  of  observation  solely,  but  that 
the  ascertainment  of  them  involves  reasoning,  e.g.  astronomical  facts, 
the  distance  of  the  moon,  the  globular  form  of  the  earth,  &c.  In  par- 
ticular cases,  again,  it  is  disputed  whether  an  observation  involves 
more  than  simple  oliservation  or  not ;  as  e.g.  Kepler's  discovery  of  the 
curve  of  the  orbit  of  Mars.  Mr.  Mill  says,  this  was  only  "  the  sum 
of  the  observations,"  not  an  induction  from  them ; — the  sum  of  the 
observations  Avith  the  addition  of  the  "  curve  the  different  observed 
points  would  make  supjjosing  them  all  to  be  joined  together," — which 
was  description.  Dr.  Whewell  says  "  that  the  intermediate  positions 
between  the  several  observations  are  an  induction,  [quoting  Mr.  ^Mill 
himself  to  that  effect,]  and  that  therefore  the  whole  curve  must  be  an 
induction."  "  Are  particular  positions  to  be  conceived  as  points  of 
a  curve  without  thinking  of  the  intennediate  positions  as  belonging 
to  the  same  curve?"  {Philosop)hy  of  Discovery,  p.  248.)  What  proves 
the  curve  would  perhaps  be  as  much  the  argument  of  coincidence  as 
that  of  induction ;  it  appearing  to  be  a  moral  imjiossibility  that  the 
fitting  in  of  so  many  points  in  the  orbit  with  the  figure  of  an  ellipse 
should  be  a  mere  chance,  the  other  unobserved  points  not  fitting  in 
with  it.  I  have  mentioned  these  cases  to  illustrate  the  jioint  that 
observation,  popularly  so  called,  sometimes  involves  regular  reasoning. 
But  though  the  observation  of  facts  which  constitutes  the  first  part  of 
induction  involves  in  particular  cases  reasoning,  observation  alone  is 
all  that  is  required  for  induction,  and  this  is  the  main  faculty  at  woi'k 
in  this  stage. 

NOTE  4,  p.  42. 

"  The  very  essence  of  the  whole  argument  is  the  invaluable  jjre- 
servatiou  of  the  principle  of  order:  not  necessarily  such  as  we  can 


II] 


Note  4  233 


directly  recognise,  but  the  universal  conviction  of  the  unfailing  sub- 
ordination of  everything  to  some,  grand  principles  of  law,  however 
imperfectly  apprehended  or  realised  in  our  partial  conceptions,  and 
the  successive  subordination  of  such  laws  to  others  of  still  higher 
generality,  to  an  extent  ti^anscending  our  conceptions,  and  constituting 
the  true  chain  of  universal  causation,  which  culmmates  in  the  sublune 
conception  of  the  Cosmos. 

"  It  is  in  immediate  connexion  with  this  enlarged  view  of  nniversal 
immutable  natural  order,  that  I  have  regarded  the  narrow  noticjns  of 
those  who  obscure  the  sublime  prospect,  by  imagining  so  unworthy 
an  idea  as  that  of  occasional  interruptions  in  the  physical  economy  of 
the  world. 

"  The  only  instance  considered  was  that  of  the  alleged  sudden 
supernatural  origination  of  new  species  of  organised  beings  in  remote 
geological  epochs.  It  is  in  relation  to  the  broad  principle  of  law,  if 
once  rightly  apprehended,  that  such  inferences  are  seen  to  be  wholly 
unwarranted  by  science,  and  such  fancies  utterly  derogatory  and 
inadmissible  in  philosophy ;  while,  even  in  those  instances  properly 
understood,  the  real  scientific  conclusions  of  the  invariable  and  indis- 
soluble chain  of  causation  stand  \'indicated  in  the  sublime  contempla- 
tions with  which  they  are  thus  associated. 

"  To  a  correct  apprehension  of  the  whole  argument,  the  one  essen- 
tial requisite  is  to  have  obtained  a  complete  and  satisfactory  grasp  of 
this  one  grand  lyrinciple  of  law  pervading  nature,  or  rather  constituting 
the  very  idea  of  nature ; — which  forms  the  vital  essence  of  the  whole 
of  inductive  science,  and  the  sole  assurance  of  those  higher  inferences 
from  the  inductive  study  of  natural  causes,  which  are  the  indications 
of  a  supreme  intelligence  and  a  moral  cause. 

"  T/ie  ^l:hole  of  the  ensuing  discussion  must  stand  or  fall  with  the 
admission  of  this  grand  principle.  Those  who  are  not  prepared  to 
embrace  it  in  its  full  extent,  may  probably  not  accept  the  conclusions : 
but  they  must  be  sent  back  to  the  school  of  inductive  science,  where  alone 
it  must  be  independently  imbibed  and  thoroughly  assimilated  with  the 
mind  of  the  student  in  the  first  instance. 

"  On  the  slightest  consideration  of  the  nature,  the  foundations,  and 
general  results  of  inductive  science,  we  see  abundant  exemplification 
at  once  of  the  legitimate  objects  which  fall  within  the  province  of 
physical  philosophy,  and  the  limits  which,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  must  be  imposed  on  its  investigations.  We  recognise  the  powers 
of  intellect  fitly  employed  in  the  study  of  nature,  but  indicating  no 
conclusions  beyond  nature  ;  yet  pre-eminently  leading  us  to  perceive 
in  nature,  and  in  the  invariable  and  universal  constancy  of  its  laws, 
the  indications  of  universal,  unchangeable,  and  recondite  arrangement, 
dependence,  and  connexion  in  reason."  {Powell  on  the  Order  of  Nature, 
p.  228.) 

"  In  an  age  of  physical  research  like  the  present,  all  highly  culti- 
vated minds  and  duly  advanced  intellects  have  unbil)ed,  more  or  less, 
the  lessons  of  the  inductive  philosophy,  and  have  at  least  in  some 
measure    learned    to   appreciate   the   grand  foundation    conception 


234  Note  4  [Lect. 

of  universal  law — to  recognise  the  impossibility  even  of  any  ttco 
material  atoms  subsisting  together  without  a  determinate  relation — of 
any  action  of  the  one  on  the  other,  whether  of  equilibrium  or  of 
motion,  without  reference  to  a  physical  cause — of  any  inoditicatiou 
whatsoever  in  the  existing  conditions  of  material  agents,  unless 
through  tlie  invariable  operation  of  a  series  of  eternally  impressed 
consequences  folhnving  in  some  necessary  chain  of  orderly  connexion." 
{Pou-cll's  Stuihj  of  the  Evidences  of  Christianity,  p.  133.) 

"  The  enlarged  critical  and  inductive  study  of  the  natural  world 
cannot  but  tend  powerfully  to  e\'ince  the  inconceivableness  of 
imagined  interruptions  of  natural  order,  or  supposed  suspensions  of 
the  laws  <.if  matter,  and  of  that  vast  series  of  dependent  causation 
which  constitutes  the  legitimate  field  for  the  investigation  of  science, 
whose  constancy  is  the  sole  warrant  for  its  generalizations."     (p.  1 10.) 

"  No  amount  of  attestation  of  innumeral)le  and  honest  ■witnesses 
would  ever  con\ince  any  one  versed  in  mathematical  and  mechanical 
science,  that  a  person  had  squared  the  circle  or  discovered  jierpetual 
motion.  Antecedent  credibility  depends  on  antecedent  knowledge, 
and  enlarged  ^dews  of  the  connexion  and  dependence  of  truths  ;  and 
the  value  of  any  testimony  will  be  modihed  or  destroyed  in  different 
degrees  to  minds  differently  enlightened."     (p.  141.) 

A  writer  in  the  Quarterly  Review  has  forcibly  pointed  out  that 
Buch  language  as  this  violates  "  the  very  caution  prescribed  and  com- 
manded by  the  logic  of  induction,  which  rigidly  confines  statements 
of  facts  to  actual  experience,  refraining  from  any  admixture  with 
these  of  assumption  or  hypothesis."  The  "  Immutability  of  the 
Laws  of  Nature "  is,  he  observes,  such  an  assumjrtion  or  hyj^othesis, 
and  is  therefore  an  offence  against  "inductive  logic — that  logic  whose 
nobleness  and  potency  is  centred  in  a  rigid  discrimination  of  experi- 
ence from  imagination."  {Article  on  the  Immutability  of  Nature, 
1861.) 

NOTE  5,  p.  46. 

Mr.  Mill  aims  at  providing  induction  with  a  complete  logical 
basis,  and  discards  the  idea  that  the  uniformity  of  nature  rests  upon 
any  antecedent  ground  or  assumption  in  the  mind.  "  I  must  protest," 
he  says,  "  against  adducing  as  evidence  of  the  truth  of  a  fact  in  ex- 
ternal nature  the  disposition,  however  general,  of  the  human  mind  to 
believe  it.  Belief  is  not  proof,  and  does  not  dispense  with  the  necessity 
of  proof .  ...  To  demand  evidence  when  the  belief  is  ensured  by  the 
mind's  own  laws  is  supposed  to  be  appealing  to  the  intellect  against 
the  intellect.  But  this  I  apprehend  is  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
nature  of  evidence.  By  evidence  is  not  meant  anything  and  every- 
thing which  produces  belief.     There  are  many  things  which  generate 


11] 


Note  5  235 


belief  besides  evidence  :  a  mere  strong  association  of  ideas  often 
causes  a  belief  so  intense  as  to  be  imshaken  by  experience  or  argu- 
ment. Evidence  is  not  that  which  the  mind  does  or  must  yield  to, 
but  that  which  it  ought  to  yield  to."  (vol.  ii.  p.  95.)  We  could  not 
have  a  more  decided  announcement  that  the  writer  intended  to  estab- 
lish law  in  nature,  or  the  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature,  upon  a 
logical  and  argumentative  as  distinguished  from  an  instmctive  ground. 
He  disproves  the  latter  by  another  argument  :  "  Were  we  to  suppose 
(what  is  perfectly  possible  to  imagine)  that  the  present  order  of  the 
universe  were  brought  to  an  end,  and  a  chaos  succeeded  in  which 
there  was  no  fixed  succession  of  events,  and  the  past  gave  no  assurance 
of  the  future  ;  and  if  a  human  being  were  miraculously  kept  alive  to 
witness  this  change,  lie,  surely  would  soon  cease  to  believe  in  any  unifor- 
mity, the  uniformity  itself  no  longer  existing.  If  this  is  admitted, 
either  the  belief  in  uniformity  is  not  an  instinct,  or  it  is  an  instinct  con- 
quei'able,  like  all  other  instincts,  by  acquired  knowledge."     (vol.  i. 

P-  97-) 

The  reply  to  this  argument  is,  that  when  the  belief  in  the  future 
uniformity  of  nature  is  pronounced  to  be  instinctive,  it  is  only  pro- 
nounced to  be  instinctive  upon  the  condition  of  her  j^asi  uniformity. 
The  belief  which  is  pronounced  to  be  instinctive  absolutely,  is  the 
belief  that  the  unknown  will  be  like  the  known.  It  depends  there- 
fore upon  what  the  known  or  past  is,  what  we  believe  the  unknown 
or  future  will  be.  If  the  past  has  been  order,  we  believe  the  future 
will  be  order  ;  if  the  past  has  been  chaos,  we  believe  the  future  will 
be  chaos.  The  instinctive  belief  which  is  spoken  of  is  the  belief 
according  to  which  the  future  in  our  minds  instinctively  reflects  the 
past,  whatever  that  past  may  be. 

Discarding,  then,  altogether  the  instinctive  or  antecedent  ground,  as 
the  ground  of  the  legitimate  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature,  Mr. 
Mill  proceeds  to  provide  this  beUef  with  real  evidence,  or  to  place  it 
upon  a  full  logical  basis.  And  the  first  ground  which  he  puts  forward 
is  that  this  belief  is  "  verified  by  experience."  "  Some  believe  it,"  he 
says,  "  to  be  a  principle  which,  antecedently  to  any  verification  by 
experience,  we  are  compelled  by  the  constitution  of  our  thinking 
faculty  to  assume  as  true  ;"  but  he,  on  the  other  hand,  pronomices 
that  this  principle  both  requires  and  has  the  verification  of  experience. 
"  The  assumption  with  regard  to  the  course  of  nature  and  the  order 
of  the  universe,"  i.e.,  the  belief  in  its  uniformity,  he  says,  "  is  an 
assumj)tion  involved  in  every  case  of  induction.  And  if  we  consult  the 
actual  course  of  nature  ivefind  that  the  assumption  is  loarranted.  The 
universe  we  find  is  so  consti  tuted,  that  whatever  is  true  in  any  one 


236  Note  5  [Lect. 

case  is  true  in  all  cases  of  a  similar  description.  This  universal  fart 
is  a  warrant  for  all  inferences  from  experience The  justifica- 
tion of  our  belief  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  past,  is  that  the 
future  does  resemble  the  past :  and  the  logician  is  bound  to  demand 
this  outward  evidence,  and  not  to  accept  as  a  substitute  for  it  a  sup- 
posed internal  necessity."     (vol.  i.  316  ;  v.  2,  97.) 

I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  what  Mr.  Mill  can  mean  by  saying 
that  the  assumption  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  "  verified  by  ex- 
perience," "is  warranted  by  a  universal  fact;"  and  by  saying  that 
"  the  justification  of  our  belief  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  past, 
is  that  the  future  does  resemble  the  past."  If,  indeed,  I  use  experi- 
ence in  such  a  sense  as  to  combine  it  with  and  include  within  it  an 
instinctive  or  antecedent  ground,  that  is  the  ground  upon  which  the 
belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  ordinarily  put  ;  the  ground,  viz. 
that  although  such  a  belief  of  course  implies  a  past  experience,  and 
would  be  impossible  without  it,  the  belief  is  instinctive  itjwn  this 
past  experience.  The  sun  liavinrj  risen  up  to  this  morning,  which  is 
past  experience,  I  believe  that  it  will  rise  to-morrow,  which  is  an  in- 
stinctive belief  or  assumption  upon  that  past  experience.  But  if  I  use 
the  "  verification  of  experience "  in  distinction  to  an  antecedent  or 
instinctive  ground,  in  that  case  the  "  verification  "  of  my  belief  in  the 
sun's  rising  to-morrow  "by  experience"  can  only  mean  the  verifica- 
tion of  it  by  the  fact  itself  of  the  sun's  rising  to-morroiv.  Such  an 
"experimental  proof"  of  induction  would  indeed  convert  any  in- 
ductive conclusion  into  a  universal  proposition  ;  for  a  conclusion 
which  is  "  2)roved"  and  "  verified  "  by  "  experience,"  as  distinguished 
from  any  "  general  disposition  of  the  human  mind  to  believe  it,"  is 
undoubtedly  an  actual  and  true  fact.  But  such  an  "  experimental 
proof"  of  induction  cannot  be  stated  without  an  absurdity  ;  for  we 
cannot  without  a  contradiction  in  terms  speak  of  the  subject  of  induc- 
tive belief  being  verified  by  experience  when  that  belief  is  by  the  veiv 
supposition  an  advance  upon  our  experience  :  my  belief  that  the  sun 
will  rise  to-morrow  cannot  be  verified  by  the  fact  of  the  sun's  rising 
to-morrow,  when  as  yet  by  the  very  form  of  the  expression  that  iact 
has  not  yet  taken  place.  Such  a  kind  of  verification  could  only  be 
expressed  by  saying,  "  I  believe  that  the  sun  has  risen  to-morroic." 
Whatever  amount  of  experience  we  may  have  backward,  that  experi- 
ence can  only  verify  the  belief  that  preceded  it — the  belief  in  those 
particular  facts  of  which  that  experience  was  the  verification  ;  that 
past  experience  cannot  possibly  verify  my  belief  in  a  fact  which  is 
now  future  :  yet  this  is  what  Mr.  Mill  verbally  states, — "The  justi- 
fication of  our  belief  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  past,  is  that  the 


II] 


Note 


237 


future  does  resemble  tlie  past."  That  which  was  once  a  future  fact 
may  have  become  in  ten  thousand  instances  a  present  fact,  and,  when 
it  Ijecame  present,  have  resembled  the  past ;  but  we  cannot  possibly 
pronounce  that  what  is  now  future  resembles  the  past,  because  the 
future  does  not  now  exist.  Whatever  past  verifications  there  may 
have  been  of  the  once  future,  that  ivhich  is  at  this  time  future  cannot 
l^e  included  in  them  ;  and  for  our  belief  in  it  we  must  depend  upon 
an  antecedent  ground  or  assumption  in  our  minds  that  the  future  will 
resemble  the  past.  The  order  or  uniformity  of  nature  could  indeed 
be  verified  by  experience,  were  it  a  jmst  order  or  uniformity  only  ; 
l)ut  it  is  a  future  order  as  well  ;  and  the  belief  respecting  that  future 
must  rest  uj)on  an  assumption  by  which  we  connect  that  past  tvith 
this  future. 

As  Mr.  Mill,  however,  advances  further  in  the  construction  of  a 
logical  basis  for  induction,  his  ai'gumentative  phi^aseology  changes, 
and  the  principle  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  asserted,  instead  of 
being  "  verified  by  experience"  to  be  "  founded  on  prior  generalizations 
or  inductions."  Of  "  the  fundamental  princij^le  or  axiom  of  induction 
that  the  course  of  nature  is  uniform,"  he  says,  "  it  would  be  a  great 
error  to  offer  this  large  generalization  as  an  explanation  of  the  induc- 
tive process.  On  the  contrary,  I  hold  it  to  be  itself  an  instance  of 
induction,  an  induction  by  no  means  of  the  most  obvious  kind.  Far 
from  bemg  the  first  induction  we  make,  it  is  one  of  the  last.  .  .  . 
This  great  generalization  is  itself  founded  on  prior  generalizations." 
(vol.  i.  p.  317.)  "The  belief  we  entertain  in  the  universality 
throughout  natiu'e  of  the  law  of  cause  and  efiect  [which  is  the  same 
with  the  order  or  uniformity  of  nature]  is  itself  an  instance  of  induc- 
tion ;  we  arrive  at  this  universal  law  by  generalization  from  many 
laws  of  uiferior  generality."  (vol.  ii.  ji.  97.)  The  general  axiom  then 
of  the  imiformity  of  nature  is  founded  upon  a  numljer  of  particular 
inductions.  Upon  what  are  the  particular  inductions  founded  ?  The 
particular  inductions  are,  according  to  Mr.  Mill,  founded  upon  the 
general  axiom.  "  This  assumption  with  regard  to  the  course  of  nature 
and  the  order  of  the  universe  is  involved  in  every  case  of  induction." 
(vol.  i.  p.  316.)  But  the  construction  of  such  a  ground  of  induction 
as  this  appears  to  shew  tbat  induction  does  not,  rather  than  that  it 
does,  rest  upon  a  logical  basis.  For  what  is  the  state  of  the  case? 
The  general  assumption  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  rests  upon  parti- 
cular cases  of  induction ;  those  particular  cases  of  induction  rest  upon 
that  general  assumption  of  the  uniformity  of  nature.  The  large 
generalization  rests  upon  prior  generalizations ;  the  prior  generaliza- 
tions upon  the  large  one.     But  if  the  two  grounds  or  bases  of  indue- 


238  Note  5  [Lect. 

tion  rest  upon  each  other,  wliat  is  this  but  to  say  that  induction  as  a 
whole  is  foundation/ess;  that  it  stands  upon  no  ground  of  reason.  If 
in  every  case  t)f  induction  there  is  an  assumption,  and  that  assump- 
tion rests  upon  tliose  cases  of  induction ;  Loth  together  are  argumenta- 
tively  suspended  in  space. 

Mr.  Mill  of  course  perceives  the  objection  to  which  liis  ground  is 
open,  and  replies ;  but  instead  of  shewing  that  his  ground  furnishes 
that  "  proof"  or  "evidence"  with  which,  he  has  said,  induction  cannot 
dispense,  he  appears  to  disclaim  the  very  intention  of  giving  such 
proof  or  evidence  at  all.  "  In  what  sense  can  a  principle  which  is  so 
far  from  being  our  earliest  induction  be  regarded  as  a  waiTant  for  all 
others?  In  the  only  sense  in  which,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the 
general  propositions  which  we  place  at  the  head  of  our  reasonings 
when  we  throw  them  into  syllogisms  ever  contribute  to  their  validity 
,  .  .  .  not  contrihuting  at  all  to  'prove  the  conclusion,  but  being  a 
necessary  condition  of  its  being  proved ;  since  no  conclusion  is  jjroved 
for  wliich  there  cannot  be  found  a  true  major  premiss"  (vol.  i.  j). 
318).  The  general  assumption  then  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  has 
only  the  place  in  the  inductive  process  of  a  major  premiss  in  the 
syllogism,  which,  Mr.  Mill  says,  "  is  a  petitio  principii," — no  real  part 
of  the  argument,  but  an  intermediate  halting-place  for  the  mind, 
interposed  by  an  artifice  of  language  between  the  real  premiss  and 
the  conclusion"  (vol.  i.  p.  225). 

In  another  passage,  however,  Mr.  Mill  seems  to  promise  such  an 
explanation  of  the  a]iparent  circular  reasoning  upon  which  he  has 
based  induction  as  will  shew  that  the  circularity  in  it  is  only  ap- 
parent, and  that  it  is  at  the  bottom  real  proof.  "  If  we  assume  the 
universality  of  the  very  law  which  these  cases  [particularly  induc- 
tions] do  not  at  fii-st  sight  appear  to  exemplify  [i.e.  the  very  law  which 
is  founded  upon  then^],  is  not  tliis  a  petitio  principii?  Can  we  prove 
a  proposition  by  an  argimient  which  takes  it  for  granted  ?  And  if 
not,  on  what  e\adence  does  it  rest?"  (vol.  ii.  p.  94.)  Mr.  Mill's  ex- 
planation then  is,  that  the  large  generalization  rises  upon  sorne  parti- 
cular cases,  and  being  gained  proves  the  others.  "  The  more  obvious 
of  the  particular  unifcjrmities  suggest  and  give  evidence  of  the  general 
uniformity,  and  the  general  uniformity  once  established  enables  us  to 
prove  the  remainder  of  the  particular  uniformities."  (vol.  ii.  p.  97. 
But  this  is  no  answer  to  the  argumentative  objection  which  has  been 
urged.  For  how  were  the  more  obvious  particular  inductions,  upon 
wliich  the  whole  structure  rests,  themselves  made  ?  By  assuming  the 
general  principle  of  unifonnity—  "  This  is  an  assumption  involved  in 
every  case  of  induction."  (vol.  i.  p.  316.)     The  general  principle  then 


n] 


Note 


239 


still  remains  an  assumption  ;  for  those  cases  which  assumed  it  evi- 
dently did  not  prove  it. 

Again,  he  reminds  us  that  one  part  of  induction  may  be  foimded 
on  another  and  yet  may  correct  that  other.  The  principle  of  universal 
law  or  uniformity  in  nature,  though  a  great  philosojiliical  jOTnciple, 
he  says,  is  founded  iipon  unscientific  and  empirical  inductions  ;  for 
the  precariousness  of  this  eaiiy  and  loose  kind  of  induction  diminishes 
"as  the  subject-matter  of  observation  widens  ;"  and  the  law  now 
mentioned  is  "  an  empirical  law  co-extensive  with  all  human  experi- 
ence." But  the  principle  of  universal  law  or  uniformity  once  proved 
corrects  and  improves  upon  the  looser  and  earlier  inductions ;  and 
"  we  substitute  for  the  more  fallible  forms  of  the  process,  an  operation 
grounded  on  the  same  process  in  a  less  fallible  form  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  98). 
But  though  it  is  true  that,  looking  upon  induction  in  its  results,  one 
part  corrects  another  ;  the  correction  of  the  results  of  induction  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  philosophical  c/round  of  induction,  which  Mr. 
Mill  still  leaves  in  the  state  which  has  been  described  ;  the  general 
law  of  uniformity  resting  on  the  particular  cases,  and  the  particular 
cases  on  the  general  law. 

The  representation,  then,  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  as  being,  in 
distinction  to  an  antecedent  assiunption,  "  a  universal  fact,"  "  certain," 
"absolute,"  "proved  ;"  the  assertion  that  "the  justification  of  our 
belief  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  jiast  is  that  the  future  does 
resemble  the  past ;  "  this  identification  of  a  law  of  nature  with  a  uni- 
versal proposition  falls  to  the  ground,  and  with  it  the  following  state- 
ments : — "  We  cannot  admit  a  proposition  as  a  law  of  nature  and  yet 
believe  a  fact  in  real  contradiction  to  it.  We  must  disbelieve  the 
alleged  fact,  or  believe  that  we  were  mistaken  in  admitting  the  sup- 
posed law."  "  If  an  alleged  fact  be  in  contradiction,  not  to  any  num- 
ber of  approximate  generalizations,  but  to  a  completed  generalization 
grounded  on  a  rigorous  induction,  it  is  said  to  be  impossible."  "  An 
impossibility  is  that  the  truth  of  which  would  conflict  with  a  com- 
plete induction"  (voL  ii.  pp.  157,  159,  164). 

It  is  proper,  however,  to  add,  that  when  Mr.  Mill  arrives  at 
the  point  that  he  has  to  make  a  statement  on  the  sulyect  of  belief 
in  miracles,  that  statement  appears  not  to  agree  with  and  carry  out 
this  account  of  induction,  but  to  be  in  ojiposition  to  it.  He 
says  : — 

"  But  in  order  that  any  alleged  fact  should  be  contrary  to  a  law  of 
causation,  the  allegation  must  be,  not  simply  that  the  cause  existed 
without  being  followed  by  the  effect,  for  that  would  be  no  uncommon 
occurrence  ;  but  that  this  happened  in  the  absence  of  any  adequate 


240  Note  5  [Lect. 

couiiteractiiig  cause.  Now,  in  the  case  of  an  alleged  miracle,  the 
assertion  is  the  exact  opposite  of  this.  It  is,  that  the  ell'ect  was  de- 
feated, not  in  the  absence,  Liit  in  consequence  of  a  counteracting 
cause,  namely,  a  direct  interpo.sition  of  an  act  of  the  Mill  of  some 
Iji'iiig  who  has  jiower  over  nature  ;  and  in  particular  of  a  l)eing  whose 
Avill,  heing  assumed  to  have  endowed  all  the  causes  with  the  jiowers 
liy  which  they  produce  their  ett'ects,  may  well  he  supposed  able  to 
counteract  them.  A  miracle  (as  was  justly  remarked  by  Brown)  is 
no  contradiction  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  it  is  a  new  efiect  sup- 
posed to  be  produced  by  the  introduction  of  a  new  cause.  Of  the 
adequacy  of  that  cause,  if  ])resent,  there  can  be  no  doubt  ;  and 
the  only  antecedent  improbability  which  can  be  ascribed  to  the 
miracle,  is  the  improbability  that  any  such  cause  existed  (vol.  ii. 
p.  159). 

This  statement  then  certainly  implies  that  a  miracle  is  not  im- 
possible, and  admits  of  being  rationally  believed.  For  a  miracle  is 
pronounced  to  be  possible  if  there  is  an  adequate  cause  in  counter- 
action to  natural  causes  to  account  for  it  :  "  the  interposition  of  an 
act  of  the  will  of  some  being  who  has  power  over  nature  "  is  admitted 
to  be  such  an  ade(|uate  counteracting  cause  ;  and  it  is  implied  that 
there  is  nothing  contrary  to  reason  in  the  belief  in  such  a  being.  But 
such  a  .statement  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  miracle  does  not  agree  with 
the  previous  position  which  Mr.  Mill  has  laid  down  ;  because  he  has 
said  that  a  fact  in  contradiction  to  a  comj^leted  induction  is  impos- 
sible, and  we  know  that  a  miracle  is  such  a  fact.  That  men,  e.g.,  do 
not  after  death  return  to  life  again  is  "  a  completed  induction  ;  "  and 
therefore  the  resun-ection  of  a  man  after  death  is  a  contradiction  to  a 
"  completed  induction."  It  is  true  that  a  mir-acle  is  not  in  contradic- 
tion to  a  law  of  causation,  in  the  sense  of  causation  by  an  act  of  the 
Divine  will ;  but  the  law  of  causation  of  which  Mr.  Mill  has  all 
along  spoken,  and  the  contradiction  to  which  he  has  pronounced  to  be 
an  impossibility,  is  a  law  which  consists  simply  in  a  succession  of 
uniform  facts  ;  it  is  physical  law  simply,  the  chain  of  natural  causes, 
which  natural  causes  are  only  another  word  for  recun-ent  facts.  A 
miracle,  though  it  is  not  contrary  to  a  law  of  causation  which  includes 
the  Divine  will  as  a  cause,  is  contrary  to  this  law  of  natural  causation 
or  the  order  of  nature.  Mr.  ]\Iill's  test  of  impossibility  has  been  all 
along  a  strictly  matter-of-fact  test — "a  completed  generalization,"  a 
"  completed  induction."  In  this  last  statement,  however,  he  adopts 
another  test,  that  viz.  of  causation  absolutely,  and  refuses  to  jiro- 
nounce  upon  the  impossibility  of  a  fact  so  long  as,  though  contrary 
to  the  order  of  natural  causes,  it  can  be  referred  to  an  adequate 
counteracting  cause.     I  gladly  accept  Mr.  Mill's  statement  on  the 


11]  Notec^ 


241 


subject  of  belief  in  miracles,  but  if  this  statement  is  true,  Mr.  Mill's 
previous  language  ret^urres  correction.^ 

The  sense  of  abstract  possibility  indeed  in  Mr.  Mill's  mind,  re- 
vealed by  him  in  various  statements  in  his  works,  cannot  be  said  to 
be  too  jealous,  or  timid,  or  narrow.  This  idea,  which  is  cherished  by 
him  as  a  philosophical  liberty  and  right,  includes  in  it  many  results 
so  stupendous  and  overwhelming  that  no  miracle  can  be  compared 
with  them.  "  I  am  convinced,"  he  says,  "  that  any  one  accustomed 
to  abstraction  and  analysis,  who  will  fairly  exert  his  faculties  for 
this  purpose,  will,  when  his  imagination  has  once  learned  to  entertain 
the  notion,  find  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  in  some  one,  for  in- 
stance, of  the  many  firmaments  into  which  sidereal  astronomy  now 
divides  the  universe,  events  may  succeed  one  another  at  random  with- 
out any  fixed  law."  (ii.  96.)  "  In  distant  parts  of  the  stellar  regions, 
where  the  phenomena  may  be  wholly  unlike  those  with  which  we 
are  acquainted,  it  would  be  folly  to  affirm  confidently  that  this  gene- 
ral law  [of  uniformity]  prevails.  The  uniformitj'  in  the  succession  of 
events,  otherwise  called  the  law  of  causation,  must  not  be  received  as 
a  law  of  the  universe,  but  of  that  portion  of  it  only  which  is  within 
the  range  of  our  own  observation."  (p.  104.)  It  must  be  remarked 
that  this  reign  of  enormity,  contradictory  at  its  very  root  to  our  order 
of  nature,  and  involving  all  the  miracles,  did  they  take  place  on  this 
earth,  which  the  wildest  fancy  can  even  picture  to  itself,  has  not, 
according  to  Mr.  Mill's  conception,  its  possible  locality  in  another 
and  invisible  world,  but  in  this  very  material  universe  in  which  we 
are  living ;  the  distance  of  this  portentous  scene  from  this  planet, 
however  long,  is  a  certain  definite  distance.  Such  conceptions  as 
these  have  subjected  Mr.  Mill  to  much  criticism,  but  to  whatever 
charge  they  are  open,  it  is  not  to  the  charge  of  a  limited  sense  of 
possibility.  The  objection  made  to  miracles  is  that  they  are  diver- 
gences from  the  laws  of  the  material  world  introduced  into  the  mate- 
rial world ;  the   same  persons  who  would   admit  any   amount   of 

^  Mr.  Mill's  statement  of  Hume's  argument,  as  only  asserting  that  "  no 
evidence  can  prove  a  miracle  to  any  one  who  did  not  previously  believe 
the  existence  of  a  Being  with  supernatural  power,"  is  an  incorrect  one. 
Hume  asserts  that  the  existence  of  a  God  makes  no  difference  to  his  ai'gu- 
ment;  and  rightly:  because  his  argument  rests  simply  upon  a  comparison 
of  the  respective  contradictions  to  experience  in  the  two  facts  themselves 
— the  truth  of  the  miracle,  and  the  falsehood  of  the  witness  ;  the  former 
of  which  two  contradictions,  he  says,  is  greater  than  the  latter.  But  if  this 
argument  is  correct,  it  is  equally  correct  whether  a  Deity  is  supposed  or 
not.  For  if  experience  is  our  only  guide,  it  is  the  only  test  also  of  the 
will  of  the  Deity  ;  which  will,  therefore,  is  no  additional  consideration  to 
experience,  but  is  identical  with  and  is  merged  in  it. 


242  Note  I  [Lect. 

strangeness  in  anoDur  invisible  -world  objecting  to  the  introduction 
of  divergence  or  strangeness  into  this  world.  Mr.  Mill's  conception 
violates  this  distinction  conspicuously,  and  so  involves  the  great 
point  objected  to  in  miracles. 


LECTUREIII. 

NOTE  1,  p.  51. 

A  MIRACLE  is  popularly  called  "  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature." 
This  phrase  is  objected  to  by  some  writers,  upon  the  ground  that  the 
laws  of  nature  which  are  spoken  of  as  violated  in  a  miracle,  are  not 
really  violated  but  continue  in  force  all  the  time,  that  force  being  not 
annihilated  but  only  counteracted  by  a  force  or  law  above  them. 

"  We  shoidd  tenn  the  miracle,"  says  Archbishop  Trench,  "  not  the 
infraction  of  a  law,  l»ut  behold  in  it  the  lower  law,  neutralized,  and 
for  the  time  put  out  of  working  order  by  a  higher.  ....  Continually 
Ave  behold  in  the  world  around  us  lower  laws  held  in  restraint  by 
higher,  mechanic  by  dynamic,  chemical  by  vital,  physical  by  moral  ; 
vet  we  say  not,  when  the  lower  thus  gives  \)\iu'e  in  favour  of  the 
higher,  that  there  was  any  violation  of  law,  or  that  anything  con- 
trary to  nature  came  to  pass ;  rather  we  acknowledge  the  law  of  a 
greater  freedom  swallowing  up  the  law  of  a  lesser.  Thus  -when  I  lift 
up  my  ann,  the  law  of  gravitation  is  not,  as  far  as  my  arm  is  con- 
cerned, denied  or  annihilated  ;  it  exists  as  much  as  ever,  but  is  held 
in  suspense  by  the  higher  law  of  my  will.  The  chemical  laws  which 
would  bring  about  decay  in  animal  substances  still  subsist,  even  when 
they  are  checked  and  hindered  by  the  salt,  which  keeps  those  sub- 
stances from  corruption."  {Notes  on  the  Miracles:  Preliminary  Essay, 
ch.  ii.) 

Upon  the  same  ground  Mr.  Llewellyn  Da\nes  objects  to  the  de- 
scription of  a  miracle  as  "  a  susijcnsion  of  the  laws  of  nature  :" — 

"  We  do  not  say  that  the  knowledge  and  the  Avill  of  man  when  they 
come  into  play  suspend  the  laws  of  nature.  If  I  hold  a  stone  in  my 
hand,  or  set  a  magnet  so  as  to  hold  up  a  heavy  piece  of  iron,  the  law  of 
gravity  acts  as  regularly  as  if  the  stone  or  the  ii'on  fell  to  the  ground. 
If  the  skill  of  a  physician  cures  a  patient  of  a  fever,  no  jihysiological 
law  is  suspended  any  more  than  if  the  patient  were  left  alone  to  die. 
Ijut  the  human  knowled<j,e  and  will  do  effect  results.  Suppose  them 
withdrawn,  and  things  would  be  very  dillerent  from  what  they  are. 
So  with  the  Divine  Will.  We  ought  not  to  say  that  any  operation 
(tf  it,  however  miraculous,  suspends  the  laws  of  nature."  (Signs  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Heaven,  p.  37. 


Ill] 


Note 


243 


Dr.  Heurtley  objects  to  the  term  "violation,"  but  not  to  the  term 
"  susj)ension  : '' — 

"  A  miracle  is  a  -vaolation  neither  of  the  laws  of  matter  nor  of  any- 
other  laws  of  nature.  It  is  simply  the  intervention  of  a  Being  pos- 
sessing or  endued  with  superhuman  power, — an  intervention  which, 
though  it  temporarily  modifies  or  suspends  the  operation  of  the  laws 
ordinarily  in  operation  in  the  world,  is  yet  in  itself  exercised  in  strict 
accordance  with  the  law  of  that  Being's  nature,  or  superindued  natui'e, 
by  whom  it  is  exercised."     {Replies  to  Essays  and  Reviews,  p.  148.) 

The  writer  of  an  article  in  the  Christian  Remembrancer  (October 
1863),  objects  to  both  terms,  "  suspension"  and  "contradiction:" — 

"  An  important  inquiry  still  remains,  viz.  whether  our  definition 
of  a  miracle  as  an  event  with  a  supernatural  cause  is  a  sufficient  one  ? 
In  later  times,  as  we  know,  this  definition  has  not  been  thought  suffi- 
cient ;  but  another  idea  has  been  added  to  it,  viz.  '  contrary  to  nature,' 
'  suspension  of  a  natural  law  or  cause.'  The  inquiry  is  a  most  im- 
portant one ;  for,  if  we  adopt  this  addition,  we  lay  the  miracle  open, 
as  we  shall  see,  to  very  formidable  objections.  In  addressing  our- 
selves to  the  solution  of  this  point,  the  first  thing  to  be  ascertained 
is,  whether  this  idea  necessarily  enters  into  our  conception  of  a 
miracle.  A  little  consideration  will  shew  that  it  does  not.  Any 
event  clearly  ascertained  to  have  a  supernatural  cause  would  un- 
doubtedly be  regarded  as  miraculous,  even  though  not  contrary  to 
nature.  The  stone,  for  instance,  rolled  away  from  the  door  of  the 
sepulchre  we  regard  as  a  miracle,  on  the  simple  ground  that  it  was 
done  by  angels.  Yet  it  cannot  be  alleged  that  that  event  Avas  con- 
trary to  nature,  or  that  it  involved  a  suspension  of  a  law  of  nature. 
The  same  act  might  have  been  performed  by  man  or  by  mechanical 
power,  and  in  that  case  it  would  have  been  perfectly  natural.  We 
thus  see  that  the  distinguishing  mark  of  the  miracle,  to  our  mind,  is, 
not  contrary  to  nature,  but  having  a  supernatural  cause.  We  see, 
too,  that  the  supposition  of  the  suspension  of  the  law  of  nature  does 
not  apply  to  all  miracles.  It  does  not  apply  to  a  miracle  considered 
as  a  miracle.  Consequently,  if  it  does  apply  to  some  miracles  it 
must  be  accidental  to  them." 

By  what  particular  expression  we  denote  the  diff^erence  from  the 
order  of  nature  involved  in  a  miracle,  whether  we  do  or  do  not  call 
it  a  violation  of  natural  law,  a  suspension,  &c.,  is  a  question  of  lan- 
guage and  no  more,  .so  long  as  we  strictly  understand  that  the  natural 
laws  to  which  these  terms  "  violation  "  and  "  suspension  "  are  appUed 
are  one  set  of  laws  only,  viz.  that  which  comes  within  the  cognizance 
of  our  experience.  The  effect  of  these  laws  is  in  the  particular  in- 
stance of  a  miracle  hindered  or  prevented  ;  something  takes  place 
which  would  not  take  place  if  these  laws  alone  were  in  operation. 


244  Note  I  [Lect. 

Whether  this  prevention  of  the  e^eci,  or  this  other  e,fftci,  be  called  a 
violation  of  the  law  or  not,  is  immaterial,  as  far  as  regards  the  par- 
ticular law  in  question  ;  it  makes  no  difference  whether  we  say  that 
that  law  is  stisj^cnded,  or  continues  in  force  but  is  counteracted.  The 
phrase  "  violation  or  suspension  of  law  "  in  its  ordinary  signification, 
has  reference  only  to  the  particular  material  laws  which  are  concerned 
in  the  case,  and  therefore  as  commonly  used,  it  does  not  appear  to  be 
objectionable.  What  is  of  importance  is  that,  if  a  miracle  be  a  viola- 
tion or  suspension  of  ijarticular  laws,  there  are  other  higher  laws  of 
Avhich  it  is  an  instance,  at  the  very  time  that  it  is  a  violation  or  sus- 
pension of  the  lower  ones :  and  that  a  miracle  is  thus  not  against  law 
upon  the  scale  of  the  whole  of  the  universe  ;  the  giving  way  of  lower 
law  to  higher  being  itself  an  instance  of  law,  tbe  violation  of  the 
particular  being  the  observance  of  the  whole. 

"  What  in  each  of  these  cases  is  wrought  may  be  against  one  par- 
ticular law,  that  law  being  contemplated  in  its  isolation,  and  rent 
away  from  the  complex  of  laws,  whereof  it  forms  only  a  part.  But 
no  law  stands  thus  alone  ;  and  it  is  not  against  but  rather  in  harmony 
with  the  system  of  laws ;  for  the  law  of  those  laws  is,  that  when 
powers  come  into  conflict,  the  weaker  shall  give  way  to  the  stronger, 
the  lower  to  the  higher.  In  the  miracle  this  world  of  ours  is  drawn 
into  and  within  a  higher  order  of  things ;  laws  are  then  at  work  in 
the  woi'ld,  which  are  not  the  laws  of  its  fallen  condition,  for  they  are 
laws  of  a  mightier  range  and  higher  perfection ;  and  as  such  they 
claim  to  make  themselves  felt,  ami  to  have  the  pre-eminence  and  the 
predominance  which  are  riglitly  their  own."  {Trench,  Notes  on  the 
Miracles :  Preliminary  Essay,  ch.  iii.) 

Bishop  Fitzgerald  expresses  the  same  idea  with  some  philosophical 
additions : — 

"Again,  when  miracles  are  described  as  ' interferences  with  the 
laws  of  nature,'  this  description  makes  them  appear  improbable  to 
many  minds,  from  their  not  sufficiently  considering  that  the  laws  of 
nature  interfere  with  one  another;  and  that  we  cannot  get  rid  of 
'  interferences'  npon  any  hypothesis  consistent  with  experience. 
When  organization  is  superinduced  npon  inorganic  matter,  the  laws  of 
inorganic  matter  are  interfered  with  and  controlled;  wlien  animal 
life  comes  in  there  are  new  interferences;  when  reason  and  conscience 
are  superadded  to  will,  we  have  a  new  class  of  controlling  and  inter- 
fering powers,  the  laios  of  which  are  moral  in  their  character.  In- 
tellig'ences  of  pure  speculation,  Avho  could  do  nothing  but  observe  and 
reason,  surveying  a  portion  of  the  universe — such  as  the  greater  jiart 
of  the  materal  universe  may  be — wholly  destitute  of  living  inhabi- 
tants, might  have  reasoned  that  such  powers  as  active  beings  jiossess 
were  incredible,  that  it  was  incredible  that  the  Great  Creator  would 


Ill] 


Note  2  245 


suffer  the  majestic  uniformity  of  laws  which  He  was  constantly 
maintaining  through  boundless  space  and  innumerable  worlds,  to  be 
controlled  and  interfered  with  at  the  caprice  of  such  a  creature  as 
man.  Yet  we  know  by  experience  that  God  has  enabled  us  to  con- 
trol and  interfere  with  the  laws  of  external  nature  for  our  own  pur- 
poses ;  nor  does  this  seem  less  imiirobable  beforehand  (but  rather 
more),  than  that  He  should  Himself  interfere  with  those  laws  for 
oiu"  advantage."    (Article  on  Miracles ;  Dictionary  of  the  Bible,  p.  376.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  64. 

"No  extent  of  physical  investigation  can  warrant  the  denial  of  a 
distinct  order  of  impressions  and  convictions  wholly  different  in  kind, 
and  affecting  thai  ^portion  of  our  compound  constitution  which  we 
term  the  moral  and  spiritual. 

"  That  impressions  of  a  sprritual  kind,  distinct  from  any  which 
positive  reason  can  arrive  at,  may  be  made  on  the  internal  faculties 
of  the  soul,  is  an  admission  which  can  contravene  no  truth  of  our 
constitution,  mental  or  bodily.  Nor  can  it  be  reasonably  disputed 
on  any  physical  ground  that,  under  peculiar  conditions,  such  spiritual 
impressions  or  intimations,  in  a  peculiarly  exalted  sense,  may  be 
afforded  to  some  highly-gifted  individuals,  and  worthily  ascribed  to 
a  Divine  source,  thus  according  with  the  idea  we  attach  to  the  term 
'  revelation.' 

"  On  other  grounds  it  may  perhaps  be  argued,  that  such  a  mode  of 
communicating  high  spiritual  truth  is  suitable  to  the  truths  com- 
municated ;  that  sjairitual  things  are  exhibited  by  spiritual  means  ; 
moral  doctrines  conveyed  through  the  fitting  channel  of  the  moral 
faculties  of  man.  But  all  Ave  are  at  present  concerned  to  maintain  is, 
that  both  the  substance  and  the  mode  of  the  disclosure  are  thus  wholly 
remote  from  anything  to  which  physical  difficulties  can  attach,  or 
which  comes  under  the  province  of  sense  or  intellect. 

"  But  then,  in  accordance  with  its  nature,  the  objects  to  which  such 
a  revelation  refers  must  he  properly  and  exclusively  those  belonging  to 
moral  and  spiritual  concep)tions :  whether  as  related  to  what  we  experi- 
ence within  ourselves,  or  pointing  to  and  supposing  a  more  extended 
and  undefined  world  of  spiritual,  unseen,  eternal  existence,  above  and 
beyond  all  that  is  matter  of  sense  or  reason,  of  which  science  gives  no  in- 
timation— apart  from  the  world  of  material  existence,  of  ordinary 
human  action,  or  even  of  metaphysical  siDeculation,  wholly  the 
domain  and  creation  of  faith  and  insjsiration.  Such  a  world,  it  is 
acknowledged,  is  disclosed  by  Christianity  as  the  subject  of  a  peculiar 
revelation,  presenting  objects  which  are  wholly  and  exclusively  those 
of  faith,  not  of  sense  or  knowledge. 

"  Thus  it  follows,  in  regard  to  revelation  in  general,  that  so  far  as 
its  objects  are  properly  those  which  are  in  their  nature  restricted  to 
purely  religious  and  spiritual  truths,  we  must  acknowledge  that  in 
these,  its  more  characteristic  and  essential  elements,  it  can  involve 
nothing  lohich  can  come  into  contact  or  collusion  with  the  truth  of  pjhysi- 


246  Note  2  [Lect. 

cal  scievce  or  inductive  uniformity;  though  wholly  extraneous  to  the 
world  of  positive  knowledge,  it  can  imply  nothing  at  variance  with  any 
part  of  it,  aud  thus  can  involve  us  in  no  difficulties  on  physical 
grounds. 

"  Thus,  a  piirely  spiritual  revelation,  as  such,  stands  on  quite  dis- 
tinct j^Tounds  from  the  idea  of  physical  interruption.  Yet  this  dis- 
tinction has  been  continually  lost  sight  of,  while  it  is  of  the  most 
jM-imary  importance  for  vindicating  the  acceptance  of  such  revelation 
as  the  source  of  spiritual  truth  "  (Powell's  Order  of  Nature,  p.  276). 

"  Men  formerly,  and  even  at  present  under  metaphysical  influences, 
have  cavilled  at  mysteries,  hut  acquiesced  in  miracles.  Under  a  more 
positive  system,  the  most  enlightened  are  the  first  to  admit  s])iritual 
mysteries  as  matters  of  faith,  utterly  beyond  reason,  though  they  find 
deviations  fii'om  physical  truth  irreconcilable  to  science"  {Ihid.  p. 
292). 

"  If  in  what  has  preceded  no  reference  has  been  made  to  such  high 
mysteries  as  the  Trinity,  the  union  of  the  Divine  and  human  natures 
in  Christ,  the  Atonement  by  His  death,  the  infiuence  of  the  Holy 
.Spirit,  or  Sacramental  grace,  it  is  because  these  and  the  like  tenets  of 
the  Church  do  not  properly  fall  under  the  jiresent  discussion  ;  since 
though  in  some  few  points  touching  upon  material  things — on  the 
human  existence  and  death  of  Christ,  and  on  the  nature  of  man— yet 
they  involve  no  consideration  of  a  physical  kind,  infringing  on  the 
visible  order  of  the  natural  world,  and  thus  cannot  be  open  to  any 
ditficulties  of  the  kind  here  contemplated  :  in  fact,  all  the  objections 
which  have  been  raised  against  them  are  of  a  metaphysical,  moral,  or 
philological  nature. 

"  But  if,  in  other  cases,  the  highest  doctrines  are  essentially  con- 
nected with  the  narrative  of  miracles,  Ave  have  seen  that  the  most 
earnest  believers  contemplate  the  miracle  by  the  light  of  the  doctrine, 
and  both  solely  with  the  eye  oi  faith 

"  Thus  the  resurrection  of  Christ  is  emphatically  dwelt  upon,  not 
in  its  physical  letter,  but  in  its  doctrinal  spirit  ;  not  as  ajihysiological 
phenomenon,  but  as  the  corner-stone  of  Christian  faith  and  hope, 
the  type  of  spiritual  life  here,  and  the  assurance  of  eternal  life  here- 
after. 

"  So,  in  like  manner,  the  transcendent  mysteries  of  the  Incarna- 
tion and  the  Ascension  are  never  alluded  to  at  all  by  the  Apostles  in 
a  historical  or  material  sense,  but  only  so  far  as  they  are  involved  in 
jioints  of  spiritual  doctrine,  and  as  objects  oi  faith ;  as  connected  with 
the  Divine  manifestation  of  the  '  Word  made  flesh,'  '  yet  without  sin,' 
—with  the  inscrutaJile  work  of  retlemption  on  earth  and  the  unseen 
intercession  in  heaven — with  the  invisible  dispensations  of  the  gift  of 
grace  from  above,  and  with  the  hidden  things  of  the  future,  which 
'  eye  hath  not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  have  entered  the  heart  of  man,' 
with  the  predicted  return  of  Christ  to  judge  the  world,  and  the  eternal 
triumph  of  His  heavenly  kingdom. 

"  And  in  this  spiritualised  sense  has  the  Christian  Church  in  all 
ages  acknowledged  these  Divine  mysteries  and  miracles,  '  not  of  sight, 


Ill]  Note  I  247 

but  of  faith,' — not  expounded  by  science,  but  delivered  in  traditional 
formularies, — celebrated  in  festivals  and  solemnities, — by  sacred 
rites  and  symbols, — embodied  in  the  creations  of  art,  and  proclaimed 
by  choral  harmonies  ; — through  all  which  the  spirit  of  faith  adores 
the  '  great  mystery  of  godliness, — manifested  in  the  flesh, — ^^justified 
in  the  spirit,  seen  of  angels, — preached  unto  the  Gentiles, — believed 
(Ui  in  the  world, — received  up  to  glory'"  [Ihid.  p.  456). 


NOTE  3,  p.  68. 

"  L'uNiTE  jointe  a  I'infini  ne  I'augmente  de  rien,  non  plus  qu'uu 
pied  a  une  mesure  infinie.  Le  fini  s'aneantit  en  presence  de  I'iutlni, 
et  devient  un  pur  neant.  Ainsi  notre  esprit  devant  Dieu  ;  ainsi  notre 
justice  devant  la  justice  divine 

"  Nous  connaissons  qu'il  y  a  un  infini  et  ignorons  sa  nature,  comme 
nous  Savons  qu'll  est  faux  C£ue  les  nombres  soient  finis  ;  done  il  est 
vrai  qu'il  y  a  un  infini  en  nombre,  mais  nous  ne  savons  ce  qu'il  est. 
11  est  faux  qu'il  soit  pair,  il  est  faux  qu'il  soit  impair- ;  car,  en  ajoutant 
I'unite,  il  ne  change  point  de  nature  :  cependant  c'est  un  nombre,  et 
tout  nombre  est  pair  ou  impair ;  il  est  vrai  que  cela  s'entend  de  tons 
nombres  finis 

"  Nous  connaissons  I'existence  de  I'infini  et  ignorons  sa  nature, 
parce  qu'il  a  etendue  comme  nous,  mais  non  pas  des  bornes  comme 
nous  "  ( Pascal,  ed.  Fougercs,  vol.  ii.  pp.  1 63,  1 64). 

"  The  idea  of  infinite  has,  I  confess,  something  of  positive  in  all 
those  things  we  apply  to  it.  When  we  would  think  of  infinite  space 
or  duration,  we,  at  first  step,  usually  make  some  very  large  idea,  as, 
perhaps,  of  million  of  ages  or  miles,  which  possibly  we  double  and 
multiply  several  times.  All  that  we  thus  amass  together  in  our 
thoughts  is  positive,  and  the  assemblage  of  a  great  number  of  positive 
ideas  of  space  or  duration.  But  what  still  remains  beyond  this  we 
have  no  more  a  positive  distinct  notion  of,  than  a  mariner  has  of  the 
depth  of  the  sea  where,  having  let  down  a  large  portion  of  his  sound- 
ing-line, he  reaches  no  bottom  ;  whereliy  he  knows  the  depth  to  be 
so  many  fathoms  and  more,  but  how  much  that  more  is  he  hath  no 
distinct  notion  at  all  ;  and  could  he  always  supply  new  line  and  find 
the  plummet  always  sink,  without  ever  stopping,  he  would  be  some- 
thing in  the  posture  of  the  mind  reaching  after  a  complete  and  posi- 
tive idea  of  infinity.  In  which  case,  let  this  Kne  be  ten  or  ten  thousand 
fathoms  long,  it  equally  discovers  what  is  beyond  it,  and  gives  only 
this  confused  and  comparative  idea,  that  this  is  not  all,  but  one  may 
yet  go  further.  So  much  as  the  mind  comprehends  of  any  space,  it 
has  a  positive  idea  of  ;  but  in  endeavouring  to  make  it  infinite,  it 
being  always  enlarging,  always  advancing,  the  idea  is  still  imperfect 

and  incomplete For  to  say  a  man  has  a  po.^itive  clear 

idea  of  any  quantity,  without  knowing  how  great  it  is,  is  as  reasonal  de 
as  to  say  he  has  the  positive  clear  idea  of  the  nmulier  of  the  sands  on 
the  seashore,  who  knows  not  how  many  there  be^  but  only  that  they 


248  Note  4  [Lect. 

are  more  than  twenty So  that  what  lies  beyond  our 

jiositive  idea  towards  infinity,  lies  in  obscurity  ;  and  as  the  in- 
determinate confusion  of  a  negative  idea,  wherein  I  know  I  neither 
do  nor  can  comprehend  all  I  would,  it  being  too  large  f(jr  a  finite 
and  naiTow  capacity."    (Locke  On  Human  Understanding,  bk.  ii.  ch. 

17). 

"  Pra^terea,  si  jam  finitum  constituatur 
Omne,  quod  est,  spatium,  si  quis  prociuTat  ad  oras 
Ultimus  extremas,  jaciatque  volatile  telum, 
Id  validis  utrum  contortum  viribus  ire. 
Quo  fuerit  missuni,  mavis,  longeque  volare. 
An  prohibere  aliquid  censes,  obstareque,  posse? 
Ulterutrum  fatearis  enini  sumasque,  necesse  est. 
Quorum  utrum  c^ue  tibi  efi'ugium  prsecludit,  et  omne 
Cogit  ut  exempta  concedas  fine  patere. 
Nam  sive  est  aliipiid,  quod  prohibeat  officiatqiie, 
Quo  minu'  quo  missum  est  veniat,  finique  locet  se  ; 
Sive  foras  fertur,  non  est  ea  fini'  profecto. 
Hoc  pacto  sequar,  atque,  oras  ubicumque  locaris 
Extremas,  quasram,  quid  telo  denique  fiat. 
Fiet,  uti  nusquam  possit  consistere  finis  ; 
Efiugiumque  fuga)  prolatet  copia  semper." 

Lucretius,  i.  962. 

NOTE  4,  p.  69. 

One  particular  argument  of  Bishop  Butler  in  opposition  to  the  pre- 
sumption against  miracles  is  dra\vn  from  the  fact  of  creation,  as  being 
itself  a  miracle,  or  of  the  nature  of  one,  and  so  a  precedent  for 
miracles  ;  there  being  no  piesimi^jtion,  when  a  power  difterent  from 
the  coiu'se  of  nature  was  exerted  in  the  first  jilacing  of  man  here, 
against  that  power  going  on  to  exert  itself  fm-ther  in  a  revelation. 

"  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  some  operations 
which  we  should  now  call  miraculous ;  particularly  none  against  a 
revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world  ;  nothing  of  such  presum]> 
tion  against  it,  as  is  supjwsed  to  be  implied  or  expressed  in  llie  word 
miraculous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course 
of  nature  ;  and  implies  somewhat  difterent  from  it,  considered  as 
being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no  course  of  nature  at  the  time 
which  we  are  speaking  of,  or,  if  there  were,  we  are  not  ac([uainted 
Avhat  the  course  of  nature  is  upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And 
therefore  the  question,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to 
them  at  that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a  question  concerning 
a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  question  of  fact.  And  we  have  the  like 
I'eason,  be  it  more  or  less,  to  admit  the  rejiort  of  tradition  concerning 
this  question,  and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the  same 
antiquity;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was  first  jJeopled. 


Ill]  Note  4  249 

"  Or  thus :  wlien  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state,  there  was 
a  power  exerted  totally  different  from  the  present  course  of  nature. 
Now,  whether  this  power,  thus  whollj'  different  from  the  present 
course  of  nature,  for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the  word  mir- 
aculous ;  whether  this  power  stopped  immediately  after  it  had  made 
man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itself  fartlier  in  giving  him  a  revelation, 
is  a  question  of  the  same  kind  as  whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted 
itself  in  such  a  particular  degree  and  manner  or  not. 

"  Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the  world  be 
considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called  l)y  that  name ;  the  case 
will  not  be  different :  since  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  such  a 
power  was  exerted.  For  supposing  it  acknowledged,  that  our  Saviour 
spent  some  years  in  a  course  of  woi^king  miracles :  there  is  no  more 
presumption,  worth  mentioning,  against  His  having  exerted  this  nura- 
culous  power,  in  a  certain  degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain  degree  less ; 
in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in  one  or  two  fewer;  in  this,  than 
in  another  manner."     {Analogij,  part  ii.  ch.  ii.) 

This  argument  does  not  ajjpear  to  be  interfered  with  by  anything 
which  science  has  brought  to  light  since  Butler's  time.  It  assumes 
indeed  a  "  beginning  of  the  world,"  and  scientific  authorities  state 
that  there  are  no  evidences  in  nature  of  a  beginning.^  But  supposing 
this  to  be  the  case,  science  still  does  not  assert  that  there  is  no  begin- 
ning, but  only  deny  that  the  examination  of  nature  exhibits  proof 
that  there  is  one. 

Science  would  indeed  ajipear  to  be  in  the  reason  of  the  case  in- 

^  "It  lias  been  already  observed  that  strict  science  offers  no  evidence  of 
the  commencement  of  the  existing  order  of  the  universe.  It  exhilnts  indeed 
a  wonderful  succession  of  changes,  but  however  far  back  continued,  and  nf 
however  vast  extent,  and  almost  inconceivable  modes  of  operation,  still 
only  changes  ;  occui'ring  in  recondite  order,  however  little  as  3'et  disclosed, 
and  in  obedience  to  physical  laws  and  causes,  however  as  yet  obscure  and 
hidden  from  us.  Yet  in  all  this  there  is  no  beginning  properly  so  called  ; 
no  commencement  of  existence  when  nothing  existed  before :  no  creation 
in  the  sense  of  origination  out  of  non-existence,  or  formation  out  of 
nothing.  The  nebular  theory  may  be  adopted  in  cosmology,  or  the 
development  hypothesis  in  palaeontology — or  any  other  still  more  ambi- 
tious systems  reaching  back  in  imagination  into  the  abysses  of  past  time ; 
yet  these  are  only  the  expositions  of  ideas  theoretical  and  imaginary,  but 
still  properly  within  the  domain  of  physical  order,  and  even  by  them  we 
reach  no  proper  commencement  of  existence.  More  than  half  a  century 
ago,  Dr.  Hutton  announced  the  first  ideas  of  a  natural  geology,  and  boldly 
declared,  '  In  the  economy  of  the  world  I  can  find  no  traces  ot  a  beginning, 
no  prospect  of  an  end,'  and  all  the  later  progress  of  science  has  pointed,  as 
from  its  nature  it  must  do,  to  the  same  conclusion,  nor  can  any  other 
branch  of  science  help  us  farther  back  than  geology.  In  a  word,  geology 
(as  Sir  C.  Lyell  has  so  happily  expressed  it)  is  '  the  autobiography  of  the 
earth,'  but,  like  other  autobiographies,  it  cannot  go  back  to  the  birth." 
(Powell's  Order  of  Nature,  p.  250.) 


250  Note  4  [Lect. 

competent  to  pronounce  that  there  was  no  beginning  in  nature  ; 
because  however  far  back  she  may  trace  the  history  of  the  formation 
of  the  material  world,  she  can  only  assert  what  she  has  discovered, 
viz.  the  fjirthest  point  backward  reached  ;  she  cannot  assert  what 
succession  lies  beyond  the  last  ascertained  point,  still  less  that  this 
succession  is  infinite.  It  may  be  said  that  when  the  process  of  re- 
search has  gone  on  for  a  long  time,  and  when  it  always  has  been 
found  hitherto  that  however  far  back  we  have  gone,  there  has  been 
something  discovered  larther  back  still ;  the  presumption  is  raised  that 
this  retrogression  could  be  seen  to  go  on  for  ever,  if  we  could  oidy 
continue  to  trace  it.  But  this  is  no  more  than  a  presumption,  which 
ought  to  give  way  to  other  considerations,  if  there  are  such  of  a 
weighty  and  urgent  kind,  for  believing  the  contrary. 

The  value  indeed  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  scientific  evidence  of 
a  beginning  in  nature  as  a  proof  there  is  no  beginning,  miist  depend 
on  the  consideration  whether  there  would  or  could  be  scientific  evi- 
dence of  a  beginning,  supposing  there  to  be  one.  For  if,  supposing 
a  beginning,  no  search  or  analj'sis  of  nature  might  or  could  afford 
evidence  of  it,  in  that  case  no  proof  of  the  want  of  a  beginning  is 
furnished  by  the  absence  of  scientific  evidence  for  one.  E\ddence  of 
a  beginning,  we  must  remember,  is  only  another  word  for  our  being 
able  to  trace  and  find  one ;  that  is  to  say,  evidence  is  only  another 
expression  for  our  faculties.  Have  we  then  the  faculties  for  dis- 
covering by  analysis  a  beginning  in  nature  ?  In  reply  to  this  ques- 
tion it  may  be  worth  remarking,  that  we  cannot  be  sure  of  the  extent 
to  which  our  faculties  go  in  investigating  nature ;  that  we  do  not 
know  the  degree  of  their  strength  and  siibtlety,  nor  therefore,  on  this 
account,  what  conclusion  is  to  be  drawn  from  their  failure.  But, 
indeed,  there  appears  to  be  another  and  a  stronger  reason  to  allege 
why  we  cannot  draw  the  conclusion  of  there  being  no  beginning, 
from  our  not  finding  one,  or  from  there  being  no  evidences  of  one ; 
for  can  there  in  the  nature  of  the  case  be  evidences  and  proofs 
from  analysis  of  a  beginning  in  nature,  when  all  that  analysis  can 
ever  jwssibly  discover  is  the  existence  of  some  earlier  fact  than  all 
hitherto  ascertained  ones,  which  is  not  a  beginning,  and  no  evidence 
of  one.^ 

^  Mr.  Baden  rowell  supposes  that  he  enhances  his  statement  of  fact 
that  science  contains  no  evidence  of  a  beginning  by  the  addition  that  to 
"  imagine  a  beginning  is  altogether  out  of  the  domain  of  science  :" — -which 
is  the  same  as  supposing  tliat  the  testimony  of  a  witness  that  a  fact  ilid 
not  take  place,  is  strengthened  by  the  circumstance  that,  not  Ijeing  on  the 
spot  lie  could  not  have  seen  it  if  it  had  taken  place. 

That  we  cannot  however  in  viatcrial  nature  by  jihysical  analysis  dis- 


Ill] 


Note  ^  251 


Science  then  is  not  opposed  to  the  idea  of  creation,  because  all  that 
is  essential  to  the  integral  notion  of  creation  is  a  beginning,  and  a 
beginning  is  not  and  cannot  be  disproved  by  science.  Science  is 
opposed  indeed  to  a  certain  conception  of  creation,  to  creation  con- 
ceived as  an  instantaneous  oj)eration,  as  an  act  of  the  Almighty  will 
calling  at  once  and  in  a  moment  by  its  fiat  the  -vvliole  world,  material, 
animal,  and  rational,  into  existence,  without  graduation,  progression, 
succession  of  steps.  But  whether  creation  takes  place  in  this  way  or 
by  a  long  and  extended  series  of  stages  commencing  with  the  lowest 
forms  of  organic  nature,  and  terminating  in  the  existing  result,  is 
altogether  irrelevant  to  the  idea  of  creation,  for  which  all  that  is 
requisite  is  a  beginning — which  science  does  not  disprove.  The 
researches  of  science  farther  and  farther  backward,  raise  indeed,  as 
has  been  said,  a  kind  of  impression  in  the  mind  of  the  absolute  inter- 
rainableness  of  the  succession  of  causes.  But  such  an  impression 
cannot  be  urged  as  any  proof  that  this  series  is  interminable, 
becai;se  we  possess  no  knowledge  whatever  of  what  exists  beyond 
the  last  discovered  fact ;  so  that  in  the  nature  of  the  case  the  con- 
clusion that  this  series  is  interminable,  i.e.  that  this  world  has 
existed  from  all  eternity,  and  is  uncreated,  cannot  be  pronounced 
by  science. 

Upon  whatever  ground,  then,  the  existence  of  a  Creator,  and  Gover- 
nor of  the  w^orld  was  assumed  in  the  "  Analogy,"  upon  the  same  it 
may  be  assumed  now,  and  with  the  assumption  of  a  creation  goes  the 
argument  respecting  miracles /?-om  the  creation. 

Again,  the  part  of  Butler's  argument  relating  to  the  particular 
miracle  of  a  revelation  to  man,  supposes,  in  the  mode  in  which  it  is 
put,  that  mankind  was  placed  in  this  world  at  the  beginning  of  this 
world  ;  and  these  two  phrases,  "  mankind  being  first  placed  in  this 
state,"  and  "the  beginning"  or  "formation  of  the  world,"  are  used  in 
the  same  meaning :  a  supposition  which  is  opposed  to  recent  science. 
But  this  supposition  makes  no  diff'erence  to  Butler's  argument  so  long 
as  the  former  of  these  two  events,  i.e.  the  first  rise  of  the  human  race, 

cover  a  beginning,  is  not  inconsistent  with  that  beginning  admitting  of 
legitimate  proof  when  we  include  in  nature  the  order  of  intcUUjcnt  beings, 
and  apply  to  nature  so  understood  certain  principles  of  rcaaoning  inherent 
in  the  very  constitution  of  our  minds.  Because  we  conchule  from  the 
existence  of  the  universe  some  self-existent  being,  we  conchule  from  the 
order  of  intelli>,'ent  beintfs  in  the  universe,  and  the  appearances  of  design 
in  it,  the  intell igcncc  of  that  Self-existent  Being ;  and  we  conclude  from 
the  Original  Being  being  intelligent,  and  matter  not,  that  the  material 
world  cannot  be  that  Original  being,  i.e.  must  have  a  beginning.  {Clarke's 
Demonstration,  Prop,  viii.) 


252  Note  4  [Lect. 

whether  or  not  contemporaneous  with  the  other,  i.e.  the  beginning  of 
the  worhl,  is  in  itself  correctly  described  in  the  argument;  for  if 
"  when  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state  there  was  a  power 
exerted  totally  dilferent  from  the  present  course  of  nature,"  the  argu- 
ment correctly  proceeds,  "  whether  this  power  stopped,  or  went  on," 
&c.  But  that  the  power  exerted  upon  the  occasion  of  the  first  rise 
of  mankind  was  extraoidinary  is  not  disproved  or  contradicted  by 
modem  science ;  for  all  that  modern  science  has  ascertained  is,  that 
man  came  in  subsequently  to  a  long  succession  of  irrational  species ; 
but  that  there  was  a  preceding  succession  of  irrational  sjiecies  does 
not  make  the  introduction  of  the  human  species  any  the  less,  when  it 
took  place,  a  new  fact  in  the  world,  indicating  the  exertion  of  "  a 
power  totally  different  from  the  course  of  nature ; "  both  from  that 
course  of  nature  which  was  going  on  at  the  time,  when  man  as  yet 
did  not  exist,  and  from  the  present  course  of  nature,  when  we  only 
see  his  continuance,  not  his  beginning. 

Taking  the  facts  of  science,  indeed,  as  they  stand,  and  abstracted 
from  any  hypothesis  respecting  them,  the  introductions  of  all  new 
species  were  severally  "  exertions  of  a  jiower  diilerent  from  the  course 
of  nature."  These  species  may  be  said  indeed  to  constitute  a  succes- 
sion or  a  series,  and  nature  in  the  successive  introduction  of  them  may 
be  said  to  exhibit  marks  of  a  plan  or  progi'amme.  But  a  mere  succes- 
sion of  events  does  not  of  itself  constitute  an  order  or  course  of  nature ; 
that  depends  on  the  mode  or  continuity  of  the  succession.  If  there 
are  long  breaks  in  the  chain,  and  if  these  several  introductions  or  be- 
ginnings of  new  forms  of  life  take  place  at  vast  and  irregular  intervals, 
embracing  lengths  of  intervening  time  almost  transcending  our  con- 
ception, these  several  new  introductions  would  no  more  form  an  order 
of  nature,  than  particular  instances  of  resurrection  after  death,  at  in- 
tervals of  hundreds  or  thousands  of  years,  since  the  creation  of  man- 
kind would  form  a  law  of  resurrection.  These  several  introductions 
of  new  life  would  still  be  each  of  them  a  change  in  the  order  of  nature 
existing  at  the  time  of  their  respectively  taking  place ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  everything  that  is  produced  must  have  a  cause,  they  would  be  each 
the  exertion  of  power  different  from  the  course  of  nature,  then  and 
now.  Such  a  i^rogress  of  creation,  indeed,  as  that  of  which  Mr. 
Darwin  has  set  forth  the  hypothesis,  would  be  inconsistent  with  any 
event  belonging  to  that  progress  being  different  from  the  order  of 
nature  ;  because  the  order  of  nature  and  creation  would  then  be  iden- 
tical ;  the  formation  of  new  species  would  be  a  process  always  going 
on  in  all  its  stages,  earlier  or  later,  according  to  the  particular  in- 
stances; and  the  production  of  each  new  species,  as  each  was  pro- 


Ill]  Note  4  253 

duced,  would  be  only  so  slight  an  advance  upon  the  previous  step, 
that  it  would  not  be  a  difference  from,  but  only  an  instance  of,  a  con- 
stantly changing  and  advancing  order  of  nature.  The  nairaculous 
stage  indeed,  if  any,  would  be  not  that  of  creation,  whicli  was  a  con- 
tinuous order  of  nature,  but  the  present  era  of  the  world,  when  this 
order  of  nature  has  stopped.  Mr.  Darwin's  hypothesis  supplies  the 
links  and  fills  ujj  the  chasms  in  the  progress  of  creation.  But  with- 
out anything  to  fill  up  the  immense  chasms  and  breaks  in  the  order 
of  creation  as  it  stands,  the  new  species  as  they  make  their  appearance 
in  the  record  before  us  are  entirely  new  and  original  phenomena, 
starting  up  whole,  at  incalculable  intervals  from  each  other. 

Nor — though  it  may  be  hardly  worth  while  making  the  observation 
— can  any  "  creational  law"  which  does  not  fill  up  these  voids,  but 
leaves  them  standing  as  they  are,  make  any  difference  in  the  character 
of  these  j^henomena.  A  "  creational  law"  which  coexists  with  such 
gaps  and  breaks  can  only  be  a  theory  of  Divine  action,  a  conception 
of  the  mind,  not  a  law  of  nature  ;  having  the  same  relation  to  the 
productions  of  new  species  that  Mr.  Babbage's  law  of  miracles  has  to 
miracles  :  a  law  which,  as  I  observed  in  Lecture  VI.,  does  not  touch 
the  miraculous  character  of  miracles.  Secondary  causes  in  order  to 
constitute  an  order  of  nature  must  be  visible  ;  in  the  absence  of  which 
visibility  their  results  are  still  anomalous  and  strange  facts.  The 
philosopher,  however,  when  he  speaks  of  a  creational  law,  or  "  a  con- 
tinuously operative  secondary  creational  power,"  ^  only  viecms  the 
hypothesis  that  there  is,  though  unascertained,  a  law  of  nature  in  this 
department,  or  that  new  facts  constituting  an  adequate  continuity  of 
succession  will  be  discovered. 

The  "  first  placing  of  man  in  this  world,"  however,  was  a  change  in 
the  order  of  nature  so  different  in  kind  from  all  previous  changes,  and 
all  previous  animal  progress,  that  even  supposing  an  order  of  nature 
up  to  his  introduction,  that  introduction  of  him  was  still  "  the  exer- 
tion of  a  power  different  from  that  order  of  nature."  Of  this  new 
phenomenon,  then,  Sir  Charles  Lyell  says, — "  In  our  attempt  to  ac- 
count for  the  origin  of  species  we  find  ourselves  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  working  of  a  law  of  development  of  so  high  an  order  as  to 
stand  nearly  in  the  same  relation  as  the  Deity  Himself  to  man's  finite 
understanding ;  a  law  capable  of  adding  new  and  powerful  causes, 
such  as  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  of  the  human  race,  to  a 
system  of  nature  which  had  gone  for  millions  of  years  without  the 
intervention  of  an  analogous  cause."     (Antiquitij  of  Man,  oh.  xxiii.) 

To  the  hypothesis  of  a  creational  law  made  in  tliis  statement,  I 
1  Owen's  PalEeontology,  p.  444. 


254  Note  4  [Lect. 

apply  the  remarks  niarle  above.  But  Sir  Charles  Lyell  advances  a 
further  stop,  and  while  acknowledging  the  mystery  of  the  origin  of 
man,  makes  a  cautious  attempt  to  bring  that  m3'stery  within  the 
limits  of  a  class  and  order  of  known  phenomena,  which  have  come 
into  observation  in  the  actual  present  course  of  natui'e,  and  within  the 
region  of  hunaan  history  and  tradition, 

"  The  inventors  of  useful  arts,  the  poets  and  prophets  of  the  early 
stages  of  a  nation's  growth,  the  promulgators  of  new  systems  of  reli- 
gion, ethics,  and  philosophy,  or  of  new  codes  of  laws,  have  often  been 
looked  upon  as  messengers  from  heaven,  and  after  their  death  have 
had  divine  honours  paid  to  them,  while  falnilous  tales  have  been  told 
of  the  prodigies  which  accom])auied  their  birth.  Nor  can  we  wonder 
that  such  notions  have  prevailed  when  we  consider  what  important 
revolutions  in  the  moral  and  intellectual  world  such  leading  s])irits 
have  brought  about  ;  and  when  we  reflect  that  mental  as  well  as  phy- 
sical attributes  are  transmissible  by  inheritance,  so  that  we  may  jjos- 
sibly  discern  in  such  leaps  the  origin  of  the  superiority  of  certain 
races  of  mankind.  In  our  own  time,  the  occasional  ai)i)earance  of 
such  extraordinary  mental  powers  may  be  attributed  to  atavism  ;  but 
there  must  have  been  a  beginning  to  the  series  of  such  rare  and  ano- 
malous events 

"  To  say  that  such  leaps  constitute  no  interruption  to  the  ordinary 
coiu'se  of  nature,  is  more  than  we  are  warranted  in  aitirming.  In  the 
case  of  the  occasional  birth  of  an  individual  of  superior  genius,  there 
is  certainly  no  break  in  the  regular  genealogical  succession  ;  and  when 
all  the  mists  of  mythological  fiction  are  dispelled  by  historical  criti- 
cism, when  it  is  acknowledged  that  the  earth  did  not  tremble  at  the 
nativity  of  the  gifted  infant,  and  that  the  face  of  heaven  was  not  full 
of  fiery  shapes,  still  a  mighty  mystery  remains  unexplained,  and  it  is 
the  orHer  of  the  phenomena,  and  not  their  cause,  which  we  are  able  to 
refer  to  the  usual  coui'se  of  nature."  (Antiquity  of  Man,  ch.  xxiv.) 

Such  genealogical  leaps  then  having,  as  the  writer  supposes,  actually 
taken  place  in  the  intellectual  nature  of  mankind,  within  the  region 
of  historical  tradition, — which  though  it  has  imiiarted  to  its  descrip- 
tions the  shape  of  popular  poetry  and  imagination,  has  still  preserved 
in  them  the  substance  of  true  facts, — human  nature  he  conceives  to 
have  been  a  leap  of  the  same  kind  ;  only  that  instead  of  being  a  tran- 
sition from  lower  man  to  higher  man,  it  was  a  transition  from  the 
brute  to  the  man.  "  If  in  conformity  with  the  theory  of  progression, 
Ave  believe  mankind  to  have  risen  slowly  from  a  rude  and  humble 
starting-point,' such  leaps  may  have  successively  introduced  not  only 
higher  and  higher  forms  and  grades  of  intellect,  but  at  a  much  remoter 
period  may  have  cleared  at  one  bound  the  space  which  separated  the 
highest  stage  of  the  unjirogressive  intelligence  of  the  inferior  animals 


Hi]  Note  ^  255 

from  the  first  and  lowest  form  of  improveable  reason  manifested  Ly 
man." 

But  in  the  first  place,  supposing  that  advances  in  the  scale  of 
humanity  have  taken  place  by  physical  transmission,  are  difi'erences 
in  the  scale  of  humanity  parallel  cases  to  the  difference  between  the 
man  and  the  brute  %  Sir  C.  Lyell  states  his  belief  that  man  is  an  im- 
mortal being  and  a  subject  of  moral  probation,  in  which  respects  he 
supposes  him  to  differ  from  the  brute.  But  is  any  difference  in  the 
scale  of  humanity  parallel  to  a  difterence  between  being  and  not 
being  unmortal,  and  between  being  and  not  being  a  subject  of  moral 
probation  ?  And  therefore  is  any  ascent  by  a  physical  medium  to  a 
higher  level  in  the  human  scale  a  precedent  for  the  animal  "  clearing 
at  a  bound"  by  this  medium  the  awful  chasm  which  separates  an  im- 
mortal being  from  a  perishing  one,  and  the  animal  state  from  a  state 
of  moral  probation  ? 

In  the  next  place,  is  there  any  evidence  even  of  differences  in  the 
scale  of  humanity  having  taken  place  from  this  cause,  i.e.,  by  physical 
transmission  1  any  evidence  that  great  and  leading  men  who  made 
their  appearance  in  the  early  ages  of  society  transmitted  their  own 
superior  faculties  by  physical  descent,  and  that  a  permanent  rise  in 
the  subseqxient  intellectual  level  of  mankind  was  produced  by  the 
operation  of  a  genealogical  law  ?  Historical  tradition,  indeed,  speaks 
of  heroes  and  legislators  who  rose  from  time  to  time  in  the  first  ages 
of  the  world,  and  developed  and  improved  the  social  and  mtellectual 
condition  of  the  nations  to  which  they  belonged  by  education,  by  new 
codes  and  institutions,  by  new  arts  and  inventions  ;  but  not  of  men 
who  raised  the  intellect  of  mankind  and  foiinded  "  the  superiority  of 
certain  races '"  by  the  natural  transmission  of  theu'  own  higher  (quali- 
ties of  mind,  which  thus  became  the  hereditary  projierty  and  new 
nature  of  posterity.  Sir  C.  Lyell  admits  indeed  that  such  facts  as 
these  "have  a  mighty  mystery  unexplained  in  them,"  and  that 
though  the  facts  themselves  "  are  to  be  referred  to  the  usual  course 
of  nature,"  "  their  cause  lies  wholly  beyond  ns ;"  that  is  to  say,  he  does 
not  deprive  the  course  of  nature  of  mystery,  but  he  conceives  never- 
theless, that  the  leap  from  animal  to  human  nature  is  j)aralleled  bj^ 
facts  which  have  appeared  in  the  existing  course  of  nature.  Neither 
historjr,  however,  nor  tradition  discloses  such  facts  as  Sir  C.  Lyell 
needs  for  the  purpose  of  his  parallel.  We  see  indeed  genealogical 
ascents  of  intellect,  but  those  ascents  are  not  permanent,  and  found 
no  new  intellectual  nature  :  for  the  son  having  risen  above  the  intel- 
lectual level  of  his  father,  ]iis  son  returns  back  to  the  lower  stage. 
Again,  we  see  permanent  ascents  in  the  ititellect  of  man,  but  those 


256  Note  5  [Lect. 

ascents  are  not  genealogical ;  they  are  not  produced  by  physical 
transmission,  but  by  education,  by  civilization,  and  instruction  in  the 
arts  of  life.  Human  nature,  before  and  after  the  rise  of  the  great 
and  the  wise  teachers  who  have  appeared  at  difterent  epochs,  was  the 
same ;  only  in  its  fomier  state  uninstructed,  in  the  latter  enlightened 
by  new  truths  and  discoveries.  Permanent  ascents  gained  by  physi- 
cal inheritance  are  the  facts  which  Sir  C.  Lyell  needs  for  the  purpose 
of  his  parallel ;  but  these  do  not  present  themselves. 

NOTE  5,  p.  70. 

It  is  not  perhaps  sufficiently  considered  that,  whatever  criterion 
we  adopt  of  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  actions,  i.e.,  what  makes 
actions  right  or  wrong,  the  particular  standard  we  apjily  to  the 
actions  does  not  affect  the  question  of  the  principle  of  "  right,"  or 
moral  obligation  being  necessary  to  bind  those  actions  upon  the 
individual.  Thus  the  standard  of  expediency  applied  to  actions  is 
perhaps  popularly  supposed  to  conflict  and  to  dispense  with  the 
principle  of  moral  obligation  in  the  individual ;  the  notion  being  that, 
because  expediency  is  the  criterion  of  the  actions,  therefore  the 
actions  cannot  be  performed  in  obedience  to  the  moral  sense  or  sense 
of  right,  but  because  they  are  expedient.  But  in  truth  the  standard 
of  expediency  no  more  dispenses  with  the  sense  of  moral  obligation 
in  the  individual  than  any  other  standard,  nor  is  it  con'ect  to  conceive 
that  if  actions  are  performed  because  they  are  expedient,  therefore 
they  are  not  performed  under  a  sense  of  moral  obligation ;  because 
after  the  criterion  has  done  its  part  and  fixed  upon  the  actions  on 
account  of  their  expediency,  the  question  "still  remains.  Under  what 
obligation  am  I  to  do  what  is  expedient,  what  conduces  to  general 
ha]ii)iness  ?  Unless  this  additional  step  can  be  made  out,  the  actions 
may  be  proved  to  be  ever  so  useful  and  advantageous  to  the  com- 
munity, but  the  link  which  connects  them  with  the  duty  of  the 
individual  is  wanting. 

The  system  of  Bentham  is  defective  in  this  imi:)ortant  link — the 
medium  between  the  community  and  the  individual,  by  wliich  what 
is  useful  to  the  community  becomes  binding  upon  the  individual.  He 
gives  with  great  copiousness  of  statement  his  definition  of  right  and 
wrong  in  actions,  viz.,  their  being  advantageous  or  disadvantageous 
to  the  whole  social  body,  including  the  individual  himself.  "  Only  so 
far  as  it  produces  happiness  or  misery  can  an  act  be  properly  called 
virtuous  ox  vicious."  {Deontology,  yol.  i.  p.  141.)  "  Will  clamouring 
fen- '  ought '  or  '  ought  not,'  that  perpetual  petitio  frinciini,  stand  in 


Ill]  Note  5  257 

the  stead  of  utility  ?  Men  may  wear  out  the  air  with  sonorous  and 
unmeaning  words ;  tliose  words  will  not  act  upon  the  mind  ;  nothing 

M'ill  act  upon  it  but  the  apjirehensions  of  pleasure  and  pain 

Avow  then  that  what  is  called  duty  to  oneself  is  but  prudence,  and 
what  is  called  duty  to  others  is  effective  benevolence."  (Introduction 
to  Deontology,  vol.  ii.)  But  supposing  this  criterion  of  rightness  in 
actions  themselves  to  be  adopted,  viz.,  their  producing  happiness,  the 
question  still  remains,  "Why  must  I  perform  these  actions'?  what 
have  I  to  do  with  the  happiness  of  others?"  If  the  principle  of 
"ought "  then  is  admitted,  and  the  sense  of  "ought"  allowed  to  exist 
in  our  minds,  there  is  a  tie  which  binds  the  indi\'idual  to  society. 
He  cannot  neglect  the  happiness  of  others  without  self-reproach,  and 
without  the  right  of  others  to  reproach  him.  But  without  this  sense 
of  "  ought "  how  does  the  matter  stand  ?  A  certain  class  of  actions 
are  attended  by  most  valuable  results,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  highly 
for  the  interest  of  the  community  that  they  should  be  performed. 
But  all  that  is  by  the  very  profession  proved  is  the  interest  of  the 
community.  What  difference  does  it  make  in  the  individual,  not 
doing  them  ?  Is  he  himself  at  all  in  a  different  state  whether  he  does 
them  or  not?  Why  should  he  reproach  himself,  what  right  have 
others  to  reproach  him,  if  he  does  not  do  them  ?  Without  the  sense 
of  "  ought "  in  the  individual  there  is  a  large  amount  of  human  hap- 
piness laid  before  us  as  the  result  of  certain  actions,  but  there  is 
nothing  to  bind  the  individual  to  those  actions,  or  make  him  respon- 
sible for  that  hajjpiness.  Society  is  lucky,  and  is  to  be  congratulated 
ujjon  its  good  fortune,  if  it  obtains  such  a  class  of  actions  from  him  ; 
but  society  cannot  say,  '  You  ought  to  do  them,'  for  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  the  principle  or  sense  of  "  ought."  If  he  has  not  done  them, 
all  that  can  be  said  is  that  he  has  not  done  them — a  fact  which  is  no 
more  a  reflection  upon  him  than  the  omission  of  anything  else  which 
was  not  incumbent  upon  him.  Without  the  principle  of  "  ought "  to 
supplement  the  criterion  of  expediency,  the  virtuousness  of  an  action 
is  identical  with  certain  advantageous  effects,  and  means  these  effects, 
and  has  no  other  meaning.  But  these  effects  are  wholly  outside  the 
individual  agent,  and  do  not  affect  him  in  the  slightest  degree  as 
attaching  any  quality  to  him,  or  making  any  difference  in  his  inward 
condition.  Praise  or  blame  can  only  attach  to  him  in  the  sense  in 
which  these  terms  must  be  used  and  to  which  they  must  be  confined 
in  this  philosophy.  Adz.,  as  the  assertion  of  one  or  another  set  of  effects  ; 
in  which  sense  they  assert  external,  or,  as  we  may  say,  historical  facts 
only,  and  do  not  touch  the  man. 

Bentham's  position,  then,  is  not  true — "  The  elements  of  pain  and 

R 


258  Note  5  [Lect. 

pleasure  give  to  the  deontologist  instruments  sufficient  for  his  work. 
'Give  nie  matter  and  motion,' said  Descartes,  'and  I  will  make  a 
physical  world.'  *  Give  me,'  may  the  utilitarian  teacher  exclaim, 
'give  me  the  human  sensibilities — joy  and  grief,  pain  and  pleasure — 
and  I  will  create  a  moral  world.  I  will  produce  not  only  justice,  hut 
generosity,  patriotism,  philanthropy,  and  the  long  and  illustrious 
train  of  sublime  and  amiable  virtues.'"  (Introduction  to  Deontology, 
vol.  ii.)  "  Deontology  "  does  not  supply  the  link  between  the  good  of 
society  and  the  individual.  It  may  be  said  that  the  principle  of 
benevolence  exists  in  the  human  mind  as  a  passion  or  affection,  indepen- 
dently of  the  sense  of  "  ought "  or  duty ;  and  that  this  is  the  link  which 
connects  the  individual  with  society.  But  the  mere  affection  of  benevo- 
lence is  only  such  a  link  so  long  as  the  affection  is  carried  on  by  its  own 
impulse,  as  the  appetite  of  hunger  or  curiosity  or  any  other  is ;  when 
benevolence  becomes  an  effort,  unless  there  is  the  sense  of  "  ought "' 
to  supply  the  place  of  the  force  of  the  appetite,  society's  hold  upon 
the  individual  goes.  For  though  benevolence,  while  it  was  in  force, 
was  advantageous  to  the  community,  the  want  of  it  cannot  be  charged 
as  a,  fault,  there  being  no  "ought"  or  "ought  not"  in  the  system. 
A  "  fault "  in  it  can  only  mean  a  disadvantageous  consequence  of  an 
action  regarded  as  a  productive  thing,  which  is  not  a  fault  in  the 
moral  sense.  Yet,  unaccomitable  as  it  may  seem,  it  is  only  when 
benevolence  does  become  an  effort,  and  therefore  depends  entirely 
upon  the  sense  of  "  ought "  for  its  exertion,  that  it  is  admitted  to  be 
a  virtue  by  Bentham.  "  But  though  the  test  of  virtue  be  usefulness, 
or,  in  other  words,  the  production  of  happiness — virtue  being  that 
which  is  beneficial  and  vice  that  wliich  is  pernicious  to  the  com- 
munity— there  is  no  identity  between  virtue  and  usefulness,  for  there 
are  many  beneficial  actions  which  do  not  partake  of  the  nature  of 
virtue.  Virtue  demands  effort."  (Deontology,  vol.  i.  p.  146.)  But 
why  should  a  man  make  the  effort  ?  Bentham  cannot  say  he  "  ought" 
to  make  it,  and  no  other  reason,  applying  to  the  individual,  can  be 
alleged.  His  very  definition  of  virtue  then  makes  it  dependent  just 
on  that  principle  which  in  his  philosophy  is  omitted.  He  is  possessed 
indeed  of  certain  "  sanctions  or  inducements  to  action,"  such  as  the 
fear  of  punishment  and  the  desire  for  approbation.  But  the  former 
of  these  two  motives  can  only  apply  to  a  very  small  proportion  of 
hvmian  actions,  if  by  punishment  we  mean  ci\dl  or  jihysical  punish- 
ment ;  and  the  apjn-obation  of  others  is  founded  upon  the  sense  of 
"  ought "  in  those  who  give  it,  and  its  force  as  a  motive  depends  upon 
the  sense  of  "  ought "  in  him  who  is  the  subject  of  it.  Abstracted 
from  this  the  approbation  of  others  is  merely  their  assertion  of  cer- 


Ill] 


Note  6  259 


tain  facts  -which  to  the  individual  make  no  difference.  To  prudential 
actions  the  obligation  is  stronger  than  to  benevolent,  because  interest 
in  himself  is  more  of  a  necessary  feeling  in  a  man  than  interest  in 
others ;  but  even  here  the  obligation  is  not  moral ;  nor  if  a  man 
chooses  not  to  regard  or  consult  for  his  owaa  interest  can  blame  attach 
to  him  ;  blame  at  least  can  only  mean  in  this  philosophy  the  asser- 
tion of  certain  consequences  of  his  conduct. 

NOTE  6,  p.  71. 

The  philosophy  of  universal  necessary  law  which  puts  man  and 
material  nature  under  the  same  head,  and  which  argues  that  if  man 
is  not  under  that  law,  neither  can  nature  be  asserted  to  be,  i.e.,  that  if 
free-will  is  allowed  in  man,  miracles  may  be  allowed  in  nature,  is 
thus  stated  : — 

"  Step  by  step  the  notion  of  evolution  by  law  is  transforming  the 

whole  field  of  our  knowledge  and  opinion Not  the  physical 

world  alone  is  now  the  domain  of  inductive  science,  but  the  moral,  the 
intellectual,  and  the  spiritual  are  being  added  to  its  empire.  ...  It 
is  the  crown  of  phiioso2)liy  to  see  the  immutable  even  in  the  complex 
action  of  human  life.  In  the  latter,  indeed,  it  is  but  the  first  germs 
which  are  clear.  No  rational  thinker  hopes  to  discover  more  than  a 
few  primary  actions  of  law,  and  some  approximating  theory  of  growth. 
Much  is  dark  and  contradictory.  .  .  . 

"Why  this  rigorous  repudiation  of  all  disorder  in  the  material 
world,  whilst  insisting  on  stupendous  perturbations  of  the  moral .' 
Why  are  all  facts  contrary  to  science  rejected,  and  theories  contrary 
to  history  retained?  Why  are  physical  miracles  absuixl,  if  spiritual 
miracles  abound?  Why  are  there  no  suspensions  of  the  laws  of 
matter,  yet  cardinal  suspensions  of  the  laws  of  mind  ?  .  .  .  .  They 
see  'the  grand  foundation — conception  of  universal  law,'  'the  invari- 
able operation  of  a  series  of  eternally  impressed  consequences  following 
in  some  necessary  chain  of  orderly  causation.'  Such  a  law,  we  con- 
ceive, is  read  in  all  human  history,  life,  and  spirit."  (Article  on  Neo- 
Christianity,  Westminster  Review,  Oct.  i860.) 

NOTE  7,  p.  72. 

The  secularist  position  is  stated  thus  by  its  chief  promnlgator  : — 
"  You  cannot  live  for  both  worlds,  because  you  do  not  know  both. 
You  know  but  one.     Live  for  the  one  you  do  know."     (Secular  Alis- 
cellany,  p.  26.) 

"  Secular  principles  relate  to  the  present  existence  of  man,  and  to 
methods  of  procedure  the  issues  of  which  can  be  tested  by  the  experi- 
ence of  this  life.  A  j^erson  holding  secular  princijales  as  general  rules 
of  life,  concerns  himself  with  present  time  and  materiality,  neither 
ignoring  nor  denying  the  future  and  spiritual,  which  are  independent 


26o  Note  I  [Lect. 

questions.  Secularity  draws  the  line  of  distinction  between  the  things 
of  time  and  the  thing's  of  eternity.  That  is  secular  which  pertains  to 
tliis  world.  The  distinction  may  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  cardinal 
propositions  of  theoh)>,'y  are  provealde  only  in  tlie  next  life,  and  not  in 
this.     If  I  believe  in  a  given  creed,  it  may  turn  out  to  be  tlie  true 

one,  but  one  must  die  to  find  out  that Pure  secular  principles 

have  for  their  object  to  fit  men  for  time.  Secularism  ])urposes  to 
regulate  human  affairs  1  )y  considerations  purely  human.  Its  principles 
are  founded  upon  nature,  and  its  object  is  to  render  men  as  perfect  as 
possible  in  this  life."     (J^rinciples  of  Secularism,  p.  6.) 

"We  desire  to  know  and  not  to  hope.  We  have  no  wants,  and  wish 
to  have  none  which  truth  will  not  satisfy.  We  would  realize  this  life 
— we  would  also  deserve  another,  but  without  the  selfishness  which 
craves  it,  or  the  presumption  which  expects  it,  or  the  discontent  which 
demands  it."     {Secularism  Distinguished  from  Unitarianism,  i).  i6.) 


LECTUEE    IV. 

NOTE  1,  p.  76. 

"  At  the  utmost  a  physico-theology  can  only  teach  a  supreme  mind 
evinced  in  the  laws  of  the  world  of  matter,  and  the  relations  of  a  Deity 
to  physical  things  essentially  as  derived  from  ])liysical  law  .... 

"  The  firm  conception  of  the  immutability  of  order  is  the  first  rudi- 
ment in  all  scientific  foundation  for  cosmo-theology.  Our  conclusion 
cannot  go  beyond  the  assumption  in  our  evidence.  Our  argument 
can  lead  us  only  to  such  limited  notions  of  the  Divine  attributes  as 
are  consistent  with  the  principle  of  '  Cosmos.'  If  we  speak  of  '  wis- 
dom,' it  is  as  evinced  in  laws  of  profoundly-adjusted  reason  ;  if  of 
'  power,'  it  is  only  in  the  conception  of  universal  and  eternal  main- 
tenance of  those  aiTangements  ;  if  of  '  infinite  intelligence,'  it  is  as 
manifested  throughout  the  infinity  of  nature ;  and  to  whose  dominion 
we  can  imagine  no  limit,  as  we  can  imagine  none  to  natural  order. 

"  If  we  attempt  to  extend  the  idea  of  '  power'  to  infinity,  or  what 
we  call  the  attriljute  of  '  Omnipotence,'  in  conformity  with  a  strictly 
natural  theology,  it  can  only  be  from  the  boundless  extent  to  which 
we  find  these  natural  arrangements  kept  up  in  incessant  activity,  but 
unchangeable  order;  the  unlimited,  and  we  believe  illimitable  expan- 
sion, both  in  time  and  space,  of  the  same  undeviating  regularity  with 
Avhich  the  operations  of  the  universally  connected  machinery  are  sus- 
tained. The  difficulty  which  presents  itself  to  many  minds,  how  to 
reconcile  the  idea  of  unalterable  laio  with  volition  (which  seems  to  im- 
ply something  changeable),  can  only  be  answered  by  appealing  to 
those  immutable  laws  as  the  sole  evidence  and  ex^wnent  we  have  of 
supreme  volition  ;  a  volition  of  immutable  mind,  an  empire  of  fixed 
intelligence. 

"  The  simple   argument  from  the  invariable  order  of  nature   is 


IV] 


Note  2  261 


wholly  incompetent  to  give  us  any  conception  whatever  of  the  Divine 
Omnipotence,  except  as  vudntaining,  or  acting  through,  that  invariable 

univerml  system  of  physical  order  and  law A  Theism  of  Cynjii- 

fotence  in  any  sense  deviating  from  the  order  of  nature  must  he  derived 
entirely  from  other  teaching :  in  fact  it  is  commonly  traceable  to  early 
religious  impressions  derived,  not  from  any  real  deductions  of  reason, 
but  from  the  language  of  the  Bible. 

"  Natm-al  theology  does  not  lead  us  to  the  supernatural,  being  itself 
the  essential  and  crowning  principle  of  the  natural:  and  pointing  to 
the  supreme  moral  cause  or  mind  in  nature,  manifested  to  us  as  far  as 
the  invariaV)le  and  universal  series  and  connexion  of  physical  causes 
are  disclosed  ;  obscured  only  when  they  may  be  obscured  ;  hidden  only 
when  they  may  be  imagined  to  be  interrupted. 

"  The  supernatural  is  the  offspring  of  ignorance,  and  the  parent  of 
superstition  and  idolatry  ;  the  natural  is  the  assurance  of  science,  and 
the  i^reliminary  to  all  rational  views  of  Theism."  (Poivell's  Order  of 
Nature,  p.  245.) 

"  It  was  formerly  argued  that  every  Theist  must  admit  the  credi- 
bility of  miracles  ;  but  this,  it  is  now  seen,  depends  on  the  nature  and 
degree  of  his  Theism,  which  may  vary  through  many  shades  of  opinion. 
It  depends,  in  fact,  on  the  precise  view  taken  of  the  Divine  attributes ; 
such,  of  course,  as  is  attainable  prior  to  our  admission  of  revelation,  or 
we  fall  into  an  argument  in  a  \'icious  circle.  The  older  writers  on 
natural  theology,  indeed,  have  professed  to  deduce  very  exact  conclu- 
sions as  to  the  Divine  j^erfections,  especially  Omnipotence ;  conclusions 
which,  according  to  the  physical  argument  already  referred  to,  appear 
carried  beyond  those  limits  to  which  reason  or  science  are  competent 
to  lead  us  ;  while,  in  fact,  all  our  higher  and  more  precise  ideas  of  the 
Divine  perfections  are  really  derived  from  that  very  revelation,  whose 
evidence  is  the  jjoint  in  question.  The  Divine  Omnipotence  is  en- 
tirely an  inference  from  the  language  of  the  Bible,  adopted  on  the  as- 
sumption of  a  belief  in  revelation.  That  '  with  God  nothing  is  impos- 
sible,' is  the  very  declaration  of  Scripture  ;  j^et  on  this  the  whole  belief 
in  miracles  is  built,  and  thus,  with  the  many,  that  belief  is  wholly  the 
result,  not  the  antecedent  of  faith."  {Powell's  Study  of  Evidences  of 
Christianity,  p.  1 1 3.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  79. 

Philosophers  have  applied  the  term ''demonstrative"  to  certain 
proofs  of  the  existence  of  a  God  ;  and  were  these  reasonings  demon- 
strative in  the  strict  mathematical  sense  it  would  not  be  correct  to  say 
that  this  great  truth  rested  on  a  ground  of  faith.  But  the  term  "  de- 
monstrative" does  not  appear  to  be  used  in  this  instance,  by  those 
who  apply  it,  in  a  strict  and  mathematical  sense.  These  kind  of  rea- 
sonings do  indeed  proceed  upon  axioms  which  instinctively  approve 
themselves  as  rational ;  and  the  axioms  being  admitted,  a  chain  of 
irresistible  consequences  finally  educes  from  them  this  cardinal  truth : 


262  Note  2  [Lect. 

but  the  axioms,  though  upon  the  broad  ground  of  reason  and  common 
sense  obligatory,  do  not  possess  the  rigid  force  of  mathematical 
axioms  ;  and  the  structure  of  reasoning  Avhich  is  built  upon  them 
shares  in  the  same  defect.  If  Ave  take  the  verj'  first  axiom,  t.y.  Mhich 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  fabric,  viz.,  that  everything  that  begins 
to  exist  must  have  a  cause,  however  near  to  the  nature  of  a  mathema- 
tical axiom  this  principle  may  be,  we  yet  perceive  a  distinct  dillerence 
between  this  principle  and  an  axiom  of  mathematics,  when  we  com- 
pare the  two  together.  We  cannot  say,  i.(j.  that  exactly  the  same  sidf- 
evident  certainty  belongs  to  this  truth  that  belongs  to  the  axiom  tliat 
things  that  are  equal  to  the  same  are  equixl  to  one  another.  Nf)r, 
therefore,  when  upon  the  basis  of  the  axiom  that  everything  that  l)e- 
gins  to  exist  must  have  a  cause,  the  argument  proceeds, — Therel'ore 
there  must  always  be  existence  antecedent  to  what  begins  ;  therefore 
something  must  have  from  eternity  existed  ;  an  eternal  succession  of 
Beings  being  neither  caiised  from  without  nor  self-existent,  is  an  in- 
consistency :  therefore  what  has  existed  from  eternity  is  one  Being  ; 
that  one  Being  as  existing  from  eternity  is  the  cause  of  all  being  that 
begins  ;  as  existing  necessarily  is  omnipresent,  for  the  necessity  is  the 
same  everywhere  ;  and  as  the  cause  of  intelligent  beings,  is  Himself 
intelligent, — does  this  superstructure  of  reasoning  possess  the  strict 
force  of  a  mathematical  proof.  The  demonstrative  argument  for  the 
existence  of  a  God  is  indeed  the  accurate  working  out  of  some  strong 
instinctive  maxims  of  reason,  but  when  Ave  endeavour  to  pursue  these 
maxims  and  the  reasoning  upon  them  to  the  point  of  necessity,  Ave  are 
not  able  to  do  so  ;  the  sul)ject  eludes  our  grasp,  because  in  truth  Ave 
have  not  faculties  for  perceiving  demonstration  or  necessary  connexion 
upon  this  subject-matter.  Nor  therefore  do  such  reasonings,  though 
called  demonstrative,  when  we  consider  the  astonishing  nature  of  the 
great  truth  Avhich  is  educed  from  them,  appear  to  dispense  with  faith 
in  the  acceptance  of  and  dependence  upon  them. 

Locke  strongly  asserts  the  demonstrative  nature  of  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  God.  "  It  is  as  certain  that  there  is  a  God,  as  that  the 
opposite  angles,  made  by  the  intersection  of  tAvo  straight  lines,  are 
equal."  (Essay  on  the  Human  TJnderstandimj,  bk.  i.  ch.  iv.  s.  16.) 
"  But  though  this  be  the  most  obvious  truth  that  reason  discovers, 
and  though  its  evidence  be,  if  I  mistake  not,  equal  to  a  mathematical 
certainty  ;  yet  it  requires  thought  and  attention,  and  the  mind  must 
apply  itself  to  a  regular  deduction  of  it  from  some  part  of  our  intuitive 
knowledge,  or  else  Ave  shall  be  as  uncertain  and  ignorant  of  this  as  of 
other  propositions,  Avluch  are  in  themselves  capable  of  clear  demon- 
stration  "VVc  have  a  more  certain  knowledge  of  the  existence 


IV]  Note  2  263 

of  a  God  than  of  anything  our  senses  have  not  immediately  discovered 
to  us.  Nay,  I  presume  I  may  say  that  we  may  more  certainly  know 
that  there  is  a  God,  than  that  there  is  anytliing  else  without  us. 
When  I  say  we  know,  I  mean  that  such  knowledge  is  within  our 
reach,  which  we  cannot  miss  if  we  will  but  apply  our  minds  to  that, 
as  we  do  to  several  other  inquiries."  The  proof  comes  under  these 
heads  : — "  Man  knows  that  he  himself  is  ;  "  "  He  knows  also  that 
nothing  cannot  produce  a  being,  therefore  something  eternal ; "  "  Two 
sorts  of  beings,  cogitative  and  incogitative ; "  "  Therefore  there  has 
been  an  eternal  wisdom."  (Book  iv.  ch.  x.) 
Clarke  says — 

"  I  proceed  now  to  the  main  thing  I  at  first  proposed  ;  namely,  to 
endeavour  to  shew,  to  such  considering  persons  as  I  have  already 
described,  that  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God  are  not  only  possible 
or  barely  probable  in  themselves,  but  also  strictly  demonstrable  to  any 
unprejudiced  mind,  from  the  most  uncontestable  principles  of  right 
reason 

"  Now  many  arguments  there  are  by  which  the  Being  and  Attri- 
butes of  God  have  been  undertaken  to  be  demonstrated ;  and  perhajjs 
most  of  those  arguments,  if  thoroughly  understood,  rightly  stated, 
fully  pursued,  and  duly  separated  from  the  false  or  uncertain  reason- 
ings which  have  sometimes  been  intermixed  with  them,  would  at 
length  ajjpear  to  be  substantial  and  conclusive.  But  because  I  would 
endeavour,  as  far  as  possible,  to  avoid  all  manner  of  perjjlexity  and 
confusion,  therefore  I  shall  not  at  this  time  use  any  variety  of  argu- 
ments, but  endeavour  by  one  clear  and  plain  series  of  jiropositions 
necessarily  connected  and  following  one  from  another,  to  demonstrate 
the  certainty  of  the  Being  of  God,  and  to  deduce  in  order  the  neces- 
sary Attributes  of  His  nature,  so  far  as  by  our  finite  reason  we  are 
enabled  to  discover  and  apprehend  them.  And  because  it  is  not  to 
my  present  purpose  to  explain  or  illustrate  things  to  them  that 
believe,  but  only  to  convince  unbelievers,  and  settle  them  that  doubt, 
by  strict  and  undeniable  reasoning;  therefore  I  shall  not  allege  any- 
thing, which  however  really  true  and  useful,  may  yet  be  liable  to 
contradiction  or  dispute ;  but  shall  endeavour  to  urge  such  proposi- 
tions only  as  cannot  be  denied  without  departing  from  that  reason 
which  all  atheists  pretend  to  be  the  foundation  of  theii-  unbelief." 
{Demonstration,  <&c.,  Introduction.) 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith,  while  arguing  that  what  does  rest  upon  pro- 
bable evidence  is  not  essential  to  religion,  maintains,  though  without 
any  special  reference  to  these  reasonings,  that  the  evidence  U2:)on 
which  the  existence  of  a  God  rests  is  7iot  expressed  by  the  phrase 
"  probable  evidence  :" — 

"  I  confess  that  I,  for  one,  enter  with  the  less  anxiety  into  any 
question  concerning  the  validity  of  mere  historical  evidence,  because 


264  Note  2  [Lect. 

I  am  convinced  that  no  question  concerning  the  validity  of  mere 
historical  evidence  can  be  absolutely  vital  to  religion.  Historical 
evidence  is  not  a  gi'omid  npon  which  religion  can  possibly  rest;  for 
the  human  testimony  of  which  such  evidence  consists  is  always  falli- 
ble ;  the  chance  of  error  can  never  be  excluded :  and  the  extra- 
ordinary delusions  into  which  great  bodies  of  men  have  fallen  shew 
that  even  in  the  case  of  a  multitvide  of  witnesses  that  chance  may  be 
present  in  a  considerable  degree,  particularly  if  the  scene  of  the 
alleged  fact  is  laid  in  an  uncritical  age  or  nation.  Probable  evidence, 
therefore,  is  the  highest  we  can  have  of  any  historical  fact.  In 
ordinary  cases  we  practically  need  no  higher.  The  great  results  of 
history  are  here ;  we  have  and  enjoy  them  as  certainly  as  we  have 
and  enjoy  any  object  of  sense;  and  it  signifies  little  by  what  exact 
agency  in  any  particular  case  the  work  of  human  progi-ess  was  carried 
on.  But  in  the  case  of  a  religion  probalde  evidence  will  not  suitice. 
lieligion  is  not  a  speculation  which  we  may  be  content  to  hold  sub- 
ject to  a  certain  chance  of  error,  nor  is  it  a  practical  interest  of  the 
kind  which  Butler  has  in  his  mind  when  he  tells  us  that  we  must 
act  on  this,  as  in  other  cases,  on  probability.  It  is  a  spiritual  affec- 
tion which  nothing  less  than  the  assured  presence  of  its  object  can 
excite.  We  may  be  quite  content  to  hold  that  the  life  of  Caj-^ar  was 
such  as  it  is  commonly  taken  to  have  been,  subject  to  certain  chances 
of  error  arising  from  his  own  bias  as  an  autobiographer,  and  from  the 
partiality,  prejudice,  or  imperfect  information  of  his  contemporaries ; 
but  we  should  not  be  content  to  hold  any  vital  fact  of  our  religion 
under  the  same  conditions.  We  may  be  ready  to  stake,  and  do 
constantly  stake,  our  worldly  interests,  as  Butler  truly  observes, 
npon  probabilities,  when  certainty  is  beyond  our  power.  But  our 
hearts  would  refuse  their  office  if  M'e  were  to  bid  them  adore  and 
hold  communion  •with  a  probable  God."  {Rational  Ecligion,  £c., 
p.  108.) 

When  the  evidence,  however,  of  a  Deity  is  described  as  "  demon- 
strative "  or  "  not  probable,"  such  a  description  does  not  appear  to 
exclude  a  gi'ound  of  faith  in  the  acceptance  of  such  evidence ;  the  con- 
clusion being  of  so  immense  and  astonishing  a  nature  that  faith  is 
required  for  relying  upon  any  reasoning  or  evidence,  however  strong, 
which  leads  to  it;  the  mind  naturally  desiring  the  verification  of 
such  i)roof. 

It  must  be  observed  that  it  is  not  only  a  Moral  Deity  whose  exist- 
ence is  an  object  of  faith;  but  a  Deity  at  all,  i.e.  such  as  is  dis- 
tinguishable from  a  mere  universal  force.  Language  is  sometimes 
used  as  if  the  ground  of  faith  only  applied  to  the  moral  attributes  of 
the  Deity,  and  the  mere  existence  of  a  Supreme  Intelligent  Being 
were  the  conclusion  of  reason  without  faith.  But  the  ground  of 
faith  comes  in  jmor  to  the  moral  attributes  of  the  Deity,  because 
the  existence  of  a  God  at  all  in  any  sense  which  comes  up  to  the 


\ 


IV]  No/es  3, 4  265 

notion  of  the  existence  of  a  Personal  Infinite  Being  is  of  itself — 
before  going  into  any  further  question —  such  an  amazing  and  super- 
natiu'al  truth  that  it  cannot  be  embraced  without  faith.  Although, 
if  we  tirst  suppose  an  Infinite  Intelligent  Being,  we  cannot  but  go  on 
to  sup23ose  that  that  Being  possesses  a  character ;  and,  some  character 
supi^osed,  it  cannot  but  be,  notwithstanding  the  confusion  of  things 
here,  more  natural  and  easy  for  ns  to  believe  that  that  character  is 
the  Moral  or  Eighteous  one,  than  that  it  is  any  other. 


NOTE  3,  p.  84. 

'•But  were  these  views  of  the  Divine  attributes,  on  the  other 
hand,  ever  so  well  established,  it  must  be  considered  that  the  Theistic 
argument  requires  to  be  a2:)plied  with  much  caution ;  since  most  of 
those  who  have  adopted  such  theories  of  the  Divine  perfections,  on 
abstract  grounds,  have  made  them  the  basis  of  a  precisely  opposite 
belief;  rejecting  miracles  altogether,  on  the  plea  that  our  ideas  of  the 
Divine  ^perfections  must  directly  discredit  the  notion  of  occasional 
interposition ;  that  it  is  derogatory  to  the  idea  of  Infinite  Power  and 
Wisdom  to  suppose  an  order  of  things  so  imperfectly  estal)lished  that 
it  must  be  occasionally  interrupted  and  violated  when  the  necessity 
of  the  case  compelled,  as  the  emergency  of  a  revelation  was  imagined 
to  do.  But  all  such  Theistic  reasonings  are  but  one-sided,  and  if 
pushed  further  must  lead  to  a  denial  of  all  active  operation  of  the 
Deity  Avhatever;  as  inconsistent  with  nnchangeable,  infinite  perfec- 
tion. Such  are  the  arguments  of  Theodore  Parker,  who  denies 
miracles  because  '  everywhere  I  find  law  the  constant  mode  of  opera- 
tion of  an  infinite  God;'  or  that  of  Wegscheider,  that  the  belief  in 
miracles  is  irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  an  eternal  God  consistent 
u-ith  Himself,"  £c.  {PowelFs  Htiuhj  of  the  Evidences  of  Cliristianity, 
P-  1 1 3-) 

The  writer  admits  that  when  the  miraculous  action  of  the  Deity  is 
denied  upon  Theistic  reasonings,  the  denial  aflects  the  action  of  the 
Deity  generally.  But  has  not  the  same  denial  the  same  result  when 
built  upon  physical  reasonings  1 

NOTE  4,  p.  85. 

"All  religion,  as  such,  ever  has  been  and  must  be  a  thing  entirely 
sui  generis,  and  implies  mystery  and  faith,  however  rightly  allied  to 
knowledge,  and  susceptible  of  "a  variety  of  external  forms,  according 
to  the  diversity  of  human  character  and  the  stages  of  human  en- 
lightenment."    {Powell's  Order  of  Nature,^.  197.) 


266  Note  I  [Lect. 


NOTE  5,  p.  85. 

O'id.  Note  2,  Lect.  III.) 

The  attempt  to  disconnect  religion  -svith  physics  in  one  remarkable 
instance  is  tlius  commented  on  by  Dr.  Heurtley: — 

"  The  miracles  which  are  connected  with  onr  Lord's  Person  and 
office  are  '  never,'  we  are  told,  '  insisted  on  in  their  physical  details, 
but  solely  in  their  spiritual  and  doctrinal  application.'  The  resurrec- 
tion, for  instance,  is  '  emphatically  dwelt  upon,  not  in  its  physical 
letter,  but  in  its  doctrinal  spirit.' 

"  One  is  at  a  loss  to  conceive  how  any  one  could  make  such  an 
assertion  as  this,  unless  he  thought  by  his  bold  confidence  to  impose 
upon  himself  and  overbear  the  reclamations  of  others.  ]\Iost  persons 
would  rise  from  tlie  perusal  of  the  15th  chapter  of  the  First  Epistle 
to  the  Corinthians  with  the  thorough  conviction  that  how  much  use 
soever  the  Apostle  may  make  of  our  Lord's  resurrection  doctrinally, 
he  does  most  emphatically  dwell  upon  it  in  its  fhydcal  letter.  Its 
literal  truth  as  a  '  ]jhysiological  phenomenon '  is  the  very  basis  and 
substratum  of  all  that  is  said  on  the  subject."  (Rejjlies  to  Essays  and 
Reviews,  p.  172.) 


LECTURE    V. 

NOTE  1,  p.  95, 

In  the  proof  of  miracles  divines  assume  the  existence  of  a  Deity. 
Butler  "  takes  for  proved  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of 
Nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  World,"  before  he  enters  upon 
the  external  and  other  evidences  of  revelation.  (Analogy,  Introduction.) 
Paley  assumes  in  like  manner,  as  the  basis  of  his  proof  of  the  Chris- 
tian miracles,  an  intelligent  and  personal  Supreme  Being.  "  Suppose 
the  world  we  live  in  to  have  had  a  Creator  ;  suppose  it  to  ajipear 
from  the  predominant  aim  and  tendency  of  the  provisions  and  con- 
trivances observable  in  the  universe,  that  the  Deity  when  He  formed 
it  consulted  for  the  happiness  of  His  sensitive  creation  ;  suppose  the 
disposition  which  dictated  this  counsel  to  continue ;  suppose  a  part 
of  the  creation  to  have  received  faculties  from  their  Maker  by  which 

they  are  capable  of  rendering  a  moral  obedience  to  His  will 

Suppose,  nevertheless,  almost  the  whole  race,  either  by  the  imper- 
fection of  their  faculties,  the  misfortune  of  their  situation,  or  by  the 
loss  of  some  prior  revelation,  to  want  this  knowledge,  and  not  to  be 
likely  without  the  aid  of  a  new  revelation  to  attain  it ;  under  these 
cii'cumstances,  is  it  improbable  a  revelation  should  be  made.''  is  it 


V] 


Note  2  267 


incredible  that  God  should  interpose  for  such  a  purpose?"  {Evidences 
of  Christianity,  Preparatory  Considerations.)  "  The  Christian  argu- 
ment of  miracles,"  says  Archdeacon  Lee,  "takes  for  granted  two 
elementary  truths — the  Omnipotence  and  the  Personality  of  God." 
{On  Miracles,  p.  39.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  100. 

"  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  common  speculative 
truths,  and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before  the  proof  of  them  ; 
which  yet  is  overcome  Ijy  almost  any  proof.  There  is  a  j^resumptiou 
of  millions  to  one  against  the  story  of  Caesar,  or  of  any  other  man. 
For  suppose  a  number  of  common  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of 
which  one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  shoiikl  happen  to  come  into  one's 
thoughts ;  every  one  would,  without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude 
them  to  be  false.  And  the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact. 
And  from  hence  it  apj)ears,  that  the  question  of  importance,  as  to  the 
matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of  the  peculiar  presumption 
supposed  against  miracles  ;  not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  pre- 
sumjition  at  all  against  them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of 
millions  to  one  against  the  most  common  facts,  what  can  a  small  pre- 
sumption additional  to  this  amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar?  It 
cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  nothing."     {Analogy,  part  ii.  cli.  2.) 

Butler  would  appear  in  this  passage  to  confound  two  different  kinds 
of  improbability,  which  Mr.  Mill  calls  improbability  before  the  fact, 
and  improbability  after.^  According  to  this  statement  the  main  and 
l^rincipal  presumption  against  a  miracle  is  that  presumption  which 
lies  against  all,  even  the  most  ordinary  facts,  when  they  are  imagined 

1  The  mistake  consists  in  overlooking  the  distinction  between  (what  may 
be  called)  improbability  before  the  fact,  and  improbability  after  it ;  two 
different  properties,  the  latter  of  which  is  always  a  ground  of  disbelief ; 
the  former  is  so  or  not,  as  it  may  happen In  tlie  cast  of  a  per- 
fectly fair  die  the  chances  are  five  to  one  against  throwing  ace ;  that  is, 
ace  will  be  tlirown  on  an  average  only  once  in  six  throws.  But  this  is  no 
reason  against  believing  that  ace  was  thrown  on  a  given  occasion,  if  any 
credible  witness  asserts  it ;  since,  although  ace  is  only  thrown  once  in  six 
times,  some  number  which  is  only  thrown  once  in  six  times  7nust  liave 
been  thrown,  if  the  die  was  thrown  at  all.  The  improbability,  then,  or 
in  other  words,  the  unusualness  of  any  fact,  is  no  reason  for  disbelieving 
it,  if  the  nature  of  the  case  renders  it  certain  that  either  that  or  some/ h lag 

equally  iinprobailc,  that  is,  equally  unusual,  did  hajipen "We  are 

told  that  A.  B.  died  yesterday  ;  the  moment  before  we  were  so  told,  the 
chances  against  liis  having  died  on  that  day  may  liave  been  ten  thousand 
to  one  ;  but  since  he  was  certain  to  die  at  some  time  or  otlier,  and  wiien 
he  died  must  necessarily  die  on  some  particular  day,  while  the  chances  are 
innumerable  against  every  day  in  particular,  experience  affords  no  ground 
for  discrediting  any  testimony  which  may  be  produced  to  the  event  having 
taken  place  on  a  given  day."     {Logic,  vol.  ii.  p.  166.) 


268  Note  2  [Lect. 

antecedently.  The  presumption  against  any  occurrence  taking  place 
wliicli  it  comes  into  one's  bead  to  imac/ine  taking  place,  is  immense  ; 
and  there  is  this  presumiition  beforehand,  Butler  says,  against  any 
miracle  taking  place  ;  but  according  to  his  statement,  this  presum})- 
tion  Avliicli  a  miracle  has  against  it  in  common  with  allfajts  whatever, 
is  the  great  and  main  presumption  against  a  miracle ;  and  any  addi- 
tional to  this,  which  may  be  peculiar  to  it,  or  attach  to  it  because  it 
is  a  miracle,  amounts  to  nothing.  "  What  can  a  small  presumption 
additional  to  this  amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar?"  But  this  state- 
ment is  not  an  adequate  representation  of  the  presumption  against  a 
miracle,  and  does  not  carry  our  common  sense  along  with  it,  l)ecause 
it  does  not  distinguish  between  the  different  natures  of  an  improba- 
bility beforehand — upon  a  ground  of  mere  random  anticipation — of 
any  event,  and  improbability  upon  the  ground  of  the  Jcind  of  event. 
He  regards  the  latter  as  a  mere  infinitesimal  addition  in  quantity  to 
the  immense  body  of  already  existing  fanner  i)resumption  ;  whereas 
the  latter  is  a  presumption  different  in  nature  and  kind  from  the 
former.  The  presumption  which  there  was  beforehand  against  any 
particular  event  is  one  which  in  its  own  nature  immediately  gives 
way  to  the  least  e\adence  of  such  an  event  occurring,  because  its  sole 
ground  was  the  want  of  evidence,  which  is  ipso  facto  removed  by 
evidence.  A  random  guess  is  in  other  words  the  entire  absence  of 
evidence  ;  but  the  mere  absence  of  proof  offers  no  resistance  to  proof. 
Wheri'as  tlie  improbability  upon  the  ground  of  the  kind  of  event  goes 
on  along  with  the  proof  of  that  event,  and  resists  that  proof ;  resists 
it,  even  though  it  ultimately  yield  to  it.  "  The  chances  against  an 
ordinarj-  event,"  says  Bishop  Fitzgerald,  "are  not  specific  hi\t  2}articu- 
lar:  they  are  chances  against  this  event,  not  against  this  kind  of 
event."  (Article  on  Miracles :  Dictionary  of  the  Bible.)  On  the  other 
hand,  the  presumption  against  a  miracle  is  presumption  against  the 
kind  of  event.  Whereas  then  Butler  represents  the  "  particular " 
presumption  against  a  miracle,  which  is  the  same  that  there  is  against 
any  common  fact  beforehand,  as  the  principal  improbability  of  a 
miracle,  and  the  "  specific  ''  presumption  as  so  minute  an  addition  to 
this  as  to  be  incajsable  of  being  estimated,  the  order  and  value  of  the 
presumptions  ought  to  be  reversed  ;  the  former  being  in  truth  nothing 
of  a  presumption,  that  is  to  say,  a  presumption  which  does  not  tell 
in  the  least  as  soon  as  ever  evidence  is  ofi'ered  ;  the  latter  being  a 
presumption  which  acts  when  evidence  is  offered.  In  this  particular 
case  Butler's  criterion  is  not  a  natural  one  ;  for  the  objection  to  the 
kind  of  event  a  miracle  is,  is  plainly  our  natural  objection  to  a 
miracle. 


V] 


Note  2  269 


"  Butler,"  says  Bishop  Fitzgerald,  "  seems  to  have  been  very  sen- 
sible of  the  imperfect  state,  in  his  own  time,  of  the  logic  of  jirobability ; 
and  though  he  appears  to  have  formed  a  more  accurate  conception  of 
it  than  the  Scotch  school  of  philosophers  who  succeeded  and  luider- 
took  to  refute  Hume  ;  yet  there  is  one  passage  in  which  we  may 
perhaps  detect  a  misconception  of  the  subject  in  the  pages  even  of 
this  great  writer. 

"  It  is  plain  that  in  this  passage  Butler  lays  no  stress  upon  the 
peculiarities  of  the  story  of  Caesar,  which  he  casually  mentions.  For 
he  expressly  adds,  'or  of  any  other  man;'  and  repeatedly  explains 
that  what  he  says  aj)plies  equally  to  any  ordinary  facts,  or  to  a  single 
fact 

"The  way  in  which  he  proposes  to  estimate  the  presumption 
against  ordinary  fiicts  is,  by  considering  the  likelihood  of  their  being 
anticipated  beforehand  by  a  person  guessing  at  random.  But  surely 
this  is  not  a  measure  of  the  likelihood  of  the  facts  considered  in 
themselves,  but  of  the  likelihood  of  the  coincidence  of  the  facts  with  a 
rash  and  arbitrary  anticipation.  The  case  of  a  person  guessing  before- 
hand, and  the  case  of  a  witness  rejjorting  what  has  occurred,  are 
essentially  different.  In  the  common  instance,  for  example,  of  an 
ordinary  die,  before  the  cast,  there  is  nothing  to  determine  my  mind, 
with  any  probability  of  a  correct  jndgment,  to  the  selection  of  any 
one  of  the  six  faces  rather  than  another  ;  and  therefore  we  rightly 
say  that  there  are  five  chances  to  one  against  any  one  side,  considered 
as  thus  arbitrarily  selected.  But  when  a  person  who  has  had  opj^or- 
tunities  of  observing  the  cast,  reports  to  me  the  presentation  of  a 
particular  face,  there  is  evidently  no  such  presumption  against  the 
coincidence  of /lis  statement  and  the  actual  fact  ;  because  he  has,  by 
the  supposition,  had  ample  means  of  ascertaining  the  real  state  of 
the  occurrence.  And  it  seems  plain  that,  in  the  case  of  a  credible 
witness,  we  should  as  readily  believe  his  report  of  the  cast  of  a  die 
with  a  million  of  sides  as  of  one  with  only  six  ;  though  in  respect  of 
a  random  guess  beforehand,  the  chances  against  the  correctness  of  the 
guess  would  be  vastly  greater  in  the  former  case,  than  in  that  of  an 
ordinary  cube 

"  The  truth  is,  that  the  chances  to  Avhich  Butler  seems  to  refer  as  a 
presumption  against  ordinary  events,  are  not  in  ordinary  cases  over- 
come by  testimony  at  all.  The  testimony  has  nothing  to  do  with 
them ;  because  they  are  chances  against  the  event  considered  as  the 
sul)ject  of  a  random  vaticination,  not  as  the  subject  of  a  report  made 
by  an  actual  observer.  It  is  possible,  however,  that  throughout  this 
oibscure  passage,  Butler  is  ai'guing  upon  the  principles  of  some  ob- 
jector unknown  to  us  ;  and,  indeed,  it  is  certain  that  some  writers 
upon  the  doctrine  of  chances  (who  were  far  from  friendly  to  revealed 
religion)  have  utterly  confounded  together  the  cpiestions  of  the  chances 
against  the  coincidence  of  an  ordinary  event  with  a  random  guess,  and 
of  the  probability  of  such  an  event  considered  by  itself."  {Dictionary 
of  the  Bible :  Article  on  Miracles.) 


270  Note  2  [Lect. 

Archdeacon  Lee  disaj^rees  with  Bishop  Fitzgerald.  "  So  far  is 
Bishop  Butler  from  ignoring  the  distinction  between  *  probability  be- 
fore and  after  the  fact,'  or,  as  he  expresses  himself  with  greater  pre- 
cision, '  before  and  after  proof,'  that  his  whole  argument  proceeds 
upon  its  recognition."  {On  Miracles,  p.  75.)  Bishop  Butler's  argmnent 
recognizes  tioo  states  of  the  case,  before  and  after  proof  of  the  fact  ; 
nor  could  it  avoid  doing  so  :  but  this  is  not  the  same  as  recognizing 
the  two  kinds  of  probability  "before"  and  "after."  He  recognizes 
improbability  before  proof,  and  certainly  after  proof ;  but  not  that 
improbability  which  conflicts  with  proof,  that  which  is  meant  by  "  im- 
probability after  the  fact."     The  writer  adds  ; — 

"  The  two  instances  selected  by  Mr.  Mill  are  indeed,  as  he  states, 
'  things  in  strict  conformity  to  the  usual  course  of  experience,  '  the 
chances  merely  being  against  them  ; '  but  tliey  are  not  in  the  least 
analogous  to  the  instances  on  which  Bishop  Butler  founds  his  pro- 
position. The  great  diff'erence  is,  that  we  do  know  all  the  chances  in 
the  one  case,  and  that  we  do  not  know  all  the  chances  in  the  other.  There 
are  but  six  sides  to  the  die  ;  the  chances,  therefore,  are  but  five  to 
one  against  ace  at  any  throw.  The  years  of  human  life  cannot 
exceed  a  definite  number,  to  which  we  can  approximate  within 
moderate  limits  ;  but  the  probability  of  the  events  on  which  the 
'  Analogy '  depends  cannot  be  thus  estimated.  The  history  of  Coesar, 
or  of  any  other  man,  or  common  facts,  are  matters  incapable  of  being 
submitted  to  calculus  of  probabilities.  The  events  of  human  life 
present  a  variety  to  which  no  bounds  can  be  set.  What  human  cal- 
culation can  make  full  allowance  for  the  influence  of  human  motives; 
or  foresee  all  the  possiltle  outbursts  of  human  passion  ;  or  reduce  the 
contingencies  of  political  change  to  the  dominion  of  unvarying  law  V 
(On  Miracles,  p.  75.) 

But  does  it  make  any  diff'erence  in  the  nature  of  the  imjirobability 
before  proof,  now  spoken  of,  whether  or  not  we  can  calculate  the 
chances  in  question  ?  We  know  that  the  chances  are  five  to  one 
against  the  throw  of  ace  in  the  cast  of  the  die,  and  that  they  are 
millions  to  one,  or  incalculable,  against  the  story  of  any  common 
man,  imagined  beforehand  ;  but  the  dift'erence  in  the  number  of  the 
opposing  chances,  which  constitutes  improbal)ility  beforehand,  makes 
not  the  slightest  diff'erence  in  the  iveigJU  of  that  improbabilitj',  when 
evidence  is  given  of  the  fact ;  which  weight  is  then  nothing,  equally 
whether  the  antecedent  chances  are  units  or  thousands.  One  die  has 
six  sides,  another,  let  us  suppose  with  Bishop  Fitzgerald,  has  a 
million  ;  beforehand,  therefore,  the  chances  in  these  two  cases  were 
respectively  five  to  one  and  a  million  to  one  against  any  particular 


V] 


Note  3  271 


throw  ;  but  this  difference  in  the  nuniLer  of  chances  beforehand 
would  not  make  a  particular  throw  when  made  at  all  more  difficult  to 
believe  or  make  it  require  at  all  more  evidence  in  the  case  of  one  die 
than  in  the  case  of  the  other ;  because  the  weight  of  the  improba- 
bility before  the  fact  would,  upon  evidence  of  the  fact,  vanish  and 
disappear  at  once  alike,  whether  that  improbability  was  five  to  one  or 
a  million  to  one.  A  die,  whether  it  has  the  one  or  the  other  number 
of  sides,  is  equally  obliged  to  fall  on  some  side  ;  which  fall,  therefore, 
is  in  either  case  equally  devoid  of  strangeness,  and  therefore  an  equal 
subject  of  evidence.  In  like  manner  any  common  man's  history  has 
antecedently  an  incalculably  greater  number  of  chances  against  it 
than  some  one  given  ordinary  event  has,  but  one  does  not  requii-e 
greater  evidence  than  the  other. 


NOTE  3,  p.  102. 

"  This  of  course  turns  on  the  general  grounds  of  our  antecedent 
convictions.  The  question  agitated  is  not  that  of  mere  testimony,  of 
its  vahie,  or  of  its  failures.  It  refers  to  those  antecedent  considerations 
which  must  govern  our  entire  view  of  the  subject,  and  which  being 
dependent  on  higher  laws  of  relief,  must  be  paramount  to  all  attesta- 
tion, or  rather  belong  to  a  province  distinct  from  it.  What  is  alleged 
is  a  case  of  the  supernatural  ;  but  no  testimony  can  reach  to  the 
supernatural  ;  testimony  can  apjily  only  to  apparent  sensiljle  facts  ; 
testimony  can  only  prove  an  extraordinary  and  perhaps  inexjilicable 
occurrence  or  phenomenon  :  that  it  is  due  to  supernatural  causes  is 
entirely  dependent  on  the  previous  belief   and  assumption  of  the 

parties If  a  nxmiber  of  respectable  witnesses  were  to 

concur  in  asseverating  that  on  a  certain  occasion  they  had  seen  two 
and  two  make  five,  should  we  be  bound  to  believe  them  ? 

"  This,  perhaj^s  it  will  be  said,  is  an  extreme  case.  Let  us  sup- 
pose another.  If  the  most  numerous  ship's  company  were  all  to 
asseverate  that  they  had  seen  a  mermaid,  would  any  rational  persons 
at  the  present  day  believe  them  ?  That  thej^  saw  something  which 
they  believed  to  be  a  mermaid  would  be  easily  conceded.  No  amount 
of  attestation  of  innumerable  and  honest  witnesses  would  ever  con- 
vince any  one  versed  in  mathematical  and  mechanical  science,  that  a 
person  had  squared  the  circle  or  discovered  perpetual  motion.  Ante- 
cedent credibility  depends  on  antecedent  knowledge,  and  enlarged 
views  of  the  connection  and  dependence  of  truths  ;  and  the  value  of 
any  testimony  will  be  modified  or  destroyed  in  different  degrees  to 
minds  differently  enlightened. 

"  Testimony,  after  all,  is  but  a  second-hand  assurance  ;  it  is  but  a 
blind  guide.  Testimony  can  avail  nothing  against  reason."  (Powell's 
Study  of  Evidences,  pp.  107,  141.) 


272  Notes  4,  5  [Lect. 


NOTE  4,  p.  104. 

"  The  essential  question  of  miracles  stands  quite  apart  from  any 
consideration  of  testimonij;  the  question  would  remain  the  same  if 
we  had  the  evidence  of  our  own  senses  to  an  alleged  miracle,  that  is 
to  an  extraordinary  or  inexplicable  fact.  It  is  not  the  mere  fact,  l)ut 
the  cause  or  explanation  of  it,  which  is  the  point  at  issue."  (PoweH's 
Siudij  of  Evidences,  p.  141.) 

"  But  material  as,  in  reference  to  the  study  of  the  last  remark,  is 
the  discussion  of  testimony,  it  must  still  be  observed  that  in  the 
general  and  abstract  point  of  view  this  is  really  but  adventitious  to  the 
question  of  miracles ;  and  that,  supposing  all  doubt  as  to  testimony 
were  entirely  removed,  as  in  the  case  of  an  actual  witness  having  the 
evidence  of  his  own  senses  to  an  extraordinary  and  perhaps  inexplicable 
fact,  still  the  material  enquiry  would  remain,  7s  it  a  miracle  ?  It  is 
here,  in  fact,  that  the  essence  of  the  question  of  credibility  is  centred 
—not  in  regard  to  the  mere  external  apparent  event,  but  to  the  cause 
of  it."  (Powell's  Order  of  Nature,  p.  286.) 

"  We  have  observed  that  a  miracle  is  a  matter  of  opinion ;  and, 
according  to  the  ordinary  view,  the  precise  point  of  opinion  involved 
in  the  assertion  of  a  miracle  is  that  the  event  in  question  is  a 
violation  or  suspension  of  the  laws  of  nature  ;  a  point  on  which 
opinions  will  chiefly  vary  according  to  the  degree  of  acquaintance 
with  physical  philosophy  and  the  acceptance  of  its  wider  principles  ; 
especially  as  these  principles  are  now  understood,  and  seem  to  im- 
ply the  grand  conception  of  the  universal  Cosmos,  and  the  sublmie 
conclusions  resulting  from  it  or  embodied  in  it."  {Ibid.  p.  291.) 

"  Of  old  the  sceptic  professed  he  would  be  convinced  by  seeing  a 
miracle.  At  the  present  day,  a  visible  mu-acle  would  but  be  the 
very  subject  of  his  scepticism.  It  is  not  the  attestation,  but  the 
nature  of  the  alleged  marvel,  which  is  now  the  point  in  question." 
(Ibid.  p.  296.) 

NOTE  5,  p.  106. 

"  The  philosopher  denies  the  credibility  of  alleged  events  profess- 
edly in  their  nature  at  variance  with  all  physical  analogy."  {Study 
of  Evidences,  p.  135.) 

"  The  literal  sense  of  physical  events  impossible  to  science  cannot 
be  essential  to  spiritual  trutli."  {Order  of  Nature,  p.  376.) 

"  Questions  of  this  kind  are  often  peqjlexed  by  want  of  due  atten- 
tion to  the  laws  of  thought  and  belief,  and  of  due  distinction  in 
ideas  and  terms.  The  projiosition  '  that  an  event  may  be  so  incredible 
as  intrinsically  to  set  aside  any  degree  of  testimony,'  in  no  way 
applies  to  or  affects  the  honesty  or  veracity  of  that  testimony,  or 
the  reality  of  the  impressions  on  the  minds  of  the  ivitncsses,  so  far  as 
relates  to  the  matter  of  sensible  foct  only.  It  merely  means  :  that 
from  the  nature  of   our  antecedent  convictions,  the  probability  of 


V] 


Note  6  273 


some  kind  of  mistake  or  deception  somewhere,  tliouj^'h  we  know  not 
where,  is  greater  than  the  prubahility  of  the  event  really  happening  in 
the  way  and  from  the  causes  assigned."  {Study  of  Evidences,  p.  107.) 

The  transference  indeed  everywhere  insisted  upon  by  this  writer, 
of  miracles  from  the  region  of  history  to  that  of  faith  (see  foUowing 
note),  indicates  of  itself  that  the  thing  pronounced  to  be  incredible, 
and  to  be  incapable  of  being  accepted  as  real,  is  not  the  cause  of  the 
miraculous  facts,  but  the  miraculous  facts  themselves  as  recorded. 
For  were  the  miracles  credible  as  facts,  and  the  supernatural  causes 
alone  denied,  why  should  not  they  be  matters  of  history,  to  be 
accepted  upon  historical  evidence — the  facts  accepted,  however  the 
causes  were  disputed  ?  But  miracles  are  denied  the  character  of 
historical  events,  and  relegated  to  the  domain  of  faith  ;  which  shews 
that,  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  the  facts  themselves  rank  as  in- 
credible, and  not  the  cause  only, 

NOTE  6,  p.  108. 

"  The  main  point  on  which  I  would  remark  as  evinced  in  these  and 
numerous  other  passages  to  the  same  effect,  is,  that  the  accej)tance  of 
miracles  as  such  seems  to  be  here  distinctly  recognized  as  the  sole 
work  of  a  religious  principde  of  faith,  and  not  an  assent  of  the  under- 
standing to  external  evidence,  the  appeal  to  which  seems  altogether 
disowned  and  set  aside.  Conviction  appears  to  be  avowedly  removed 
from  the  basis  of  testimony  and  sensible  facts,  and  placed  on  that  of 
spiritual  impression  and  high  religious  feeling."  {Powell's  Order  of 
Nature,  p.  367.) 

"  The  belief  in  miracles,  whether  in  ancient  or  modern  times,  has 
always  been  a  point  not  of  evidence  addressed  to  the  intellect,  but  of 
reZi(/ioHs/((2'^/t  impressed  on  the  s^m^.  The  mere  fact  was  nothing; 
however  well  attested,  it  might  be  set  aside  ;  however  fabulous,  it 
might  be  accepted, — according  to  the  predisposing  religious  per- 
suasion of  the  parties.  If  a  more  philosophical  survey  tend  to  ignore 
suspensions  of  nature,  as  inconceivable  to  reason,  the  spirit  of  faith 
gives  a  diflerent  interpretation,  and  transfers  miracles  to  the  more 
congenial  region  of  spiritual  contemplation  and  Divine  mystery." 
{Ibid.  p.  439.) 

"  To  conclude,  an  alleged  miracle  can  only  be  regarded  in  one  of 
two  ways  ;  either  abstractedly  as  a  physical  event,  and  therefore  to 
be  investigated  by  reason  and  physical  evidence,  and  referred  to 
physical  causes,  possibly  to  known  causes,  but  at  all  events  to  some 

higher  cause  or  law,  if  at  present  unknown  ; or,  as 

connected  with  religious  doctrine,  regarded  in  a  sacred  light, 
asserted  on  the  authority  of  inspiration.  In  this  case  it  ceases  to  be 
capable  of  investigation  by  reason,  or  to  own  its  dominion  ;  it  is  ac- 

S 


2  74  Notes  7-9  [Lect. 

cepted  on  religious  grounds,  and  can  appeal  only  to  tlie  principle  and 
influence  of  faith. 

"  Thus  miraculous  narratives  hecome  invested  with  the  character 
of  articles  of  faith."     {FoxvdVs  Study  of  the  Evidences  of  Christianity, 

p.    I|2.) 

NOTE,  7,  p.  109. 

"  The  case  indeed  of  the  antecedent  argument  of  miracles  is  very 
clear,  however  little  some  are  inclined  to  perceive  it.  In  nature  and 
from  nature,  by  science  and  by  reason,  we  neither  have  nor  can  pos- 
sibly have  any  evidence  of  a  Deity  working  miracles;  for  that  we  must 
go  out  of  nature  and  beyond  reason.  If  we  could  have  any  such 
evidence /roni  nature,  it  could  only  prove  extraordinary  natural  effects, 
which  would  not  be  miracles  in  the  old  theological  sense,  as  isolated, 
unrelated,  and  uncaused  ;  whereas  no  j)hysical  fact  can  be  conceived 
as  unique,  or  without  analogy  and  relation  to  others,  and  to  the  whole 
system  of  natural  causes."  {Poivell's  Study  of  the  Evidences  of  Christi- 
anity, p.  141.) 

NOTE  8,  p.  109. 

"If  miracles  were  in  the  estimation  of  a  former  age  among  the 
chief  supports  of  Christianity,  they  are  at  present  among  the  main 
difficulties  and  hindrances  to  its  accejDtance."  {Powell's  Study  of  the 
Evidences  of  Christianity,  p.  140.) 

"  In  the  popular  acceptation,  it  is  clear  the  Gospel  miracles  are 
always  objects,  not  evidences  of  faith  ;  and  when  they  are  connected 
specially  with  doctrines,  as  in  several  of  the  higher  mysteries  of  the 
Christian  faith,  the  sanctity  which  invests  the  point  of  faith  itself  is 
extended  to  the  external  narrative  in  which  it  is  embodied  ;  the 
reverence  due  to  the  mystery  renders  the  external  events  sacred  from 
examination,  and  shields  them  also  within  the  pale  of  the  sanctuary  ; 
the  miracles  are  merged  in  the  doctrines  with  which  they  are  connected, 
and  associated  with  the  declarations  of  spiritual  things  which  are,  as 
such,  exempt  from  those  criticisms  to  which  physical  statements 
would  be  necessarily  amenable."     {Ibid.  p.  143.) 

NOTE  9,  p.  III. 

"  It  is  not  indeed  improbable,  nay,  rather  it  is  exceedingly  probable, 
that  the  force  of  this  practical  realization  and  appropriation  should 
have  been  taken  into  exact  account  by  Him  who  launched  His  revela- 
tion into  the  world  with  so  much,  and  so  much  only,  force  as  was 
necessary  to  secure  its  reception  at  the  hands  of  those  who  by  their 
willingness  proved  their  worthiness  to  receive  it."  {Scepticism  and 
Eevelation,  by  H.  Harris,  B.l).,  Rector  of  Winterbourne-Basset,  p.  12.) 

Mr.  Harris  gives  as  an  instance  of  this  principle  the  evidence  of  the 
Resurrection  : — 

"  In  what  terms  is  the  attestation  on  behalf  of  this  miracle  described 


VI] 


Note  I  275 


by  St.  Peter  :— '  Him  God  raised  up  the  third  day,  and  shewed  Him 
openly  ;  not  to  all  the  people,  but  unto  witnesses  chosen  before  of  God, 
even  to  us  who  did  eat  and  drink  witli  Him  after  He  rose  from  the 
dead.'  What  but  the  self-confidence  of  truth  itself  would  have  dared  to 
express  itself  in  such  terms  as  these  ?  With  wliat  quiet  assurance  does 
revelation  here  assert  the  dignity  of  her  position,  as  though  she  almost 
disdained  to  make  full  use  of  the  authority  placed  at  her  disposal." 
(p.  61.) 


LECTURE    VI. 

NOTE  1,  p.  117. 

"  Consider  why  it  is  that,  with  exactly  the  same  amount  of  evidence, 
both  negative  and  positive,  we  did  not  reject  the  assertion  that  there 
are  black  swans,  while  we  should  refuse  credence  to  any  testimony 
which  asserted  that  there  were  men  wearing  their  heads  underneath 
their  shoulders.  The  first  assertion  was  more  credible  than  the  latter. 
But  "why  more  credible  ?  So  long  as  neither  phenomenon  had  been 
actually  witnessed,  what  reason  was  there  for  finding  the  one  harder 
to  be  believed  than  the  other  1  Apparently,  because  there  is  less 
constancy  in  the  colours  of  animals  than  in  the  general  structure  of 
their  internal  anatomy.  But  how  do  we  know  this  ]  Doubtless,  from 
experience.  It  appears,  then,  that  we  need  experience  to  inform  us, 
in  what  degi-ee,  and  in  what  cases,  or  sorts  of  cases,  experience  is  to 
be  relied  on.  Experience  must  be  consulted  in  order  to  learn  from 
it  under  what  circumstances  arguments  from  it  will  be  valid.  We 
have  no  ulterior  test  to  which  we  subject  experience  in  general ;  but 
we  make  experience  its  own  test.  Experience  testifies  that  among  the 
uniformities  which  it  exhibits,  or  seems  to  exhibit,  some  are  more  to 
be  relied  on  than  others ;  and  uniformity,  therefore,  may  be  presmned, 
from  an}'  given  number  of  instances,  with  a  greater  degree  of  assur- 
ance, in  proportion  as  the  case  belongs  to  a  class  in  which  the 
uniformities  have  hitherto  been  found  more  uniform."  {Alill's  System 
of  Lofiic,  vol.  i.  p.  330.) 

'  "  In  some  cases  of  apparently  marvellous  occurrences,  after  due 
allowance  for  possible  misapprehension  or  exaggeration  in  the  state- 
ments, it  might  be  conceded  that  the  event,  though  of  a  very  singular 
kind,  was  yet  not  such  as  to  involve  anything  absolutely  at  variance 
even  with  the  known  laws  of  nature  : — very  remarkable  coincidences 
of  events  ;  very  unusual  appearances  ; — very  extraordinary  affections 
of  the  human  body  ; — such  especially  as  those  astonishing  but  well- 
ascertained  cases  of  catalepsy,  trance,  or  suspended  animation  ; — very 
marvellous  and  sudden  cures  of  diseases  ; — the  phenomena  of  double 
consciousness,  visions,  somnambulism,  and  spectral  imj^ressions  ; — 
might  perhaps  be  included  in  this  class,  and,  subject  to  such  natirral 
interpretation,  be  entirely  admissible.     Other  instances  might,  however, 


276  Notes  1,'^^  [Lect. 

he,  recounted  more  absolutely  at  variance  with  natural  order,  sucli,  e.g. 
as  iinj)liecl  a  subversion  of  ja"avitation,orof  the  constitution  of  matter  ; 
descriptions  ihconceircdile  to  those  ini])ressed  with  the  truth  of  the 
great  first  i)rinci2)le  of  all  induction — the  invariable  constancy  of  the 
order  of  nature. 

"  In  such  cases  %ve  might  imagine  a  misapprehension  or  exaggera- 
tion of  some  real  event,  or  possibly  some  kind  of  ocular  illusion, 
mental  hallucination,  or  the  like."     {Poweirs  Order  of  Nature,  p.  270.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  119. 

"  The  f^imoon,  or  whatever  it  was,  which  swept  off  in  one  niglit  the 
anny  of  Sennacheril),  and  which  Avaa  adopted  as  the  instrument  iov 
efi'ecting  the  ^;recZic<t'(i  deliverance  of  Jerusalem,  may  have  taken  place 
in  its  appointed  onler  of  nature.  Nay,  there  is  nothing  rejnignant  to 
the  soundest  faith  or  the  deepest  reverence  in  the  su])piisiti(in  that  the 
physical  instruments  employed  for  accomplishing  tlie  deluge,  which 
are  represented  under  the  image  of  the 'fountains  of  the  great  deep 
being  broken  up,  and  the  windows  of  heaven  opened,'  took  place  in 
their  appointed  order  in  the  cycle  of  nature's  operations  ;  and  that 
their  foreseen  synchronism  with  the  time  appointed  for  'the  end  of  all 
flesh'  was  made  subservient  to  the  Divine  counsels.  The  miracle  is 
none  the  less  for  lieing  transferred  from  the  fact  itself  to  its  prediction 
and  ada])tation."  {Esscajs  and  Eevieivs  considered,  by  Eev.  H.  A.  JJ'ood- 
gate,  p.  93.) 

NOTE  3,  p.   119. 
Mr.  Mansel  makes  some  able  and  acute  remarks  upon  tlie  charac- 
teristic of  personal  agency,  in  the  case  of  miracles,  with  reference  to 
the  question  of  their  referribleness  to  natural  causes  : — 

"  The  fact  of  a  work  being  done  by  human  agency  places  it,  as 
regards  the  future  progress  of  science,  in  a  totally  ditferent  class  fi'om 
mere  physical  j^henomena.  The  appearance  of  a  comet,  or  the  fall  of 
an  aerolite,  may  be  reduced  by  the  advance  of  science  from  a  sujtposed 
su2)ematural  to  a  natural  occurrence  ;  and  this  reduction  furnishes  a 
reasonable  presumption  that  other  phenomena  o/re  like  character  will 
in  time  meet  with  a  like  ex^danation.  But  the  reverse  is  the' 
case  with  respect  to  those  phenomena  which  are  narrated  as  having 
T)een  produced  by  j)e7>0H«^  agency.  In  projjortion  as  the  science  of 
to-day  surpasses  that  of  former  generations,  so  is  the  improbability 
that  any  man  could  liave  done  in  past  times,  by  natural  means,  works 
Avhich  no  skill  of  the  jiresent  age  is  able  to  imitate.  The  two  classes 
of  ]ihenomena  rest  in  fact  on  exactly  opposite  foundations.  In  order 
that  natural  occurrences,  taking  place  without  human  agency,  may 
Avear  the  appearance  of  i>rodigies,  it  is  necessary  that  the  cause  and 
manner  of  their  production  should  be  t«;A-noini ;  and  every  advance 
of  science  from  the  unknown  to  the  known  tends  to  lessen  the  number 
ot  such  i)rodigies  by  referring  them  to  natural  causes,  and  increases 


VI]  Notes  ^,  5  277 

the  probability  of  a  similar  explanation  of  the  remainder.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  in  order  that  a  man  may  perform  marvellons  acts  by 
natural  means,  it  is  necessary  that  the  cause  and  manner  of  their  pro- 
duction should  be  known  by  the  performer  ;  and  in  this  case  every 
fresh  advance  of  science  from  the  unknown  to  the  known  diminishes 
the  probability  that  what  is  unknown  now  could  have  been  known  in 
a  former  iv^e. 

"The  effect,  therefore,  of  scientific  progress,  as  regards  the  Scrip- 
tural miracles,  is  gradually  to  eliminate  the  hypothesis  which  refers 
them  to  unknown  natural  causes."     {Aids  to  Faith,  p.  14.) 

NOTE  4,  p.  121. 

"  Particular  theories  as  to  the  manner  in  which  miracles  have 
been  Avrought  are  matters  rather  curious  than  practically  useful.  In 
all  such  cases  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  gi'eat  maxim — Sicbtilitas 

naturm  longe  superat  subtilitatem  mentis  humance Some  find  it 

easier  to  conceive  of  miracles  as  not  really  taking  place  in  the  exter- 
nal order  of  nature,  but  in  the  impressions  made  by  it  upon  our 

minds It  is  jilain  that  these  various  hypotheses  are  merely 

ways  in  which  ditlerent  minds  find  it  more  or  less  easy  to  conceive 
the  mode  in  which  miracles  may  have  been  wrought."  (Bishop 
Fitzgerald's  Article  on  Miracles :  Dictionary  of  the  Bible,  j).  3S2.) 

NOTE  5,  p.  125. 

Archbishop  Trench  adopts  the  ordinary  distinction  between  the 
direct  action  of  the  Deity  and  His  action  by  means  of  general  laws  ; 
His  action  in  the  order  of  nature  and  His  action  in  special  interposi- 
tions. "  An  extraordinary  Divine  causality,  and  not  that  ordinary 
which  we  acknowledge  everywhere  and  in  everything,  belongs  to  the 
essence  of  the  mii-acle  ;  powers  of  God  other  than  those  which  have 
been  always  working."  The  writer,  however,  does  not  suppose  that 
the  difference  lies  in  the  Divine  action  itself  so  much  as  in  the  revela- 
tion of  it.  "  The  um-esting  activity  of  God,  which  at  other  times 
hides  and  conceals  itself  behind  the  veil  of  what  we  term  natural 
laws,  does  in  the  miracle  unveil  itseK  ;  it  steps  out  from  its  conceal- 
ment, and  the  hand  which  works  it  is  laid  bare."  {Preliminary  Essay, 
chap,  ii.)  The  writer  of  the  article  on  "  The  Immutability  of  Nature,'' 
in  the  Quarterly  Review,  No.  220,  speaking  only  of  the  philosophical 
question,  denies  the  philosophical  ground  of  the  common  distinction 
just  referred  to.  "  It  is  only  an  arbitrary  unproved  hypothesis,  that 
in  the  ordinary  operations  of  nature  the  Divine  will  acts  only  in- 
directly and  not  directly,  precisely  as  in  the  case  of  miracles.  How 
can  you  draw  a  distinction  between  the  ordinary  operations  of  the 
Divine  wiU  in  the  daily  coiu'se  of  things  and  its  extraordinary  in  the 


278  Note  5  [Lect. 

miracles  of  Christianity  ?  ....  If  a  sovereign,  directing  the  move- 
ments of  a  mighty  host  by  secret  telegrams  every  minute,  or  concealed 
under  a  disguise,  should  on  occasions  for  some  wise  consistent  object 
appear  at  the  head  of  his  troops  and  give  the  word  of  command  him- 
self, wouhl  this  startle  the  soldier?     WoiJd  he  call  it  an  anomaly?" 

(P-  376.) 

The  author  of  "  Dialogues  on  Divine  Providence  "  rejects  the  dis- 
tinction : — 

"  What  do  we  know  of  the  laws  of  nature  more  than  you  began  by 
saying  ?  They  express  a  certain  uniformity  in  nature  ;  they  assure 
ns  that  the  same  cause  will  be  followed  by  the  same  etfect.  But 
v:]i\j  tliis  uniformity  exists,  vc^iy  there  is  this  connection  between 
cause  and  effect,  neither  they  can  tell  us  nor  can  any  one  tell  us  of 
them 

"  Fu.  I  am  disposed  to  think  you  are  right.     If  so,  what  follows  ? 

"  H.  Only  this :  it  is  a  mere  figure  of  speech  to  say  that  God  acts 
tlirovgh  laws.  The  expression  conveys  to  the  mind  an  idea  of  a 
medium  interposed  between  the  Worker  and  His  work.  But  the 
nature  of  general  laws,  if  we  have  taken  a  just  view  of  them,  justifies 
no  such  idea.  If  we  explain  the  expi-ession,  it  conies  simply  to  this — 
there  is  an  uniformity  in  God's  works.  On  the  same  occasions  He 
acts  in  the  same  way."     {Dialogues  on  Divine  Providence,  p.  17.) 

"  Providence  anct  Law  are  both  words  by  which  we  express,  or 
endeavour  to  express,  certain  truths  about  the  manner  in  which  God 
works.  Providence  implies  that  in  all  the  dealings  of  God  with  His 
creatures.  He  acts  consciously,  voluntarily,  and  knowingly,  as  an 
omniscient  and  omnipotent  agent.  Law  implies,  that  in  His  works 
and  dealings  Ave  can  tr;ice  a  certain  amount  of  uniformity  and  resem- 
blance, which  the  structure  of  our  minds  leads  us  to  believe  to  exist 
in  a  still  greater  degree  than  we  can  trace  it.  In  God,  as  a  Being  of 
periect  knowledge  and  perfect  power,  there  is  no  opposition  between 
the  grcated  uniforinitij  of  action  and  the  most  particular  regard  for  the 
issue  of  each  action,  in  all  its  multiform  consequences.  He  sees  all 
things  from  the  first,  etl'ects  all  that  He  wills  in  His  own  way,  never 
makes  a  mistake,  never  miscalculates  a  consequence,  never  overlooks 
an  element  or  a  condition,  is  never  deceived  or  overpowered  by  inde- 
pendent or  subordinate  agents,  never  need  suspend  His  steps  to  watch 
an  event,  or  retrace  His  course  to  rectify  an  error.  But  the  wisest  of 
men  must  oiten  do  this :  and  so,  misled  by  a  false  analogy,  we  are 
apt  to  attribute  to  God  the  imperfection  of  our  own  works.  We  form 
our  calculations ;  and  they  prove  erroneous  because  the  immutable 
laws  around  us  interfere  with  our  plans  in  some  unforeseen  way.  And 
this  makes  us  sometimes  speak  and  think  as  if  the  events  which 
depend  on  the  laws  which  God  has  made  were  in  some  way  inde- 
pendent of  Him,  and  out  of  the  reach  of  His  power.  The  most  pro- 
found and  thoughtful  among  us  can  never  lay  doA\Ti  iniiversal  rules 
of  conduct  with  such  absolute  accuracy  that  considerations  of  justice, 


VI] 


Note  6  279 


equity,  or  expediency  will  not  sometimes  lead  him  to  make  excep- 
tions to  his   rule  ;  and  we  transfer  too  readily  this  consequence  of 

human  imperfection  to  the  Supreme  and  Perfect  Lawgiver 

But  do  the  limits  thus  placed  to  our  faculties  aflbrd  us  the  least  justi- 
fication for  assigning  any  similar  bounds  to  His  ?  Bare,  we  assert  tluit 
His  intwitioriofimiversal  laws  doesnotcoviprehend  every  actual  andjjossible 
particular  instance?  Is  it  not  to  attribute  human  fallibility  to  Him, 
to  think  that  the  uniformity  of  action  which  He  is  pleased  to  observe 
cannot  coexist  with  the  most  perfect  and  delicate  regard  to  the  ten- 
dencies and  consequences  of  all  His  actions  ?  We  make  a  great  assump- 
tion if  we  regard  general  laws  as  instruments  and  mediums  of  Divine 
ojjerations."     {Dialogues  on  Divine  Providence,  p.  70.) 

"  Suj^pose  then  (I  need  not  say  that  it  is  no  merely  imaginary  case) 
a  person  choked  by  a  fish-bone,  and  so  killed.  Life  and  death,  we  all 
allow,  are  in  the  hands  of  God.  A  believer  would  not  doubt  that  one 
who  dies  by  an  accident  of  this  kind,  dies  at  the  time  and  in  the 
manner  which  God,  in  His  Providence,  thinks  best.  The  fish-bone 
is  the  instrument  of  His  Will.  It  has  fixed  itself  in  the  sufferer's 
throat  Ijy  no  miraculous  agency,  but  in  the  ordinary  course  of  cause 
and  effect.  But  only  consider  for  a  moment  the  comi^lication  of 
causes  which  placed  it  there.  The  toil  of  the  crew  of  a  fishing-boat 
some  two  nights  l>eibre,  the  conditions  of  wind  and  wave  which  caused 
a  fish  with  a  bone  of  this  particular  shape  to  be  caught,  the  demand 
and  consequent  supply  which  brought  it  to  a  town  some  hundred 
miles  from  the  sea,  the  little  circumstances  which  led  to  the  purchase 
in  the  town  of  this  individual  fish,  and  a  hundred  other  points  of 
detail ;  such  as  the  light  by  which  the  dinner  was  eaten,  the  exact 
degree  of  hardness  or  softness  of  the  fish,  as  dependent  on  the  precise 
manner  of  cooking,  even  the  power  of  contractility  in  the  eater's 
throat,  Avhich  may  again  have  depended  on  his  general  health,  or  on 
the  bracing  or  relaxing  state  of  the  atmosphere.  Vary  but  one  of 
these  conditions,  and  the  same  result  would  probably  not  have  hap- 
pened. And  perhaps  a  medical  man  could  not  be  found  till  too  late  ; 
and  his  absence  was  caused  by  the  illness  of  another  piatient,  itself 
dependent  on  causes  equally  remote  and  obscure.  Could  you  blame 
any  one  who,  having  first  accepted  the  truth,  that  death  in  this  case 
happened  according  to  the  Providence  of  God,  saw  His  finger  also 
in  every  circumstance  which  had  led  to  it,  and  attributed  them  all  to 
His  Will."     {Dialogues  on  Divine  Providence,  p.  1 1 1.) 

NOTE  6,  p.  127. 

"Let  the  reader  imagine  himself  sitting  before  the  calculating 
engine,  and  let  him  again  observe  and  ascertain,  by  lengthened 
induction,  the  nature  of  the  law  it  is  computing.  Let  him  imagine 
that  he  has  seen  the  changes  wrought  on  its  face  by  the  lapse  of 
thousands  of  years,  and  that,  without  one  solitary  exception,  he  has 
found  the  engine  register  the  series  of  square  numbers.  Suppose, 
now,  the  maker  of  that  machine  to  say  to  the  observer,  '  I  will,  by 


2  8o  Note  7  [Lect. 

moving  a  certain  mechanism,  which  is  invisible  to  yon,  cause  the 
i-ngine  to  make  a  cube  niimber  instead  of  a  square  one,  and  then  to 
revert  to  its  former  course  of  square  numbers ;'  tlie  observer  would  be 
inclined  to  attribute  to  him  a  degree  of  power  but  little  superior  to 
tliat  M'hich  was  necessary  to  form  the  original  engine. 

"  But,  let  the  same  observer,  after  the  same  lapse  of  time,  the  same 
amount  of  uninterru])ted  experience  of  the  uniformity  of  the  law  of 
scpiare  numbers,  liear  the  maker  of  that  engine  say  to  him, '  The  next 
numlier  which  shall  appear  on  those  wheels,  and  which  you  expect 
to  find  a  square  number,  shall  not  be  such.  When  the  machine  was 
originally  ordered  to  make  these  calculations,  I  impressed  on  it  a  law, 
which  should  coincide  with  that  of  square  numbers  in  every  case 
except  the  one  which  i=!  now  about  to  appear,  after  which  no  future 
exception  can  ever  occur  ;  but  the  unvarying  law  of  squares  shall  be 
pursued  until  tlie  machine  itself  perishes  from  decay. 

"  Undoubtedly  the  observer  would  asciibe  a  greater  degree  of 
power  to  the  artist  who  thus  willed  that  event  at  the  distance  of  ages 
before  its  arrival. 

"  If  the  contriver  of  the  engine  then  explain  to  him,  that,  by  the 
very  structure  of  it,  he  has  power  to  order  any  number  of  such 
apparent  deviations  from  its  laws  to  occur  at  any  future  periods, 
however  remote,  and  that  each  of  these  may  be  of  a  different  kind  ; 
and  if  he  also  inform  him,  that  he  gave  it  that  structure  in  order  to 
lueet  events  which  he  foresaw  must  happen  at  those  respective  periods, 
there  can  he  no  doiibt  that  the  observer  would  ascribe  to  the  inventor 
far  higher  knowledge  than  if,  when  those  events  severally  occurred, 
he  were  to  intervene,  and  temporarily  alter  the  calculations  of  the 
machine. 

"  If,  besides  this,  he  were  so  far  to  explain  the  structure  of  the 
engine,  that  tlie  ol»server  could  himself,  by  some  simple  process,  such 
as  the  mere  moving  of  a  bolt,  call  into  action  those  apparent  devia- 
tions whenever  certain  condonations  were  ]>resented  to  his  eye  ;  if  he 
were  thus  to  impart  a  power  of  predicting  such  excepted  cases,  de- 
])endent  on  the  will,  although  otherwise  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
observer's  power  and  knowledge,  such  a  structure  would  be  admitted 
as  evidence  of  a  still  more  skilful  contrivance."  (NiiitJi,  Bridgivatcr 
Treatise,  ch.  viii.) 

NOTE  7,  p.  131. 

Neander  contemplates  a  miracle  in  this  light,  as  assuming  this 
highest  and  supreme  region  of  free-will : — 

"Many  will  admit  certain  facts  to  be  inex]>lica])le  by  any  known 
laws,  and  at  the  same  time  refuse  to  grant  them  a  miraculous  or 
siqiernatural  character.  Some  are  led  by  an  unprejudiced  admission 
of  the  fiicts  to  acknowledge,  without  any  regard  whatever  to  religion, 
that  they  transcend  the  limits  of  existing  science,  and  content  them- 
selves with  that  acknowledgment,  leaving  to  the  jjrogress  of  natural 


VII] 


Note  I  281 


philosophy  or  psychology  to  discover  the  laws,  as  yet  unknown,  that 

will  explain  the  mysterious  phenomena It  is  not  upon  this 

road  that  we  can  lead  men  to  recognize  the  su]iernatui-al  and  the 
divine ;  to  admit  the  jiowers  of  heaven  as  manifesting  themselves 
u])on  earth.  Miracles  belong  to  a  region  of  holiness  and  freedom,  to 
which  neitlier  experience,  nor  observation,  nor  scientiiic  discovery 
can  lead.  There  is  no  bridge  betweeen  this  domain  and  that  of 
natural  phenomena.  Only  by  means  of  our  inward  affinity  for  this 
spiritual  kingdom,  only  by  hearing  and  obeying,  in  the  stillness  of  the 
soul,  the  voice  of  God  within  us,  can  we  reach  those  lofty  regions." 
(Life  of  Christ,  bk.  iv.  ch.  5.) 

Archbishop  Trench  dwells  on  the  same  point  of  view : — 

"  If  in  one  sense  the  orderly  workings  of  nature  reveal  the  glory  of 
God,  in  another  they  hide  that  glory  from  our  eyes ;  if  they  ought  to 
make  us  continually  remember  Him,  yet  there  is  danger  that  they 
will  lead  us  to  forget  Him,  until  this  woild  around  us  shall  prove 
not  a  translucent  medium,  through  which  we  behold  Him,  but  a 
thick  impenetrable  veil,  concealing  Him  wholly  from  oi;r  sight. 
Were  tliere  no  other  purpose  in  the  miracles  than  this,  namelj',  to 
testifij  the  liberty  of  God,  and  to  affirm  the  will  of  God,  which,  how- 
ever it  habitually  shews  itself  in  nature,  is  yet  more  than  and  above 
nature ;  were  it  only  to  break  a  link  in  that  chain  of  cause  and  effect, 
which  else  we  should  come  to  regard  as  itself  God,  as  the  iron  chain 
of  an  inexorable  necessity,  binding  heaven  no  less  than  earth,  they 
would  serve  a  great  purpose,  they  would  not  have  been  wrought  in 
vain,"     {Notes  on  the  Miracles:  Preliminary  Essay,  ch.  ii.) 


LECTUEE     VII. 

NOTE  1, 13.  142. 

The  proof  of  Mahomet's  measure  of  mankind  lies  in  the  whole 
moral  code  of  Mahometanism ;  less  however  in  that  code  taken  by 
itself,  than  in  it  as  compared  Avith  the  Gospel  system  of  morals  from 
which  it  was  so  conspicuous  and  ignominious  a  descent.  Mahomet 
was  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  Gospel  and  with  the  moral  standard 
of  the  Gospel :  he  wrote  the  Koran  with  the  Bible,  both  the  Old  and 
New  Testament,  before  him ;  he  knew  that  the  spirit  and  practice  of 
the  later  dispensation  was  an  advance  uj^on  that  of  the  earlier,  and 
that  the  standard  of  morals  had  been  a  matter  of  growth  and  pro- 
gi-ess ;  yet  in  promulgating  a  new  religion,  with  the  higher  standard 
before  his  eyes,  he  adopted  the  lower  one,  and  retrograded  not  only 
from    Christianity  but    from   Judaism.      Not   only  was    he   fully 


282  Note  I  [Lect. 

acquainted  with  the  Gospel  revelation,  but  even  professed  his  own 
to  carry  out  and  to  succeed  it  in  the  Divine  counsels :  yet  in  engraft- 
ing his  own  religion  upon  the  Law  and  the  Gospel,  he  wholly  threw 
aside  the  moral  development  and  progress  which  marked  the  succes- 
sion of  the  two  dispensations :  and  his  own  dispensation  which  was 
given  out  to  be  an  advance  even  upon  the  Gospel,  and  the  crown  of 
the  whole  structure  of  revelation,  went  back  for  its  moral  standard  to 
a  stage  prior  to  both.  It  is  commonly  stated  that  the  Mahometan 
code,  though  far  inferior  to  that  of  the  Gospel,  was  still  an  improve- 
ment upon  the  moral  standard  of  tlie  Arabian  tribes  whicli  Mahomet 
converted.  But  it  is  one  thing  to  institute  a  carnal  and  lower  moral 
system,  as  an  adaptation  to  man's  weakness,  at  an  earlier  and  an 
infant  stage  in  the  progress  of  revelation,  when  no  better  system  has 
come  to  light ;  another  thing  to  institute  the  same  in  the  maturity  of 
revelation,  wlien  the  legislator  has  a  more  perfect  moral  system  before 
his  eyes.  The  true  princij)^  of  adaptation  and  accommodation  has 
not  respect  to  the  inferior  condition  of  the  party  which  is  the  subject 
of  it  singly  and  solely;  nor  is  that  circumstance  alone  one  to  justify 
the  api^lication  of  the  principle :  were  it  so,  Christianity  could  in  no 
age  of  the  world,  not  even  in  our  own,  be  preached  to  the  heathen 
witliout  some  intermediate  religion  being  preached  first  as  an  accovi- 
modation.  The  principle  of  adaptation,  as  a  legitimate  rule  and 
principle,  has  respect  not  only  to  the  condition  of  the  people  to  be 
converted,  but  also  to  the  progress  of  revelation.  The  moral  condi- 
tion of  the  unconverted  world  may  be  bad,  and  of  course  is  bad ;  but 
nothing  can  justify  the  choice  of  a  lower  religion  and  moral  code  to 
wliich  to  convert  them,  when  there  exists  before  lis  a  higher  one. 
Yet  this  was  Mahomet's  course ; — a  course  which  indicates  his  esti- 
mate of  human  nature. 

Thus  on  the  subject  of  polygamy,  divorce,  and  concidnnage,  the 
Mahometan  code  was  doubtless  an  accommodation  to  the  moral 
standard  of  the  Arabian  tribes ;  but  it  was  an  accommodation  when 
the  Gosjjel  existed,  and  it  was  an  accommodation  much  lower  than 
that  of  the  Mosaic  law.  Mr.  Forster,  wlio  ]iartly  excuses  Mahomet 
upon  the  ground  of  accommodation,  says  :  "  The  same  cause  or  causes 
which  introduced  into  the  Mosaic  code  the  tacit  admission  of  polygamy, 
and  the  more  express  toleration  of  divoixe,  would  operate  with  equal 
force  to  extort  from  the  legislator  the  recognition  of  the  state  of  con- 
cubinage." "  But,"  he  adds,  "the  liberty  of  concubinage  granted  or 
rather  preached  by  the  pretended  successor  of  Moses,  widel}'  separates 
the  religions  in  their  moral  aspect — the  studiously  restricted  latitude 
of  the  one,  the  unbridled  and  unbounded  licentiousness  of  the  other." 


VII] 


Note  I  283 


(Mahometanism  Unveiled,  vol.  i.  p.  332.)  Again :  "  The  Mahometan 
law  of  divorce,  as  it  stands  in  the  Koran,  like  so  many  other  parts 
of  that  pretended  revelation,  is  a  compound  of  the  precepts  of 
the  Pentateuch  and  the  traditional  adulterations  of  the  Ilaljliius." 
(P-  330.) 

The  same  estimate  of  human  nature  moulds  the  legislator's  direc- 
tions on  the  subject  of  the  property  rights  of  wives  and  orphans. 
Here  are  cases  in  which  the  proverbial  rapacity  of  the  Oriental  would 
be  very  diflBicult  to  deal  with  ;  and  a  stringent  rule,  which  admitted 
of  no  escape,  would  provoke  him,  and  only  appear,  in  the  eye  of  the 
accommodating  lawgiver,  certain  to  meet  with  violation,  and,  along 
with  violation,  contempt.  The  directions  therefore  in  the  Koran  are 
constructed  with  evident  loopholes :  "  And  give  women  their  dowry 
freely;  but  if  they  voluntarily  remit  unto  you  amj imrt  of  it,  enjoy  it 
with  satisfaction  and  advantage.'"  {Koran,  ch.  iv.)  It  is  easy  to  see 
what  the  practical  operation  of  such  a  clause  as  this  would  be, — that 
it  would  be  no  difficult  matter  for  a  man  in  many  cases  to  extort  or 
win  a  consent  from  a  female  under  his  power  to  a  surrender  of  part 
of  her  property.  A  proviso  respecting  female  orphans  leaves  a 
dangerous  discretion  to  the  guardian :  "  And  give  not  unto  those  who 
are  of  iceak  understanding  the  substance  which  God  hath  appointed 
you  to  preserve  for  them "  (Ibid.) :  a  good  rule  if  used  fairly,  but 
which  is  obviously  suggestive  of  an  unfair  use  of  it.  It  was  not 
likely  that  an  Arabian  guardian  would  part  with  the  legal  possession 
of  any  property  sooner  than  was  necessary ;  nor  was  overhaste  in 
surrendering  an  estate  to  a  female  orphan  of  weak  mind  a  fault  which 
he  would  be  in  the  least  likely  to  commit.  He  need  hardly  then 
have  been  cau.tioned  against  it.  And  on  the  other  hand,  he  might 
and  would  not  improbably  extract  from  such  a  rule  a  permission  to 
constitute  himself  an  arbitrary  judge  of  his  ward's  power  to  manage 
her  own  affairs,  and  to  detain  her  property  upon  the  slightest  excuse 
on  that  head. 

The  promulgator  of  a  new  religion,  who  with  a  high  and  spiritual 
code  before  him  adojats  a  lower  and  laxer  one  as  that  of  his  religion, 
not  only  adopts  that  lower  code  but  implicitly  pronounces  judgment 
upon  the  higher  one  which  he  rejects.  He  says  virtually  that  he  con- 
siders such  a  code  impracticable,  that  it  may  be  put  forth  in  a  book, 
but  that  human  nature  cannot  be  brought  to  practise  it,  and  that  it 
is  better  to  have  i'ar  easier  laws  more  (jbeyed,  than  more  difficult  ones 
less. 


284  Notes  2,  3  [Lect. 


NOTE  2,  p.  149. 

"  If  the  special  character  of  this  deliverance  be  investigated,  we  find 
it  summed  up  in  the  word  nirvdna,  '  extinction,'  '  blowing  out.'  Such 
was  the  su])reme  felicity  of  the  Buddha  :  such  the  goal  to  which  he 
ever  2:)ointed  the  aspirations  of  his  followers.  It  was  formerly  dis- 
puted whether  more  is  meant  by  the  exjjression  nirvdna  than  '  eternal 
quietude,'  '  unbroken  sleep,  '  impenetrable  a])atliy ; '  but  the  oldest 
literature  of  Buddhism  will  scarcely  suffer  us  to  doubt  that  Gautama 
intended  by  it  nothing  short  of  absolute  '  annihilation,'  the  destruction 
of  all  elements  which  constitute  existence."  {Hardiuick's  Christ  and 
other  Masters,  pt.  ii.  p.  66.) 

Dr.  Rowland  Williaius's  representation  of  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of 
nirvdna  is  a  slight,  but  very  slight,  modification  of  Mr.  Hardwick's 
statement.  "  It  seems  acknowledged  that  such  a  conception  of  pas- 
siveness  in  Deity  aifects  your  notions  of  the  life  to  be  expected  here- 
after :  for  it  takes  away  all  clear  individuality,  and  leaves  a  breathless 
absorption."  {Cliristianity  and  Hinduism,^!.  528.)  The  Brahman  doc- 
trine of  the  final  state  2^1'ofesses  some  difference  from  the  Buddhist  ; 
but  both  schools  maintain  in  common  the  characteiistic  of  imperson- 
ality as  attaching  to  the  final  state.  "The  human  soul,  being  cased 
in  a  body,  as  in  a  succession  of  sheaths,  the  first  of  which  is  intellec- 
tual or  apprehensive,  and  the  second  aft'ectionate  or  capable  of  joy  and 
grief,  and  the  third  merely  psychic  or  vital,  unites  itself  with  these  so 
as  to  form  a  personality,  and  thus  individualizes  itself  in  isolation  from 
the  supreme  soul :  therefore  also  in  its  many  passages  from  life  to  life 
the  unhappy  soul  of  man  carries  with  it  this  subtle  body  above  spoken 
of,  and  thereby  is  constituted  what  we  call  a  person."  {Ibid.  p.  92.) 
This  personality,  however,  vanishes  in  the  final  state,  when  the  soul 
is  restored  to  oneness.  "You  will  not,"  continues  the  Brahman 
speaker  in  the  dialogue,  "  accept  the  term  void  as  an  ade(]uate  descrip- 
tion of  the  mysterious  natuie  of  the  soul,  but you  will 

clearly  apprehend  soul  [in  the  final  state]  to  be  unseen  and  ungrasped 
being,  thought,  knowledge,  and  joy,  no  other  than  very  God."  {Ibid.) 

NOTE  3,  p.  150. 

The  elevating  principle  in  patriarchal  religious  life  Mr.  Davison 
considers  to  have  been  prophecy : — 

"  Prophecy  deigned  to  take  these  early  disciples  of  it  by  the  hand. 
We  see  their  personal  fortunes,  and  in  many  jjarticulars,  their  life  and 
conduct  were  guidetl  by  it  :  this  was  a  present  pledge,  a  sensible 
evidence,  of  the  faithfulness  of  God  in  all  His  promises ;  and  so  the 


VII]  Note  4  285 

supports  of  tlieir  faith  grew  with  the  enlarged  duties  of  it :  reserved 
and  distant  hopes  acquired  a  footing  to  rest  upon,  and  drew  strength 
from  the  conviction  wliich  tlicy  had,  not  only  of  His  revelation,  but 
of  His  experienced  providential  care  and  goodness.  '  They  drank  of 
the  bi'ook  in  the  way.'  Immediate  mercies  guaranteed  the  greater  in 
prospect.  Such  was  the  service  rendered  to  religion  by  pro])hecy  in 
the  Patriarchal  age,  which  was  the  tirst  asra  of  its  more  copious  pro- 
mulgation." {Davison  on  Prophecy,  p.  93.) 

Again,  the  institution  of  sacrifice,  typical  under  the  i\Iosaic  law, 
and  before  it,  according  to  the  general  opinion  of  divines,  of  the  Great 
Atonement  upon  the  Cross,  educated  tiie  devout  Jew,  and  imparted 
to  him  ideas  tending  toward  the  Gospel  as  their  goal,  so  making  his 
religious  character  an  anticipation  of  the  Christian  one. 

"  The  action  of  the  moral  and  ceremonial  law  combined,  I  conclude 
therefore  to  have  been  such  as  would  ]iroduce,  in  reasonable  and 
serious  minds,  that  temper  which  is  itself  eminently  Cliristian  in  its 
principle  ;  viz.  a  sense  of  demerit  in  transgression  ;  a  willingness  to 
accept  a  better  atonement  adequate  to  the  needs  of  the  conscience,  if 
God  should  provide  it,  and  a  desire  after  inward  purity,  whicli  bodily 
lustration  might  represent,  but  could  not  supply  ;  in  short,  that  tem- 
per which  David  has  confessed  and  described,  when  he  rejects  his 

reliance  upon  the  legal  rites Although  it  is  clear  there  was 

no  distinct  perception  of  the  Christian  object  of  faith,  we  cannot  rea- 
sonably doubt  the  penitent  of  the  Law  would  have  been  the  devout 
discijale  of  the  Gospel,  had  God  been  pleased  to  reveal  to  him  the  real 
sacrifice  of  proi^itiation  which  the  Law  did  not  provide."  {Davison  on 
Prophecy,  p.  143.) 

"  With  reference  to  the  Patriarch  and  the  Jew,  those  antici^'iations 
of  Gospel  truth  had  a  twofold  jnirpose,  immediate  and  prospective  : 
prospective  in  the  gradual  preparation  of  the  world  for  Christianity; 
immediate  in  the  infusion  of  Christian  feelings,  sentiments,  and  hojjes 

into  the  bosoms  of  the  faithful  even  in  the  earliest  times 

Such  were  the  sentiments  of  Abraham,  when  at  the  successive  resting- 
jjlaces  in  his  pilgrimage  '  he  builded  an  altar  unto  the  Lord,  and  called 
on  the  name  of  the  Lord.'  And  such  no  doubt  were  the  sentiments 
of  many  a  inimitive  worshipper,  when  he  laid  his  hand  and  confessed 
his  guilt  upon  the  head  of  the  victim."  {Dr.  HaivJdiis's  Discourses  on 
the  Historical  Scriptures,  p.  154.) 

"  Imo  vero,  ut  sic  loquar,  quemadmodum  se  Veritas  habet,  non 
nominum  consuetudo,  Christianus  etiam  iiie  tunc  populus  fuit." 
{Augustine,  Serrn.  300.) 

NOTE  4,  p.  154. 

"  II  est  dangereux  de  trop  faire  voir  a  I'homme  combien  il  est  egal 
aux  betes,  sans  lui  montrer  sa  grandeur.  H  est  encore  dangereux  de 
lui  trop  faire  voir  sa  grandeur  sans  sa  bassesse. 


286  Note  5  [Lect. 

"  II  est  non  seiilement  impossible  raais  inutile  de  connaitre  Dieu 
pans  J.-C.  lis  ne  s'eu  sont  pas  eloigncs,  mais  approclies  ;  lis  ne  se 
sont  pas  abaisses  maia.  .  .  .  Quo  quisquam  optimus  est,  j^essiiims  si  hoc 
ipsuiit  quod  sit  optimus  ascribat  sibi. 

"  Aussi  ceux  qui  ont  coiinu  Dieu  sans  connaitre  leur  mistre  ne  I'ont 
pas  f^loritie  mais  s'en  sont  glorifies.  Quia  non  cognovit  per  sapientiam, 
placuit  Deoj)er  stultitiam  pnedicationis  salvos  fncere. 

"  Non  SL'ulement  nous  ne  connaissons  Dieu  que  par  J.-C.  mais  nous 
ne  nous  connaissons  nous  niemes  que  par  J.-C."  {Pensees  de  Pascal,  pp. 
85,316,317-) 

See  some  valuable  remarks  on  the  practical  inefficiency  of  Platonic 
doctrine  in  the  Cliristian  Remembrancer,  October,  1863  :  Article  on 
Miracles,  p.  271. 

NOTE  5,  p.  157. 

"  If  at  the  present  day  any  very  extraordinary  and  unaccountable 
fact  were  exhibiteil  before  the  eyes  of  an  unbiassed,  educated,  well- 
iiifonned  individual,  and  supiiosing  all  suspicion  of  imposture  i)Ut  out 
of  the  (juestion,  his  oidy  conclusion  would  be  that  it  was  something 
he  was  unalile  at  jjreseut  to  explain  ;  and  if  at  all  versed  in  physical 
studies,  he  would  not  for  an  instant  doubt  either  that  it  was  really 
due  to  some  natural  cause,  or  that  if  properly  recorded  and  examined, 
it  would  at  some  future  time  receive  its  explanation  by  the  advance 
of  discovery . 

"  It  is  thus  the  prevalent  conviction  that  at  the  ]>resent  day  miracles 
are  not  to  be  expected,  and  consequently  alleged  marvels  are  com- 
moidy  discredited."  {Powell's  Study  of  the  Evidences  of  Christianity,  p. 
107.) 

Mr.  Leckie  says  : — 

"  There  is  certainly  no  change  in  the  history  of  the  last  300  j'ears 
more  striking  or  suggestive,  than  that  which  has  taken  place  in  the 
esluuate  of  the  miraculous.  At  present  neaily  all  educated  men  re- 
ceive an  account  of  a  miracle  taking  place  in  their  own  day,  with  an 
absolute  and  derisive  credulity,  which  dispenses  with  all  examination 
of  the  evidence.  Although  they  maybe  entirelj'' unable  to  give  a 
satisfactory  explanation  of  some  phenomena  that  have  taken  place, 
they  never  on  that  account  dream  of  ascribing  them  to  supernatural 
agency,  such  an  hypothesis  being,  as  they  believe,  altogether  beyond 
the  range  of  reasonable  discussion.  Yet  a  few  centuries  ago,  there 
was  no  solution  to  which  the  mind  of  men  turned  more  readily  in 
every  perplexity."  (nationalism  in  Europe,  vol.  i.  p.  i.) 

The  above  extract,  which  is  the  opening  paragraph  of  Mr.  Leckie's 
work,  is  not  a  correct  representation  of  the  belief  of  modern  society. 
Undoubtedly  there  is  a  section  of  the  community  whose  belief  is  cor- 


VII] 


Note  5  287 


rectly  represented  by  it ;  but  that  is  not  a  fact  which  meets  the  case  : 
the  assertion  is  that  educated  society  as  a  whole,  thinks  a  miracle  now- 
a-days  impossible ;  and  that  it  is  society  as  a  whole  which  does  so,  is 
the  very  point.  But  is  this  true  ?  Eeligious  society,  i.e..  religious  in 
its  belief,  is  the  greater  part  by  far  of  modern  educated  society.  So- 
ciety as  a  whole  then,  making  allowance  for  exceptions,  is  religious 
society.  And  the  question  is,  what  does  such  society  think  ?  what 
would  be  a  fair  account  of  its  state  of  mind  %  Writers  who  forestall 
what  appears  to  them  the  unerring  result  of  certain  tendencies,  un- 
consciously adopt  as  representative  society  that  section  of  it  which 
has  already  arrived  at  this  expected  result :  but  they  must  be  recalled 
to  fact. 

The  truth  is,  then,  that  no  broad  or  round  statement  could  do 
justice  to  the  attitude  of  mind  in  which  religious  society  of  this  day 
stands  toward  the  hodiernal  miraculous.  There  is  a  presunqition  felt 
against  it,  a  general  expectation  that  a  supernatural  event  will  not 
occur  now  ;  but  this  is  with  a  reserve.  Religious  persons  do  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  condemned  to  such  simplicity  of  point  of  view  as 
admits  of  being  represented  by  round  statements.  The  presumption 
against  the  hodiernal  miraculous  is  not  an  absolute  or  logical  position. 
It  would  be  contrary  to  the  very  principles  of  their  religious  belief, 
and  to  their  deepest  convictions  to  make  it  such. 

I  have  mentioned  the  belief  in  sjjecial  providences  as  a  belief  in  a 
certain  remote  miraculous  agency.  But  we  may  appeal  to  the  actual 
testimony  of  conversation,  which  is  the  best  exponent  of  the  belief  of 
society,  whether  the  idea  of  the  j^ossibility  of  supernatural  events 
happening  now  is  not  a  very  commonly  received  and  entertained  one? 
Has  the  religious  and  serious  literature,  again,  of  the  present  day  de- 
parted in  any  material  respect  from  the  standard  of  belief  on  this  sub- 
ject which  we  meet  in  the  religious  writers  of  the  last  century  ;  e.g. 
Dr.  Johnson  and  Dr.  Doddridge  ?  These  two  writers  are  far  from 
being  regarded  now  as  obsolete  or  antiquated,  they  are  popular 
authors  now,  they  are  favourites  with  the  public,  their  writings  are 
read  without  the  least  idea  that  there  is  any  chasm  intervening  be- 
tween them  and  modern  thought ;  they  are  resorted  to  very  much  as 
if  they  were  writers  of  our  own  day.  Indeed,  "  the  obstinate  prin- 
ciple of  rationality,"  which  Dr.  Johnson  attributed  to  himself,  has 
been  a  great  element  in  his  popularity.  But  these  two  writers,  as  is 
well  known,  maintained  the  credibility  of  the  occurrence  of  super- 
natural events  now.  "  It  is  proper,"  says  Boswell,  "  once  for  ail  to 
give  a  true  and  fair  statement  of  Johnson's  way  of  talking  upon  the 
question,  whether  departed  spirits  are  ever  permitted  to  appear  in 


288  Note  5  [Lect. 

this  world,  or  in  any  way  to  operate  upon  human  life.  He  has  been 
ignorantly  misrepresented  as  weakly  credulous  upon  that  subject  ; 
and,  therefore,  though  I  feel  an  inclination  to  disdain  and  treat  with 
silent  contempt  so  foolish  a  notion  concerning  my  illustrious  friend, 
yet,  as  I  find  it  has  gained  gi'ound,  it  is  necessary  to  refute  it.  The 
real  fact  then  is,  that  Johnson  had  a  very  philosophical  mind,  and 
such  a  rational  respect  for  testimony,  as  to  make  him  submit  his 
understanding  to  what  was  authoritatively  proved,  though  he  could 
not  comprehend  Avhy  it  was  so.  Being  thus  disposed  he  was  willing 
to  ijiquire  into  the  truth  of  any  relation  of  supernatural  agencj'^,  a 
general  belief  of  which  has  jirevailed  in  all  ages  and  nations.  But  so 
far  was  he  from  being  the  dupe  of  implicit  faith,  that  he  examined  the 
matter  with  zealous  attention,  and  no  man  was  more  readj^  to  refute 
its  falsehood,  when  he  had  discovered  it."  Dr.  Doddridge  inserted 
in  his  Life  of  Colonel  Gardiner  the  well-known  account  of  the  vision 
which  appeared  to  him  and  led  to  his  conversion.  Without  entering 
then  into  any  criticism  of  this  or  other  such  accounts,  I  say  that  such 
nianife-itations  of  belief  in  these  and  other  writers  do  not  appear  to 
religious  readers  of  the  present  day  in  the  light  of  irrational  eccentri- 
cities or  mere  obsolete  notions :  they  fall  in  with  a  current  and 
established  standard  of  belief. 

When  it  is  said  that  educated  society  of  the  present  day  rejects  the 
miracles  of  the  present  day,  it  should  be  remembered  what  sort  of 
miracles  the  miracles  of  the  present  day  are.  We  speak  now  of 
classes  of  miracles.  What  are  these  ?  Vulgar  witchcraft  and  magic  ; 
again  spiritualist  miracles  ;  again  controversial  miracles  in  the 
Roman  Church  connected  with  the  worshiji  of  the  Virgin  and  other 
popular  doctrines  ;  that  is  to  say,  either  disreputable  miracles,  or 
miracles  connected  simidy  with  fashionable  amusement  and  curiosity, 
or  miracles  derived  from  a  source  of  imposture  and  delusion,  so  old 
and  well-known  that  it  has  become  a  byword  and  a  proverb.  There 
is  a  growth  and  an  accumulation  of  human  judgment,  with  regard  to 
the  value  of  the  polemical  class  of  miracles,  of  which  rational  men 
have  a  right  to  avail  themselves.  Modern  society  then,  it  is  said,  re- 
jects the  miracles  which  occur  now,  and  these  are,  the  miracles  which 
occur  now.  When  the  rejection  of  miracles  which  happen  now  is 
alleged,  it  should  also  be  mentioned  what  sort  of  miracles  they  are 
which  now  happen. 

Can  any  comparison  be  made,  in  point  of  dignity  and  claim  to 
respect,  between  such  supernaturalism  as  this  and  the  power  which 
broke  through  the  barrier  of  natui-e  to  t'uarantee  a  revelation  which 


VII]  Note  5  289 

has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  changed  the  condition  of  the  world  and 
raised  human  nature  ? 

The  scientific  era  of  the  worhl  has  doubtless  been  an  important 
period  in  the  education  of  mankind  ;  and  with  other  parts  of  the  mind 
of  man,  his  belief  in  the  marvellous  has  received  an  education.  It 
has  worked  itself  out  of  the  Avildness,  the  extravagance,  and  the  rank 
luxuriance  of  former  ages  ;  it  has  disciplined  itself  ;  it  has  discovered 
its  own  faults,  and  learned  not  to  mista"ke  the  want  of  discrimination 
for  reverence,  and  the  idle  recej^tion  of  every  story  for  faith.  This  ia 
educated  belief  in  the  supernatural.  It  is  so  tempered  and  cautious, 
and  its  disposition  to  assertion  is  so  checked,  that,  compared  with  the 
reckless  audacity  of  medieval  belief,  it  looks  to  many  like  disbelief. 
The  positive  element  in  it  is  overwhelmed  by  the  juxtaposition  with 
the  monstrous  credulity  which  it  has  su2)erseded  ;  the  negative 
element  is  alone  seen.  But  it  is  not  disbelief  notwithstanding. 
Modern  educated  society  is  not  unmoored  fi-om  the  belief  in  the 
hodiernal  supernatural,  as  a  possibility^  This  is  a  question  of  fact. 
Theory  may  be  stated  absolutely,  and  tendencies  may  be  asserted 
absolutely  and  summarily,  although  such  assertions  are  hazardous  ; 
but  when  persons  come  to  state  matters  of  fact,  as  e.g.  what  is  the 
sentiment  and  belief  of  society  at  the  present  day  upon  the  subject  of 
the  hodiernal  supernatural,  the  statement  should  be  faithful  to  the 
modifications  of  actual  fact.  Mr.  Leckie's  statement  is  not  ;  it  is  un- 
true ;  and  the  real  state  of  the  case  requires  another  statement,  which 
enters  really  into  particulars  and  into  the  variety  of  elements  in  the 
mind  of  modern  society. 

The  argument  that  the  actual  progress  of  society  has  been  fatal  to 
a  great  deal  of  belief,  that  a  great  deal  of  supematuralism  which  was 
once  accepted  by  the  intelligent  and  educated  of  every  age  is  now 
universally  rejected,  is  undoubtedly  a  potent  weapon  in  the  hands  of 
unbelief.  It  has  that  strength  which  is  always  gained  by  an  appeal 
to  actual  facts  ;  even  though  they  be  one  particular  and  limited  class 
of  facts.  It  is  an  argument  which  must,  in  the  natiu-e  of  the  case,  be 
very  convincing  as  condemnatory  of  the  miraculous  evidences  of 
Christianity,  to  those  who  decide  the  question  of  revelation  and  ita 
evidences  by  a  rough  application  of  those  common-sense  views  which 
are  nearest  at  hand  and  are  the  easiest  to  hit  on.  It  looks  at  fii'st 
sight  very  like  common  sense  to  say,  '  As  the  world  has  become  more 
ci\dlized,  so  much  belief  in  the  supernatural  has  gone  ;  therefore,  as 
civilization  increases,  the  rest  will  go  too  ; '  but  when  we  go  a  little 
deeper  we  find  that  it  is  common  sense  judging  upon  narrow  and 
limited  data,  not  having  the  whole  of  the  case  before  it.     Common 

T 


290  Note  5  [Lect. 

sense  is  a  correct  guide  or  not,  accoixling  to  the  amount  of  knowledge 
upon  which  it  goes  ;  ignorant  common  sense  makes  the  greatest  mis- 
takes ;  rough  or  careless  common  sense,  which  overlooks  facts  and 
jjasses  over  distinctions,  also  makes  the  greatest  mistakes.  Common 
sense  is  the  faculty  of  judging  correctly  upon  the  data  which  are  be- 
fore it ;  hut  it  does  not  in  the  least  imjily  possessing  or  realizing  all 
the  proper  data.  The  present  is  a  case  in  point.  Here  is  a  position 
allccting  a  common-sense  sound,  which  prophesies  the  total  disbelief 
in  the  supernatural  ;  but  the  fact  which  it  has  before  it,  and  upon 
which  it  judges,  is  one  kind  or  rank  of  supernaturalism  alone,  viz., 
the  grossest,  the  coarsest,  the  most  revolting,  absiuxl  and  monstrous. 
The  belief  in  this  has  disapjieared  with  gro^ving  civilization,  and 
therefore  a  common  sense  which  only  has  this  field  of  the  super- 
natural before  it,  decides  that  all  belief  in  the  supernatural  will  in 
time  disappear.  It  is  a  position  built  upon  the  roughest  and  most 
external  historical  data,  without  taking  into  account  the  inner 
religious  mind  of  man,  and  the  insight  which  the  religious  sense  im- 
parts, and  by  which  it  enables  man  to  discriminate  between  different 
kinds  of  supernatural  pretensions,  their  intrinsic  character,  and  their 
evidences. 

We  commonly  indeed  associate  common  sense  with  the  use  of  the 
readier  and  more  tangible  and  ^palpable  sort  of  data,  and  call  the 
faculty  of  judging  upon  these  data  by  that  name.  If  we  allow  this 
appropriation  of  the  term  in  the  present  case,  then  the  distinction 
which  I  have  just  drawn  may  be  expressed  thus.  In  matters  of 
ordinary  life  common  sense  of  itself  rules  ;  but  in  religious  questions 
the  religious  sense  is  a  part  of  common  sense,  and  common  sense  is 
imperfect  and  defective  unless  it  has  the  supijlement  of  the  religious 
sense.  When  then  Ave  come  to  judge  of  the  evidences  of  a  revelation 
and  the  Christian  miracles,  we  are  bound,  even  on  principles  of  com,- 
mon  sense,  to  listen  to  what  the  religious  sense  has  to  suggest.  But 
the  first  result  of  religious  thought  and  feeling  is  an  immense  dis- 
tinction between  the  vulgar  suiiernaturalism  of  imcivilized  ages  and 
tlie  Gospel  miracles  ;  a  distinction  in  the  reason  and  object  of  the 
miracles,  in  their  character,  in  the  character  of  Him  in  whom  they 
centre,  and  in  the  character  of  the  witnesses.  UncUn-  the  influence  of 
a  religious  insight,  this  distinction  is  perfectly  obvious  and  natural 
or  is  a  part  of  common  sense.  More  than  this,  religious  thought  and 
feeling  supply  a  very  good  and  a  i:)erfect]y  natural  reason  why  the 
evidences  of  revelation  should  not  meet  the  test  of  easy  common 
eense  ;  because  they  suggest  that  those  evidences  were  intended  and 
designed  for  those  who  had  cultivated  the  religious  sense. 


VII] 


Note  5  291 


Let  us  suppose  a  person  of  deep  religious  mind,  who  felt  strongly 
that  the  evidences  of  revelation  could  not  he  seen  in  their  proper 
strength  without  the  religious  sense  and  temper,  i.e.  by  common  sense 
alone  ;  and  that  it  was  in  harmony  with  the  Divine  character  that 
this  failure  to  satisfy  common  sense  alone  should  be  designed.  It  is 
clear  that  his  rationale  of  Christian  evidence  is  an  answer  by  antici- 
pation to  Mr.  Leckie's  attack  ;  that  it  cuts  under  it,  and  takes,  by  a 
l^revious  admission,  the  ground  from  underneath  an  argument  which 
depends  entirely  for  its  force  upon  a  rough  prima  facie  common 
sense,  which  does  not  take  into  account  the  reasons  and  considera- 
tions which  naturally  spring  out  of  the  religious  sense. 

The  pi'ogress  of  enquiry  has  been  fatal  to  a  great  deal  of  belief  in 
other  instances  besides  the  supernatural  ;  and  yet  it  has  only  in  those 
instances  castigated  and  educated  the  belief,  and  not  destroyed  it. 
Take,  e.g.,  the  doctrine  of  final  causes.  "We  know  the  abuses  and 
extravagancies  with  which  this  doctrine  was  taught  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  by  which  it  was  perverted,  as  Bacon  so  often  complains,  to 
the  total  neglect  of  the  search  for  physical  causes.  The  philosopher 
■went  through  nature  with  the  maxim  of  Aristotle  in  his  mouth,  that 
"  Nature  made  nothing  in  vain,"  and  applied  it  as  the  sole  reason  and 
account  to  be  given  of  every  arrangement  in  nature.  "  Did  you  ask 
what  was  the  cause  of  the  eyebrows  ? "  says  Bacon,  "  you  were  told 
it  was  the  design  to  defend  the  eyes.  Did  a^ou  ask  what  was  the 
cause  of  the  hardness  of  the  hides  of  animals  ?  you  were  told  that  it 
was  the  design  to  protect  them  from  the  cold.  Did  you  ask  what  was 
the  cause  of  the  leaves  of  trees  ?  the  reply  was,  that  it  was  the 
design  to  give  shelter  to  the  fruit.  Did  you  ask  what  caused  the 
bones  ?  you  were  told  it  was  the  design  to  supply  the  body  with  a 
framework  to  support  it.  Did  you  ask  what  caused  the  clouds  in  the 
sky  1  you  were  told  that  it  was  the  design  to  supply  the  earth  with 
rain  and  moisture.  Did  you  ask  the  cause  of  the  earth's  denseness 
and  solidity  ?  you  were  told  it  was  the  design  to  furnish  animals  with 
a  standing-ground  and  dwelling-place."  {Pe  Augm.  1.  iii.  ch.  iv.)  In 
this  way,  in  every  case  in  which  a  cause  was  wanted  for  a  natural 
effect,  the  vacuum  was  filled  up  with  an  immediate  act  of  the  Deity, 
creating  that  particular  physical  condition  of  things,  on  account  of  its 
serviceableness  and  use  ;  and  here  all  enquiry  stopped.  It  did  not 
occur,  e.g.  to  anybody,  as  Bacon  says,  that  "  there  was  a  physical  cause 
for  the  hardness  of  the  hides  of  beasts,  in  the  contraction  of  the  pores 
by  the  cold  and  exposure  to  the  outer  air ;  besides  a  final  cause,  in  the 
defence  of  the  animal  from  the  weather.  And  so  throughout."  The 
result  was,  he  continues,   ingens  scientiaruni  detrimentum.    "  The 


292  Note  5  [Lect. 

treating  of  final  causes  in  physics,  expelled  and  cast  out  the  inquisi- 
tion of  physical  causes,  and  was  the  occasion  'of  men  resting  in  mere 
specious  and  shadoAvy  account  of  things,  instead  of  penetrating  to 
the  real  natural  reasons." 

This  mischievous  and  despotic  reign  of  final  causes  has  been  long 
over,  and  in  innumerable  instances  where,  before  the  advance  of 
science,  an  act  of  creating  design  stood  as  the  sole  cause  of  a  par- 
ticular natural  arrangement,  that  design  has  been  displaced  as  the 
immediate  cause,  and  a  purely  physical  cause  has  been  inserted  in 
its  place.  Throughout  the  whole  realm  of  nature  blind  agents  or 
physical  laws  have  been  discovered,  which  occupy  the  next  place  to 
the  ultimate  facts  of  which  the  reason  is  enquired ;  and  what  directly 
precedes  these  natural  dispositions  of  things,  is  found  to  be  not  design 
but  material  agency  producing  the  effect  in  question  without  an 
intention.  The  laws  of  motion  and  gravitation,  e.g.  are  blind  agents, 
which  are  the  immediate  producers  of  the  revolutions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  And  a  succession  of  blind  physical  causes  has  produced  the 
consistency,  and  the  atmosphere  of  this  earth — all  that  condition  of 
it  which  makes  it  fit  for  the  habitation  of  men.  The  discovery  of 
this  material  agency  in  the  production  of  the  existing  condition  of 
nature,  has  been  and  is  now  extending,  and  in  investigating  the 
works  of  creation  we  are  more  and  more  met  by  intei'vening  classes 
of  causes  which  are  purely  natural.  And,  as  usual,  theory  is  in 
advance  of  facts,  and  threatens  such  large  additions  to  the  empire  of 
physical  causation,  and  such  an  immense  further  withdrawal  of 
nature  from  the  immediate  action  of  design,  that  some  minds  have 
been  filled  with  serious  apprehensions.  Sjjeculation  has  invaded  the 
realm  of  animal  nature,  and  proposes  to  account  even  for  those 
organic  animal  structures  which  are  the  most  consjiicuous  instances 
of  design,  and  which  appear  to  come  straight  from  the  hands  of  the 
Divine  Artificer,  by  material  agency,  and  blind  combinations  of 
circumstances  acting  in  the  place  next  and  immediate  to  the  final 
result. 

But,  without  going  to  theories,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
direct  action  of  final  causes  has  thus  been  drawn  back  in  multitudes 
of  instances  by  solid  observation,  and  been  supplanted  in  the  par- 
ticular place  hitherto  assigned  to  them,  by  physical  causes.  And  yet 
no  philosophical  mind  sees  in  this  whole  j^rogress  of  scientific  dis- 
covery, any  real  danger  to  the  substance  of  the  doctrine  of  final 
causes.  Science  does  not  indeed  itself,  with  all  its  new  introduced 
apparatus  of  physical  causes,  pretend  to  be  able  to  do  without  a 
Designing  Mind  in  nature.     The  boldest  school  of  sj^eculation  even, 


VII]  Note  5  293 

in  behalf  of  physical  causes,  requires  some  organic  substance  to  begin 
with  of  which  design  can  be  the  sole  account ;  for  it  is  only  an 
elementary  organic  structure,  which  could  be  capable  of  an  organic 
develoi"iment ;  over  which  combinations  of  circumstances  afterwards 
could  have  that  effect  of  bringing  it  out  and  amjilifying  it  and 
elaborating  it  as  an  organic  formation.  The  adaptation  then  of  the 
original  framework  of  nature  to  an  intricate  and  unlimited  develop- 
ment by  subsequent  material  causes  remains  stUl  a  proof  of  Design 
in  nature.  "  Peut-etre  une  etude  plus  ajiprofondie,"  says  a  dis- 
tinguished champion  of  Design,  M.  Paul  Janet — "  nous  ajq^rendra-t- 
elle  a  demeler  quelque  chose  reelle  qui  nous  echappe,  et  nous  mon- 
trera  un  eft'et  naturel  la  011  nous  croyons  voir  la  main  d'une  volonte 
prevoyante."  But  he  sees  no  danger  to  Design  in  the  admission. 
The  whole  intelligence  of  mankind,  in  short,  still  maintains  the  evi- 
dence of  design  or  final  causes  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  v^ 
The  doctrine  of  final  causes  then  has  since  the  extravagant,  hasty, 
and  careless  application  of  it  in  the  middle  ages,  received  from  the 
progress  of  science  an  education;  it  has  been  corrected  by  observa- 
tion ;  it  has  been  checked  and  modified  by  the  discovery  of  material 
causes  next  in  succession  to  the  ultimate  results  in  nature.  But  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes  has  still  been  modified  only,  not  disproved 
or  suj^erseded ;  it  still  is  as  necessary  and  as  true  a  doctrine,  in  the 
eye  of  human  reason,  as  it  ever  was  ;  and  the  j)roof  of  it  is  only 
removed  a  step  further  back.  The  distinction  by  wliich  Bacon 
guaranteed  its  safety  against  peril  from  science,  then  in  its  dawn,  has 
been  verified  by  science  in  its  progress.  "  Neque  vero  ista  res  in 
dubium  vocat  providentiam  divinam,  aut  ei  quicquam  derogat ;  sed 
potius  eamdem  miris  modis  confirmat  et  evehit.  Nam  sicut  in  rebus 
civilibus  prudentia  politica  fuerit  altior  et  mirabilior,  si  quis  opera 
aliorum  ad  suos  fines  et  desideria  abuti  possit,  quibus  tamen  nihil 
consilii  sui  impertit  (ut  interim  ea  agant  quoe  ipse  velit  neutiquam 
vero  se  hoc  facere  intelligant)  quam  si  consilia  sua  cum  administris 
voluntatis  suee  communicaret :  sic  Dei  sapientia  eft'ulget  mirabilius, 
cum  natura  aliud  agit,  providentia  aliud  elicit ;  quam  si  singulis 
schematibus  et  motibus  naturalibus,  providentise  characteres  essent 
iinpressi."  (De  Augm.  1.  iii.  ch.  iv.)  It  would  appear  from  modern 
discovery  that  Creative  design  was  more  distant  and  circuitous  than 
the  design  of  the  human  artificer  in  constructing  a  machine ;  was 
in  less  immediate  contact  with  the  result,  and  of  earlier  date  in 
scheme ;  that  it  acted  on  a  larger  scale  by  bringing  things  together 
from  difterent  and  distant  quarters,  and  by  the  iise  of  contingent 
materials,  whose  place  in  the  plan  was  only  seen  by  the  light  of  the 


\ 


294  Note  I  [Lect. 

end ;  that  it  threw  itself  upon  a  longer  series  of  media,  interposing 
between  the  spring  of  operations  and  the  result.  But  creative  design 
is  not  obscured  on  these  accounts,  but  only  appears  the  more  subtle, 
powerful,  and  grand. 

The  case  is  sub.<tantially  the  same  with  respect  to  the  supernatural. 
The  doctrine  of  the  supernatural  was  pushed  to  extravagant  and 
absurd  lengths  in  uncivilized  ages,  it  ran  riot  and  set  itself  up  as  the 
universal  account  of  what  was  extraordinary  in  the  world  and  human 
life.  It  has  in  later  times  undergone  a  check,  and  been  expelled 
from  much  ground  which  it  had  unlawfully  occupied.  Natural 
causes  have  been  discovered  of  eccentric  phenomena  which  were  once 
attrilnited  universally  to  a  sui>ernatural  agency.  But  the  doctrine 
of  the  supernatural,  like  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  has  still  only 
been  educated,  and  not  superseded.  It  has  been  stripjjed  of  its 
monstrous  growth  and  enormities,  but  it  still  exists  in  the  reason 
of  man,  and  the  principle  has  not  been  shaken. 


LECTUEE    VIII. 

NOTE  1,  p.  165. 

*'This  important  circumstance,"  says  Dr.  Newman,  "must  be 
considered,  which  is  as  clear  as  it  is  decisive,  that  the  Fathers  speak 
of  miracles  as  having  in  one  sense  ceased  with  the  Apostolic  period ; 
— that  is,  (considering  they  elsewhere  speak  of  miracles  as  existing 
in  their  own  times,)  they  say  that  Afostolic  miracles,  or  miracles  like 
the  Apostles',  whether  in  their  object,  cogency,  impressiveness,  or 
character,  were  no  longer  of  occurrence  in  the  Church ;  an  interpre- 
tation which  they  themselves  in  some  passages  give  to  their  own 
words.     'Argue  not,' says  St.  Chrysostom, '  because  miracles  do  not 

happen  now,  that  they  did  not  happen  then In  those  times 

they  Avere  profitable,  and  noAV  they  are  not.'  He  proceeds  to  say 
that,  in  spite  of  this  difi'erence,  the  mode  of  conviction  was  sub- 
stantially the  same.  '  We  persuade  not  by  philosophical  reasonings, 
but  from  Divine  Scrijiturc,  and  we  recommend  what  Ave  say  by  the 
mirack'S  then  done.  And  then  they  persuaded  not  by  miracles  only, 
but  by  discussion.'  And  presently  he  adds,  'The  more  evident  and 
constraining  are  the  things  which  happen,  the  less  room  there  is  for 
faith.'  {Horn,  in  i  Cor.  vi.  2,  3.)  Again,  in  another  part  of  his 
works :  '  Why  are  there  not  those  now  who  raise  the  dead  and  per- 
form cures  ?  I  Avill  not  say  why  not ;  rather,  Avhy  are  there  not 
those  now  who  despise  the  present  life  ?  Why  serve  we  God  for 
hire  ?  When  however  nature  was  weak,  when  faith  had  to  be 
planted,  then  there  were  many  suchj  but  now  He  wills,  not  that 


VIII]  Note  I  295 

we  should   hanji;  on  these  miracles,  but  be  ready  i'or  death.'     (Horn. 
VIII.  in  Col.  s."5.) 

"  In  like  manner  St.  Augustine  introduces  his  catalogue  of  con- 
temporary miracles  by  stating  and  allowing  the  objection  that 
miracles  were  not  then  as  they  had  been.  '  Why,  say  they,  do  not 
these  miracles  take  place  now,  which,  as  you  preach  to  us,  took  place 
once  ?  I  might  answer  that  they  were  necessary  before  the  world 
believed,  that  it  might  believe.'  {Be  Civ.  Dei,  xxii.  8.)  He  then  goes 
on  to  say  that  miracles  were  wrought  in  his  time,  only  they  were  not 
so  public  and  well-attested  as  the  miracles  of  the  Gospel."  {Essay  on 
the  Miracles  of  the  Early  Ages,  p.  39.) 

The  confession  of  the  Fathers  that  miracles  had  ceased  in  their 
days,  while  at  the  same  time  they  allude  to  miracles  going  on  in 
their  day,  has  evidently  reference  to  the  Jcind  of  miracles  which  the 
current  marvels  of  their  own  day  were,  as  compared  with  the  body 
of  Gospel  miracles.  In  the  body  of  Gospel  miracles,  the  greater 
miracles,  as  they  are  called,  miracles  of  a  sublime  and  majestic  tyj^e 
indicative  of  a  supreme  dominion  over  nature,  occupy  a  prominent 
place ;  amid  the  current  miracles  of  the  Patristic  age  they  appear 
so  rarely,  and,  when  they  do  appear,  are  mentioned  with  so  little  of 
that  circumstance  and  particularity  which  constitute  a  condition  of 
truth  in  facts,  that  they  do  not  materially  affect  the  character  and 
rank  of  those  miracles  as  a  mass.  As  a  body  they  consist  of  exor- 
cisms, visions,  cures  in  answer  to  j)rayer ;  the  latter  in  the  fourth 
century  becoming  connected  with  the  memories  and  relics  of  j)ar- 
ticular  saints  and  martyi-s.  Irenaeus,  in  a  well-known  passage 
{Contra  Hcer.  ii,  31),  alludes  to  some  who  had  been  raised  to  lil'e 
again  by  the  prayers  of  the  Church — /lexo.  vqaTela^  iroWrjs  Kai  XiTaveias 
€wiiTTpe\l/€  TO  TTvev/jLa  rod  TereXenrr/Koros.  But  the  reference  is  SO  vague 
that  it  possesses  but  little  weight  as  testimony.  "  Irenaeus,"  observes 
Dr.  Hey,  "only  affirms  this  in  general  without  mentioning  any 
particular  instance,  and  it  is  somewhat  strange  that  no  instance  was 
ever  produced  in  the  three  first  centuries There  is  not  how- 
ever the  same  want  of  instances  with  regard  to  the  other  branches 
of  miracles  said  to  have  been  performed  in  the  Church,  namely, 
seeing  visions,  prophesying,  healing  diseases,  curing  demoniacs,  and 
some  others.'"'  {Kaye's  Tertullian,  p.  168.)  Neander  doubts  whether 
Irena3us  is  clear  in  his  o^v^l  mind  as  to  what  he  intended  to  assert 
here,  and  supposes  that  he  may  not  have  meant  by  the  death  from 
which  the  persons  had  been  raised  real  death,  but  only  some  form  of 
apparent  death  {Church  History,  sect,  i.),  but  at  any  rate  the  iudefinite- 
ness  of  the  reference  takes  away  all  accuracy  from  the  reported  fact. 
Professor  Blimt  attaches  somewhat  more  value  to  the  statement  of 


296  Note  I  [Lect. 

Irenoeus  than  either  Neander  or  Hey,  but  still  comments  on  the 
obvious  vagueness  and  indefiniteuess  of  it : — 

"In  these  instances  (exorcism  and  others)  he  uses  the  present 
tense,  Sai/xovas  iXavfovai,  Trpdyvucriv  ix°^'^'->  '''^^^  Kaixvovras  Iwurai,  ^ctp^c- 
jxara  i'xdvTuv,  TravTodairah  yXCoffffais  XaXovvTuv,  rd  Kpv<pia  twv  dvOpwiruv 
ft's  (pavepbv  aydvTuv.  But  when  the  miracle  of  raising  the  dead  is 
touched  on,  the  expressions  are  less  definite,  saipe  evenit  fieri,  ttoXXcikij, 
the  phrase  indefinite  as  to  time — 6  Kdpios,  oi  drrdcrToXoi,  ij  wdaa  (KK\r]<Tia, 
the  language  again  indefinite  as  to  agents — so  the  tense  in  these  cases 
is  no  longer  the  present,  but  the  aorist,  t6  nvevfia  rod  TereXevTTjKdros 
i-n-iaTpe\pe,  the  spirit  of  the  dead  returned — ixo-picBr),  he  was  granted 
to  the  prayers  of  the  saints — veKpol  i]yipdriffav  kclI  ■n-apip.ei.vav  aiiv  •rjp.tv, 
the  dead  have  been  raised  up,  and  have  continued  with  us.  There  is 
something  remaikable,  at  least,  in  the  change  of  tense,  something 
which,  when  coupled  with  the  looser  construction  of  the  sentences, 
would  lead  us  to  think  that  though  Irena^us  had  no  doubt'  of  the 
fact  of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  having  been  effected  by  the 
brethren,  he  had  not  witnessed  a  case  with  his  own  eyes."  {Blunt  on 
the  Early  Fathers,  p.  387.) 

Augustine  again,  long  after,  alludes  in  his  list  of  miracles  {De  Civ. 
Dei,  xxii.  8)  to  some  cases  in  which  persons  had  been  raised  to  life 
again  by  prayer  and  the  intercession  of  martyrs,  whose  relics  were 
applied.  But  though  Augustine  relates  Avith  great  particularity  and 
length  of  detail  some  cases  of  recoveries  from  complaints  in  answer 
to  prayer,  his  notices  of  the  cases  in  which  persons  had  been  raised 
to  life  again  are  so  short,  bare,  and  summary,  that  they  evidently 
represent  no  more  than  mere  report,  and  report  of  a  very  vague  kind. 
Indeed,  with  the  preface  which  he  prefixes  to  his  list,  he  cannot  be 
said  even  to  profess  to  guarantee  the  truth  or  accuracy  of  the  different 
instances  contained  in  it.  "  Haec  autem,  ubicunque  fiunt,  ibi  sciuntur 
vix  a  tota  ipsa  civitate  vel  quocunque  conimanentium  loco.  Nam 
plerumque  etiam  ibi  paucissimi  sciunt,  ignorantibus  cteteris,  maxima 
si  magna  sit  civitas;  et  quando  alibi  aliisque  narrantnr,  non  tantum 
ea  commendat  auctoritas,  ut  sine  difBcultate  vel  dubitatione  cre- 
dantur,  quamvis  Christianis  fidelibus  a  fidelibus  indicentur."  He 
puts  down  the  cases  as  he  received  them  then,  without  pledging 
himself  to  their  authenticity.  "  Eucharius  presbyter  ....  mortuus 
sic  jacebat  ut  ei  jam  pollices  ligarentur:  opitulatione  memorati 
martyris,  cimi  de  memoria  ejus  reportata  fuisset  et  super  jacentis 

corpus  missa  ipsius  presbyteri  tunica,  suscitatus  est Audurus 

nomen  est  fundi,  ubi  ecclesia  est  et  in  ea  memoria  Stejihani  martyris. 
Pucrum  ([ucndam  parvulum,  cum  in  area  luderct,  cxorl)itantes  boves 
qui  vehiculuni  tiahebant,  rota  obtriverunt,  et  confestim  palpitavit 


"VIII]  Note  I  297 

exspirans,  Hunc  mater  arreiitnm  ad  eandem  memoriam  posiiit ;  et 
non  solum  revixit,  venim  etiam  illa3siis  apparuit."  There  are  three 
other  cases  of  the  same  kind,  in  which  there  is  nothing  to  verify  the 
death  from  which  the  return  to  life  is  said  to  take  place,  as  being 
more  than  mere  suspension  of  the  vital  powers ;  hut  the  writer  does 
not  go  into  particulars  of  description  or  proof,  but  simply  inserts 
them  in  his  list  as  they  have  been  reported  to  him. 

The  comments  of  the  heathen  world  upon  the  miracle  of  our  Lord's 
Resurrection,  which  are  incidentally  alluded  to  in  the  Apologetic  and 
other  treatises  of  the  Fathers,  shew  how  completely  the  heathen  dis- 
tinguished between  their  o'wti  ciuTent  miraculous  pretensions  and  real 
and  undoubted  miracles,  where  they  had  the  opportunity  of  compar- 
ing the  two.  They  had  their  own  popular  and  established  super- 
naturalism,  which  they  professedly  respected  and  accepted  ;  their 
exorcisms,  their  rights  of  augury,  their  oracles,  their  miraculous 
cures,  which  were  registered  in  temples  ;  but  as  soon  as  a  miraculous 
fact  was  presented  to  them,  about  which  there  could  be  no  doubt  that 
it  was  miraculous,  they  exhibited  as  much  astonishment  and  incre- 
dulity as  if  they  only  pretended  to  believe  in  the  powers  of  nature 
and  the  order  of  nature.  That  a  man  should  rise  from  the  dead  was 
treated  by  them  as  an  absolutely  incredible  fact.  "  The  mystery  of 
the  Resurrection,"  says  Origen,  who  speaks  of  it  as  including  the 
miracle  of  Christ's  Resurrection,  which  he  has  just  mentioned,  "  is 
sjioken  of  by  the  unbelieving  with  ridicule" — QpvWe'irai  yeXcb/xevov 
vTTo  Tuiv  dwlaTuv.  (^Contra  Gels.  lib.  i.  s.  7.)  Celsus  j^laces  the  account 
of  our  Lord's  Resurrection  in  the  same  list  with  the  legendary  de- 
scents of  Zamolxis,  Rhampsinitus,  Orpheus,  Protesilaus,  Hercules, 
and  Theseus,  into  the  infernal  regions,  and  their  return  thence.  "  Has 
any  one,"  he  asks,  "  who  has  been  really  dead  ever  risen  again  ? " 
(lib.  ii.  s,  55.)  Celsus,  it  is  true,  did  not  profess  much  belief  in  cur- 
rent heathen  supernaturalism  ;  he  speaks  however  of  the  art  of  magic 
not  like  one  who  wholly  rejected  it,  excepting  philosophers  from  lia- 
bility to  the  magician's  influence,  just  as  Origen  excepted  devout 
Christians  from  the  same.  (lib.  vi.  s.  41.)  "Celsus,"  says  Neander, 
"  expresses  himself  as  though  he  considered  magic  to  be  an  art  pos- 
sessed of  a  certain  power,  though  held  by  him  in  no  gi-eat  account." 
(Ciiurch  History,  sect,  i.)  Ctecilius,  the  representative  of  heathenism 
in  the  "  Octavius"  of  Minutius  Felix,  professes  his  belief  in  the  rites 
of  augury,  in  heathen  prophecy,  and  in  various  heathen  mii-acles  ; 
but  he  declares  that  he  cannot  believe  that  any  one  has  ever  risen 
again  from  the  dead ;— "  Quis  unus  ullus  ab  inferis  remeavit  horarum 
ealtem  coimneatu?"  (c.  vii.  xi.)     The  heathen  Autolycus  challengea 


298  Notes  2,  3  [Lect. 

Thuopliilus  to  produce  an  instance  of  a  dead  man  rising  to  life  again. 
Augustine,  in  the  22nd  book  of  the  "  De  Civitate  Dei,"  devotes  him- 
self to  the  defence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  against  the 
notion  of  the  philosojAical  heathens  that  it  was  a  simple  impossi- 
bility ;  and  the  particular  resurrection  of  Christ  is  defended  against 
the  same  charge.  "  Sed  hoc  incredibile  fuit  aliquando  :  ecce  jam  cre- 
didit  mundus  subUitum  Christi  corpus  in  coclum,  resurrexionem 
carnis."  (c.  v.) 

NOTE  2,  p.  178. 

"  We  lay  out  of  the  case  siuli  stories  of  siq-iernatural  events  as  require 
on  the  part  of  the  hearer  nothing  more  than  an  otiose  assent ;  stories 
upon  which  nothing  depends,  in  which  no  interest  is  involved,  nothing  is 
to  be  done  or  changed  in  consequence  of  believing  them.  Such  stories  are 
credited,  if  the  careless  assent  that  is  given  to  them  deserve  that  name, 
more  by  the  indolence  of  the  hearer,  than  by  his  judgment  ;  or, 
though  not  much  credited,  are  passed  from  one  to  another  Anthout 
inquiry  or  resistance."  {Paley's  Evidences,  p.  131.) 


NOTE  3,  p.  180. 

"  One  of  the  saddest  portions  of  modern  controversy,"  says  Dr. 
Pusey,  "  is  the  thought  how  much  is  owing  to  forged  writings  ;  to 
Avliat  extent  the  prevailing  system  as  to  the  Blessed  Virgin  came  in 
upon  the  authority  of  writings  which  Roman  Catholic  critics  now  own 
to  have  been  wrongly  ascribed  to  the  great  Fathers  whose  names  they 
bear  ;  to  what  extent  the  present  relation  of  Rome  to  the  Eastern 

Church  and  to  ourselves  is  owing  to  the  forged  Decretals The 

forgery  of  the  Decretals  alter  they  had  '  jiassed  for  true  during  eight 
centuries'  was  owned  by  all,  even  by  the  Church  of  Rome.  But  the 
system  built  upon  that  forgery  abides  still."  {An  Eirenicon,  pp.  236, 
2550 

"  Up  to  this  period  the  Decretals,  the  letters  or  edicts  of  the 
Bishops  of  Rome,  according  to  the  authorized  or  common  collection 
of  Dionysius,  commenced  with  Pope  Siricius,  towards  the  close  of  the 
fourth  century.  To  the  collection  of  Dionysius  was  added  that  of 
the  authentic  councils,  which  bore  the  name  of  Isidore  of  Seville. 
On  a  sudden  was  ])roiuulgated,  unannounced,  without  preparation, 
not  absolutely  unquestioned,  but  apparently  overawing  at  once  all 
doubt,  a  new  code,  which  to  the  former  authentic  documents  added 
lifty-nine  letters  and  decrees  of  the  twenty  oldest  Popes  from  Clement 
to  Melchiades,  and  the  dimation  of  Constantine  ;  and  in  the  third 
part,  among  the  decrees  of  the  Popes  and  of  the  councils  from  Silves- 
ter to  Gregory  II.,  thirty-nine  false  decrees,  and  the  acts  of  several 


VI II]  Note  i^  299 

unauthentic  councils.  In  this  vast  manual  of  sacerdotal  Christianity 
the  Popes  appear  from  the  first  the  parents,  guardians,  legislators  of 

the  faith  throughout  the  whole  world The  author  or  autlicjrs 

of  this  most  audacious  and  elaliorate  of  pious  frauds  are  unknown  ; 
the  date  and  place  of  its  compilation  are  driven  into  such  narrow 
limits  that  they  may  be  determined  within  a  few  years,  and  within  a 
very  circumscriV)ed  region.  The  false  Decretals  came  not  from  Rome  ; 
the  time  of  their  arrival  at  Rome,  after  they  were  known  beyond  tlie 
Alps,  appears  almost  certain.  In  one  year  Nicholas  I.  is  apparently 
ignorant  of  their  existence,  the  next  he  speaks  of  them  with  full 
knowledge."     (Milman's  Latin  Christianity,  pp.  303,  305.) 

A  writer  in  the  Christian  Remembrancer,  April  1854,  has  investi- 
gated with  the  most  elaborate  care  and  most  penetrating  research  the 
miracle  of  the  "  House  of  Loretto."     He  concludes  : — 

"  It  is  a  fiction  that  has  exercised  and  is  still  exercising  enormous 

practical  inlluence  throughout  Western  Christendom It  has 

amassed  treasures  that  would  have  fed  almost  the  entire  poor  of 
Europe  for  their  lives.  It  has  extorted  homage  from  Erasmus,  from 
Descartes.  Into  it  has  been  introduced  the  purest  of  virgins  and 
holiest  of  mothers,  for  the  purpose  of  stamping  with  her  authority  the 
clumsiest  as  well  as  the  falsest  of  all  legends.  It  forms,  finally,  the 
sixth  Lection  of  a  special  office  set  forth  by  Papal  infallibility,  and  by 
no  means  obsolete,  in  which  Almighty  God  is  venerated  for  a  mira- 
culous exercise  of  His  power,  which,  according  to  the  framers  of  the 
story,  clearly  ought  to  have  been  exerted,  but  never  Avas  !  While  the 
seventh  Lection  consists  of  a  portion  of  the  first  chapter  of  St.  Luke's 
Gospel,  in  the  preceding  one — as  it  were  to  illustrate  the  contrast  be- 
tween light  and  darkness — what  follows  is  assumed  to  be  no  less 
trustwortliy. 

"'The  house  in  which  this  Virgin  was  born,  hallowed  by  the 
divine  mysteries,  and  snatched  by  the  ministry  of  angels  out  of  the 
hand  of  the  infidel,  was  translated  first  into  Dalmatia,  and  afterwards 
into  the  temtory  of  Loretto,  in  the  province  of  Picenum,  during  the 
Pontificate  of  the  holy  Celestine  V.  And  it  is  proved  to  be  the  very 
one  in  which  the  Word  was  made  Flesh  and  dwelt  amongst  us,  as 
well  by  papal  diplomas  and  the  abundant  veneration  of  the  whole 
world,  as  also  by  the  constant  power  of  miracles  and  the  grace  of 
heavenly  benefits.  Whereupon  Innocent  XII.,  moved  by  these 
things,  in  order  that  the  faithful  might  be  more  effectually  stirred  up, 
and  put  in  mind  of  the  worship  of  our  most  beloved  mother,  gave 
directions  to  celebrate  with  mass  and  office  appropriate,  the  transla- 
tion of  the  said  holy  house,  which  is  observed  throughout  the  whole 
province  of  Picenum  with  anniversary  solemnity.' 

"  What  a  train  of  melancholy  reflections  is  thus  afforded  by  Decem- 
ber loth  !  The  largest  portion  of  Christendom  by  far  insisting  upon 
Papal  infallibility  as  a  vital  principle  ;  Papal  infalUljility  thus  so- 
lemnly pledged  to  an  untruth  !  " 


300  Notes  4,  5  [Lect. 


NOTE  4,  p.  1 8 1. 

"  Solas  pro  sanctitate  virtutes  exposcere  videtur  S.  Joannes  Chry- 
sostomus  in  inscript.  adorum  (pag.  64,  02}er.  torn.  3);  Actio  quidem 
bona  etiam,  sine  siijnis  eos,  a  quibux  peracta  fuerit,  introducit  in  cmlum. 
Miraculum  autem  et  signum  absque  conversatione  deducere  ad  vestibula 
ilia  nonpossunt:  quod  ipsum  latins  proseciuitur  Anastasius  Episcopus 
Nicsenus,  qui  vLxit  post  Concilium  Trullanum  (teste  Cardinali  Bellar- 
mino  de  Scriptoribus  Ecclesiasticis)  in  opere  cui  titulus,  De  qiicestionibus 
in  sacram  Hcripturam,  qu.  23.  torn.  i.  Biblioth.  Fatruin,  ubi  ait  :  Non 
oportet  autem  ant  virum  orthodoxum  ex  signis,  aut  Pro2)hetam  dijudicare, 
quod  sit  sanctns ;  sed  ex  eo  quod  vitam  recte  instituit,  £c.  Quoniam 
ergo,  ut  ostensum  est,  a  peccatorihus  et  incredulis  smpe  fiunt  signa  et  pro- 
pheticB  per  quamdam  dispensationem,  non  oportet  de  cetero  ex  rebus  ejiis- 
modi  dijudicare  quempiam,  ut  sit  sanctus ;  sed  ex  eorum  fructibus,  ut 
dicit  Dominus,  cognoscetis  eos.  Fructus  veri  et  spiritalis  viriostendit 
etiam  Apostolus  dicens ;  Fructus  autem  spiritus  est  charitas,  gaudium, 
pax.  Fides,  Mansuetudo,  continentia.  Supra  A'idimus,  13.  Petrum 
Damiani  nulla  in  liistoria  \itsc  S.  Dominici  Loricati  miracula  nar- 
rasse,  et  respondisse,  id  mirum  esse  non  deliere,  cum  nee  legatur, 
ullum  factum  fuisse  miraculum  a  Beatissima  Virgine  Maria,  nee  a  S. 
Joanne  Baptista.  Callisto  II.  summo  Pontifici  miracula  requirenti 
pro  Canonizatione  S.  Conradi  Episcoj^i  Constantiensis  Ulricus  ejus- 
dem  Ecclesiai  Ejjiscopus  ita  respondit  {apud  Pistorium  Script,  rer. 
Germ.  torn.  3.  j)-  638) ;  Operam  dedi,  ex  Patrum  schedulis,  hujus  Viri 
dignissimam  Deo  conversationem  potius,  quam  miracula,  qua;  nonnum- 
quam  reprobis  cum  Sanctis  communia  sunt,  contmentibus,  sequens  opus- 
culum  colligere,  vestrmque  siMimitati  examinandum  dirigere 

"  At,  his  minime  obstantibus,  de  necessitate  turn  virtutum,  aut 
martyrii,  tum  miraculorum  in  causis  Beatificationis  et  Canonizationis 
nulla  rationabilis  duliitatio  esse  potest,  uti  sscpe  in  hujus  operis  de- 

cursu  a  nobis   dictum  est Ad  persuadendam   miraculorum 

necessitatem  in  causis  Beatificationis  et  Canonizationis  satis  superque 
esset  asserere,  inconcussam  semper  fuisse'  et  esse  Apostolical  sedis 
praxim  miracula  in  his  causis  requirendi."  {Benedict  XIV.,  Opera,  lib. 
iv.  pars  Hi.  c.  5.  §§  2,  4.) 


NOTE  5,  p.  182. 

It  is  disputed  when  ecclesiastical  miracles  begin.  Dr.  Hey  denies 
that  the  Apostolical  Fathers  make  any  allusions  to  themselves  working 
mh-acles : — 

"  For  fifty  years  after  the  ascension  of  Christ,  none  of  the  Fathers 
made  any  pretensions  to  the  possession  of  miraculous  powers.  We 
have  already  spoken,  in  a  former  Lecture,  of  those  Fathers  who  are 


VIII] 


Note 


301 


called  the  Apostolic,  of  Ignatius,  Polycarp,  Barnabas,  Hernias  ;  now 
it  is  an  historical  truth  not  to  be  omitted,  that  not  one  of  those  pious 
men,  though  they  were  the  principal  governors  of  the  Cliurcli,  and  the 
immediate  successors  of  the  Apostles  in  that  government  (us  -well  as 
their  companions  and  friends),  ever  speaks  of  himself  as  capal)le  of 
counteracting  the  ordinary  powers  of  nature ;  they  all  endeavour  to 
inculcate  the  morality  and  religion  of  the  Gospel,  but  tliat  merely  as 
men,  possessed  indeed  of  the  sense  and  meaning  of  the  sacred  writers, 

but  entirely  void  of  theii-  extraordinary  power I  only  affirni, 

however,  that  none  of  the  AjDostolic  Fathers  sjieaks  of  himself  as  en- 
dued with  a  power  of  working  miracles  ;  we  must  not  absolutely  say 
that  no  miracles  have  ever  been  said  to  be  wrought  about  the  time 
they  lived  :  because  there  is  a  very  celebrated  letter  extant  Irom 
the  Church  of  Smyrna,  giving  an  account  of  the  martyrdom  of  Poly- 
carp, which  is  said  to  have  been  attended  with  circmustances  suffi- 
ciently miraculous."     (Kaye's  TertuUian,  p.  165.) 

Professor  Blunt  decides  that  they  allude  to  miracles  as  going  on  in 
the  Church : — 

"  It  has  been  disputed  whether  the  Apostolical  Fathers,  properly  so 
called,  speak  of  contemporary  miracles  at  all.  Considering  how  short 
are  their  works,  and  the  practical  purpose  for  which  most  of  them  are 
written,  the  absence  of  all  allusion  to  miracles  in  them  would  2:)rove 
little  or  nothing,  and  might  w"ell  be  accidental.  Such  an  expression, 
however,  as  that  of  Clemens  Romanus,  that  there  was  in  the  Church  of 
Corinth  '  a  j^lentiful  outpouring  of  the  Holy  Ghost  upon  all,'  (ttXtj/jtjs 
Jlph'/jLaToi  'Ayiov  ^kx'-'O'i-s  eirl  iravras  eyivero) — or  that  of  Ignatius,  ad- 
dressed to  the  Church  of  Smyrna,  '  that  it  was  mercifully  Idest  with 
every  good  gift,'  (ev  iravrl  xapicr/j-ari),  '  that  it  was  wanting  in  no  good 
gift,'  {avvdrepriTos  oPcra  iravToi  x°-P''-'^l^^'''°^) — such  phraseology,  I  say, 
being  compared  with  times  both  before  and  after,  when  it  undoubt- 
edly had  miraculous  as  well  as  other  gifts  in  contemjJation,  would 
lead  us  to  think,  I  agree  with  Dodwell,  that  Clemens  and  Ignatius 
did  not  exclude  such  gifts  from  their  account."  {Blunt  on  the  Early 
Fathers,  lect.  vi.) 

Bishop  Kaye  states  his  view  of  the  early  Church  miracles  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage : — 

"  The  supposition  that  miraculous  powers  were  gradually  withdrawn 
from  the  Church,  appears  in  a  great  measiu-e  to  account  for  the  uncer- 
tainty which  has  prevailed  respecting  the  period  of  their  cessation. 
To  adopt  the  language  of  undoubting  confidence  on  such  a  subject 
would  be  a  mark  no  less  of  folly  than  presumption ;  but  I  may  be 
allowed  to  state  the  conclusion  to  which  I  have  myself  been  led  by 
a  comparison  of  the  statements  in  the  Book  of  Acts  with  the  writings 
of  the  Fathers  of  the  second  century.  My  conclusion  then  is,  that  the 
power  of  working  miracles  was  not  extended  beyond  the  disciples, 
upon  whom  the  Apostles  conferred  it  by  the  imjjosition  of  their  hands. 
As  the  number  of  those  disciples  gradually  diminislied,  the  instances 
of  the  exercises  of  miraculous  poAvers  became  continually  less  fi-eq^uent, 


2,02  Note  5  [Lect. 

and  ceased  entirely  at  the  death  of  the  last  individual  on  -wliom  the 
liands  of  the  Apostles  had  been  laid.  That  event  wmdd,  in  the  natu- 
ral course  of  things,  take  place  before  the  middle  of  the  second  cen- 
tury,— at  a  time  when,  Christianity  having  ol>tained  a  looting  in  all 
the  provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire,  the  miraculous  gifts  conferred 
upon  its  fii-st  teachers  had  perfonued  their  appropriate  office, — that  of 
pi'oving  to  the  world  that  a  New  Revelation  had  been  given  from 
heaven.  What  then  woiUd  be  the  effect  produced  upon  the  minds  of 
the  great  body  of  Christians  by  their  gradual  cessation  ?  ]\Iany  would 
not  observe,  none  would  be  willing  to  observe  it;  for  all  must  natu- 
rally feel  a  reluctance  to  believe  that  powers  which  had  contributed 
so  essentially  to  the  rapid  diffusion  of  Christianity  were  withdrawn. 
They  who  remarked  the  cessation  of  miracles  would  probably  succeed 
in  persuading  themselves  that  it  was  only  temporary,  and  designed 
by  an  all-wise  Providence  to  be  the  prelude  to  a  more  al)un<lant  effu- 
sion of  supernatural  gifts  upon  the  Church.  Or  if  doubts  and  mis- 
givings crossed  tiieir  minds,  they  would  still  be  unwilling  o]ienly  to 
state  a  fact  which  might  shake  the  steadfastness  of  their  friends,  and 
would  certainly  be  urged  by  the  enemies  of  the  Gospel  as  an  argu- 
ment against  its  Divine  origin.  They  would  pursue  the  i)lan  which 
has  been  pursued  by  Justin  Martyr,  Theophilus,  Irenaius,  &c.  ;  they 
would  have  recourse  to  general  assertions  of  the  existence  of  super- 
natural powers,  without  attempting  to  produce  a  specific  instance  of 

their  exercise Let  me  repeat,  that  I  ofi'er  these  observations 

with  that  diffidence  in  my  own  conclusions  which  ought  to  be  the 
predominant  feeling  in  the  mind  of  every  inquirer  into  the  ways  of 
Providence.  I  collect  from  passages  already  cited  from  the  Book  of 
Acts,  that  the  power  of  working  miracles  was  conferred  by  the  hands 
of  the  Apostles  only ;  and  consequently  ceased  with  the  last  discijile 
on  whom  their  hands  were  laid.  I  perceive  in  the  lanrjuage  of  the 
Fathers,  who  lived  in  the  middle  and  end  of  the  second  century, 
when  speaking  on  this  subject,  something  which  betrays,  if  not  a  con- 
viction, at  least  a  suspicion,  that  the  power  of  w'orking  miracles  was 
withdrawn,  combined  with  an  anxiety  to  keep  up  a  belief  of  its  con- 
tinuance in  the  Church.  They  affirm  in  general  terms  that  miracles 
were  jjerformed,  but  rarely  venture  to  produce  an  instance  of  a  parti- 
cular miracle.  Those  who  followed  them  were  less  scrupulous,  and 
proceeded  to  invent  miracles;  very  different  indeed  in  circumstances 
and  character  from  the  miracles  of  the  Gospel,  yet  readily  believed  by 
men  wdio  were  not  disposed  nicely  to  examine  into  the  evidence  of 
facts  which  they  wished  to  be  true.  The  success  of  the  first  attempts 
naturally  encouraged  others  to  practise  similar  impositions  upon  the 
credulity  of  mankind.  In  every  succeeding  age  miracles  multiplied 
in  nund'jer  and  increased  in  extravagance;  till  at  length,  by  their  fre- 
quency, they  lost  all  title  to  the  name,  since  they  could  no  longer  be 
considered  as  deviations  from  the  ordinary  course  of  nature."  {Kaye's 
Tertullian,  pp.  98  et  seq.) 

Upon  the  question  of  the  continuance  of  miraculous  powers  in  the 
Church  our  earlier  divines  decline  to  draw  any  precise  line,  and  are 


VIII]  Note  5  303 

favourable  to  an  indefinite  prolongation  of  their  existence  in  the 
Church.     Thus  Jackson  : — 

"  Generally,  miracles  were  usual  in  the  infancy  of  Cliristianity,  as 
we  read  in  ecclesiastical  stories ;  nor  can  it  be  certainly  <,'atlu'red 
when  they  did  certainly  cease.  To  say  they  endured  no  longer  than 
the  primitive  Church  can  give  no  universal  satisfaction,  save  only  to 
such  as  think  it  enough  for  all  the  world  to  have  the  light  of  the 
Gospel  locked  up  in  the  chancel  of  some  one  glorious  church :  for 
some  churches  were  but  in  the  prime  or  change,  when  others  were 
full  of  Christian  knowledge.  The  use  of  miracles  at  the  same  instant 
was  befitting  the  one,  not  the  other.  For  God  usually  speaks  to  new- 
born children  in  Christ  by  miracles  or  sensible  declarations  of  His 
])0\ver,  mercy,  or  justice  :  as  parents  deter  their  children  from  evil  in 
tender  j'ears  by  the  rod,  or  other  sensible  signs  of  their  dis2)leasure ; 
and  allure  them  to  goodness  Avith  apples,  or  other  like  visible  pledges 
of  their  love :  but  when  they  come  to  riper  years,  and  are  capable  of 
discourse,  or  apprehensive  of  wholesome  admonitions,  they  seek  to 
rule  them  by  reason.  Proportionably  to  this  course  of  parents  doth 
God  speak  to  His  Church :  in  her  infancy  (wheresoever  planted),  by 
sensible  documents  of  His  power ;  in  her  maturity,  by  the  ordinary 
]>reaching  of  His  word,  which  is  more  apt  to  ripen  and  confirm  true 
Christian  faith  than  any  miracles  are,  so  men  would  submit  their 
reason  xmto  the  rules  set  down  in  Scripture,  and  unjmrtially  examine 
all  events  of  time  by  them,  as  elsewhere,  God  willing,  we  shall  show. 

"  These  grounds,  well  considered,  will  move  any  sober  spirit  at  the 
least  to  suspend  his  assent,  and  not  sufter  his  mind  to  be  hastily  over- 
swayed  with  absolute  distrust  of  all  such  miracles,  as  either  our 
writers  report  to  have  been  wrought  in  this  our  land  at  the  Saxons' 
first  coming  hither,  or  the  French  historiographers  recoiil  in  the  first 
conversion  of  the  Franks,  or  in  the  i^rime  of  that  Church."  [Jackson's 
Comments  on  the  Creed,  bk.  i.  ch.  13.) 

Professor  Blunt  dissents  from  Bishop  Kaye's  position  res^aecting  the 
early  Church  miracles : — 

"  Though  the  Bishop  of  Lincoln's  theory  is  one  which  is  well  cal- 
culated to  reconcile  a  sceptical  age  to  the  accejjtance  of  ecclesiastical 
miracles  in  a  degree,  and  though  I  have  sometimes  felt  inclined  to 
adopt  it  myself,  yet  on  further  reading  and  further  examination  of 
the  subject,  I  am  led  to  doubt  if  the  testimony  of  the  Fathers  can  be 
squared  to  it,  if  it  can  satisfy  the  conditions  of  the  case."  {On  the 
Early  Fathers,  p.  406.) 

AVarburton  admits  some  special  miracles,  rejects  the  great  body, 
especially  those  of  later  times,  and  for  the  rest  adopts  the  position  of 
a  suspense  of  judgment: — 

"  Not  that  it  is  my  purpose  positively  to  brand  as  false  every  pre- 
tended miracle  recorded  in  ecclesiastical  and  civil  history,  which  wants 


304  Note  5 

this  favourable  capacity  of  being  reduced  to  one  or  other  of  the  species 
explained  above.  All  that  I  contend  for  is,  that  those  miracles,  still 
remaining  unsupported  by  the  nature  of  that  evidence  which  I  have 
shown  ought  to  force  conviction  from  every  reasonable  mind,  should 
be  at  present  excluded  from  the  privilege  of  that  conviction. 

"  Indeed  the  greater  ])art  may  be  safely  given  up.  Of  the  rest, 
which  yet  stand  undiscredited  by  any  considerable  marks  of  impos- 
ture, we  may  safely  susjiend  our  belief,  till  time  hath  aflbrded  further 
lights  to  direct  o^^r  judgment."    {Divine  Legation,  bk.  ix.  ch.  5.) 


MUm  AND  PATERSON,  PRINTERS,  EDINBURGH. 


Date  Due 

. 

'^       '    ',:'^' 

~j  . 

^4^1^ 

iiifi..a^riMMi 

0m 

PHa^VprxTw  n 

$) 

BS2419.M939 

Eight  lectures  on  miracles  preached 

Princeton  Theological  Seminary-Speer  Library 


1    1012  00072  9436 


